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Burkina Faso
Our monthly conflict tracker highlights five conflict risks in July.
CrisisWatch identified six deteriorations in June. Notably:
Aside from the scores of conflict situations we regularly assess, we tracked significant developments in: Bolivia, Cuba, Gabon, Honduras, Madagascar, Moldova, New Caledonia and South Africa.
What happened in June? In what could amount to the deadliest attack on the army since anti-jihadist operations began in 2015, the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) reportedly killed on 11 June over 100 soldiers in an attack on a military base in Mansila town, Yagha province, Sahel region. The following day, artillery fire hit state television headquarters near the presidential residence in the capital Ouagadougou. Although President Ibrahim Traoré said a soldier had accidentally mishandled a weapon, unconfirmed rumours swirled that the Mansila attack had provoked an army mutiny. Attacks by security forces and jihadists causing mass civilian casualties continued.
Why does it matter? The 11 June attack and rumours of growing discontent within the armed forces serve as a stark reminder of Traoré’s inability to halt jihadist violence and stop Burkina Faso’s downward spiral. While the military government publicly insists that it is restoring security, the massacre at Mansila, as with other deadly attacks against the army in the weeks before, illustrates that it has thus far been unable to do so. The attack has exposed and fuelled divisions within the military, leading to speculation of threats to the regime’s grip on power. Caught between jihadists and security forces, civilians are meanwhile paying a heavy price.
What to watch in the coming weeks and months? The government’s security failures could threaten its survival. Long-standing divisions within the military are likely to become more prominent, and reports of budget shortages could mean that parts of the security forces are not being paid. President Traoré may increasingly rely on outside support from Africa Corps and Sahelian allies, especially Mali and Niger, to stay in power. Still, if the security situation continues to deteriorate at its current pace, a power struggle could erupt within the military, and lead to Traoré’s ouster. A leadership vacuum could benefit jihadist groups and worsen an already catastrophic humanitarian crisis.
As they struggle to get a grip on security, the authorities are likely to continue their heavy-handed crackdown on dissent. They have banned almost all foreign broadcasters and blocked their websites for reporting on human rights groups’ allegations that the security forces are responsible for slaughtering civilians. Some local media have also been banned. Critics of the military regime have been forcibly conscripted or disappeared. Repression will likely increase as the junta tries to bury reports of jihadist attacks on soldiers like the Mansila massacre. The recent extension of a general mobilisation decree means the government will continue to rely on forced conscription to suppress any critical voices.
Meantime, villagers across the country – especially in the Est, Centre-Est, Sahel, Centre-Nord, Nord, Boucle du Mouhoun regions – find themselves trapped between jihadist groups and security forces, both of which often use indiscriminate violence. Widespread displacement – with at least two million currently on the move – is unlikely to end soon as civilians fear returning to areas recently recaptured by the government for fear of persistent insecurity and as jihadists maintain a blockade on dozens of towns.
What should be done? Recognising that it will need popular support to defeat the jihadists, the government should place a much higher emphasis on protecting communities and curbing abuse within its ranks.
Western partners should continue to engage with the military regime in Ouagadougou in non-security sectors, particularly promoting social cohesion and community dialogue as part of an effort to convince the authorities of the utility of non-military solutions to insecurity. To ensure that massacres of civilians are not forgotten or silenced by state-controlled media, Western partners should also make public statements whenever large-scale massacres are committed by one of the parties to the conflict.
Western partners should also continue to help humanitarian actors and relevant ministries provide humanitarian assistance to populations in need, notably internally displaced people, that are an estimated 10 per cent of a total population of 22 million.
Amid continued political tensions, govt clamped down on press while security forces’ abuses remained prevalent.
Political tensions remained high ahead of 2025 legislative elections. As electoral commission continued preparations for polls, opposition Frodebu party – primarily ethnic Hutu party that held power briefly in 1993 – 2 June held meeting in capital Gitega; conference’s combative tone toward govt suggested party may attempt to compete strongly in next year’s polls, despite widespread political repression. Meanwhile, Supreme Court 27 June upheld life sentence of former PM Bunyoni on several charges including attempting to overthrow govt, amid reports authorities may fear his continued influence.
Govt escalated media intimidation and harassment. Political reporter for independent Iwacu outlet 4 June reported he escaped attempted arrest by two policemen in largest city Bujumbura; Iwacu 6 June said it had received warning from press regulator against breaching media guidelines after series of critical articles including on economy. Regulator 11-12 June also prohibited rebroadcast of radio debate featuring opposition leader Agathon Rwasa that focussed on national budget. Human rights group Ligue Iteka 14 June called on govt to stop harassment and intimidation of press and journalists.
Alleged abuses by security forces remained widespread. Targeting of those linked to opposition figure Rwasa continued to cause concern after series of late May arrests and beatings by police and ruling-party youth wing Imbonerakure of Rwasa supporters in Cankuzo, Rutana and Ruyigi provinces.
In other important developments. Amid economic crisis and worsening fuel and power supply, govt 13 June passed two-year budget that observers saw as overly optimistic; National Assembly president same day threatened to reprimand MPs commenting on current crisis. Leaked UN report early June alleged Rwanda has increased backing to RED-Tabara rebel group, in line with govt’s allegations. SOS Media Burundi 25 June reported military court in Rutana 18-22 June imprisoned or fined hundreds of soldiers for allegedly refusing to fight M23 rebels alongside Congolese army in eastern DRC.
Instability remained widespread in North West (NW) and South West (SW) regions as Anglophone crisis continued, attracting increasing domestic and international attention.
Govt and Ambazonia rebels continued to clash. Separatists 5 June ambushed and killed municipal councilor in Zhoa commune, Menchum division (NW). Combined militias under Ambazonia Peoples Liberation Council 8 June ambushed army patrol between Muyuka and Kumba towns, with unspecified casualties. Clashes between govt forces and separatists 14-18 June in Ekondo-Titi, Mundemba and Isangele areas in Ndian division (SW) caused unknown casualties. Gunmen 17 June attacked checkpoint at entrance to Buea city (SW) killing at least one civilian. Conflict took increasing toll on taxi drivers; separatists banned taxis in Bamenda city (NW), burning down at least seven vehicles during standoff partly in response to govt’s 31 May suspension of night-time circulation of motorcycles to limit gunmen’s movements. Some drivers and bike riders in Bamenda 21 June protested against separatist violence. Meanwhile, amid confusion over one separatist faction’s call for all yellow taxis in Anglophone areas to switch to blue and white colours of Ambazonia flag, bitter wrangling erupted, with many faction leaders condemning policy and violence against taxis.
International actors sounded alarm over Cameroon’s conflicts. NGO Norwegian Refugee Council 4 June ranked Cameroon’s displacement crisis second most neglected worldwide, highlighting prolonged Anglophone conflict and jihadist insurgency in Far North (see below). At UN Security Council briefing 10 June, Russia and Japan expressed concern at violence in NW and SW, France called on parties to Anglophone crisis to pursue dialogue while South Korea called for Cameroonian-led conflict resolution initiative in Anglophone regions.
Jihadist violence persisted in Far North. Multinational Joint Task Force continued Operation Lake Sanity to reclaim territory. In Mayo-Sava division, insurgents 6 June killed one soldier near Mora town, while troops 15 June killed two Boko Haram combatants in Amchide town. In Mayo-Tsanaga division, militants 12 June clashed with national army in Koza town, leaving one dead on each side, and soldiers 13-14 June arrested 12 Boko Haram fighters in Moskota town. Islamic State West Africa Province fighters 17 June abducted local head of fishermen’s association in Chahack area, Logone-et-Chari division.
Govt continued campaigns against rebels and strengthened its political hand ahead of local elections; foreign nationals faced repression.
Large-scale offensives against rebels continued. Govt, supported by Russian paramilitary Africa Corps (previously Wagner Group) and ethnic Azandé militia, continued operations that began late May against Fulani-led Unity for Peace in Central African Republic (UPC) in Haut-Mbomou prefecture; army drove UPC from area it had controlled for five years, captured two key leaders and by 8 June seized approximately 100 weapons and disarmed 80 UPC soldiers. Offensive raised concerns over increased insecurity in Haut-Mbomou as UPC fighters crossed into neighbouring DR Congo – potentially reorganising for counterattack – and of possible targeting of Fulani and Muslim civilians accused of backing rebels. Civilians suffered collateral damage from other govt-rebel conflicts. In Haute-Kotto prefecture, Coalition of Patriots for Change rebels 2 June burned houses in three villages in Ouadda sub-prefecture, forcing residents to flee after accusing them of supporting army. Meanwhile, 115 anti-Balaka militia fighters 22 June voluntarily disarmed in Kouango town, Ouaka prefecture, amid army-Russian paramilitary deployment.
Political tensions continued as govt pursued manoeuvres to solidify control. Discontent remained high in some areas like Haut-Ubangi region, where opposition enjoys support, after President Touadéra 30 May bypassed constitutional requirement to hold elections for regional governors, citing electoral commission’s financial difficulties, and appointed them directly. Opposition alliance 13 June reiterated it would boycott municipal elections due in Oct; earlier, French Ambassador to Bangui 6 June urged participation, warning of risk of permanent exclusion from political landscape, causing discontent within opposition. UN electoral adviser 4-14 June led delegation to capital Bangui to assess preparations.
Amid Russian influence, foreign nationals faced repression. Court 21 June charged Belgian-Portuguese national working for American NGO with six crimes, including terrorism, following his May arrest in Zemio town, Haut-Mbomou, reportedly ordered by Russian paramilitaries. Authorities 10 June arrested two French-Algerian nationals in Bangui as prosecutors charged them with mercenary activities; Russian propaganda networks widely broadcasted arrest. Civil society platform led by pro-Russian figure following day organised demonstration attended by around 100 in capital to condemn foreign interference and express solidarity with army.
Ruling party stepped up opposition repression following May presidential election win; govt maintained delicate balancing act with international partners.
Internal party divisions escalated as repression of opposition figures intensified. Despite election win last month, tensions within ruling-Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS) erupted amid strains of competition for govt positions; notably, physical confrontation between MPS Secretary General and party member 7 June resulted in injuries to latter. Meanwhile, concerns over domestic and international repression of opposition continued after France-based activist Charfadine Galmaye Salimi 30 May accused National Security Agency head and deputy of plotting to assassinate him in France. Police 3 June violently repressed student protest in capital N’Djamena’s ninth district, injuring at least 12 students.
Govt directed army to deploy to tackle rising crime. President Déby 18 June ordered exceptional national army deployment to address rising crime in interior following attacks by road-blocking bandits on traders in Salamat province, including 2 June near Am-Timam town that killed one and 8 June in Haraze-Mangueigne division that killed another, prompting local outcry. Meanwhile, assailants 12 June attacked Toumbao village, Logone Oriental province, killing five civilians, injuring seven and stealing 500 cattle.
Govt deepened relations with Russia, but also defended ties with West. Russian FM Lavrov 5 June visited N’Djamena, marking further step in strengthening bilateral ties following Déby’s Jan visit to Russian capital Moscow; Lavrov praised bilateral cooperation and encouraged Chad’s support for Russia in conflict in Ukraine. Despite growing Russian influence and ongoing anti-Western rhetoric by some regime figures, govt continued to support traditional allies; authorities 7 June banned peaceful march by Revolutionary Movement for Democracy and Peace group against French presence while PM Halina 13 June reaffirmed commitment to historic Western allies but emphasised country’s right to engage with new security partners during presentation of govt program to National Assembly.
In another important development. Govt 20 June announced that fire 18-19 June engulfed military ammunition depot in N’Djamena, resulting in nine deaths and dozens of injuries.
Islamic State-linked group sharply escalated attacks, killing hundreds in east; M23 rebels continued advance, new govt appointed amid political tensions.
Jihadist violence surged in Beni and Lubero territories in North Kivu province. Islamic State-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) intensified attacks with series of deadly assaults. Group 4-7 June reportedly killed close to 100 civilians in several villages in Baswagha-Madiwe locality, Beni territory; ADF 12-13 June extended attacks to Lubero territory, further south than usual area, killing at least 40 civilians in Maikengo village. Civil society groups 15 June said militants may have killed at least 200 in previous month in Beni and Lubero. Violence also continued in neighbouring Ituri province. In Mambasa territory, ADF 11 June attacked Masongo town, killing six civilians. In Djugu territory, ethnic Lendu militia CODECO 20 June killed 25 civilians in Bianda village and same day killed at least 36 in Lodjo village.
M23 rebels extended offensive northward in North Kivu. Advancing from early June onwards, M23 28 June seized strategic Kanyabayonga town on Route Nationale 2, important gateway to commercial Butembo and Beni towns, and took Kirumba town two days later; expansion opened up access to Lubero territory, north of main hotspots of Masisi and Rutshuru territories where military and allies continued to clash with M23. Fighting displaced tens of thousands including north toward Beni territory, while thousands sought refuge in provincial capital Goma; displacement to neighbouring South Kivu province also contributed to deteriorating security and humanitarian conditions there, including in Minova town which remained in line of rebel mortar fire. Meanwhile, leaked UN report noted heavy Rwandan military presence in North Kivu (see Rwanda).
New govt took office after months of delay. National Assembly 11 June endorsed new 54-member strong govt under PM Suminwa, dominated by President Tshisekedi’s Union for Democracy and Social Progress and close associates. Sidelining or demoting of senior ruling-coalition figures and their parties – including National Assembly head Vital Kamerhe and FM Lutundula – incited discontent over perceived power grab by Tshisekedi. Meanwhile, church observation mission 17 June published final report on Dec 2023 general elections, criticising electoral commission’s handling of vote.
Govt continued bellicose rhetoric against DR Congo (DRC), as leaked UN report suggested Kigali’s heavy involvement in neighbour’s security crisis; diplomatic initiatives remained moribund.
Kigali maintained criticism of Kinshasa govt. During 20 June press interview, President Kagame accused Congolese President Tshisekedi of reviving “genocidal ideology” targeting Congolese Tutsis and asserted govt “ready” to engage in conflict with DRC, but refused to confirm presence of Rwandan troops in neighbouring country; comments came in response to Tshisekedi’s repeated accusations since Dec 2022 of Rwanda’s support to Congolese M23 rebels and involvement in “genocide” in eastern DRC. UN Panel of Experts report leaked early June reiterated Rwandan military involvement in DRC, reporting Kigali had at least 4,000 troops in North Kivu province; report also highlighted increased Rwandan support for Burundian RED-Tabara rebels following Burundi’s troop deployment in DRC.
Regional diplomacy continued to stall. Luanda process to bring DRC and Rwanda to negotiating table remained moribund with little sign of improvement; Angolan President João Lourenço 27 June said he was negotiating to organise meeting between Kagame and Tshisekedi “very soon”, but Congolese PM Judith Suminwa same day during visit to displacement camp in eastern DRC said Kinshasa would not negotiate with Kigali.
In another important development. National Electoral Commission 14 June announced Kagame, Frank Habineza of Democratic Green Party and independent Philippe Mpayimana as candidates for 15 July presidential election.
UN expert deplored Eritrea’s human rights record, while relations between Moscow and Asmara continued to strengthen.
Eritrea’s human rights record came under renewed UN scrutiny. In his fourth report to UN Human Rights Council, UN special rapporteur Mohamed Babiker 20 June said situation in Eritrea remains dire, with authorities showing “little willingness to address ongoing violations”, which include “indefinite and compulsory national service, the repression of freedom of religion or belief, the state of the rule of law and the administration of justice, and violations of civil and political rights”; Babiker also noted Eritrean authorities’ growing efforts to suppress critical voices in the diaspora. Chargé d’Affaires to UN Habtom Zerai same day criticised “annual ritual of demonising Eritrea”.
Eritrea welcomed Russian naval presence in Red Sea. Speaking to Russian news agency Tass, Russian Ambassador to Eritrea Igor Mozgo 11 June said Asmara had welcomed “visits” of Russian navy ships to Red Sea and advocated “permanent presence” in region; Mozgo added that Asmara would like to see more active Russian presence in Africa to serve as “counterweight to Western influence”. Comments come after Russian Pacific fleet late March-early April visited Massawa port, indicating growing defence partnership between the two countries.
Nationwide unrest over finance bill left dozens of protesters dead as demonstrators stormed parliament, with hundreds injured or detained; police mission to Haiti began deployment.
Unrest erupted as thousands demonstrated over proposed tax increases. Spontaneous protests, largely driven by middle-class youths organising themselves on social media, 18 June erupted in capital Nairobi against controversial finance bill containing new taxes that many fear will raise already high cost of living and cause job losses; police arrested dozens and used tear gas and water cannons, wounding several demonstrators. Parliamentary finance committee same day announced it would drop certain clauses, although many controversial levies remained including on cancer treatments and female sanitary products. As protests 20 June resumed and spread to towns and cities nationwide, clashes with security forces reportedly left 200 injured; in Nairobi, police allegedly shot and killed one protester, while another reportedly died when hit by tear gas canister. Demonstrators 25 June stormed parliament after lawmakers passed bill, setting fire to parts of building; medic groups said at least 23 killed as police allegedly shot live-rounds to disperse demonstrators. President Ruto next day said he would not sign bill into law and would engage in dialogue with youth. Protests persisted 27 June, albeit at smaller scale, with some members of defence forces deployed in Nairobi to ensure calm.
Attacks bearing Al-Shabaab hallmark persisted in north east. Gunmen 2 June killed village elder in Malamande village in Lamu county, while police 5 June discovered explosive device at border point with Somalia in Mandera county, and assailants 7 June killed four construction workers near border in Garissa county.
Nairobi-led multinational police mission to Haiti arrived after delays. Amid domestic opposition challenging legality of deployment of 1,000 Kenyan police to lead UN-backed mission to Haiti, Kenyan police chief 18 June met Haitian counterpart to assure him of support, while U.S. same day authorised over $100mn to support mission; first batch of several hundred Kenyan officers 25 June arrived in Haiti (see Haiti).
Al-Shabaab conducted large-scale assault on central town while Jubaland forces took back area outside Kismayo city; clan violence persisted while tensions remained high with Ethiopia.
Militants conducted attack in centre, security forces advanced in south. In most significant attack in Galmudug state (centre) since March, Al-Shabaab 8 June launched assault on govt forces in Ceel Dheere town; militants initially overran army positions and entered town but troops forced them back and regained some territory toward Ali Yabal village; authorities claimed to have killed 47 militants and reported loss of five soldiers. In Jubaland state (south), security forces began clearing road between Kismayo and Kulbiyow towns, 10 June seizing Buulo Xaaji town. As drawdown of AU mission (ATMIS) continued, AU Peace and Security Council 20 June endorsed post-ATMIS mission to focus on securing key urban centres and logistical nodes. Concerns remained high over Islamic State (ISIS)’s growing profile after U.S. in May conducted first anti-ISIS operations in country since Jan 2023 with airstrike in Bari region (Puntland state).
Clan violence erupted, notably in Galmudug. Clashes between Marehaan and Dir sub-clans 8 June erupted in Laandheere village, Abudwaq district, Galgaduud region, killing over 50. Other clashes reported in June between various clans in Galgaduud, Lower Shabelle and Mudug regions as govt’s previous reconciliation efforts appeared to have failed to resolve grievances or stem violence.
Ethiopia-Somaliland port deal continued to aggravate govt. Despite reported Turkish attempts to mediate between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa and Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani 12 June speaking to President Mohamud and Ethiopian PM Abiy in separate calls, little progress made towards rapprochement. Concerns grew over impact of tensions on security as govt officials late May-early June asserted Ethiopian forces would not be part of security picture post-ATMIS unless Addis Ababa retracts deal with Hargeisa; govt’s ambassador to UN 24 June accused Ethiopian troops of cross-border “incursion” into Hiraan region.
In other important developments. Puntland President Said Deni 15 June declared readiness for direct talks with federal govt over issues of contention. UN Security Council 6 June elected Somalia to non-permanent seat for two-year term starting Jan 2025.
Kenya-led peace talks between holdout opposition groups and govt advanced to draft agreement but faced pushback from VP Machar, economy worsened further, and new armed group emerged.
Kenya-led peace talks yielded draft agreement opposed by VP Machar. Following talks between govt and several opposition groups that did not sign 2018 peace accord, Kenyan mediation team mid-June shared draft peace deal with parties. In addition to security, financial and judicial reforms, agreement includes provisions on unimplemented elements of 2018 peace deal, such as drafting of permanent constitution; parties worked on power-sharing section of draft, which could determine timetable for new transitional period (potentially leading to postponing of elections), as well as on revised structure of executive, legislature and judiciary. VP Machar 19 June said agreement undermined 2018 peace deal; his resistance could encourage others within coalition govt in Juba feeling disadvantaged by power-sharing formula to oppose agreement.
Economic crisis worsened as govt sought outside financing. Economy remained in dire straits, exacerbated by breakdown of key oil pipeline in Feb due to conflict in Sudan. South Sudan Opposition Alliance MP David De Dau 19 June pressed President Kiir to urgently address crisis, warning that public employees had not been paid for months and that “hunger is looming”. Efforts to secure loans from international partners, including International Monetary Fund and Ethiopia, remained challenging due to stringent conditions attached to loans and Juba’s compromised financial credibility, alongside pipeline rupture.
Holdout opposition group splintered, leading to formation of new armed group. National Salvation Front (NAS) led by Thomas Cirillo (holdout opposition group not party to Kenya talks) splintered as top commander, Maj Gen. Kohn Kenyi Loburon, 20 June criticised Cirillo’s “poor leadership” and announced he had formed new rebel group dubbed National Salvation United Forces; defection of Loburon, who has proven adept at defending NAS territory from govt advances, represents major blow to Cirillo.
Intercommunal violence persisted in several states. Notably, UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) 24 June announced stepped-up patrols in Unity State and Ruweng Administrative Area (RAA) following deadly cross-border clashes over stolen cattle.
Rapid Support Forces (RSF) overran Sennar’s capital and could capture entire state, expanding conflict to previously peaceful parts of Sudan; fighting in and around North Darfur’s capital El Fasher intensified further.
RSF overran Sennar’s capital and could capture entire state. RSF rapidly advanced into Sennar state, with paramilitary 29 June storming capital Sinja, seizing military base and forcing thousands to flee; RSF could take over entire state in coming weeks, expanding hostilities to previously peaceful parts of country and bringing conflict closer to Gedaref and Blue Nile states, as well as Ethiopian border.
Battle for El Fasher raged, increasingly involving ethnic militias. RSF continued to besiege El Fasher, last stronghold of Sudanese army (SAF) in North Darfur, launching offensives from multiple fronts in and around city with growing support from Arab militias. Meanwhile, SAF and allied Darfuri armed groups (which are mobilising mainly from Zaghawa community) intensified airstrikes and offensives in RSF-controlled eastern and south-eastern parts of El Fasher, as well as in RSF strongholds and Arab villages around North Darfur. Battle for city could lead to large-scale massacres along ethnic lines, while prolonged siege threatens to worsen already catastrophic humanitarian crisis. UN Security Council 13 June adopted resolution urging immediate halt to RSF’s siege of El Fasher, cessation of hostilities in area and unrestricted movement of civilians.
Violent clashes continued elsewhere. In Gezira state, RSF forces 5 June attacked Wad Al-Noura village, resulting in nearly 100 deaths; RSF claimed they engaged civilian-clad militias, while locals alleged indiscriminate killing of civilians. In West Kordofan, RSF 20 June took control of state capital, Al Fula, after intense fighting with SAF. Fighting in June also persisted in Bari city south of capital Khartoum.
AU set up new committee to facilitate talks between warring parties. AU Peace and Security Council 21 June met to discuss Sudan, leading to formation of Presidential Committee led by President Museveni of Uganda and comprising one leader from each African sub-region, whose aim is to facilitate meeting between SAF leader, Gen. Abdel Fatah al-Burhan, and RSF leader, Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo “Hemedti”.
Military denied supporting Congolese rebel group; govt cracked down on alleged internal financial misconduct.
Allegations of support to Congolese rebels strained ties with DR Congo. Military 13 June reiterated denials that it was clandestinely supporting Congolese rebel group M23 after leaked UN report early June contained such allegations; concerns grew that, amid reports, Congolese govt could look to end military cooperation with Uganda and joint operations against Islamic State-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces rebels in eastern DRC. Meanwhile, govt continued rapprochement with Rwanda after late May meeting of military officials in Rwanda’s Nyagatare town to discuss cross-border security issues.
Authorities launched high-profile arrests on corruption charges. Following UK April and U.S. May sanctions on various politicians over corruption, govt in June launched own anti-corruption campaign. Police 11 June arrested three MPs for allegedly soliciting bribes to manipulate 2024-2025 national budget and 19 June arrested another two over mismanagement of $36mn earmarked for compensating cooperative societies. President Museveni 18 June announced expanded anti-corruption campaign targeting local administration-level theft of public funds.
Govt temporarily averted potential strike amid persistent fiscal policy discontent. Local traders threatening two-month strike agreed to re-schedule meeting with govt called to resolve grievances on new tax policies and additional taxes from 20 June to 31 July. Meanwhile, govt 13 June presented 2024-2025 budget with security forces bolstered through 25% salary increase – in part to address discontent among lower-ranking military personnel and amid extensive recruitment drive – while oil and gas sector’s budget allocation more than doubled.
Ruling coalition secured majority in parliament in May legislative elections, but political climate remained tense with reports of widespread fraud.
Political tensions remained high in immediate aftermath of 29 May legislative elections. Notably, demonstrations 30 May broke out in Tsihombe municipality, Androy district, with electoral office set on fire as opposition denounced apparent irregularities in vote such as ballot stuffing; country’s largest electoral observation mission, Safidy Observatory, 1 June denounced “worrying incidents” during polls including distribution of money and food to voters by candidates, and questioned neutrality of National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI); candidates from President Rajoelina’s Irmar political alliance same day accused opposition of paying for votes. After CENI provisional results 11 June showed Irmar had won relative majority, High Constitutional Court 27 June rejected most opposition complaints and gave three additional seats to govt coalition, announcing Irmar had secured 84 out of 163 parliamentary seats, while main opposition alliance of two former presidents won 22. Meanwhile, authorities 17 June released under judicial supervision independent MP who had filed complaint about election-day irregularities and who police had arrested 31 May for allegedly organising protests in Tsihombe.
Police arrested and charged main opposition party interim leader and dozens of supporters; President Mnangagwa’s remarks sparked diplomatic spat with Zambia.
Police arrested opposition members at gathering. Police 16 June arrested at least 80 youth members of opposition Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC), including interim party leader Jameson Timba, who gathered at Timba’s private residence in capital Harare; authorities next day charged 77 detainees with “gathering with intent to promote public violence and disorderly conduct”; as detainees appeared in court 18 June, Tinashe Chinopfukutwa from Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights reported his clients had been abused upon arrest. Harare court 27 June denied bail to defendants, as police reportedly beat dozens and arrested several CCC supporters protesting outside. Rights group Amnesty International 19 June called for “immediate release” of detainees and investigations into allegations of torture.
Mnangagwa railed against neighbours in leaked video, causing diplomatic spat. Video emerged of Mnangagwa accusing Zambia and Malawi of colluding with U.S. “both in terms of security and in terms of financial support” to isolate govt, and asking Russian President Vladimir Putin for support including in defence matters; meeting between both leaders took place 13 June on sidelines of St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. Zambian FM Haimbe 20 June rejected suggestions as “unwarranted attacks” and called on AU and Southern African regional body SADC to mediate talks with Mnangagwa’s govt; U.S. 27 June said claims it was militarising Zambia “absolutely false”.
Jihadists launched one of deadliest attacks on military to date, amid reports of mutiny attempt within army, raising significant stability concerns.
Major assault shook military as security situation remained perilous. In what could amount to deadliest attack on army since country began anti-jihadist operations in 2015, al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) 11 June raided military base in Mansila town, Sahel region, near Niger border; JNIM claimed to have killed 107 soldiers, while local sources reported over 100 dead and others taken hostage. Attack reportedly fuelled divisions within military, leading to speculation of threats to regime’s grip on power (see below). Security forces and militants conducted other deadly attacks during month, with high toll on civilians. Notably, JNIM 6 June raided Dasse village, Boucle du Mouhoun region, reportedly killing 63; group next day killed around 30 civilians and military auxiliaries (VDPs) in Kossodougou village, East region. In North region, soldiers 11 June allegedly killed around 24 civilians in Ouahigouya area, Yatenga province.
Rumours of mutiny attempt surfaced. Artillery fire 12 June hit state television headquarters near presidential residence in capital Ouagadougou, injuring two; military authorities stated incident was mistaken launch by soldier. Media reports, however, alleged previous day’s Mansila attack had provoked mutiny in army, which President Capt. Traoré 20 June denied on state television. Govt also refuted news outlet Radio France Internationale’s claims that dozens of Malian soldiers and Russian Africa Corps (formerly Wagner Group) paramilitaries 18 June arrived in Ouagadougou.
Govt continued to limit international press. French network TV5Monde 18 June aired interview with Newton Ahmed Barry, journalist and former electoral commission president, where he openly criticised regime’s inability to combat jihadism since taking power in Sept 2022. Govt same day announced six-month suspension of TV5Monde for “intention to deceive public opinion”.
Diplomatic relations deepened with Russia, Sweden closed embassy. Russian FM Lavrov 4-5 June visited Ouagadougou, emphasised Moscow will continue to supply military equipment and training. Meanwhile, Sweden 20 June announced closure of embassies in both Ouagadougou and Malian capital Bamako and establishment of new embassy covering regional activity in Senegalese capital Dakar.
Jockeying between major political players continued ahead of 2025 presidential election.
Figures from ruling Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace (RHDP) continued to call for President Ouattara to stand as candidate in Oct 2025 presidential election; during speech to Congress, Ouattara 18 June praised his govt’s achievements and country’s economic growth under his rule, but did not clarify whether he intended to run for fourth term. Main opposition party Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) leader Tidjane Thiam 22 June began national tour with rally in Soubré city, Nawa region, criticising govt’s record and calling on PDCI activists to encourage voter registration across country.
Junta kept tight control over political parties and media, while forcing aside former military ally; Russia sought further influence over Conakry.
Junta tightened control over political parties and media. Govt 19 June began evaluation of political parties’ compliance with rules on their activities including financing, only one year after last assessment; in lead up, opposition Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea (UFDG) VP Fodé Oussou Fofana 6 June described process as “way of keeping busy, of distracting, of finding alibis to avoid getting to essential issues” and voiced fears govt might ban main opposition parties, while UFDG leader and former PM Cellou Dalein Diallo same day expressed doubts about junta’s intention to restore constitutional order. Media regulatory body 13 June suspended two of its commissioners after they accused President Col. Doumbouya of giving money to media owners to gain favours; latter same day filed defamation complaint against suspended commissioners. Against backdrop of restrictions on press freedom, Guinean Social Forces Forum, comprising civil society actors, 22 June called for civil disobedience and strike action until restoration of media rights and release of jailed journalists.
Authorities imprisoned former army chief of staff Sadiba Koulibaly, who later died. Military court 14 June sentenced Koulibaly, previously prominent Doumbouya ally, to five years in prison for “desertion and illegal possession of weapons” and removed him from army; junta same day dismissed 40 officers and non-commissioned officers for desertion. Govt 25 June announced Koulibaly had died in prison of cardiac arrest, but lawyers’ union 27 June called for independent investigation as much remained unclear about circumstances surrounding death. Case raised speculation that ruling elite may be concerned about internal discord and threats to Doumbouya’s position.
Govt enhanced ties with Russia. Russian FM Lavrov 3 June began Africa tour with visit to capital Conakry, meeting Doumbouya and FM Kouyaté; both sides expressed commitment to strengthening security, diplomatic and economic cooperation, although Doumbouya also said “Guinea remains an open, sovereign country that cooperates with everyone”.
Industrial action compelled authorities to back down over union leader’s arrest; tensions rose among ruling powers.
Union action forced govt to reverse arrest, but civil liberties crackdown continued. Authorities 5 June arrested Hamadoun Bah, head of banking union and deputy leader of country’s largest union, on forgery charges amid union dispute; unions criticised arrest, which some see as likely tied to Bah’s criticism of justice system. Following arrest, bank and gas stations 6-10 June held strikes backed by other unions, demanding unionist’s release. After apparent intervention by President Col. Goïta, authorities 10 June freed Bah. Meanwhile, imprisoned former head of state security Kassoum Goïta and former colonel Alpha Yaya Sangaré remained missing; unidentified individuals 31 May abducted both men from cells. Security forces 8-27 June detained journalist after he covered small anti-govt demonstration in capital Bamako. Authorities 20 June arrested 11 political leaders at private meeting of alliance of political parties and civil society groups, following April suspension of political parties’ activities.
Rifts between military authorities and civilian PM exposed. PM Maïga 18 June called for continued support to Goïta; in apparent sign of dissatisfaction, however, PM also endorsed M5-RFP political movement’s May statement criticising removal of M5-RFP ministers from office in July 2023 and military’s unilateral decision to prolong transition; move came after late May arrest of chargé de mission at Maïga’s office over his role in statement. Political tensions with opposition continued after govt-in-exile led by former supreme court lawyer Mohamed Chérif Koné formed late May, and Bamako court late May refused to dissolve opposition SADI party led by exiled activist Oumar Mariko; capacity for Koné and Mariko to mobilise major domestic opposition to military authorities remained remote.
Violence persisted across north and centre. Al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims 5 June claimed to have killed Islamic State Sahel Province commander in Fitili area, Gao region (north). Military 13 June reported repelling ambush near Douentza town, Douentza region (centre).
In another important development. Sweden 20 June announced closure of embassies in Bamako and Burkinabé capital Ouagadougou, establishing embassy covering regional activity in Senegalese capital Dakar.
Tensions with Benin remained high, while armed groups supporting deposed President Bazoum launched attacks; govt continued reorganising foreign alliances.
Diplomatic standoff with Benin continued with arrest of Nigerien oil workers. Authorities during month persisted with refusal to reopen land border with Benin, while oil exports through shared pipeline continued to face blockages from both govts. Amid tensions, Beninese authorities 5 June arrested five Nigerien nationals working for Chinese-Nigerien operator of pipeline (WAPCo), alleging they fraudulently attempted to access oil terminal and accusing them of spying. Niamey next day blocked oil exports in protest and 8 June reiterated allegations French forces in northern Benin were training “terrorists” to destabilise Niger. After Cotonou 17 June gave three of the detainees 18-month suspended sentence, two former Beninese presidents 25 June travelled to Niger in attempt to ease tensions, though oil exports remained on hold (see Benin).
Supporters of former president Bazoum launched attacks. Patriotic Liberation Front, pro-Bazoum armed group, 12 and 16 June attacked Niger-Benin pipeline in Dosso region, killing six soldiers in first attack and reportedly putting it out of commission in second; another group supporting Bazoum, Patriotic Front for Justice, 21 June kidnapped regional official and four others, reportedly killing another, in Bilma city, Agadez region; both groups called on China to cancel oil exports until Bazoum freed. Meanwhile, supreme court 14 June lifted Bazoum’s immunity in treason case.
Jihadist violence persisted in Diffa and Tillabery regions. In Diffa, military 11 June reportedly clashed with Boko Haram near Bagara village, six militants killed. In Tillabery, Islamic State Sahel Province 9 June killed 24 civilians in two attacks in Tera department, while militants likely affiliated with al-Qaeda 25 June killed at least 20 soldiers and one civilian near Tassia village.
Govt continued military and international realignment. Russian Deputy Defence Minister 3 June met President Gen. Tiani and PM Zeine to discuss defence and energy cooperation. Withdrawal of U.S. troops formally began 7 June, to be completed by 15 Sept. Meanwhile, authorities 2o June revoked French company Orano’s operating permit for uranium mine.
Insecurity remained widespread as jihadist, bandit and separatist violence persisted despite security forces’ operations against armed groups.
Army reported gains against jihadists in North East, but groups remained threat. Govt’s “clearance campaign” against Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Boko Haram militants around Lake Chad and Sambisa Forest in Borno state made some gains including troops 2-6 June raiding four ISWAP camps in Bama, Marte and Ngala areas, reportedly killing over 100 insurgents; soldiers 15 June destroyed multiple ISWAP camps around southern shore of Lake Chad, rescuing 34 women and children held captive by group. ISWAP, however, continued attacks on civilian population in north east of Borno in attempt to reassert control. Notably, militants 10 June abducted unconfirmed numbers of travellers along Maiduguri-Damaturu highway. Three suspected female suicide bombers 29 June attacked several locations in Gwoza town, near Cameroon border, killing 32 people and wounding 42.
Banditry remained widespread in North West and North Central zones. Security forces continued ground and air campaign against armed groups including Kaduna state govt 13 June saying it had killed notorious bandit leader alias Buharin Yadi and almost 40 others in Giwa and Sabuwa areas, while airstrikes 15 June killed over 80 armed group members in Katsina state’s Faskari area. Despite military operations, armed groups continued attacks and abductions including in Kaduna, Katsina, Niger and Sokoto states. Notably, in Katsina, gunmen 4 June killed at least 30 in several villages in Dutsin-Ma and Safana areas, while in Kankara area bandits 9 June killed 26 people including four police officers and kidnapped dozens in two villages. In Sokoto, armed group 16 June attacked village in Gwadabawa area, killing six and abducting over 100.
South East recorded uptick in violence between security forces and separatists. In Abia state, troops 8 June raided camp of separatist group Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) armed wing Eastern Security Network (ESN) in Arochukwu area, killing six. Authorities blamed IPOB/ESN for 11 June killing of two police officers and one civilian in Ikeduru area, Imo state.
Authorities called for dialogue to end insurgency in Amhara, violence in Oromia remained rampant, and Amhara-Tigray tensions persisted despite federal efforts to tackle territorial dispute.
Peace conference took place in Amhara region amid continued hostilities. Violence between federal forces and Amhara nationalist militias known as Fano persisted, with clashes reported in West Gojjam, North Gojjam, East Gojjam, Central Gondar, South Wollo, North Wollo and North Shewa zones. State of emergency declared in Aug 2023 expired 3 June, though military command posts remained operational amid fierce battles and Fano militants’ targeting of local officials and civilians. Security forces throughout month reportedly killed dozens of civilians suspected of Fano ties, including in West Gojjam and North Shewa zones. Regional, federal and military leaders 24-25 June gathered in regional capital Bahir Dar for peace conference, resulting in formation of 15-member Regional Peace Council, comprised of prominent figures from Amhara and backed by federal govt, to facilitate talks with Fano militias.
Oromia region remained wracked by insecurity. Fano militants conducted attacks in Oromia-Amhara borderlands and deeper within Oromia, threatening to heighten inter-ethnic tensions. Notably, alleged Fano militants 15 June fought with Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) in Dera Woreda (North Shewa Zone), marking first direct clash reported between the two groups, and which left four civilians dead; suspected Fano militiamen 15 June killed dozens of civilians in Nono woreda (West Shewa Zone). Meanwhile, federal-OLA fighting continued, with OLA 8 June claiming they had killed “thousands of regime combatants”. Resumption of peace talks appeared increasingly unlikely.
Tigray-Amhara tensions persisted. Tigray-Amhara tensions simmered amid implementation of Addis Ababa’s plan to tackle their territorial dispute (which entails dismantling Amhara-established administrations in Western and Southern Tigray and resettling displaced Tigrayans). Notably, BBC 15 June spoke with residents in Tselemt woreda (Western Tigray), who claimed that Tigray forces had killed local leaders and attempted to dismantle Amhara administration themselves, before federal forces intervened. Meanwhile, federal parliament 4 June allowed Tigray People’s Liberation Front to re-register as political party.
Relations with Mogadishu remained tense. Somalia's ambassador to UN 24 June accused Ethiopian troops of illegal cross-border incursion that led to confrontations with local security forces (see Somalia).
Tensions continued to mount ahead of concurrent party and presidential elections scheduled for 13 Nov amid concerns votes may not take place on time.
As opposition continued to allege partiality of National Election Commission in favour of President Bihi, body’s chairperson 5 June warned ruling Kulmiye party against undermining commission’s autonomy. Disagreements persisted over election technology as some Kulmiye officials continued to push for deployment of eye scanners at polling stations to confirm voter identities, while opposition Waddani party raised doubts about practicality. Adding to tensions, govt 20 June arrested Waddani supporter at Hargeisa airport upon his return to country, sparking protests. Clan-based political tensions could also hinder elections after Bihi 9 June stated members of Gacaan Libaah movement that rebelled against govt in Aug 2023 would face trial, contradicting previous agreement and potentially reigniting dispute. Meanwhile, Horseed political association 2 June reiterated decision not to participate in upcoming party elections, alleging system favoured three officially recognised political parties.
Islamic State militants remained active in northern Cabo Delgado province; tensions over general elections set for October continued to grow.
Islamic State Mozambique Province (ISMP) militants remained threat in north. Insurgents continued to move freely around districts of Cabo Delgado including along coast in Macomia, Mocímboa da Praia and Quissanga, with several villages in all three districts left deserted as people feared for safety; reports of presence of group 19 June caused panic in Macomia town, which suffered large-scale assault in May. Violence continued as ISMP 19 June attacked Mbau town, Mocímboa da Praia, where Rwandan and local militia troops are stationed, reportedly killing four civilians; at least one soldier killed same day in Nambala village, Macomia, after triggering explosive device set by insurgents. ISMP also increased activity in Cabo Delgado’s southern districts of Chiúre, Mecufi and Metuge, raising concerns over potential attack near provincial capital Pemba; in Chiúre, residents of Mazeze town 18 June sought refuge in forest amid militant movement nearby. Threat of spillover to neighbouring Nampula province, where militants were spotted 18 June, also remained prevalent. Despite insecurity, govt continued to downplay severity of situation; President Nyusi 16 June said govt and international forces had managed to expel militants from district capitals and destroyed all of group’s permanent bases, although observers questioned assessment.
Political tensions mounted ahead of Oct votes. Confusion and uncertainty around upcoming general elections remained high with parties and electoral commission differing on electoral calendars, campaigning rules and more. Nyusi’s 30 May veto of revision to electoral law that would have allowed district courts to order recounts fuelled concerns over potential restrictions on free and fair vote; electoral commission 10 June admitted it had inadvertently registered over 800,000 non-existent voters, primarily in ruling FRELIMO party strongholds. Meanwhile, thousands of voters in Cabo Delgado were unable to register or collect voting cards due to insecurity.
Ruling African National Congress (ANC) lost parliamentary majority in landmark election but formed unity govt; largest opposition party challenged results in court.
President Ramaphosa re-elected to lead broad coalition. Electoral commission 2 June announced results of 29 May general election as incumbent ANC lost parliamentary majority for first time since democratic transition in 1994, securing 40% of vote and 159 out of 400 parliamentary seats, down from 57.5% and 230 in 2019; centrist-right Democratic Alliance came second (22%, 87 seats) followed by new uMkhonto weSizwe party (MKP) led by former President Zuma (14.5%, 58 seats). Electoral authorities declared polls “free and fair”, dismissing allegations of widespread irregularities lodged by MKP. ANC 14 June signed statement of intent with Democratic Alliance and Zulu nationalist Inkatha Freedom Party to form govt of national unity, ensuring that new parliament 15 June re-elected Ramaphosa as president. ANC 17 June invited all parties to participate in coalition and ten (including ANC) agreed to join, giving unity govt 287 seats in parliament. MKP and populist Economic Freedom Fighters declined, choosing to form “progressive” opposition caucus in parliament instead. After fraught negotiations between ANC and Democratic Alliance over number of cabinet posts for each party, Ramaphosa 30 June announced 32-member multi-party cabinet comprising 20 ANC ministers, six from Democratic Alliance and rest from several small parties.
Opposition party led by former president alleged election rigging. MKP leader Zuma 2 June rejected results and demanded election re-run as he claimed polls suffered from serious irregularities. Party 16 June launched legal challenges seeking to declare election invalid without providing evidence of malfeasance; MPs from MKP stayed away from 14-15 June first sitting of parliament and Ramaphosa’s 19 June inauguration but were sworn in 25 June.
Political tensions heightened amid implementation of national dialogue’s proposed reforms.
Constitutional revision process received mixed reactions within political class. Recommendations from April national dialogue that political parties be suspended, and that former ruling Democratic Party of Gabon leaders have three-year ineligibility from office imposed, remained contentious; opposition parties argued measures exceeded legal bounds. Meanwhile, revision of electoral roll ahead of upcoming 2025 elections began 24 June, sparking opposition calls for transparency in process. Opposition accused interior ministry – which national dialogue recommended be in charge of running elections – of bias in favour of transitional President Nguema. Amid growing concerns, PM Ndong Sima 18 June affirmed efforts to implement as many dialogue recommendations as possible ahead of pivotal Dec 2024 constitutional referendum, but stated enacting “all” will be impossible, while Institutional Reform Minister 28 June stated govt already implementing some recommendations and would not reverse course.
In another important development. Main opposition figure Albert Ondo Ossa 11 June called for release of “genuine” results of Aug 2023 presidential election, asserting himself as rightful winner and denouncing perceived authoritarian tendencies during transition; coup d’état occurred shortly after announcement that incumbent President Ali Bongo Ondimba had won re-election.
Detention of Nigerien nationals ratcheted up bilateral tensions; threat of jihadist spillover from neighbouring countries remained high.
Diplomatic standoff with Niger continued with arrest of Nigerien oil workers. Bilateral tensions persisted as Niger refused to reopen its land border and oil exports through shared pipeline faced blockages from both govts. Authorities 5 June arrested five Nigeriens working for Chinese-Nigerien operator of pipeline (WAPCo), alleging they fraudulently attempted to access oil terminal and accusing them of spying; in response, Niamey next day blocked oil exports from their side and 8 June denounced “kidnapping” of workers (see Niger). Govt 13 June released two of those detained but 17 June convicted other three, including WAPCo deputy director general, of falsifying data, giving them 18-month suspended sentence; relatively lenient sentence seen by many as attempt at compromise while former presidents Bony Yayi and Soglo 25 June travelled to Niger and met Nigerien President Gen. Tiani and PM Zeine in attempt to ease tensions; oil exports, however, remained on hold.
Jihadist violence continued in north. Pendjari National Park and others including W Park remained vulnerable to jihadist infiltration from Burkina Faso and Niger despite ongoing deployment of troops in area. Notably, gunmen 4 June killed seven soldiers in ambush near Tanguieta town in Pendjari park in Atacora department near Burkina Faso border.
Russian President conducted first state visit to North Korea, signalling strengthened security partnership; in response, Seoul issued strong condemnations, including threats to arm Ukraine.
Russia and North Korea entered new strategic partnership. Russian President Putin 18-19 June paid “friendly state visit” to Pyongyang for first time in 24 years; Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un 19 June signed new bilateral treaty to strengthen “defence capabilities” and promote science and technology cooperation; leaders signed mutual defence article binding both parties to “provide military and other assistance immediately using all available means” should either party be “attacked and finds itself in a state of war”, in accordance with Article 51 of UN Charter and consistent with both countries’ laws; observers raised alarm over possible violations of UN Security Council resolutions by expansion of alleged North Korean weapons transfers to bolster Russian war in Ukraine, and transfers of Russian military technologies to North Korea.
Seoul responded to Russian-North Korea treaty with threats to arm Ukraine. South Korea 20 June condemned new Russian-North Korea treaty, insisting that it threatens their security and violates UN Security Council resolutions; Seoul warned that it would consider sending arms directly to Ukraine in contravention of its long-standing position of not supplying weapons to countries actively engaged in conflict. South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol 24 June called for “robust security readiness” during meeting of senior secretaries.
Tensions rose at border as sides used loudspeakers, balloons and other means to show protest. Seoul 9 June resumed broadcasting international news and K-pop via loudspeakers on inter-Korean border; move in retaliation to North Korea floating south 1,000 balloons filled with trash and manure in May. Kim Yo Jong, sister of North Korean leader 10 June warned loudspeakers could spark “very dangerous situation” and risked provoking “crisis of confrontation”. After South Korea detected two separate incursions of North Korean troops crossing Military Demarcation Line, a third saw 20-30 North Korean soldiers 18 June cross Military Demarcation Line, retreating after South Korean military fired warning shots; incidents mark pattern of behaviour that implies potential desire to slowly escalate.
Tensions remained high between Taiwan and China as U.S. approved more military support to Taipei and China maintained intense military activity around island.
Elevated cross-strait tensions persisted. China Defence Minister Dong Jun 1 June warned at Shangri-la dialogue that any pursuit of Taiwan’s independence would be met with force, leading to “destruction”, and accused external forces of creating dangerous situation for island; 21 June ramped up pressure by issuing new legal guidelines to punish those it says support Taipei’s independence, notably threatening to impose death penalty against “diehard” separatists; Taiwan President Lai Ching-te of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 24 June responded by reiterating that autocracy is the real “evil”. Taiwan Mainland Affairs Council 6 June reported Taiwanese tourist detained for a few days in Fujian province, China, marking first time member of tour group was detained. Meanwhile, opposition party Kuomintang leader Fu Kun-chi 10 June criticised Lai for antagonising China and emphasised importance of maintaining friendly relations with all countries.
U.S. continued military support to Taiwan. U.S. 18 June approved $360mn arms sale to Taiwan, including hundreds of armed drones and missile equipment. Taiwan-U.S. Defense Industry Forum 6 June held closed-door meeting in Taipei, while U.S. Pentagon 5 June approved $3bn sale of F-16 spare parts to Taiwan. Meanwhile, G7 leaders 14 June issued joint communiqué during two-day summit held in Italy, stressing importance of “peace and stability” across Taiwan Strait, affirming support for Taiwan’s “meaningful participation in international organisations” where statehood is no prerequisite or, if it is, that Taiwan be granted observer or guest status.
China maintained military activity around Taiwan. As of 26 June, Taiwan detected 579 Chinese military aircrafts around island, of which at least 391 either crossed unofficial “median line”, entered south-western airspace or were detected within Taiwan’s de facto air defence identification zone (ADIZ). Taiwan reported 391 sightings of Chinese navy vessels in surrounding waters. Taiwanese Defence Minister Wellington Koo 18 June confirmed sighting of Chinese nuclear-powered submarine in Taiwan Strait, surfacing near Taiwan’s Kinmen Islands where it was later joined by Chinese military vessel.
Taliban authorities prepared late-June high-level meeting on Afghanistan, third such international meeting convened under UN auspices; attacks by armed groups persisted.
Taliban authorities engaged in regional and international diplomacy. Taliban spokesperson, Zabihullah Mujahid, 30 June led Afghan delegation to two-day UN-sponsored meeting on Afghanistan held in Doha, Qatar, making it de facto authority’s first participation in third such international meeting which brings envoys from some 22 countries. Exclusion of Afghan women, civil society and non-Taliban stakeholders during this round sparked public criticism with calls by some activists for boycott of the meeting unless representation is widened. UN Special Representative for Afghanistan Roza Otunbayeva, 21 June confirmed Afghan women would not be included but insisted women’s rights would be discussed; also said UN would meet Afghan civil society actors before and after Doha meeting. Mujahid 19 June critiqued UN’s report on women’s rights violations in Afghanistan, calling it biased for “attempting to tarnish perceptions ahead of the upcoming Doha meeting”. Previously, Taliban Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani, 4 June undertook first publicised foreign visit and met UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan. UN Security Council 5 June approved travel ban exemptions for four senior Taliban members, including Haqqani, to perform Hajj pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia.
Security situation remained volatile. Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP) 3 June claimed responsibility for assassination of Taliban commander in Ghor province (West), signalling expansion into new province. Taliban authorities 1 June claimed arrest of IS-KP members allegedly responsible for attacks against Shia community in Herat. National Resistance Forces (NRF) commander 11 June published video claiming to have returned to Afghanistan to continue struggle against Taliban; NRF 25 June claimed that it killed six Taliban members in two attacks in capital Kabul. UN 21 June reported ongoing anti-Taliban attacks in past three months.
Conflict in Myanmar’s northern Rakhine state continued to drive unrest in Bangladesh’s Rohingya refugee camps as civilians caught in crossfire fled, searching for refuge.
Rohingyas sought to leave Myanmar as fighting in Northern Rakhine intensified. Arakan Army 16 June warned “all residents to evacuate” Maungdaw, predominantly Rohingya town in Rakhine state. With thousands of civilians believed to be caught in violence, Bangladesh’s commissioner for refugees 22 June said “…our stand is that not a single more Rohingya will enter our land”; at UN Human Rights Council Bangladesh 18 June reiterated Rohingya repatriation was “only durable solution” to forced displacement. Despite govt pledges, rising number of Rohingyas continued to find ways across, either by boat or land. Home Minister Asaduzzaman Khan 20 June warned Myanmar and AA against cross-fire, threatening retaliation if cross-border shooting persisted. Myanmar 12 June had moved two military ships into Naf River close to Bangladesh territory; Bangladesh 6-14 June suspended vessel movement between Teknaf and St Martin’s Island due to fighting.
Situation in Rohingya refugee camps remained tense but armed group recruitment slowed. Three Rohingya refugees 10 June died after clashes between Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO) and Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA); Rapid Action Battalion 10-13 June arrested six ARSA members including two commanders. RSO forced recruitment in the camps declined significantly from late May, likely due to international pressure on govt and pushback from refugees. Bangladesh 9 June repatriated 134 Myanmar security forces as Myanmar repatriated 45 Bangladeshis.
Opposition announced major reshuffle, final voting of district chairs completed. Opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) 15 June reorganised 39 executive positions and dissolved multiple city committees, widely seen as unilateral move by chairman Tarique Rahman to consolidate power within party. Election Commission 5 June completed final round voting to elect district chairs; low voter turnout of just 34% was attributed to BNP boycott; despite ruling Awami League’s directive, 77% of winning chairs were relatives or associates of sitting AL lawmakers.
In other important developments. PM Hasina 21-22 June visited India calling it “short but very fruitful”. Police 12 June recovered body of alleged Kuki-Chin National Front (KNF) member killed in combat.
Poll results confirmed opposition candidates secured victory in Kashmir valley constituencies, authorities continued to misuse anti-terror laws, militant attacks and counterinsurgency operations persisted.
Muslim-majority Kashmir valley rejected ruling party’s proxy candidates. Official results shared 4 June indicated Ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) won two seats in Hindu-majority constituencies of Udhampur and Jammu. Meanwhile, in Muslim-majority Kashmir valley, opposition party National Conference (NC) secured two seats; all BJP-backed candidates lost, as did Mehbooba Mufti and Omar Abdullah, two former chief ministers from People’s Democratic Party and NC, respectively; in Baramulla constituency, people elected jailed political leader Abdul Rashid Sheikh, previously arrested in 2019 on terror-funding charges; if Sheikh is convicted, he will lose parliamentary seat and new polls will be held.
Authorities used anti-terror laws to stifle dissent. J&K administration 8 June dismissed without formal investigation four govt employees “for their involvement in anti-national activities”. Authorities 14 June charged under anti-terror law novelist Arundhati Roy and former professor from Kashmir Sheikh Shaukat Hussain for public comments made at 2010 event, seen as promoting Kashmiri separatism. Kashmiri political parties 15 June condemned use of anti-terror laws to supress dissent and criminalise free speech; 200 Indian academics, activists and journalists on around 23 June published letter demanding govt to reverse decision.
Militants launched major attack as security operations continued. In Jammu’s Reasi district, suspected militants 9 June attacked bus carrying Hindu pilgrims, killing nine and injuring more than 30 people; police 19 June claimed to arrest man who provided logistical support to militants. In Jammu’s Doda district, militants 11 June attacked security check post, wounding six people, including five security forces personnel and special police officer; during operation, militants 12 June injured another security personnel. In South Kashmir’s Pulwama district, security forces 3 June killed two alleged militants of Pakistani jihadist Lashkar-e-Taiba organisation. In Kathua district, Jammu region, security forces 11-12 June killed two militants, soldier died during operation. In Baramulla district, security forces 19 June killed two militants during operation; 22-23 June shot down suspected militant near Line of Control. Security forces 26 June also killed three militants in Doda district, Jammu region, leaving one policeman injured.
Authorities unveiled new security plan while insecurity in regions bordering Afghanistan and internal political crisis continued.
Relations with Afghanistan remained tense. Amid mounting tensions with Kabul, Pakistan 22 June announced new anti-terrorism plan, Operation Azm-i-Istekham (Resolve for Security) to counter extremism and militancy in the country. After backlash from Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and Pashtun nationalist parties, PM Shahbaz Sharif 24 June claimed operation was “erroneously misunderstood” clarifying that it was not all-out operation that would lead to the massive displacement of people in conflict zones. At UN 18 June Pakistan called for “concerted effort” to recover weapons from militant groups like Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Normalcy returned to Chaman district in Balochistan after protests 7 June against mandatory visa regime for cross-border travel to Afghanistan turned violent. Security forces clashed with demonstrators as they attacked govt offices, injuring at least 40 people including 17 security personnel. Chaman border crossing with Afghanistan remained closed for seventh consecutive month, causing economic losses and hardship for traders.
Militant attacks and faith-based violence continued, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). Officials 9 June confirmed death of seven soldiers who were targeted by roadside bomb in Lakki Marwat district in KP; military 10 June claimed to have killed 11 “terrorists” suspected in attack during overnight operation between 10-11 June in Lakki Marwat District, also in KP militants were suspected of 18 June killing of prominent local journalist. News reports 16 June surfaced about death of Pakistani Taliban commander, Abdul Manan, in Afghanistan amid reports of internal strife within TTP. Faith-based violence continued. Notably, mob 20 June killed Muslim tourist from Punjab for allegedly desecrating Quran in KP’s Swat district. Police 8 June arrested man suspected of killing two men from Ahmadiyya community in Punjab’s Mandi Bahuddin district.
Internal political deadlock continued. Islamabad High Court 3 June acquitted former PM Imran Khan and FM Shah Mahmood Qureshi in cipher case and overturned 10-year sentence. However, both faced additional charges in other cases, making likelihood of their release slim. Despite first agreeing to negotiate with govt, Khan 14 June told journalists negotiating with “powerless” govt was futile when “higher authorities” predetermined outcomes.
Additional tranche of four-year IMF loan released amid improved economic climate; President Wickremesinghe’s challenge to Supreme Court provoked criticism.
IMF authorised disbursement of new tranche of $3bn four-year loan. Executive Board of International Monetary Fund (IMF) 12 June approved second review of Extended Funds Facility and authorised disbursement of additional $336mn as part of four-year loan. Colombo 26 June said it had sealed agreements with bilateral creditors committee led by Japan, France and India to restructure debt of $5.9bn. Official statistics released 14 June showed country’s economy grew by 5.3% in first quarter of 2024, considerably faster than 2% growth predicted by IMF for 2024. Govt’s plans to institute IMF-backed rental income tax by April 2025, designed to replace promised property, inheritance and gift taxes, sparked considerable uncertainty and criticism over impracticality and additional burdening of middle class, rather than wealthy groups govt and IMF said they intended to target.
President Wickremesinghe’s criticism of Supreme Court sparks controversy. In parliamentary session Wickremesinghe 18 June attacked Supreme Court’s 17 June determination that key elements of govt’s draft Gender Equality bill were inconsistent with constitution and needed to be removed or amended. President’s statement widely condemned with Bar Association of Sri Lanka 19 June criticising speech as “threat to Supreme Court and entire judicial system” and rejecting president’s proposed parliamentary select committee to review Supreme Court ruling as “dangerous precedent”. Senior Tamil National Alliance member M.A. Sumanthiran 18 June alleged president’s statement was part of larger plan to intimidate Supreme Court into approving constitutional amendment to extend president’s term from five to six years.
Sinhala-dominated parties appealed for support of Tamil voters in north and east. During visit to northern towns, Samagi Jana Balawegaya leader and likely presidential candidate Sajith Premadasa 9 June promised he would implement thirteenth amendment, designed to grant enough powers to provinces to satisfy demands for self-rule by Tamils in north and east. National People’s Power (NPP) and Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) leader Anura Kumara Dissanayake 11 June also visited north, said JVP party also supported “properly implementing” provincial council system, falling short of clear promise to fully implement thirteenth amendment.
Arakan Army (AA) expanded control in west, fuelling displacement, while ethnic armed groups and regime continued hostilities in north and south west.
In west, AA continued to make battlefield progress. AA rebels 6 June escalated attacks against last regime positions in northern Rakhine state, claiming capture of key military base in Maungdaw township; AA 16 June ordered residents to leave Maungdaw town after it claimed seizure of nearly all military posts in township. Local media 23 June reported that AA had seized key regime base in Ann township vital for defence of its Western Regional Command headquarters. Further south, local sources 24 June reported AA captured Thandwe Airport and Ngapali beach resort along with 132 regime soldiers, 47 policemen and their families. Meanwhile, regime forces 11 June ordered residents to leave as they attempted to secure outskirts of Rakhine capital, Sittwe; UN Human Rights chief 18 June called military response “indiscriminate”, said displaced Rohingya communities had “nowhere to flee”. UN Food Program 25 June denounced burning and looting of its food warehouses in Rakhine.
In north, Kachin Independence Army (KIA) clashed with regime. KIA and regime forces 4 June renewed fighting near Momeik town in northern Shan state forcing 300 people to flee; KIA continued its push through eastern parts of Kachin State, seizing Sadon town on 11 June. While southern Kachin State increasingly comes under KIA control, it is facing more pushback across border in northern Shan State from other ethnic armed groups.
In south east, Karen forces braced for tough fight. Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) prepared to defend Thingan Nyi Naung village from regime convoy attempting to cross Dawna Mountain range. KNLA has signalled its determination to keep control of strategic village despite its loss of nearby border trade town of Myawaddy. Meanwhile, regime-aligned Kayin National Army (formerly, Kayin State Border Guard Force) is in firm control of Myawaddy.
In other important developments. Regime forces 17 June arrested 13 members of Yangon-based underground group for allegedly planning to attack regime leader, Min Aung Hlaing, during 8 June ceremony for new bridge. Around 1,400 retired personnel under Reserve Forces Law, 1 June began reporting for duty.
Security operations continued in south, as authorities continued to fight communist rebels.
Insecurity persisted in Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM). Authorities 5 June arrested senior commander of Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) in Datu Piang town for his alleged involvement in burning police car and shooting inside church in Maguindanao del Sur in 2020; suspect is accused of violating Anti-Terrorism Act and faces multiple charges including attempted murder, arson, and frustrated murder. Explosion 18 June occurred at fuel station hours after local govt declared Lamitan in Basilan province free from presence of Abu Sayyaf Group, leaving one person injured; police next day dismissed speculation of group’s involvement citing extortion as motive for attack; Basilan authorities 19 June condemned attack, saying it undermined efforts of provincial and local governments to maintain peace and order in province. Members of 118 Base Command of Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) 19 June clashed with MILF’s 105th base command in Datu Unsay municipality of Maguindanao del Sur, killing one civilian.
Clashes between security forces and communist rebels continued, notably in Mindanao and the Visayas. Amid ongoing counter-insurgency operations, military continued to exert pressure on various New People’s Army (NPA) fronts, targeting leaders of guerrilla units and their legal fronts, as many fighters surrendered over last weeks. Military 10 June announced death of one communist rebel after 9 June clash with New People’s Army (NPA) in Sultan Kudarat province, Mindanao. NPA rebels 23 June briefly clashed with security forces in north Samar, in Eastern Visayas region, killing one rebel. Hostilities, that saw rise in Luzon island, killed total of 17 and injured four during month.
Criminal Court indicated former PM Thaksin on lèse-majesté charges, ethics case against PM Srettha continued, and deadly violence persisted in deep South.
Court indicted former PM Thaksin, Move Forward Party (MFP) continued to face threat of dissolution. Criminal Court 18 June indicted former Thai PM Thaksin Shinawatra for defaming Thai monarchy during 2015 interview with Korean newspaper; Court same day released him on 500,000 baths (or $13,600) bail and ordered him to reappear in court on 19 Aug. Amid court case about potential ban of election-winning MFP on lèse-majesté charges, former MFP leader Pita Limjaroenrat 9 June held press conference outlining party’s legal defence; Constitutional Court 18 June ordered MFP to submit deposition transcripts to court within seven days, set 3 July as date for next hearing.
Proceedings against PM Srettha Thavisin continued, senatorial elections began. Following Constitutional Court’s decision in late May to hear petition filed by 40 senators to remove PM Srettha from office on ethical grounds, court 18 June ordered individuals and agencies involved in case to submit more evidence within 15-day period, set 10 July as next hearing date. Process to select 200 senators from 20 professional and social groups began 9 June, with three rounds of intergroup polling by senate candidates at local, provincial and national levels; national-level poll concluded 26 June amid allegations of fraud, with results due on 2 July.
Violence continued in deep south. Rangers 9 June apprehended two suspected militants and 13 June discovered IED on National Highway roadside in Bannang Sata district, Yala province. In Pattani’s Nong Chik district, unknown attackers 13 June killed employee of Khor Thanyong Subdistrict Administrative Organisation as he rode his motorcycle to work. In Yala’s Bannang Sata district, suspected militants 14 June shot dead two Buddhist villagers. Gunmen 25 June killed human rights activist Roning Dolah in Yarang district, Pattani. An IED attack 27 June wounded ranger non-commissioned officer in Sri Sakhon district, Narathiwat. Militants 30 June detonated car bomb in front of police housing block in Bannang Sata district, Yala, killing one civilian and wounding 21 other people.
In another important international development. Govt 20 June submitted formal request to join BRICS, hoping to become member of group at next summit in Russia in October 2024.
China continued maritime activity in East China Sea, while U.S. and Japan sought to further bolster defence ties.
Beijing’s maritime activity around disputed areas persisted. As of 26 June, Japan reported 104 Chinese vessels entering Japan’s contiguous zone during month. Tokyo 7 June identified four Chinese Coast Guard vessels, reportedly armed with cannons, in Japan’s territorial sea near disputed area off Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. In rare occurrence, Chinese coast guard vessels entered into the territorial sea around the disputed islands for five days in a row 20-24 June. Netherlands’ defence ministry 8 June accused Chinese fighter jets of approaching Dutch navy frigate and helicopter in manner that “caused a potentially unsafe situation” in East China Sea; Beijing 11 June rejected accusations.
U.S. and Japan deepened defence ties. U.S. 7-18 June held biennial military exercise near Guam and Palau islands, Philippine Sea, including Japan for first time. Earlier, U.S., South Korean and Japanese coastguards 6 June engaged in first joint drill in Sea of Japan off Tango Peninsula. Japan and U.S. week of 10 June agreed to establish working groups on joint production of air defence missiles, warship and aircraft repairs and supply chain resiliency; 11 June held first