Tensions continued to mount ahead of concurrent party and presidential elections scheduled for 13 Nov amid concerns votes may not take place on time. 

As opposition continued to allege partiality of National Election Commission in favour of President Bihi, body’s chairperson 5 June warned ruling Kulmiye party against undermining commission’s autonomy. Disagreements persisted over election technology as some Kulmiye officials continued to push for deployment of eye scanners at polling stations to confirm voter identities, while opposition Waddani party raised doubts about practicality. Adding to tensions, govt 20 June arrested Waddani supporter at Hargeisa airport upon his return to country, sparking protests. Clan-based political tensions could also hinder elections after Bihi 9 June stated members of Gacaan Libaah movement that rebelled against govt in Aug 2023 would face trial, contradicting previous agreement and potentially reigniting dispute. Meanwhile, Horseed political association 2 June reiterated decision not to participate in upcoming party elections, alleging system favoured three officially recognised political parties.

Govt continued to prepare for November elections while tensions with Dhulbahante fighters remained high along Sool frontline.

Authorities progressed with vote arrangements. Ahead of 13 Nov concurrent party and presidential elections, House of Representatives 12 May approved presidential appointees to committee overseeing registration of political associations that will run in polls to decide which can become political parties; step further eases fears elections could be delayed. 

Tensions remained high but stable along Sool region frontline. Despite late April clashes in Sanaag region between Haber Jeclo sub-clan of Isaaq (Somaliland’s largest clan) and Dhulbahante clan members, frontlines between govt troops and those from SSC-Khatumo (self-declared administration for Dhulbahante community) in Sool region stayed largely quiet. Meanwhile, SSC-Khatumo leader Abdulkadir Firdhiye 14 May visited Somali capital Mogadishu for consultations between Somali federal govt and member states (see Somalia), but did not participate as full federal member state.

Authorities pursued preparations for implementation of Jan port deal with Ethiopia. Technical committee from Hargeisa early May announced it had finished its work and was awaiting counterparts from Addis Ababa, while President Bihi 18 May said he was certain agreement would be implemented “shortly”.

Govt announced date of Nov elections as lull in fighting in Sool region continued. 

Authorities confirmed date of Nov polls. Election commission 20 April announced party and presidential elections to take place 13 Nov and unveiled voter list two days later. Slow technical preparations and funding concerns, however, fuelled speculation that polls could still be delayed, despite March passing into law of electoral bill. 

Lull in fighting continued along Sool region frontline. Although govt troops and Dhulbahante clan militias conducted movements along frontline in Sool region, calm continued to hold.

In another important development. Govt 4 April rejected Somalia’s order to close Ethiopian consulate in capital Hargeisa amid persistent tensions with Mogadishu over Jan-announced Ethiopia-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding over sea access and diplomatic recognition.

Signing of electoral law ended uncertainty around Nov 2024 party and presidential elections and removed source of tension between govt and opponents.

Approval of bill paves way for vote, opposition welcomed move. President Bihi 9 March signed electoral bill and other related measures into law, ending months of tensions and speculation that polls due to be held Nov 2024 would be delayed. Main opposition party Waddani welcomed developments and Waddani candidate Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi Irro 21 March met Bihi and cabinet members, as sides prepare to move forward with elections where vote for political parties and presidency will be held concurrently.

Troop movements continued but calm remained along Sool region frontline. Govt troops and Dhulbahante clan militias conducted movements along frontline in Sool region; lull in fighting between sides however held.

In another important development. Technical committee aiming to finalise Jan-announced Ethiopia-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding over sea access and diplomatic recognition conducted meetings with stakeholders, including in coastal areas, at Berbera port and with opposition parties.

Election-related dispute kept domestic politics tense ahead of Nov polls, while fallout from port deal with Ethiopia continued to loom large.

Electoral uncertainty persisted. House of Elders and House of Representatives 17-18 Feb passed revised electoral law paving way for presidential and political party elections in Nov. President Bihi has 21 days to sign bill, but opposition remains concerned that he will not do so and instead seek to delay vote, reneging on Aug 2023 govt-opposition deal.

Fallout from deal with Addis Ababa continued. As Bihi 22 Feb vowed to implement agreement with Ethiopia to lease stretch of Somaliland’s coastline to establish naval base and commercial maritime services in return for potential acknowledgement of Somaliland as sovereign state, Mogadishu-Hargeisa tensions remained high over agreement. Series of suspicious deaths in Mogadishu of civilians originally from Somaliland further stoked tensions, while airspace control, which currently falls under Somalia’s purview, became battleground. Somalia around 23 Feb accused Somaliland of interfering in communications with flights, while Somaliland around 25 Feb claimed contradictory instructions from Somalia 24 Feb nearly led to mid-air collision.

In move that could revive election-related dispute, President Bihi refused to sign electoral laws; govt announced plan to give landlocked Ethiopia commercial and military access to sea, sparking domestic opposition and ratcheting up regional tensions. 

Electoral tensions re-emerged. President Bihi 22 Jan returned recently-approved electoral laws back to House of Elders over alleged procedural flaws, instead of signing them into law. Move re-ignited tensions and suspicions among opposition that Bihi does not want to hold presidential election by year’s end. Notably, opposition party Waddani same day vowed to “respond strongly and take swift action”. 

Deal with Addis Ababa sparked diplomatic crisis. Govt and Ethiopia 1 Jan signed Memorandum of Understanding for Addis Ababa to lease 20km stretch of Somaliland’s coastline to establish naval base and commercial maritime services; Hargeisa claimed Ethiopia would in return acknowledge Somaliland as sovereign state, which would make Addis Ababa first capital to recognise its independence from Somalia, while Ethiopia said it would conduct “in depth-assessment” of its position on the matter. Somaliland and Ethiopia’s army chiefs 9 Jan met in Addis Ababa to discuss military cooperation. Deal, which came days after Bihi and Somalia President Mohamud agreed to resume Somalia-Somaliland dialogue, caused international consternation. Notably, Mogadishu 2 Jan denounced “act of aggression”, vowed to defend Somalia’s territorial integrity by “any legal means” (see Somalia).

Domestic opposition to deal also emerged, auguring difficult implementation. Opposition called for more transparency over agreement, with Waddani party in days after announcement pointing to significant discrepancies between Ethiopia and Somaliland’s accounts of deal. Communities in western Somaliland (where naval base may be located), who hold historical grievances over perceived marginalisation by Isaaq (Somaliland’s largest clan), 6 Jan held demonstrations against potential transfer of land to Ethiopia. Police 6 Jan detained three journalists holding debate about agreement at TV station in capital Hargeisa. Meanwhile, defence minister 7 Jan resigned in protest at agreement, saying Ethiopia remained “number one enemy” and having Ethiopian troops stationed in Somaliland would be inappropriate.  

In another important development. Lull in fighting between govt and Dhulbahante clan militias in Sool region persisted.

Tensions persisted between govt and Dhulbahante clan militias in Sool region, while new Dhulbahante authorities insisted on becoming federal member state of Somalia.

Situation remained precarious in Sool region despite lull in fighting. Govt and Dhulbahante clan militia in Dec continued to reinforce positions near frontline, leading to concerns of resumption in fighting. Risk of further skirmishes between Isaaq (Somaliland’s largest clan) and Dhulbahante militias around Buhoodle town also remained high. Meanwhile, govt 4 Dec and 8 Dec claimed arresting spies working for Somali, Dhulbahante and Puntland authorities.

Dhulbahante administration continued to assert independence. SSC-Khatumo state (new self-declared administration for Dhulbahante community) 23 Dec rejected participation in Puntland elections in Jan and insisted on being autonomous Somalia state.

Somaliland and Somalia agreed to resume dialogue. President Bihi and Somalia President Mohamud 28-29 Dec met in Djibouti, agreed to resume dialogue to resolve political issues, after previous talks stalled in 2020; sides also agreed to cooperate on security and fight against organised crime. Bihi 31 Dec also travelled to Ethiopia for talks with PM Abiy Ahmed.

Inter-clan clashes pitted Dhulbahante militias against Isaaq sub-clan fighters in Sool region and parliament prepared for Nov 2024 elections.

Security situation remained precarious in Sool region. Dhulbahante clan militias 6-9 Nov clashed with fighters from Haber Jeclo sub-clan of Isaaq (Somaliland’s largest clan) at Buq-dharkayn town, 20km south of frontline of conflict between Somaliland govt and SSC-Khatumo state (new self-declared administration for Dhulbahante community) around Oog town, leading to unconfirmed number of deaths and capture of prisoners. Govt and SSC-Khatumo state accused each other of stoking violence and reinforced nearby positions. Deadly clashes 22 Nov resumed in Buq-dharkayn and Maygaale areas. Though fighting has mostly been on clan militia level, Somaliland pointed to involvement of Somalia’s Puntland state, while SSC-Khatumo called on Somali and international actors to pressure Somaliland President Bihi to cease hostilities. Ruling party’s deputy chairman, Hussein Aden Adde, 27 Nov reportedly defected to SSC-Khatumo. Meanwhile, self-declared administration continued lobbying to become member state of Somalia.

Electoral tensions remained low amid preparations for Nov 2024 vote. August agreement between Bihi and opposition to simultaneously hold political party and presidential elections on 13 November 2024 continued to hold. House of Elders 18 Nov agreed to form committee to review amendments to election law made by parliament.

Govt messaging signalled desire to retake territory lost to Dhulbahante clan militias in Sool region.

Tensions remained high between govt and Dhulbahante clan forces in Sool region. In strongest public comment since Somaliland army’s pull-out from Dhulbahante-inhabited parts of Sool region in late Aug, President Bihi 14 Oct said Somaliland would not accept separate administration in Sool. Reports emerged of troop mobilisation in Qorilugud area near Buhoodle city, which could augur attempt to retake territory in coming months. Meanwhile, leader of SSC-Khatumo state (new self-declared administration for Dhulbahante community) Abdulkadir Firdhiye 6-22 Oct visited Somali capital Mogadishu, reiterated desire to form new Somali member state during talks with Somali PM Hamza Abdi Barre and President Mohamud; local media 19 Oct reported that Mogadishu recognised SSC-Khatumo as interim administration.

Clan tensions erupted elsewhere. Clan tensions late Sept-early Oct flared around Togdheer region’s capital Burco and Sanaag region’s capital Erigabo, resulting in small skirmishes; SSC-Khatumo 18 Oct accused Bihi of “inciting hatred” among clans.

Electoral dispute de-escalated further. Electoral-related strains continued to dissipate after Gacaan Libaah militia, which originally opposed August agreement between Bihi and opposition to simultaneously hold political party and presidential elections on 13 Nov 2024, late Sept agreed to lay down arms. Election-related tensions continued to simmer in Awdal region, however, with some prominent Gadabursi clan figures attempting to organise themselves both inside and outside Somaliland.

New front line between Dhulbahante clan militias and govt forces stabilised, while election-related tensions dissipated after President Bihi accepted compromise with opposition.

Front line shifted away from Sool region’s capital Las Anod. Following Dhulbahante militiamen’s major victory with Aug capture of Goojacade army base near Las Anod, new front line emerged between Oog and Guumays villages in western Sool. New division corresponds roughly to boundaries between Isaaq and Dhulbahante clans, with Isaaq being dominant grouping in Somaliland. Both sides in Sept sent reinforcements to area, raising fears of further clashes, but new front line remained quiet. Meanwhile, SSC-Khatumo State (self-declared govt of Dhulbahante separatists) 14 Sept hosted large delegation of MPs from Somalia as it strives to become Somali member state.

President Bihi accepted compromise on longstanding electoral dispute. Weakened by army’s retreat from Sool, Bihi 30 Aug accepted recommendations from elders of Haber Jeclo, sub-clan of Isaaq, who had been mediating between govt and opposition on electoral dispute; agreement will see combined political party and presidential election on 13 November 2024. As Gacaan Libaah militia opposed deal, Bihi 6 Sept offered to pardon group in exchange for their demobilisation, and militia late Sept accepted to disband. Political association headed by prominent figure from Western Somaliland also criticised agreement as Isaaq-mediated deal that leaves out non-Isaaq communities such as Gadabursi, tapping into latent grievances in Awdal region.