In November 2016, the government and FARC rebels signed an agreement ending five decades of guerrilla war, yet peace remains elusive as new armed groups have stepped in to compete for territory and illicit businesses. To defend the gains of the peace process and stop a new cycle of conflict from taking hold, the state must redress the inequality underlying social discontent, make peace with Colombia’s last major insurgency, the ELN, and design security strategies that put protecting people first. Crisis Group has worked on Colombia’s conflicts since 2002, publishing over 40 reports and briefings and meeting hundreds of times with all parties in support of inclusive peace efforts. We monitor the FARC deal’s progress and carry out field research on issues ranging from new patterns of armed conflict to Colombia’s relations with its troubled neighbour, Venezuela.
As part of the 2016 peace deal, the Colombian government promised support to ex-combatants as they re-entered civilian society. Reintegration camps were supposed to aid in this process. As Crisis Group expert Glaeldys González reports, support has fallen short, especially for ex-combatants with disabilities.
FARC-EMC splinters continued to escalate attacks along Pacific Coast as peace talks with ELN remained in disarray; govt opened negotiations with FARC dissident group Segunda Marquetalia.
Hostilities between military and FARC-EMC splinters intensified. Splinter groups of dissident FARC faction known as EMC stepped up attacks along Pacific Coast, targeting police stations, launching car bombs and improvised explosives, and striking buildings with armed drones. Apparent EMC splinter members 16 June shot at car transporting father and nephew of VP Francia Márquez in Jamundí town, Valle de Cauca department. President Petro 8 June ruled out any peace process with splinters amid violent attacks, saying “the order is to neutralise EMC” in Cauca department. Next round of dialogue with EMC factions still at negotiating table, led by alias Calarcá, is set tentatively for early July; sides 14 June inaugurated commission in Meta, aimed at stimulating rural development in areas of department under Calarcá’s control.
ELN statement following group’s VI Congress contained few surprises. National Liberation Army (ELN) held its VI Congress in secret, 17 June released statement largely reiterating insurgency’s longstanding talking points. Communiqué said it will continue peace talks, while blaming current crisis in negotiations on alleged govt non-compliance; it also failed to clarify key public concerns, including whether group will continue kidnapping for ransom and if it is contemplating laying down arms. Group voiced support for Constituent Assembly, controversial idea floated by Petro in order to enact constitutional reforms.
Govt opened talks with Segunda Marquetalia. Talks between govt and dissident FARC faction Segunda Marquetalia, which wields significant territorial control along border with Ecuador, 24-29 June took place in Venezuelan capital Caracas. Negotiations focused on conflict de-escalation and improving conditions for civilians; importantly, Segunda Marquetalia agreed to share coordinates of its troops to avoid armed confrontations. Legal uncertainty clouds process, however, as many in leadership are former signatories to 2016 peace accord who subsequently returned to arms.
In other important developments. U.S. court 10 June ordered Chiquita Brands International to pay $38.3mn in compensation to families of eight victims assassinated by paramilitary groups in Colombia in early 2000s. Congress 14 June passed govt’s pension reform.
The closer an armed group is to the population [in Colombia], the harder it is to move toward peace, because they are ever more a part of society.
The trend of violence against ex-combatants [in Colombia] is a strong deterrent to disarmament.
Violence in Colombia has long come from combats between illegal groups, and from the pressure they exert on civilians.
State presence [in Panama] overly focuses on border control and does not prioritise the protection of migrants.
The ELN [in Colombia] has made very clear they have no intention of ceasing their economic activities which includes kidnapping.
By the time the Colombian state signed a peace accord with the former FARC rebels [in 2016], kidnapping nearly disappeared … But in recent years that trend has reversed.
On the Horizon sounds the alarm about conflicts and crises that may emerge over the next three to six months. It identifies key actors and dates to watch in support of global conflict prevention efforts.
In this video, Crisis Group's Senior Analyst for Colombia Elizabeth Dickinson talks with communities living in areas with a strong presence of the Gaitanista Self-Defence Force.
The Gaitanistas, Colombia’s largest and richest armed and criminal group, remain outside the government’s initiative for dialogue with all the country’s armed organisations. To avoid jeopardising other peace processes and to protect civilians, Bogotá should seek gradual talks with the Gaitanistas, while maintaining security pressure.
Organised crime has infiltrated the Amazon basin, seeking land for growing coca, rivers for drug trafficking and veins of gold underground. These groups are endangering the rainforest and the safety of those attempting to defend it. It is imperative that regional governments take protective measures.
In this video, personal narratives from migrants, smugglers, and locals shed light on the perilous journey through the Darién Gap, a treacherous migration route between Central and South America marked by criminal control.
Migrants from far and wide are trekking northward through the Darién Gap, a dense jungle where they face dangers including criminal predation. Steps to improve law enforcement, ease crises in countries of origin and provide more humanitarian aid would push policy in the right direction.
Despite peace talks between the government and armed groups, levels of violence in Colombia remain high. In this excerpt from the Watch List 2023 – Autumn Update, Crisis Group outlines how the EU can promote negotiations and encourage inclusiveness therein.
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