Diplomatic spat with Rwanda intensified with border closure, amid escalating rhetoric and reports of troop build-up along border; crisis is part of three-way tussle involving DR Congo. 

Burundi closed border with Rwanda amid escalating rhetoric. Interior Minister Martin Niteretse 11 Jan announced decision to suspend diplomatic relations and close all borders with Rwanda over Kigali’s alleged support for RED-Tabara rebels. Kigali immediately labelled move “unfortunate decision” that violates principles of East African Community (EAC) regional bloc, which 12 Jan called for “peaceful settlement” of dispute. SOS Médias Burundi 14 Jan reported arbitrary arrest of at least 38 Rwandan nationals in Mugina commune, and 58 others in Rugombo commune, both Cibitoke province, since 11 Jan; most of them were reportedly repatriated to Rwanda in following days. President Ndayishimiye 21 Jan said Rwandans are “prisoners of bad leaders”. Kigali next day denounced “inflammatory allegations aimed at sowing division among Rwandans”, and President Kagame 23 Jan vowed to “fight” to protect Rwanda. Gitega same day accused Rwanda of recruiting Burundian refugees in Rwanda to join RED-Tabara. In further sign of growing tension, SOS Médias Burundi 25 Jan reported increasing number of soldiers and ruling party youth wing (Imbonerakure) policing border with Rwanda (see Rwanda). 

Authorities intensified clampdown on main opposition party. Interior ministry 17 Jan sent letter to main opposition party, National Council for Freedom (CNL) – whose activities are currently suspended due to govt-orchestrated internal dispute – accusing it of collaborating with terrorist organisation and threatening “consequences”. Move came after CNL 2 Jan co-signed letter sent by platform of civil society and political groups to guarantors of 2003 Arusha agreement, urging them to support agreement’s continued application. 

In another important development. Former PM Alain-Guillaume Bunyoni 2 Jan reportedly lodged appeal after being sentenced late 2023 to life imprisonment on several charges including attempting to overthrow govt and threatening president’s life.

Govt continued military campaign to subdue independence-seeking Anglophone militias, while jihadists kept up attacks in Far North region. 

Security situation in Anglophone regions remained dire. Govt aircraft 10 Jan crashed in Kikaikelaki town, near Kumbo city, Bui division (North West region); exchange of fire followed between Anglophone separatist combatants and govt forces, with unknown casualties; military said aircraft suffered mechanical failure, while separatists claimed shooting it down. For first time since Dec 2019, govt 20 Jan said army 9 Jan killed separatist militia Ambazonia Defence Forces ground commander in clashes near Batibo town, Momo division (North West). Meanwhile, govt’s renewed attempt to crush weekly general strike called by separatists, dubbed “Monday ghost town”, ratcheted up tensions. Notably, separatists reportedly trying to enforce ghost town 15 Jan attacked police station and fired shots for hours in Nkwen neighbourhood of North West regional capital Bamenda. Fako Black Tar separatist militia overnight 29-30 Jan raided parts of South West regional capital Buea and killed at least two civilians, claiming residents did not comply with ghost town order. Separatist faction Interim Government of Ambazonia 29 Jan announced ending cooperation with UN agencies, putting humanitarian operations at risk. Biafra separatist militants from Nigeria 12 Jan reportedly attacked Cameroonian govt forces in Abana town, Bakassi Peninsula (South West).

Jihadist militants kept up attacks on military, civilians in Far North region. Boko Haram 1 Jan killed four Christians and abducted ten others celebrating New Year in Bargaram village, Logone-et-Chari division; in video posted online, militants vowed to avenge Palestinian victims of war in Gaza. Army 7-8 Jan repelled jihadist attack on military post in Zamga town and cleared three landmines near Djibrili town, both Mayo-Tsanaga division, while Boko Haram 20 Jan killed at least five civilians in two villages of Mayo-Tsanaga. Suspected Boko Haram gunmen 10 Jan abducted three staff members of international humanitarian organisation Première urgence in Yémé village, Mayo-Sava division. 

President Biya announced fuel price increase in bid to cut spending. In his end-of-year address, Biya 31 Dec announced further reduction of fuel subsidy in 2024; move could further increase cost of living and fuel popular discontent.

Authorities appeared set to eliminate potential rivals before 2025 elections, while incidents involving explosive device attacks compounded already dire security situation. 

Authorities settled scores with potential dissidents and election rivals. Joint patrol of govt forces and Russian paramilitary Wagner Group 3 Jan arrested mayor of Baboua, Caprang Ephraim, and commander of north west defence zone, Col Modoua, in Nana-Mambéré prefecture; detentions may be related to inter-ethnic disputes within military, particularly over control of mineral resources. Court in capital Bangui 17 Jan sentenced in absentia former National Assembly speaker, Karim Meckassoua, to life imprisonment on charges of endangering state security and colluding with Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC) rebels. 

President Touadéra continued hazardous push to diversify security partners. Around 150 people from pro-Russian civil society platform Initiative Committee for the Control and Investigation of the U.S. Actions 25 Jan demonstrated in front of U.S. Embassy in Bangui to demand withdrawal of U.S.-based private security company Bancroft Global Development; protest came after presidency in Dec confirmed military cooperation agreement between govt and Bancroft. Wagner’s reaction could turn into something more worrisome if Touadéra is not able to share duties and benefits among security partners. 

Security situation marked by resurgence of explosive device attacks. Improvised explosive device (IED), possibly linked to armed group Return, Reclamation, Rehabilitation (3R), 11 Jan killed three civilians and injured another in Bouar town (Nana-Mambéré prefecture). Another IED 15 Jan killed one UN peacekeeper and wounded another five in Mbindale village (Lim-Pendé prefecture). Meanwhile, Wagner elements 9 Jan attempted to shoot down unidentified object flying over their base in Ndélé town (Bamingui-Bangoran prefecture); local authorities next day imposed curfew and arrested ten civilians. Violent clashes between armed actors took place in various regions. Unity for Peace in the Central African Republic (UPC) combatants 7 Jan attacked Azandé Ani Kpi Gbé (AAKG) ethnic militia in Obo town (Haut-Mbomou prefecture), resulting in at least three deaths. CPC elements 8 Jan attacked base hosting army and Wagner elements in Kabo town (Ouham-Fafa prefecture); fifteen rebels and four govt soldiers killed, and at least ten civilians wounded.

Transitional president maintained tight grip on power despite appointment of opposition leader as PM; authorities announced foiling destabilisation attempt, and pro-Sudanese armed forces hacking group targeted Chad. 

Opposition leader named PM, Deby endorsed as presidential candidate. Transitional President Gen Mahamat Déby 1 Jan appointed Succès Masra, founder of opposition party Les Transformateurs, as PM of transitional govt. Déby in following days asserted his authority, however. New govt formed 2 Jan kept key figures from previous govt while Masra secured only three ministries for his party. In likely bid to tighten control over Masra’s actions, Déby 8 Jan appointed Les Transformateurs defector, Moustapha Masri, as deputy head of his civilian cabinet. Ruling party Patriotic Salvation Movement of late President Idriss Déby 13 Jan nominated President Mahamat Déby as candidate for presidential election due to be held in Oct. 

Security situation remained precarious. Military 12 Jan announced foiling planned “insurrection” and arresting 80 armed officers, including alleged coordinator of insurrectional movement, Lt. Kouroumta Levana Guelemi; development might be related to interethnic struggles within national army. Almost 900 fighters from rebel coalition Union of Democratic Forces for Democracy 2 Jan gathered in Faya-Largeau city (Borkou province) with their president, Mahamat Nouri, to disarm as per 2022 Doha agreement, but govt’s inability to fund disarmament program could lead to tensions and further instability. Meanwhile, intercommunal conflicts continued in country’s centre and south; notably, clash between herders and farmers 6 Jan left one dead and unknown number injured in Abtouyour department (Guéra province). 

Cyberattack targeted Chad over stance on Sudan conflict. Pro-Sudanese armed forces hacking group, Anonymous Sudan, 10 Jan hit Chad’s internet infrastructure, causing hours-long internet blackout; group said attack was in retaliation for N’Djamena’s alleged support for paramilitary Rapid Support Force (RSF). Meanwhile, Chadian and Sudanese FMs 18 Jan met in Ugandan capital Kampala to discuss bilateral relations. 

In another important development. Déby 24 Jan met with Russian President Putin in Russia’s capital Moscow.

President Tshisekedi inaugurated for new term as his coalition swept legislative and provincial elections; eastern provinces saw fierce M23 conflict and attacks on civilians by other groups. 

Tshisekedi sworn in as his coalition scored big in elections. Constitutional Court 9 Jan confirmed Tshisekedi’s victory in presidential election with 73% of vote, rejecting two legal challenges to provisional results. Tshisekedi sworn in 20 Jan after Moïse Katumbi and Martin Fayulu, second and third respectively in presidential contest, 18 Jan condemned decision but declined to call protests on inauguration day, citing security risks. Fayulu 20 Jan turned down Tshisekedi’s offer of official opposition spokesman position. Electoral commission (CENI) 14, 22 Jan published legislative and provincial election results, giving Tshisekedi’s coalition comfortable majorities. Earlier in month, CENI 5 Jan cancelled legislative and provincial elections results in two constituencies citing irregularities and disqualified 82 candidates for legislative, provincial and municipal elections over suspected fraud. 

M23 conflict persisted in North Kivu province. Pro-govt Wazalendo militia around 16 Jan clashed with M23 rebels on Karuba-Mushaki road in bid to capture Mushaki town (Masisi territory). After Wazalendo and army around 22 Jan launched offensive to take Mweso town (Masisi) from M23, bombing of civilian homes 25 Jan left at least nineteen dead. Fighting also reported in and around Sake town (Masisi), where bomb 27 Jan killed one civilian. Army drone strike 16 Jan killed two M23 commanders in Kitshanga town, which straddles Rutshuru and Masisi territories. Meanwhile, army 17 Jan claimed three Congolese soldiers killed or captured by Rwandan army previous day had crossed border “inadvertently” (see Rwanda). 

Other armed groups continued to wreak havoc in eastern provinces. In Ituri province, Islamic State-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) 8 and 12 Jan killed seven people in Irumu territory; 14 Jan killed eight in Mambasa territory. Group 23-30 Jan killed 26 in attacks across Beni territory (North Kivu). CODECO association of ethnic Lendu militias attacked Djugu territory settlements (Ituri), with eight people killed 1-2 Jan and three others 4 Jan. 

In another important development. Adam Chalwe, former leader of ex-president Joseph Kabila’s party, 6 Jan joined Alliance du Fleuve Congo, newly created politico-military group allied with M23.

Three-way tussle with Burundi and DR Congo intensified as Gitega closed border with northern neighbour amid escalating rhetoric, while Rwandan army shot Congolese soldier dead. 

Burundi closed border with Rwanda as both sides escalated rhetoric. Burundian govt 11 Jan announced suspending relations and closing all borders with Rwanda over Kigali’s alleged support for RED-Tabara rebels; Rwandan govt immediately labelled move “unfortunate decision” that violates principles of East African Community regional bloc, which 12 Jan called for “peaceful settlement” of dispute. Burundian President Ndayishimiye 21 Jan said Rwandans are “prisoners of bad leaders”. Kigali next day denounced “inflammatory allegations aimed at sowing division among Rwandans”, and President Kagame 23 Jan vowed to “fight” to protect Rwanda. Burundian govt same day accused Rwanda of recruiting Burundian refugees in Rwanda to join RED-Tabara, and late Jan reportedly increased number of soldiers and ruling party youth wing (Imbonerakure) policing border with Rwanda (see Burundi). 

Tensions with DR Congo led to deadly border incident. Army 16 Jan announced capturing two Congolese soldiers after they crossed into Rwandan territory near Rubavu town, and shooting another dead as he tries to open fire on Rwandan forces; Congolese army next day claimed trio had crossed border “inadvertently” and said it had referred to Regional Joint Verification Mechanism for repatriation of soldier’s body and release of other two. Congolese President Tshisekedi 30 Jan reiterated claims that M23 rebels are backed by Rwanda, referred to Kigali as “aggressor” which “occupies a portion of our territory” (see DR Congo).

President Isaias met with Somali counterpart amid heightened tensions over Ethiopia-Somaliland memorandum of understanding.

Ethiopia and Somaliland 1 Jan signed memorandum of understanding that would allow Ethiopia to develop naval base along coast of Somaliland; Hargeisa said deal includes recognition of Somaliland’s independence, though Addis Ababa’s commitment to this step appears tentative (see Ethiopia, Somaliland). Announcement ratcheted up regional tensions. Mogadishu, which views Somaliland as part of Somalia’s territory, 2 Jan called agreement an “act of aggression” and began rallying regional allies in order to exert pressure on Addis Ababa to halt deal (see Somalia). Notably, Somali President Mohamud 8 Jan met with President Isaias in capital Asmara. Mohamud next day claimed Isaias supported “the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Somalia”; Asmara issued no official statement but is widely expected to side with Mogadishu on issue amid deteriorating relations with Ethiopia. 

President Ruto threatened to defy courts, sparking fears of manipulation of judiciary, while sporadic attacks by Al-Shabaab, cattle-rustlers and criminal groups continued.

Ruto’s criticism of judiciary sparked concerns about independence of courts. President Ruto 2 Jan accused unnamed judges of “corruption” and working with opposition to impede govt’s policies, suggesting govt could defy judges’ orders; courts had put govt’s plans to raise taxes for projects including universal health coverage and affordable housing on hold citing unconstitutionality. Bar association Law Society of Kenya 12 Jan held countrywide protests denouncing attempt to intimidate judges. Chief Justice Martha Koome and Ruto 22 Jan met in Nairobi in bid to prevent further escalation; opposition leader Raila Odinga called meeting “irresponsible” accusing executive of holding judiciary “hostage”.

Al-Shabaab continued attacks near Somali border. Al-Shabaab 4 Jan attacked Kenyan military base in El-Waq town, just across border in Somalia’s Gedo region. Roadside bomb 15 Jan injured five police officers in Lafey town, Mandera county. Suspected Al-Shabaab explosive device 18 Jan killed police officer and injured four others near Bula Hawa border crossing in Mandera county.

Deadly cattle rustling and banditry persisted. Unidentified assailants 5 Jan killed three people attempting to retrieve stolen livestock in Elgeyo-Marakwet county. Suspected banditry attacks in Baringo county 8 Jan left three people dead on road from Marigat town to Chemoe village, and around 13 Jan killed another two people in Natan village.

In other important developments. Court 26 Jan blocked govt plan to deploy police to Haiti to lead UN-backed multinational mission, saying it was “unconstitutional, illegal and invalid” due to lack of “reciprocal arrangement” between Kenya and Haiti; govt same day vowed to appeal decision. Ruto 30 Jan said he would sort “paperwork” to push ahead with deployment.

Mogadishu reacted furiously to Ethiopia-Somaliland port deal; absent de-escalation, diplomatic row could weaken anti-Al-Shabaab campaign and further undermine regional stability.

Diplomatic row erupted over Ethiopia’s sea access deal. Govt rejected Ethiopia-Somaliland agreement signed 1 Jan, which grants Ethiopia sea access for naval facility via Somaliland, and potentially paves way for Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland’s independence (see Somaliland); Mogadishu 2 Jan denounced “act of aggression” violating Somalia’s sovereignty and recalled ambassador to Ethiopia for consultations. Thousands 3 Jan protested against agreement in capital Mogadishu, and President Mohamud 6 Jan signed bill nullifying deal. Govt mobilised support among international partners, with AU, Intergovernmental Authority on Development, EU, U.S. and others reiterating support for Somalia’s sovereignty. Mohamud also engaged regionally, travelling to Eritrea 8 Jan and to Qatar 22 Jan. Mogadishu 18 Jan rejected engagement with Ethiopia, saying “there is no space for mediation” until Addis Ababa retracts agreement. 

Operations against Al-Shabaab militants continued at slow pace. In Mudug region of Galmudug state (centre), security forces and Al-Shabaab 6 Jan clashed in Jeeh-jeeh area, and militants 24 Jan temporarily overran pro-govt clan militia position in Caad district. Airstrikes targeting militants in central states of Galmudug and Hirshabelle, including in Galhareeri 25 Jan, Cali Heyle 27 Jan, and Buq Aqable same day, showed govt’s reliance on international air support. Meanwhile, militants continued attacks, albeit at lower level; in Mogadishu, Al-Shabaab 11 Jan killed UN security guard in mortar attack targeting airport compound, and 16 Jan killed four people in suicide attack near Banadir regional administration. Suspected Al-Shabaab combatants 10 Jan also kidnapped several UN contractors after their helicopter crashed in Galmudug. Potential rupture in Somalia-Ethiopia relations would have significant consequences on security operations, given Somalia’s cooperation with Ethiopia against Al-Shabaab.

Puntland election cycle concluded peacefully with President Deni’s re-election. Puntland President Said Deni 8 Jan won second five-year term in indirect election; opposition largely accepted result despite alleging manipulation in selection of MPs who took part in vote; legislators representing Dhulbahante community participated in elections after SSC-Khatumo (self-declared administration for Dhulbahante in territory also claimed by Somaliland) vowed not to in Dec. Vote concluded peacefully, offering parties opportunity to move on from divisive episode.

Calls to postpone elections rose, intercommunal violence escalated in Warrap state and Abyei administrative area, as well as Jonglei state, and Sudan’s war drew closer to South Sudan. 

Calls to delay 2024 elections rose amid lack of preparedness. More voices called for extension of transitional govt’s mandate due to inadequate time to organise credible elections. Notably, South Sudan Opposition Alliance MP David De Dau 2 Jan proposed five-year extension. During meeting with UN envoy Nicholas Haysom, opposition leader Riek Machar 11 Jan maintained that his party Sudan People’s Liberation Army-in Opposition (SPLA-IO) will participate in polls only if key prerequisites, including census, constitution and unification of forces, are in place. 

President Kiir expelled Nuer leader as violence escalated in Abyei. Fighting between Twik Dinka from Warrap state and Ngok Dinka from disputed Abyei region continued to escalate. President Kiir 10-11 Jan met local officials amid mounting pressure, 16 Jan ordered expulsion of Nuer spiritual leader Gai Maciek from Warrap for aggravating violence; Maciek refused to leave, 18 Jan attacked cattle camp in Mayom county, killing fifteen and stealing 800 cattle. Twic youth and Maciek’s forces 27-28 Jan carried out attacks in Abyei, killing over 50, including two UN peacekeepers. 

Jonglei saw stepped-up intercommunal violence; army and opposition clashed in Unity. In breach of Jonglei State’s 2021 peace agreement, armed Murle youth from Greater Pibor Administrative Area 4 Jan attacked Dinka cattle camp in Duk county, killing 24 Dinka and stealing 7,000 cattle; gunmen 15 Jan killed Duk county chief in Poktap town. With Dinka mobilising for possible revenge attack, peace dialogue among Murle, Dinka and Nuer communities is at risk. Meanwhile, army-SPLA-IO skirmishes in Unity State 29 Jan injured at least two.

Alleged alliance between rebel general and Sudan’s paramilitary raised concern. Advances by Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) brought war closer to border with South Sudan (see Sudan). Unity State commander William Manyang Mayak 10 Jan claimed rebel general Stephen Buay and hundreds of Nuer fighters had allied with RSF and were planning attacks on oilfields, prompting army to deploy along border; Buay 30 Jan denied claims. 

Paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) advanced south into Sennar, White and Blue Nile states, and began consolidating power in Darfur region; RSF leader’s diplomatic tour continued.

RSF advanced south and began consolidating power in Darfur. Following RSF’s Dec advance toward central-eastern Sudan and subsequent capture of Gezira state capital, army early Jan began arming civilians in Gezira; RSF 18 Jan threatened to continue offensives into eastern Gedarif, Kassala and Port Sudan states if civilian recruitment continues. In south, RSF early Jan surrounded Sennar city, Sennar state, and advanced toward White and Blue Nile states, triggering formation of new militias that support army. Meanwhile, RSF stepped up efforts to form civil administration and security structures in parts of Darfur region it controls. Notably, in West Darfur state it appointed new governor and pursued peace deals with local actors; in North Darfur state, it worked to de-escalate tensions with Darfuri armed groups, most of whom are Juba Peace Agreement signatories, and forged alliances to bolster security presence in state capital El Fasher. 

Fighting fuelled ethnic conflict in Kordofan region. In South Kordofan state, RSF 8 Jan attacked army position around Dilling town, leading to skirmishes with rebel group Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (al-Hilu) due to group’s ethnic affiliation with army; confrontation turned into ethnic-based conflict between non-Arab Nubian SPLM-N (al-Hilu) and RSF-affiliated Misseriya and Hawazma Arab militias. In West Kordofan state’s Babanusa town, RSF-army clashes 22-24 Jan reportedly killed and injured dozens.

Army stepped up offensives. Army renewed aerial offensives in capital Khartoum, as well as South Darfur and Gezira states; 27 Jan launched ground attacks in Khartoum’s north and south east amid offensive in sister city Omdurman. Addressing troops in Kassala state, Burhan 30 Jan announced shift in strategy, directing army and allies to launch full-scale offensive against RSF.

RSF leader continued diplomatic engagement. RSF leader Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo “Hemedti” continued regional tour, 18 Jan attended Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) summit in Uganda, prompting army 20 Jan to suspend Sudan’s membership in setback for IGAD mediation effort. Hemedti 2 Jan signed declaration with civilian coalition TAQADDUM, agreeing to ceasefire talks with army; army leader 5 Jan rejected declaration. 

Human rights violations and repression of dissent continued, while govt kept up operations against Islamic State-affiliated rebels.

Civil society activists and opposition politicians remained under threat. Unidentified assailants 3 Jan stabbed prominent gay rights activist Steven Kabuye on outskirts of capital Kampala, leaving him in serious condition; fellow LGBTQ+ activists said homophobia and harassment have soared since draconian anti-LGBTQ law was enacted in May 2023. Police 18 Jan placed three opposition leaders under house arrest, including former presidential candidates Robert Kyagulanyi, alias ‘Bobi Wine’, and Kizza Besigye, ahead of planned protest demanding govt action to address deteriorating road conditions. In interview with French TV channel France 24 published 30 Jan, Wine called for “civil disobedience, a moral uprising, a revolution” against President Museveni.

Govt’s campaign against Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) continued. Museveni 9 Jan called on Islamic State-affiliated ADF rebels based in DR Congo (DRC) to surrender, and military 20 Jan reported killing three ADF combatants and rescuing eight hostages in Irumu territory, Ituri province in eastern DRC. 

In another important development. Museveni 5 Jan appointed three former govt-aligned legislators to leadership roles at electoral commission. Amid outcry from opposition, Museveni 17 Jan backtracked on two of these appointments prior to parliamentary confirmation hearings. 

Opposition leader Nelson Chamisa left Citizens Coalition for Change, claiming party had been hijacked by ruling ZANU-PF; economic climate drove migration. 

Widening rift between rival factions of main opposition party led to its implosion. Self-proclaimed secretary-general of main opposition party Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC), Sengezo Tshabangu – who triggered series of by-elections by recalling CCC elected officials – 15 Jan announced interim party leadership structure, challenging CCC president Nelson Chamisa’s hold on party. High Court 19 Jan ruled recalled CCC MPs and municipal councillors could not be candidates in next by-elections for six parliamentary seats due to be held 3 Feb. Chamisa 22 Jan accused unnamed members of CCC of “selling out”, and 25 Jan announced leaving “hijacked” party, reiterating Tshabangu’s rise is part of ploy by ruling party ZANU-PF party to infiltrate and divide CCC, and ultimately regain two-thirds majority in parliament. Meanwhile, court 30 Jan gave former opposition MP Job Sikhala two-year suspended sentence for allegedly inciting violence, but released him on bail after almost 600 days in pre-trial detention.

Gloomy economic outlook drove migration. Hike in passport application fees, effective 1 Jan, sparked rush for passports with long queues reported late Dec outside Harare’s passport office. Govt’s move is part of attempt to stem surge in migration amid lack of formal jobs and low prospects of economic recovery; govt data from 2022 reported 900,000 Zimbabwean emigrants, though number likely an undercount. 

Ouagadougou announced withdrawal from West African regional bloc alongside Mali and Niger, dealing blow to regional integration; authorities claimed foiling coup attempt and Russian troop deployment continued.

Junta announced leaving ECOWAS, defying pressure to restore constitutional rule. Junta leaders of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger 28 Jan announced leaving ECOWAS, denouncing “inhumane” sanctions imposed by regional bloc following coups. ECOWAS immediately said three countries were “important members of the Community” and bloc “remains committed to finding a negotiated solution to the political impasse”; also said it had not yet received formal withdrawal notification.

Deployment of Russian troops accelerated. Contingent of about 100 Russian military personnel 24 Jan reportedly arrived in capital Ouagadougou in what appeared to be initial phase of 300-member force deployment.

Authorities continued to silence dissent amid report of coup plot. Authorities 18 Jan announced foiling coup attempt scheduled to take place 14 Jan, accused network of military officers, as well civilians and activists, of conspiring to destabilise institutions. Meanwhile, silencing of dissent continued. Notably, men in civilian clothes 24 Jan arrested lawyer and political activist Guy-Hervé Kam in capital Ouagadougou on undisclosed charges; his political movement accused transitional authorities of orchestrating “kidnapping”.

Govt forces and civilian auxiliaries continued to clash with jihadist militants. In Centre-North region, al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) militants 3 Jan attacked military base in Gabou town, Sanmatenga province, killing seventeen members of state-sponsored civilian militia (VDPs). In Sahel region, army 21 Jan reportedly killed prominent leader of Islamic State Sahel Province, Harouna Oulel, near Oueldi village, Oudalan province. NGO Human Rights Watch 25 Jan accused security forces of killing at least 60 civilians in drone strikes between Aug and Nov 2023, said attacks may amount to war crimes. Transitional President Capt. Traoré 5 and 10 Jan shared details about previously announced tax hikes on salaries and govt bonuses and benefit increases for VDPs; new taxes illustrate Ouagadougou’s financial difficulties, while prospect of better conditions for VDPs may backfire if authorities fail to fulfil promises.

Main opposition party laid out plans for return to power in 2025, and govt affirmed American and Chinese diplomatic ties.

New PDCI leader promoted participatory and inclusive decision-making. Former Credit Suisse CEO, Tidjane Thiam, inaugurated 24 Jan as president of main opposition party Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI); Thiam mapped out party’s strategy to return to power in 2025, vowing to promote participatory decision-making to strengthen PDCI’s internal democracy, while calling for reform of Independent Electoral Commission. After launching membership campaign, party early Jan reportedly recruited nearly 4,000 new members.

Relations remained strong with Washington. During visit to Côte d’Ivoire, U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken 23 Jan praised govt’s approach to security, notably making sure security forces understand “the needs, the concerns of communities”, as model for other countries. Earlier, Wall Street Journal newspaper 3 Jan reportedU.S. diplomats met with Ivorian officials to discuss possibility of setting up reconnaissance drone base in Côte d’Ivoire. 

In another important development. Govt 17 Jan also reaffirmed long-standing strategic partnership with China, as Chinese FM Wang Yi publicly thanked Abidjan for “firm support” on Taiwan issue.

Military govt granted pardon to alleged coup plotters, while international community voiced concern over media repression.  

Military officers pardoned of alleged coup attempt. Govt 2 Jan released video detailing coup attempt allegedly undertaken by two senior military officers at unclear date several months ago, which govt did not report at the time; pair admitted to attempting to overthrow transitional President Col. Doumbouya but were granted presidential pardon without official trial, amid lack of clarity over incident. 

Uncertainty around constitutional referendum persisted. Govt 23 Jan announced Doumbouya elevated to rank of general amid continuing doubts over domestic political future after he used 31 Dec New Year’s address to announce plans to hold constitutional referendum in 2024 as part of transition to civilian rule. Announcement came hours after deposed President Condé 31 Dec released video stating his intention to return to country and “re-establish democracy and constitutional order”. 

International community voiced concern over repressive govt tactics. After Dec crackdown on critical media, diplomats representing country’s most important partners in Conakry (including U.S., EU and China) 10 Jan expressed dissatisfaction with military govt’s restrictions on internet, social media and press; in response, govt in following days cited national security concerns and need to capture revenue generated by social media, while saying restrictions would end “very soon”. Media regulator, High Authority of Communication (HAC), 17 Jan suspended website Dépêche Guinée for nine months, and prohibited publishing director Abdoul Latif Diallo from “creating or providing his services to a news organisation” for six months. NGO Committee to Protect Journalists 31 Jan urged authorities to “immediately roll back the wave of censorship efforts unleashed on the press in recent months”.

Bamako announced withdrawal from West African regional bloc alongside Burkina Faso and Niger, dealing blow to regional integration; junta also ended 2015 Algiers Accord with separatist rebels.

Junta announced leaving ECOWAS, defying pressure to restore constitutional rule. Junta leaders of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger 28 Jan announced leaving ECOWAS, denouncing “inhumane” sanctions imposed by regional bloc following coups. ECOWAS immediately said three countries were “important members of the Community” and bloc “remains committed to finding a negotiated solution to the political impasse”; also said it had not yet received formal withdrawal notification.

Bamako terminated 2015 Algiers peace agreement, launched own peace initiative. Amid resumption of hostilities in northern Mali in recent months, coalition of 2015 Algiers Accord signatory armed groups, Permanent Strategic Framework (CSP), 2 Jan rejected junta-proposed inter-Malian dialogue for peace and reconciliation, denouncing manoeuvre to definitively invalidate Algiers accord and sideline international mediation. Diplomatic spat with Algiers over Algeria’s mediation role persisted despite Algerian ambassador returning to Bamako 5 Jan and Malian ambassador returning to Algeria 7 Jan. Junta 25 Jan declared “immediate termination” of Algiers Accord, accusing Algeria of interfering in its affairs, and next day issued decree establishing committee to organise national peace and reconciliation dialogue.

State violence against civilians continued amid conflict with jihadist groups. In north, air force 5 Jan carried out drone strike against civilian vehicles in Almoustarat area, Gao region, killing three; govt forces and Russian paramilitary Wagner Group 9 Jan burned several encampments for internally displaced persons in Tabagart village, Timbuktu region, and reportedly killed ten people after abducting them. In centre, army and Wagner group 2 Jan reportedly killed at least ten civilians on outskirts of Touara village, Ségou region. Explosive device likely planted by al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) militants 5 Jan killed five civilians in Ogossagou village, Mopti region.

In another important development. FM Abdoulaye Diop 12 Jan said withdrawal of UN mission (MINUSMA) was nearly complete with 95% peacekeepers gone and all assets transferred to state.   

Niamey announced withdrawal from West African regional bloc alongside Burkina Faso and Mali, dealing blow to regional integration; Niamey strengthened ties with Russia. 

Junta announced leaving ECOWAS, defying pressure to restore constitutional rule. Junta leaders of Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso 28 Jan announced leaving ECOWAS, denouncing “inhumane” sanctions; move defies pressure to restore constitutional rule and deals blow to regional integration. ECOWAS immediately said three countries were “important members of the Community” and bloc “remains committed to finding a negotiated solution to the political impasse”; also said it had not yet received formal withdrawal notification. Earlier in month, ECOWAS mediation led by Togo 8 Jan obtained release of deposed President Bazoum’s son, Salem Bazoum. ECOWAS delegation visit originally scheduled for 10 Jan and postponed to 25 Jan at Niamey’s request did not take place, as ECOWAS delegation reported “technical issues”.

Authorities kept severing ties with France and strengthening relations with Russia. France 2 Jan confirmed permanent closure of its embassy in Niamey citing “serious impediments making it impossible to carry out its missions”. Authorities 26 Jan reportedly sent home fifteen European training mission (EUCAP) staff and 26-27 Jan prevented their head of mission and at least five French nationals from entering country. After signature of military cooperation agreements with Russia in Dec, PM Zeine 16 Jan led delegation to Russian capital Moscow; both countries announced plans to enhance military cooperation.

Insecurity persisted in Tillabery region (south west). In Gotheye department, air force 5 Jan launched airstrikes on Garé Garé gold miners camp, Tiawa village, reportedly killing at least 30 jihadist militants and at least fifteen civilians; NGO Center for Civilians in Conflict 11 Jan called for “full, impartial, and transparent investigation”, reminded armed forces of their obligation to “never target civilians”. In Kollo department, suspected jihadist militants 11 Jan attacked gendarmerie post in Laoudou village, south of Niamey, killing two gendarmes and five civilians.

Islamic State affiliate claimed rare attack outside Lake Chad Basin; tide of kidnappings for ransom continued in and around Federal Capital Territory. 

Rare jihadist attack reported in central Nigeria amid continued violence in North East. Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) claimed first attack outside Lake Chad Basin since April 2022 with 2 Jan killing of four Christians in Nasarawa state’s Karu area, about 15km from federal capital Abuja; group vowed to attack non-Muslims anywhere to avenge Palestinians killed in Gaza. Meanwhile in north-eastern Borno state, Boko Haram 1 Jan killed twelve people in Gartamawa village, Chibok area, and 8 Jan attacked Gajiram town in Nganzai area, burning six people to death; two commercial vehicles 9 Jan ran over landmines along Ngala-Dikwa road in Ngala area, with eight people dead.In neighbouring Yobe state, suspected jihadist militants 5 Jan killed several people and set church ablaze in Kwari village, Geidam area.

Surge in kidnappings for ransom continued in and around Abuja. FCT’s Commissioner for Public Complaints, Dalhatu Ezekiel, 15 Jan urged federal govt to declare state of emergency in Federal Capital Territory (FCT) amid spate of kidnappings for ransom, including 2 Jan abduction of man and his six daughters in Bwari area. Similar attacks also took place in adjoining states. Notably in Kaduna state, armed groups 2-7 Jan killed at least 21 people and kidnapped 143 others in three villages of Kauru area and near Katari town in Kachia area, along Abuja-Kaduna highway. Gunmen 16 Jan also abducted seventeen residents of Tafa area, Niger state.

Criminal groups continued attacks and abductions in North West. In Katsina state, armed group 14 Jan stormed military camp in Nahuta town, Batsari area, forcing troops to flee; toll unknown. In Zamfara state, kidnappings for ransom 9-10 Jan targeted state’s finance ministry official and senior university lecturer in state capital Gusau. 

North Central saw several incidents of herder-farmer violence. Notably, gunmen 22-23 Jan killed at least 50 villagers in Plateau state, prompting 24-hour curfew and calls for authorities to curb herder-farmer violence. Suspected herders 31 Jan raided village in Agatu area, Benue state, killing at least nine people and kidnapping others.

Fallout from alleged coup attempt continued. 

Govt 2 Jan announced treason charges against twelve people for suspected involvement in alleged coup attempt in Nov 2023, and next day said former President Ernest Bai Koroma had also been charged with treason. Govt 8 Jan indicted 27 military personnel and sacked 48 others in connection with incident. Court 17 Jan granted Bai Koroma permission to travel abroad for medical treatment.

Govt struck deal with Somaliland to secure Red Sea access, ratcheting up regional tensions; violence in Amhara and Oromia persisted; and Tigray’s humanitarian crisis mounted.

Tensions with Somalia spiked over Ethiopia-Somaliland deal. Ethiopia and Somaliland 1 Jan signed memorandum of understanding that would allow Ethiopia to develop naval base along Somaliland’s coast; Hargeisa said deal includes recognition of Somaliland’s independence, though Addis Ababa’s commitment to this step appears tentative. Announcement fuelled regional tensions. Mogadishu, which views Somaliland as part of Somalia’s territory, 2 Jan called agreement an “act of aggression” and rallied regional allies (see Somalia). African Union Peace and Security Council 17 Jan held emergency session, agreed to dispatch envoy to mediate. Regional bloc Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) 18 Jan called extraordinary meeting, Ethiopia did not attend but in leaked letter dated 22 Jan requested IGAD summit to discuss issue. Despite backlash, ruling Prosperity Party 26 Jan pledged to press ahead with deal.

Violence in Amhara region persisted. Military continued battling Amhara nationalist militias known as Fano. Notably, Fano militants 3 Jan entered North Shewa Zone’s administrative capital, Debre Berhan, assassinated head of zonal peace and security office before military next day ejected them. Fano 6 Jan attacked Gondar city, disrupting transport and business for two days. Ethiopian Air Force 12 Jan conducted drone strikes on Fano units near school in Merhabete Woreda (North Shewa Zone), killing two. State of emergency due to expire early Feb, even as military struggles to suppress rebellion.

Oromia insurgency continued. Insurgency in Oromia region pitting govt forces against Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) continued. Notably, security forces 12 Jan conducted drone strike in Horo Guduru Wollega Zone, killing four. OLA 28 Jan declared twenty-day ban on transport and business throughout region.

Humanitarian situation in Tigray region deteriorated further. Tigray interim administration’s (IRA) emergency task force 10 Jan said about 4.5mn people are at risk of famine, wrought by war-related economic destruction, drought and inadequate relief efforts; IRA 29 Jan said region is on brink of humanitarian catastrophe not seen since “infamous” 1984-1985 famine. Meanwhile, internally displaced persons in regional capital Mekelle 24 Jan protested slow implementation of Pretoria peace agreement. 

In move that could revive election-related dispute, President Bihi refused to sign electoral laws; govt announced plan to give landlocked Ethiopia commercial and military access to sea, sparking domestic opposition and ratcheting up regional tensions. 

Electoral tensions re-emerged. President Bihi 22 Jan returned recently-approved electoral laws back to House of Elders over alleged procedural flaws, instead of signing them into law. Move re-ignited tensions and suspicions among opposition that Bihi does not want to hold presidential election by year’s end. Notably, opposition party Waddani same day vowed to “respond strongly and take swift action”. 

Deal with Addis Ababa sparked diplomatic crisis. Govt and Ethiopia 1 Jan signed Memorandum of Understanding for Addis Ababa to lease 20km stretch of Somaliland’s coastline to establish naval base and commercial maritime services; Hargeisa claimed Ethiopia would in return acknowledge Somaliland as sovereign state, which would make Addis Ababa first capital to recognise its independence from Somalia, while Ethiopia said it would conduct “in depth-assessment” of its position on the matter. Somaliland and Ethiopia’s army chiefs 9 Jan met in Addis Ababa to discuss military cooperation. Deal, which came days after Bihi and Somalia President Mohamud agreed to resume Somalia-Somaliland dialogue, caused international consternation. Notably, Mogadishu 2 Jan denounced “act of aggression”, vowed to defend Somalia’s territorial integrity by “any legal means” (see Somalia).

Domestic opposition to deal also emerged, auguring difficult implementation. Opposition called for more transparency over agreement, with Waddani party in days after announcement pointing to significant discrepancies between Ethiopia and Somaliland’s accounts of deal. Communities in western Somaliland (where naval base may be located), who hold historical grievances over perceived marginalisation by Isaaq (Somaliland’s largest clan), 6 Jan held demonstrations against potential transfer of land to Ethiopia. Police 6 Jan detained three journalists holding debate about agreement at TV station in capital Hargeisa. Meanwhile, defence minister 7 Jan resigned in protest at agreement, saying Ethiopia remained “number one enemy” and having Ethiopian troops stationed in Somaliland would be inappropriate.  

In another important development. Lull in fighting between govt and Dhulbahante clan militias in Sool region persisted.

Jihadist attacks surged in northern Cabo Delgado province, undermining govt’s claim of return to stability. 

Islamic State-affiliated militants intensified attacks in Cabo Delgado. Islamic State Mozambique Province (ISMP) from late Dec until 20 Jan carried out at least fourteen attacks, primarily in Mocímboa da Praia, Macomia and Muidumbe districts, leading to dozens of deaths and kidnappings. Notably, ISMP attack 5 Jan killed at least four people in Chimbanga village, Mocímboa da Praia. UN 22 Jan said attacks in Macomia and Muidumbe 26 Dec-17 Jan displaced 5,343 people amid reports of food shortages. ISMP 21 Jan reportedly occupied strategic Mucojo village in Macomia district, marking first significant settlement held by ISMP since it was expelled from Mbau town (Mocímboa da Praia) in Aug 2021; Mozambican troops abandoned their position after receiving threats from militants, amid reports suggesting deteriorating relations between Mucojo residents and military after troops mid Jan killed three civilians. ISMP explicitly linked series of attacks to Islamic State’s central command’s 4 Jan call for global offensive and 30 Jan said “preaching trip” was under way in northern Mozambique.

Attacks undermined govt’s claim that ISMP no longer poses threat. Bishop of Pemba diocese 2 Jan warned of “attitude of complacency” over situation in Cabo Delgado, while Denis Hurley Peace Institute of Southern African Catholic Bishops’ Conference 17 Jan accused Rwandan and Mozambican troops of preventing people from fleeing Mocímboa da Praia. Surge in attacks also heightened concerns that withdrawal of Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), due to be completed by July, may be premature. Meanwhile international commission, announced late Nov by president of Islamic Council of Mozambique, in Jan began work to promote talks between govt and insurgents in Cabo Delgado. 

Political fallout from contested municipal elections continued. Attorney General 9 Jan dismissed request from main opposition party RENAMO to suspend Constitutional Council ruling that validated results of Oct local elections. Divisions also emerged within RENAMO after spokesperson 4 Jan announced current leader Ossufo Momade will be candidate in presidential election due to be held in Oct; others in party wished to wait for vote at party congress.

Top opposition leaders suffered major setbacks in presidential bids. 

Supreme Court 5 Jan upheld defamation conviction against opposition leader Ousmane Sonko and Constitutional Council hours later rejected his presidential candidate application. Constitutional Council 20 Jan released final list of twenty candidates for presidential election due in Feb, not including Ousmane Sonko and other opposition heavyweight Karim Wade, son of former president Abdoulaye Wade. Sonko 28 Jan endorsed Bassirou Diomaye Faye, imprisoned secretary-general of Sonko’s dissolved PASTEF party, as replacement candidate and called for his release.

Post-election violence erupted as opposition contested President Assoumani’s re-election. 

Presidential election held 14 Jan despite boycott call by some opposition leaders accusing electoral commission of favouring ruling party. Electoral body 16 Jan declared incumbent President Azali Assoumani winner, giving him fourth five-year term. All five opposition candidates immediately cried foul, alleging ballot-stuffing and inconsistent results. Violent protests 17-18 Jan erupted in capital Moroni against Assoumani’s re-election; clashes between demonstrators and security forces left one person dead and at least 25 injured. Interior ministry 17 Jan imposed countrywide night-time curfew. Supreme Court 24 Jan confirmed Assoumani’s re-election.

Jihadist violence persisted and opposition warned President Talon against seeking third term in 2026 election.

Jihadist attacks persisted in north. Suspected al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) insurgents 1 Jan clashed with military in Tissoua locality, Alibori department, leading to death of five militants. Local sources also reported movement on 9 Jan of JNIM militants near Park W, Alibori. 

Tensions started to build ahead of 2026 general elections. Former president and leader of opposition party Les Démocrates Thomas Boni Yayi 1 Jan warned President Talon against attempting unconstitutional third term in 2026 and accused ruling party of planning to change constitution; govt denied claim. Constitutional Court 4 Jan called on National Assembly to amend electoral calendar for 2026 general elections, and MP from ruling coalition 26 Jan submitted constitutional amendment bill to parliament to revise electoral calendar. Les Démocrates and three other opposition parties 29 Jan held consultations in commercial capital, Cotonou, stated opposition to constitutional reform.

Inter-Korean tensions escalated after North Korea fired artillery near South Korean island and formally dropped goal of unification, signalling Pyongyang’s intention to stoke tensions on peninsula in 2024. 

North and South Korea exchanged fire at sea, raising risk of major crisis. North Korea starting 5 Jan fired more than 200 rounds of artillery shells into seas around South Korean island of Yeonpyeong. In response, South Korea same day launched more than 400 artillery shells into same waters, having ordered civilians to seek shelter on island. Incident follows collapse in Nov 2023 of agreement reached at Sept 2018 inter-Korean summit, which had prohibited artillery fire in area, and may indicate North Korea’s intention to drastically raise tensions by manufacturing conditions for deadly clash in West Sea – scene of past deadly maritime escalations. 

North Korean leader took aim at reunification. Leader Kim Jong Un 15 Jan announced that Supreme People’s Assembly “newly legalised the policy of [North Korea] toward the south on the basis of putting an end to the nearly 80 year-long history of inter-Korean relations and recognising the two states both existing on the Korean peninsula”; Kim also called for reinforcement of land border with south, dissolved institutions dealing with inter-Korean relations, and urged constitutional revision to eliminate references such as “northern half” of peninsula. Moves mark most assertive measures against South Korea in recent years, likely aimed at countering Seoul’s soft power, exerting pressure on U.S. and south in election year and diminishing public resistance to war; steps nonetheless are reversible and align with Kim’s framework for reunification through federation – one state under two systems.

Pyongyang conducted weapons testing. 14 Jan tested solid-fuel hypersonic missile with intermediate range and 19 Jan conducted test of nuclear-capable underwater attack drone. North Korea 24, 28 and 30 Jan test fired cruise missiles into waters off western coast. 

Russia and North Korea continued engagement. North Korean FM Choe Son Hui 16 Jan met Russian President Putin in Russian capital Moscow in bid to "strengthen strategic and tactical cooperation". UK 22 Jan presented fresh evidence to UN indicating transfer of North Korean weapons to Russia for Ukraine war.

Taiwan’s incumbent party won unprecedented third presidential term, as China downplayed result and refrained from significantly intensifying military activity around island.

Democratic Progress Party (DPP) won presidential election. Taiwan’s incumbent DPP secured historic third term in 13 Jan presidential poll, which elected William Lai as new president having emerged with 40% of vote; DPP, however, did not secure majority in Legislative Yuan as it won only 51 seats, while opposition Kuomintang won 52, likely reflecting voters’ frustration over domestic issues. In response, China same day dismissively stated election result “does not represent mainstream opinion in Taiwan” and reiterated commitment to complete national unification. Taiwan’s senior representative in U.S. 19 Jan described status quo as “neither unification, neither independence”; Chinese embassy 23 Jan responded that “independence forces are trying to stoke confrontation and antagonism”. 

China maintained military activity in Taiwan Strait. As of 29 Jan, Taiwan detected 318 Chinese military aircraft around island, of which 89 either crossed unofficial “median line” or were detected inside Taiwan’s air defence identification zone – approximately on par with activity in Dec; notably, over thirteen planes 27 Jan crossed “median line”. Taiwan spotted 132 Chinese navy vessels in surrounding waters. Taiwan reported significant increase in balloons from China crossing “median line”, tallying at least 22 in Jan compared to seven in Dec. Taiwan’s Defence Ministry 9 Jan issued nationwide emergency alert after China launched satellite which passed through Taiwan’s airspace. USS Carl Vinson aircraft carrier 11 Jan deployed east of Taiwan; USS John Finn destroyer 24 Jan transited Taiwan Strait. 

U.S. maintained diplomatic support; Nauru severed ties with Taiwan. Senior U.S. delegation 14 Jan met with political leaders in Taiwan, expressing concern about stability in strait. U.S. House of Representatives 12 Jan passed “Taiwan Non-Discrimination Act of 2023” and “PROTECT Taiwan Act” aimed at advocating Taiwan’s membership of International Monetary Fund and countering Beijing’s efforts to exclude island from financial institutions. Meanwhile, Pacific nation Nauru 15 Jan severed ties and aligned with China, leaving Taiwan with just twelve states recognising it; Pacific island Tuvalu late Jan signalled it would review ties with Taiwan after its own election.

Islamic State’s local branch launched multiple attacks across country and in neighbouring Iran, while Taliban authorities made first arrest under draconian 2022 decree on women’s dress. 

After short pause, Islamic State resumed deadly attacks. In its first attack of 2024 following pause since mid Nov 2023, Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-KP) 4 Jan beheaded Taliban member in Kunar province (north east). IS-KP 6 Jan conducted explosive strike in capital Kabul’s Dasht-e Barchi district, which killed two and injured over a dozen. Suicide explosion 14 Jan rocked office of provincial governor in Nimruz province (south west), killing three security guards; although unclaimed, it also bore hallmarks of IS-KP. Relatedly, IS-KP claimed twin bombings in Iran’s Kerman city that killed scores (see Iran). 

Taliban enforced conservative dress rules on women. Reports 2 Jan surfaced that Taliban authorities had arrested women in Kabul for violating religious hijab-wearing rules, marking first reported arrest for such violation since May 2022 decree enforcing rules; Taliban officials claimed women were detained and released on bail after male relatives had been informed. Meanwhile, crackdown on political space continued: reports indicated that Taliban authorities had arrested over dozen Hizb-ut-Tahrir members in Takhar province (north) as part of broader crackdown on group. 

Pakistan and Afghanistan took steps to repair ties, but bilateral tensions remained. Acting Deputy Defence Minister Shirin Akhund 3 Jan visited Pakistan for meetings with senior Pakistani officials. Pakistani politician Fazal-ur-Rehman 7 Jan visited Kabul; unconfirmed reports claimed Rehman was granted audience with Taliban emir, making him only the second foreign dignitary to meet Taliban leader in recent years. Talks followed months of tension between two countries over anti-Pakistan militants growing active in borderlands, but issue remains unresolved. 

Norway and UK engaged diplomatically with Taliban. Norway’s Chargé d’Affaires to Afghanistan Paul Klouman Bekken 9 Jan met Taliban’s Deputy FM for Political Affairs Mohammad Abbas Stanekzai. UK’s Chargé d’Affaires to Afghanistan Robert Dickson 12 Jan met Stanekzai; Dickson stated bilateral “engagement will be further enhanced in the future”.

Ruling Awami League won fourth consecutive election marred by low turnout and boycott by main opposition party, while insecurity and hardship continued in Rohingya refugee camps. 

Awami League secured massive majority in largely uncontested election. Awami League 7 Jan secured 222 of 300 elected seats in national parliament, awarding PM Sheikh Hasina another five-year term that marks her fourth consecutive and fifth overall election victory; Awami League members who ran as “independent” won additional 61 seats. Poll, however, was uncompetitive as main opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) boycotted vote following arrest of most of its party leaders since Oct. Officials claimed turnout was 42%, although many suspected real figure was as low as 28%. Voting on 7 Jan passed without major incident, although violence occurred between supporters of official Awami League candidates and those standing as independents. Potential arson on train in capital Dhaka 5 Jan killed four, which govt blamed on BNP, while police arrested Awami League youth leader after he 15 Jan allegedly hacked to death BNP supporter in Mymensingh city. After vote, U.S., UK and Canada said poll fell short of democratic standards, while India, China and Russia enthusiastically supported its outcome; threat of U.S. sanctions appeared to recede. Hasina now faces challenge of navigating crisis of declining foreign currency reserves and high inflation. While election marks major blow to BNP, party announced plans to hold “black flag” processions countrywide on 30 Jan to coincide with first session of new parliament; although party was able to reopen head office in Dhaka, Hasina before poll hinted at further crackdowns, including possible deregistration of party. 

Insecurity and hardship continued in Rohingya refugee camps. Newly-appointed FM Hasan Mahmud 14 Jan signalled support for proposed repatriation pilot project to return 3,000 refugees to Myanmar’s Rakhine state; heavy fighting in Rakhine, however, cast doubt over returns (see Myanmar). Meanwhile, police said armed and criminal violence 4-16 Jan killed four refugees. UN 23 Jan reported at least 569 Rohingya dead or missing in attempts to flee Bangladesh/Myanmar in 2023, highest toll since 2014. Following election, national newspapers displayed growing anti-Rohingya sentiment.

Militant activity remained at low ebb in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), while mandate of grassroots body of representatives expired as new regional elections remained in doubt. 

Militant attacks and security operations remained at low ebb due to winter. Security forces and militants 3 Jan engaged in gun battle in Kulgam district. Security forces 4 Jan arrested Hizbul Mujahideen militant from New Delhi. Security forces 5 Jan killed alleged Lashkar-e-Tayyaba militant in Shopian district. Authorities 21 Jan arrested juvenile harbouring militants. During annual press conference, India’s army chief 11 Jan claimed “increase in terrorism” in last five-six months in J&K’s Rajouri and Poonch districts, describing it as “one area our adversaries have been active in”; he claimed security forces killed 45 militants in last three years in area, while militants killed seven soldiers in Kashmir valley and twenty in Rajouri-Poonch area in same period. Security forces 27 Jan busted module of cross-border arms smuggling and arrested five militant associates in Kupwara district. 

Terms of grassroots political representatives expired. Mandate of 28,000 grassroots representatives elected in 2018 to first-ever three-tier system of representation in J&K officially ended on 9 Jan after completion of five-year term, bringing end to last semblance of political representation in region; calls continued for regional assembly election to be held this year, last of which was held in 2014, but no date has been set. 

Govt banned two separatist organisations. Ministry of Home Affairs 27 Dec declared Muslim League Jammu Kashmir “an unlawful association” for five years under Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, accusing it of seeking to establish “Islamic rule in J&K”. Ministry 31 Dec declared Tehreek-e-Hurriyat unlawful for five years under same law, alleging “terror activities to fuel secessionism in J&K”. 

In other important developments. India’s Border Security Force 20 Jan seized consignment of arms and ammunition smuggled by drone, allegedly from Pakistan, in Punjab district. India 13 Jan protested UK High Commissioner to Islamabad’s visit to Pakistan-administered Kashmir, asserting “such infringement of India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity is unacceptable”. Pakistan’s FM 25 Jan claimed “credible evidence” of links between Indian agents and 2023 killings of two Pakistanis in Pakistan; India rejected allegation.

Iran and Pakistan launched tit-for-tat cross-border strikes on alleged insurgents, militants continued deadly attacks in provinces along Afghan border and country prepared for 8 Feb general election. 

Iran launched cross-border strikes, prompting Pakistani retaliation. Dispute erupted after Iran 16 Jan launched cross-border strikes on village in Balochistan’s Panjgur district, claiming to target “strongholds” of Jaish al-Adl – anti-Iranian Baloch militant group. Pakistan claimed strike killed two children and recalled its ambassador in Tehran. Pakistan 18 Jan launched strikes on village near Iranian border city of Saravan, claiming to target Pakistani Baloch militants. De-escalating crisis, Tehran and Islamabad 29 Jan struck agreement on FM-level coordination mechanism and stationing military liaison officers at border. 

Militant attacks continued in provinces bordering Afghanistan, including on election candidates. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants 9 Jan killed six police constables and injured 28 in Bajaur district; militants next day shot dead three constables in Kohat district. Assailants 10 Jan shot dead election candidate in North Warizistan district. In Balochistan province, bomb 13 Jan killed five soldiers in Kech district. In Turbat town, assailants 25 Jan killed police constable in attack on election official’s office. Baloch militants 30 Jan killed four security personnel and two civilians in Mach city. Meanwhile, Interior Ministry 2 Jan said over 500,000 Afghans had been “repatriated” under ongoing forcible deportation drive. Head of Deobandi party Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam –Fazl (JUI-F) 8 Jan met senior Afghan Taliban officials and, reportedly, the Emir (see Afghanistan). 

Opposition Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) faced setbacks ahead of 8 Feb elections. After former PM Imran Khan 26 Dec appealed to Supreme Court in bid to remove ban from public office ahead of polls, Khan’s main competitor Nawaz Sharif 8 Jan overcame last legal hurdle to contest polls after Supreme Court overturned lifetime ban. Supreme Court 13 Jan upheld Election Commission ruling that denied PTI its recognisable election symbol; PTI candidates will now contest election as independents. In further blow to PTI, special court 30 Jan sentenced Khan to ten years imprisonment in diplomatic cable case; Khan’s lawyers lodged appeal. In third conviction, court 31 Jan sentenced Khan to fourteen years imprisonment for illegally selling state gifts.

Govt began 2024 with raft of legislation to expand powers of surveillance and repression and advance its contested reconciliation agenda, while police crackdown on drugs led to tens of thousands of arrests. 

Govt moved to retain and expand surveillance powers. Parliament 24 Jan passed govt’s Online Safety Bill, despite uncertainty whether it included amendments required by earlier Supreme Court review; civil society and opposition parties criticised expansive powers law would afford state to regulate speech on social media, as opposition lawmaker labelled it “threat to our democracy”. Global tech and social media companies 16 Jan urged govt to withdraw bill. Govt 10 Jan presented to parliament proposed Anti-Terrorism Act, which was only modestly changed from version first introduced in early 2023 that was roundly criticised; Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 19 Jan criticised new draft, while bill’s constitutionality was challenged in numerous Supreme Court petitions.

Govt sought to advance its reconciliation program amid opposition. Govt 1 Jan publicised text of legislation to establish Commission for Truth, Unity and Reconciliation amid near unanimous opposition from survivors’ groups and rights activists who view it as designed to win support at UN Human Rights Council. Parliament 9 Jan passed legislation to establish eleven-member “Office for National Unity and Reconciliation” despite opposition from most Tamil parliamentarians and many civil society groups. Police 4 Jan arrested and detained for eight days prominent Tamil woman campaigner seeking truth about enforced disappearance of her son, following protest against President Wickremesinghe’s visit to northern town of Vavuniya. 

Police faced criticism for heavy-handed drug crackdown. Public Security Minister Tiran Alles continued to champion police operation which to date has led to arrest of over 40,000 suspected of using or selling drugs and detention in prison or “rehabilitation” centres of more than 3,000; while popular among some parts of public, OHCHR 12 Jan criticised “heavily security-based response to country’s drug problem”. 

International creditors recognised economic progress. International Monetary Fund officials 19 Jan stated reforms had produced first signs of recovery but stressed importance of “sustaining the reform momentum”.

Regime remained on backfoot as ethnic armed groups in north expanded control before agreeing to another tenuous ceasefire, while Arakan Army made major gains in west; regime extended state of emergency for six months. 

Three Brotherhood Alliance seized territory in Shan State before partial ceasefire. After collapse of China-brokered peace talks on 23 Dec, heavy clashes continued between Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) – member of Three Brotherhood Alliance – and regime in Kokang Self-Administered Zone in northern Shan State, where MNDAA seized full control of Laukkai town as 2,400 soldiers 3 Jan surrendered. Brotherhood Alliance 6 Jan attacked Hopang and Pan Lone towns in regime-controlled part of Wa Self-Administered Division. Concurrently, Brotherhood member Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) clashed heavily with regime forces in bid to solidify its control in northern Shan State, capturing Kutkai town on 7 Jan; TNLA consolidated its position around Lashio, Kyaukme and Hsipaw towns. Following third round of China-brokered talks, regime and Brotherhood Alliance 11 Jan agreed to ceasefire in northern Shan State; TNLA, however, 13 Jan accused regime of launching airstrikes in Kyaukme and Mogoke townships. 

Arakan Army (AA) broadened its offensive in Rakhine. With 11 Jan ceasefire not applying to Rakhine theatre, AA (member of alliance) 15 Jan captured all of Paletwa township and detained regime brigadier-general before expanding operations further south, forcing battalion of regime soldiers to surrender in Minbya on 17 Jan, and seizing Pauktaw town, close to state capital Sittwe, on 24 Jan. 

Hostilities persisted in Kachin and Kayah states. After Kachin Independence Army (KIA) mid Dec captured two outposts in Kachin State from military and allied militia forces, KIA 3 Jan shot down regime Mi-17 transport helicopter near Laiza, killing six crew members. In Kayah, Karenni Nationalities Defence Force and other allied groups claimed to control more than 80% of state capital Loikaw. 

Regime extended state of emergency. Despite devastating battlefield losses and unprecedented nationalist criticism of regime leader Min Aung Hlaing, regime showed little sign of panic: Min Aung Hlaing 4 Jan announced plans to hold national census to improve voter list for general election. On eve of third anniversary of coup, regime 31 Jan extended state of emergency for six months.

Clan violence, rebel infighting and security operations continued in south, while security forces battled Communist insurgents.

Insecurity persisted in Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM). During reconciliation ceremony between members of Sinsuat clan in Cotabato city, shootout 3 Jan erupted between escorts of two prominent clan politicians. Bangsamoro regional police 15 Jan deployed personnel of elite Special Action Force in three towns in Lanao del Sur province and its provincial capital Marawi city to help local officials guard against clan wars and protect constituents from local terrorists. In Maguindanao del Sur province, armed men associated with Moro Islamic Liberation Front’s (MILF) 105 and 106 Base Command 19 Jan clashed in Kulambog village, motivated by political rivalry. Security forces 26 Jan launched operations against jihadist group Daulah Islamiya in Lanao del Sur, killing nine militants – including two alleged suspects linked to deadly bombing in Marawi in Dec – and leaving four soldiers wounded. 

Clashes persisted between Communist rebels and military. Clashes between govt forces and Communists in Luzon Island (Sorsogon) in north, Mindanao Island (Agusan del Norte) in south and Visayas Islands (Negros and Samar) in centre killed at least nine combatants and civilians.

Constitutional Court ruled Move Forward Party’s lèse-majesté stance unconstitutional, Court of Appeals handed activist 50-year prison sentence, and govt signalled talks with main southern separatist group may resume in Feb. 

Constitutional Court ruled on cases concerning future of Move Forward Party. After stunning victory in May 2023 general election, Move Forward Party’s leader Pita Limjareonrat was suspended from MP duties due to allegations he broke election law by holding shares in media company during election campaign. Constitutional Court 24 Jan ruled Pita did not violate election regulations. Constitutional Court 31 Jan ruled that Move Forward Party’s efforts to amend Section 112 of Criminal Code – the lèse-majesté law – violate constitution and must cease; verdict will likely trigger legal proceedings to dissolve party. 

Court sentenced activist to 50 years for lèse-majesté conviction. Court of Appeals in Chiang Rai 18 Jan found Mongkol “Busbas” Thirakot, a 30-year-old activist, guilty of eleven counts of lèse-majesté associated with 27 Facebook posts, for which he was sentenced to three years imprisonment on each count, which combined with earlier convictions marked record sentence of 50 years. Bangkok criminal court 17 Jan convicted attorney Arnon Nampa of lèse-majesté for three Facebook posts from Jan 2021, sentencing him to four years imprisonment. 

Govt signalled potential return to southern dialogue amid militant attacks. Deputy PM Somsak Thepsuthin 10 Jan met with Malaysia’s General Zulkifli Zainal Abidin, facilitator of peace dialogue with main southern separatist armed group Barisan Revolusi Nasional; talks have been in abeyance for almost one year but govt’s chief negotiator said he expected talks to resume in Feb. Meanwhile, four motorcycle-borne militants 10 Jan opened fire on Border Patrol Police (BPP) vehicle in Bannang Sata district, Yala province, injuring two officers. Militants next day ambushed BPP vehicle in Rueso district, Narathiwat province, killing lieutenant. IED attack 16 Jan damaged BPP vehicle in Sri Sakhon district, Narathiwat province, but caused no injuries.

China maintained naval activity in East China Sea, while Japan strengthened defence posture amid regional threats. 

Beijing continued maritime presence. As of 28 Jan, Japan spotted 105 Chinese vessels in Japan’s contiguous zone, with six vessels detected in Japan’s territorial sea. Japan’s Coast Guard 11 Jan urged four Chinese vessels to leave its territorial waters, which marked first time Chinese coast guard ships entered such waters since 18 Dec. Japanese, South Korean and U.S. navies 16 Jan held three-day trilateral maritime exercise off South Korea’s Jeju Island to bolster regional security. 

Tokyo continued military build-up. Tokyo late Dec approved record increase in defence spending for 2024, accelerating deployment of long-range cruise missiles, amid perceived regional threats. Japan 18 Jan signed deal with U.S. to purchase up to 400 Tomahawk cruise missiles. Japan late Dec revised arms export guidelines to enable Patriot missile systems to be delivered to U.S. for onward transfer to Ukraine, prompting Russia to warn move could have “grave consequences” for bilateral relations.

Ethnic conflict in Manipur state in north east showed no sign of ending, security forces stepped up anti-Maoist operations in centre, and regional competition with China came into focus amid ongoing border dispute. 

Deadly attacks persisted in Manipur. Authorities 11 Jan recovered bodies of three people from Meitei community after four went missing previous day. Gunfight on border of Imphal West and Kangpokpi districts 17 Jan killed Meitei village volunteer; Meiteis 20-22 Jan held strike in protest. Armed assailants 17 Jan killed two police personnel in Moreh district, forcing state govt to ask central govt to send helicopters. Mob 17 Jan tried to attack police headquarters in Thoubal district, with three security forces personnel wounded from gunfire. Unidentified gunmen 18 Jan killed three Meitei men on Bishnupur-Churachandpur district border. Gunfight between armed Meiteis and Kuki tribals 27 Jan killed Kuki village defence volunteer in Kangkokpi district. Army chief 11 Jan said insurgent groups operating in Myanmar were seeking to cross into India to set up bases. 

Chhattisgarh state (centre) witnessed uptick in anti-Maoist operations. Shootout between Maoists and security forces 1 Jan killed six-month-old baby and injured mother in Bijapur district. Security forces 12 Jan killed Maoist commander in Bijapur. Security forces 20 Jan killed three Maoists, including two women, in Bijapur. Clashes 30 Jan killed three paramilitary soldiers. In state capital Raipur, Home Minister Amit Shah 21 Jan urged security forces to eradicate Maoism within three years. In Jharkland state (east), suspected Maoists 8 Jan set ablaze several vehicles near mine in Gumla district. 

Amid border dispute, strategic competition with China heightened in Indian Ocean. Army chief 11 Jan described situation along disputed “Line of Actual Control” as “stable but sensitive”, saying priority was to continue talks with Beijing and return to state quo ante before 2020 clashes. Indian media 14 Jan reported that Indian and Chinese forces had clashed on two occasions in 2022, which were previously undisclosed. In sign of strategic competition spilling into region, Maldives President Muizzu’s staff 14 Jan reaffirmed decision that Indian military personnel must leave country by 15 March; move followed Muizzu’s five-day state visit to China 7 Jan, where pair agreed to elevate ties.

Amid mounting tensions, China and Philippines struck deal to improve maritime communication, while Manila sought to deepen military ties with Western partners. 

Beijing and Manila brokered communication agreement. China’s military 3 Jan launched two-day routine patrol in SCS, concurrently as USS Carl Vinson began drills with Philippine navy; Philippines military 4 Jan reported two Chinese navy vessels shadowed Philippine and U.S. ships. Philippine Coast Guard revealed video purportedly showing China’s Coast Guard harassing Philippine fishermen near Scarborough Shoal on 12 Jan; 27 Chinese maritime militia ships were spotted near Scarborough Shoal on 21 Jan. In rare move by regional leader, Philippines’ President Marcos Jr. 15 Jan congratulated winner of Taiwan’s presidential election and expressed hope for cooperation (see Taiwan Strait); China next day summoned Philippine ambassador, warned Manila “not to play with fire”. Philippine military chief 15 Jan announced intention to develop islands and reefs in SCS to make them habitable for troops, including enhanced provisions for troops stationed at grounded warship on Second Thomas Shoal. Philippine Defence Secretary Teodoro Jr. 17 Jan announced country was planning “more robust” military activities with U.S. and its allies in face of “more aggressive” China. In positive step, Manila and Beijing 19 Jan brokered agreement to enhance maritime communication in SCS, aiming to defuse tensions and manage differences around contested areas. 

Philippines deepened defence ties with Western partners. Philippines 11 Jan signed defence agreement with UK that could expedite Manila’s military modernisation through access to UK’s advanced weapons systems. German FM Annalena Baerbock 13 Jan met Marcos Jr. and FM Enrique Manalo and pledged €129mn assistance to coast guard, including additional drones for SCS operations; Baerbock expressed concern over China’s SCS activities. Philippines and Canada 19 Jan signed memorandum of understanding to enhance defence cooperation. 

Disputes between China and Vietnam came into focus. U.S.-based research organisation early Jan reported presence of Chinese coast guard ship 5901 near Vietnam’s oil exploration blocks at Vanguard Bank in SCS since early Dec. Vietnam 20 Jan asserted its claim over Paracel and Spratly Islands, prompting China 24 Jan to reiterate its own claims. Philippines and Vietnam 30 Jan agreed coast guard cooperation pact in SCS.

Protests over surprise public sector wage cut sparked widespread rioting, killing at least 22 and forcing govt to declare state of emergency. 

Following unannounced docking of paycheques, which govt blamed on computer glitch, police and other civil servants 10 Jan declared strike and staged protest outside parliament in capital Port Moresby. Rioting and looting erupted throughout Port Moresby and Lae city, which observers blamed on opportunistic residents of poorer suburbs exploiting absence of police; unrest reportedly left 22 dead and caused extensive property damage. PM James Marape same day called in military and next day declared fourteen-day state of emergency, while suspending chief of police, who was reinstated 26 Jan. Marape 19 Jan announced cabinet reshuffle, facing prospect of no-confidence vote in Feb. Telecommunications Minister Timothy Masiu same day threatened social media shutdown over widespread misinformation around riots.

Efforts to crack down on independent media and civil society drew condemnation from human rights groups and UN. 

Authorities moved against several media outlets and over a dozen journalists. Law enforcement agents and security services 15 Jan searched offices of news agency 24.KG and detained outlet’s director and two chief editors, Makhinur Niyazova and Anton Lymar, for several hours on charges of “war propaganda”; Niyazova told reporters actions linked to outlet’s coverage of Ukraine war. Ministry of Interior next day searched several other independent media organisations and detained eleven journalists and media workers on charge of “calls for disobedience and mass riots”. 

Human rights groups warned of growing threat to freedom of expression. Eight international human rights groups 16 Jan said raids came amid “worsening campaign against free speech in Kyrgyzstan”; UN human rights office 20 Jan echoed warning, saying actions “appear to be part of a larger pattern of pressure against civil society activists, journalists and other critics of the authorities”. Days later, parliament’s Committee on Constitutional Legislation 23 Jan endorsed draft law on “foreign representatives”, prompting number of human rights organisations 25 Jan to issue statement urging parliament to reject “Russia-style ‘foreign-agents bill’”. 

In another important development. During visit to Tajik capital, Dushanbe, Türkiye’s FM hinted at imminent border deal between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (see Tajikistan).

Watchdog painted grim picture of media freedom in Tajikistan, and Türkiye’s foreign minister hinted at possible border deal between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan during working visit. 

Watchdog warned of intensified media crackdown since 2022. Committee to Protect Journalists 4 Jan warned in its annual report that Tajikistan’s media “are in their worst state since the violent years of the civil war” of 1992-1997. Watchdog said series of harsh sentences handed down to seven journalists in 2022 and 2023 marked “a deeply chilling escalation in the years-long constriction of independent media”, with several journalists reportedly linking crackdown to suppression of May-June 2022 protests in Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region. 

Türkiye’s FM hinted at imminent border deal between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. President Rahmon and FM Muhriddin 10 Jan met with Türkiye’s FM Hakan Fidan in capital Dushanbe to discuss bilateral ties, with sides reportedly stressing need to boost cooperation “in all areas of mutual interest”. Speaking with reporters after meeting, Fidan also hinted that Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan could sign border deal in March 2024, but offered few details.

Tashkent upgraded diplomatic relations with Beijing. 

President Mirziyoyev 23-25 Jan visited China amid efforts to deepen bilateral ties and secure investment. Mirziyoyev 24 Jan met with China’s leader Xi Jinping in capital Beijing, during which pair announced they have upgraded diplomatic ties from “comprehensive strategic partnership” to “all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership”, meaning deeper cooperation and mutual support in regional and international affairs. Sides also agreed to work closely on range of infrastructure projects, including China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway.

UN appointed new personal envoy, which could mark possible step toward eventual return to formal talks although sides clung to long-held positions. 

UN Sec Gen filled “personal envoy” role. UN Sec Gen António Guterres 5 Jan announced former Colombian FM Maria Angela Holguin Cuellar would fill UN “personal envoy” position, last appointed in 2017 and vacant since Oct 2021, after relevant parties gave their consent to appointment. Republic of Cyprus President Christodoulides same day welcomed appointment and said he was determined to resume formal talks based on UN resolutions. Turkish Cypriot leader Ersin Tatar cautioned that new negotiations could only begin if de facto Turkish Cypriot administration in north was given same international status as Republic of Cyprus, while both Ankara and “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”) clarified they approved appointment on condition that mandate does not exceed six months and focuses solely on exploring if there exists “common ground” for talks. Turkish Cypriot “FM” Tahsin Ertuğruloğlu 11 Jan rejected possibility of continuing negotiations from where they left off in failed 2017 summit, calling for new process based on rectifying unequal status of two sides. Cuellar 29-30 Jan visited Cyprus and met with various political and civil society actors, including leaders of two communities. Meanwhile, Christodoulides 27 Jan unveiled fourteen-point plan of measures and benefits for Turkish Cypriots; “TRNC’s” “PM” Ünal Üstel denounced plan as attempt to “fool Turkish Cypriots”. UN Security Council 30 Jan voted unanimously to renew mandate of UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for another twelve months. 

Arrest of Turkish Cypriot lawyer stoked controversy. Tatar 11 Jan said that late Dec arrest of lawyer Akan Kürşat in Italy, prompted by Republic of Cyprus police filing complaint over money laundering and embezzlement, was attempt to disrupt Cuellar’s work; Christodoulides 13 Jan denied any link between case and recent attempts at putting negotiations back on track.

Islamic State (ISIS) conducted first attack in seven years, killing one and prompting intensified crackdown, while clashes with Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) killed over dozen soldiers in Iraq, prompting wave of airstrikes. 

ISIS killed one in first attack since Jan 2017. In first claimed attack on Turkish soil in over seven years, ISIS 28 Jan carried out armed assault on Italian Catholic Church located on outskirts of Istanbul, killing one individual. Subsequently, security forces conducted series of raids in Istanbul, detaining nearly 50 ISIS-linked suspects, including two assailants identified as nationals from Russia and Tajikistan. Detentions brought total number of individuals apprehended by security forces (including foreign nationals) during Jan to 280. Earlier, security units 1 Jan apprehended alleged ISIS ring leader Abdullah al-Jundi in northern Syria. 

Clashes with PKK killed more than a dozen Turkish soldiers in northern Iraq. Late Dec spate of attacks on Turkish troops in northern Iraq continued, as PKK 5 Jan killed five soldiers in attack on military base and clash 12 Jan killed nine Turkish soldiers (see Iraq). In response, military 12-16 Jan launched airstrikes in both northern Iraq and Syria, targeting PKK/People’s Protection Units militants as part of strikes on 114 targets in both countries; military’s intensified shelling in northern Syria marked unusually high level for winter months (see Syria). In south east Türkiye, Interior Minister Ali Yerlikaya 16 Jan announced security forces had destroyed eighteen PKK winter shelters in drone strikes in rural areas. 

Parliament ratified Sweden’s NATO bid, govt actively engaged abroad. Parliament 23 Jan ratified Sweden’s membership to NATO; Ankara expects U.S. to greenlight sale of F-16s in return. Relations with Greece remained on course for improvement, although Greece’s steps to purchase U.S. jets and combat ships stoked concern in Ankara. Attempting to play constructive role in Ukraine-Russia war (see Ukraine), Erdoğan 5 Jan told Ukrainian President Zelenskyy Türkiye was ready to host peace talks. Govt continued to voice strong opposition to Israel’s war in Gaza (see Israel-Palestine); police 2 Jan detained 34 people on suspicion of working for Israeli intelligence. Iranian President Raisi 24 Jan visited Ankara, meeting President Erdoğan; pair called for end to Israeli attacks in Gaza.

Baku and Yerevan continued bilateral work on peace treaty, but internationally mediated talks remained on hold. 

Baku and Yerevan exchanged draft peace treaty amid simmering tensions. Bilateral efforts on Armenia-Azerbaijan peace treaty continued, with Yerevan 4 Jan returning draft proposal to Baku. In interview that nearly derailed efforts, however, Azerbaijani President Aliyev 10 Jan said Baku could cease participation in talks should Yerevan refuse to compromise, notably regarding security measures along border; he also reiterated calls for Russian-supervised corridor connecting mainland with exclave Nakhchivan, threatened military action if Armenia continued to procure weapons or ever sought to reclaim Nagorno-Karabakh (see Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict) and claimed “all of Zangezur” – alluding to southern Armenia – and other areas were historically Azerbaijani territory. PM Pashinyan 13 Jan decried “unacceptable territorial claims” but later softened stance, while EU 22 Jan threatened “severe consequences” if Armenia’s territorial integrity is violated. Sides 31 Jan held fresh talks on border delimitation but provided no details on what was discussed. 

Baku continued to reject foreign mediation as Russia sought greater role. Senior EU and U.S. officials mid Jan travelled to capital Yerevan for talks, but not to Azerbaijan amid speculation in Azerbaijani media about cooling relations with West over Baku’s takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh (see Azerbaijan). Russia, meanwhile, sought to reassert its dominant role in region. Notably, ruling party 16 Jan confirmed partial delivery of Russian weaponry to Armenia after two-year delay; Russian FM Lavrov 18 Jan touted Russian mediation in 2023, blamed West for acting as spoiler. 

In another important development. PM Pashinyan and his Georgian counterpart 26 Jan signed memorandum on “strategic partnership” in Georgia’s capital Tbilisi.

Baku and Yerevan continued bilateral work on peace treaty, but internationally mediated talks remained on hold; tensions with EU rose ahead of 7 February presidential election. 

Baku and Yerevan exchanged draft peace treaty amid simmering tensions. Bilateral efforts on Armenia-Azerbaijan peace treaty continued, with Yerevan 4 Jan returning draft proposal to Baku. In interview that nearly derailed efforts, however, President Aliyev 10 Jan said Baku could cease participation in talks should Yerevan refuse to compromise, notably regarding security measures along border; he also reiterated calls for Russian-supervised corridor connecting mainland with exclave Nakhchivan, threatened military action if Armenia continued to procure weapons or ever sought to reclaim Nagorno-Karabakh (see Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict) and claimed “all of Zangezur” – alluding to southern Armenia – and other areas were historically Azerbaijani territory. Armenian PM Pashinyan 13 Jan decried “unacceptable territorial claims” but later softened stance, while EU 22 Jan threatened “severe consequences” if Armenia’s territorial integrity is violated. Sides 31 Jan held fresh talks on border delimitation but provided no details on what was discussed. 

Baku continued to reject foreign mediation as Russia sought greater role. Senior EU and U.S. officials mid Jan travelled to capital Yerevan for talks, but not to Azerbaijan; EU Special Representative for South Caucasus Toivo Klaar 19 Jan cited Baku’s need to focus on Feb election, though Azerbaijani media suggested cooling relations with West over Baku’s takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh could be reason for not involving foreign mediators. Russia, meanwhile, sought to reassert its dominant role in region. Notably, Armenia’s ruling party 16 Jan confirmed partial delivery of Russian weaponry after two-year delay; Russian FM Lavrov 18 Jan touted Russian mediation in 2023, blamed West for acting as spoiler. 

In other important developments. Ahead of 7 Feb presidential poll, authorities 13 Jan arrested Elnara Gasimova in Baku for alleged people smuggling, tenth journalist detained in three months. Meanwhile, Parliament Assembly of the Council of Europe 24 Jan did not ratify credentials of Azerbaijani delegation, citing among other things concern about “free and fair elections”, “respect for human rights” and Baku’s military operation in Nagorno-Karabakh.

PM Garibashvili resigned from office, official in breakaway Abkhazia announced construction of Russian naval base in region could begin in 2024, and ruling party sought closer ties with China. 

PM Garibashvili tendered his resignation. PM Garibashvili 29 Jan resigned from his post, citing ruling Georgian Dream party’s “internal democratic principle of rotation” amid reports he will switch positions with party chairman, Irakli Kobakhidze; news came month after return to politics of party’s founder, Bidzina Ivanishvili. 

De facto Abkhaz official said work on Russian naval base could commence in 2024. During interview with Russian news agency RIA Novosti, breakaway Abkhazia region’s de facto Security Council secretary 12 Jan confirmed Moscow is preparing to build naval base in region, and that construction would likely begin in 2024; de facto president Aslan Bzhania in Oct 2023 had announced agreement with Moscow to construct base in Ochamchira town along Black Sea coast amid stepped-up Ukrainian attacks on its Black Sea Fleet in Russian-annexed Crimea. 

Tbilisi strengthened ties with China and Armenia. Kobakhidze 14-20 Jan led delegation to China, held meetings with senior officials to ensure “proper implementation” of 2023 Strategic Partnership Agreement; Chairman of the Parliamentary Foreign Relations Committee Nikoloz Samkharadze 15 Jan said delegation “received a promise of unwavering support from China” to support Georgia’s territorial integrity. Meanwhile, then-PM Garibashvili and his Armenian counterpart 26 Jan signed memorandum on “strategic partnership” in capital Tbilisi.

Pristina and Belgrade resolved license plate dispute in positive step toward normalisation, but sparred over currency; Kosovo Serbs in north launched petition to remove Albanian mayors from office. 

Normalisation process between Serbia and Kosovo saw progress and setback. Serbia 1 Jan enforced Dec decision allowing cars with Kosovo license plates to enter its territory, though insisted this did not equal recognition; in return, Kosovo 4 Jan ended requirement to cover Serb license plates with stickers. EU 7 Jan welcomed “positive step” toward normalisation. Simultaneously, EU 1 Jan opened visa-free travel to Schengen area for Kosovar citizens. Despite progress, Central Bank 17 Jan announced decision to suspend Serbian dinar beginning 1 Feb, after which Euro will be “only currency allowed” in Kosovo; Serbia 19 Jan condemned measure. EU Special Representative Miroslav Lajčák 30 Jan urged sides to step up normalisation efforts ahead of June 2024 EU parliamentary elections.

Kosovo Serbs launched petition to remove Albanian mayors from office in north. Hundreds of Kosovo Serbs from northern municipalities 17 Jan started petition to remove four Albanian mayors from office, who were elected in April 2023 municipal polls boycotted by local Serbs. Process began after Pristina issued administrative order in Sept 2023 allowing removal of mayors through petition process as first step toward holding new election. 

Germany bolstered NATO-led force. Germany 16 Jan increased troop contribution to NATO-led force KFOR from 80 to 300 soldiers, citing “worsening security”.

Russia conducted deadly airstrikes as its ground forces retook battlefield initiative, which could shift war’s centre of gravity north; Ukraine stepped up diplomatic efforts. 

Russia escalated strikes on Ukrainian cities as Kyiv scaled up air defence. Russia 29 Dec-8 Jan launched massive airstrikes targeting civilian and military infrastructure; U.S. and allies 10 Jan alleged attacks featured first use of North Korean ballistic missiles (see Russia). UN humanitarian agency 16 Jan claimed hundreds of civilians were killed or wounded; energy infrastructure remained operational. President Zelenskyy 30 Jan said Russia had launched nearly 1,000 missiles and drones at Ukraine since beginning of 2024. In effort to counter attacks, Ukraine 17 Jan claimed first successful use of hybrid ‘FrankenSAM’ air defence system against Russian drone, 20 Jan claimed scaled-up electronic warfare capabilities enabled interception of twenty missiles on 13 Jan. Sides, meanwhile, traded blame for downed plane in Russia’s Belgorod region 24 Jan that left 74 dead, including 65 Ukrainian prisoners of war. 

Moscow regained battlefield initiative and could shift war’s epicentre north. Russia’s ground forces continued attacking Avdiivka town in eastern Donetsk region, with reports late Jan indicating they had entered town’s southern periphery. In northern Kharkiv region, stepped-up Russian attacks near Kupiansk city 16 Jan prompted governor to order nearby villages to evacuate; Russian military 21 Jan claimed capture of Krokhmalne village, south east of Kupiansk; 29 Jan reported capture of Tabaivka village, which Ukraine denied. With Moscow increasingly able to dictate battlegrounds, fighting’s epicentre could shift north in coming weeks. 

Kyiv sustained high-intensity diplomatic activity. Ukraine 12 Jan signed ten-year security cooperation agreement with UK. Govt delegation 14 Jan attended meeting on Ukraine’s peace plan at World Economic Forum in Davos, along with 82 other countries; China remained absent. Polish PM Donald Tusk 22 Jan met President Zelenskyy in capital Kyiv, announced military assistance and commitment to dialogue over trade issues. 

In other important domestic developments. Govt 30 Jan filed revised version of mobilisation reform bill to parliament following criticism over potential constitutional violations and corruption risks. Meanwhile, Zelenskyy 29 Jan asked top commander Valerii Zaluzhnyi to step down amid rising tensions between the two; Zaluzhnyi refused.

Nagorno-Karabakh formally ceased to exist. 

Nagorno-Karabakh formally dissolved. Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) 1 Jan officially ceased to exist following Azerbaijan’s lightning military operation in Sept 2023 that ended three decades of de facto self-rule. In lengthy interview about conflict with Armenia (see Armenia, Azerbaijan), Azerbaijani President Aliyev 10 Jan threatened military action if Yerevan ever sought to reclaim enclave; he also announced govt’s goal is to return 140,000 Azerbaijani internally displaced people “to their ancestral lands by the end of 2026” and reiterated that “the Armenians of Karabakh… would live as Azerbaijani citizens” should they choose to return to region. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan 25 Jan extended pre-trial detention of fifteen members of former de facto authorities. 

France-Azerbaijan tensions persisted over latter’s Sept military operation. French Senate 17 Jan adopted non-binding resolution calling on govt to condemn Azerbaijan’s military takeover of NK and impose sanctions, and to demand guarantees for right of ethnic Armenian population to return to NK; Azerbaijan’s legislature next day responded with similar calls to impose sanctions on France. Parliament Assembly of the Council of Europe 24 Jan did not ratify credentials of Azerbaijani delegation, citing among other things concern about Baku’s Sept 2023 military operation in Nagorno-Karabakh, “which led to allegations of ‘ethnic cleansing’”.

Authorities deepened crackdown, arresting over 200 people in lead-up to February elections; govt proposed new military doctrine. 

Authorities conducted mass raids as crackdown escalated. In lead-up to Feb parliamentary elections, Viasna human rights centre 23 Jan said authorities detained or interrogated scores for alleged “involvement in extremist groups”, including former political prisoners; as of 30 Jan, over 200 people “persecuted” amid ever-worsening crackdown. EU and U.S. 25 Jan decried “wave of repression”. 

Minsk announced monitors for Feb elections. Govt 5 Jan invited Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation and Commonwealth of Independent States – regional intergovernmental organisation comprising former Soviet republics – to observe 25 Feb polls, 8 Jan announced it would not invite Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe due to organisation’s “double standards”. Opposition leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya 12 Jan reiterated call to boycott elections. 

Minsk put forward updated national security doctrine. Lukashenko 16 Jan convened Security Council to discuss updated military doctrine draft, which for first time provides for use of nuclear weapons (Russia stationed tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus in 2023). Defence Minister Viktor Khrenin 19 Jan said weapons were “an important component” of doctrine’s overall focus on “preventive deterrence of potential adversaries”. Meanwhile, Lukashenko 29 Jan met with Russian President Putin 29 Jan in Russian city St. Petersburg to discuss ways to deepen alliance.

Russian leaders alleged readiness for Ukraine peace talks but on their terms, Kyiv intensified drone attacks, and Bashkortostan region witnessed large-scale protests over jailed activist. 

Moscow accused Kyiv of hindering peace efforts, attacks into Russia persisted. Speaking in Moscow region about Ukraine war, President Putin 16 Jan dismissed Kyiv’s “peace formulas” and said Russia would not give up occupied territories. In further sign Kremlin is only prepared to negotiate on its terms, FM Lavrov 22 Jan said Russia was ready for talks but that Kyiv seeks to “perpetuate the war”; he added that Western aid to Ukraine complicates search for peace. Meanwhile, Ukraine stepped up drone attacks into Russia, notably targeting oil infrastructure. Ukrainian forces 14 Jan shot down early warning and control aircraft A-50 over Sea of Azov and damaged Il-22M aircraft, killing unknown number. Moscow and Kyiv traded blame for downed plane in Russia’s Belgorod region 24 Jan that left 74 dead, including 65 Ukrainian prisoners of war. 

Anti-war presidential candidate saw surge of support. As March election drew closer, anti-war presidential hopeful Boris Nadezhdin 25 Jan said he had collected around 200,000 signatures endorsing his candidacy, double amount required for him to run in poll, 31 Jan submitted application to Central Election Commission to run. Two other candidates 30 Jan withdrew from race and endorsed Putin. 

Thousands protested in Bashkortostan in support of jailed activist. Protest 15 Jan took place in Baymak city of Bashkortostan region against trial of Fail Alsynov, environmental activist and campaigner for preservation of Bashkir language and culture. Authorities 17 Jan sentenced Alsynov to four years in prison for “inciting hatred”, prompting more protests that led to clashes with police. Despite warnings from authorities, protesters 19 Jan rallied again in Ufa city. 

Russia allegedly acquired Iranian and North Korean weapons. U.S. 4 Jan said Russia used North Korean ballistic missiles to strike Ukraine (see Ukraine), while UK 22 Jan presented fresh evidence to UN indicating transfer of North Korean weapons to Russia. Sky News 10 Jan claimed Iran has developed new attack drone and appears close to providing Moscow with surface-to-surface missiles.

Criminal violence remained high, with LGBTQ community notably targeted; opposition accused President López Obrador of using govt powers to strengthen ruling party’s electoral campaign. 

Criminal violence persisted. Shootout between Jalisco and Sinaloa Cartels in Chicomuselo municipality, Chiapas state (south), 4 Jan killed twenty; fighting between groups during month displaced hundreds. Alleged members of La Familia Michoacana crime group 4 Jan attacked rival group Los Tlacos in desert area of Buenavista de los Hurtado, Guerrero state (south west), using drones and killing unconfirmed number. Gunmen 15 Jan abducted activist searching for her disappeared son and killed two of her family members at her house in Salamanca city, Guanajuato state (centre). Meanwhile, concerns grew over stepped-up violence in run up to 2024 elections as rival groups jockey for influence. 

Month saw number of attacks targeting LGBTQ+ community. Four transwomen were assassinated in first two weeks of 2024: attacks include 11 Jan killing of activist and Movimiento Ciudadano politician Miriam Noemí Ríos in Zamora municipality, Michoacán state (centre) and 14 Jan murder of activist and ruling MORENA party candidate for Senate Samantha Gómez Fonseca in Mexico City. Activists following day protested in capital Mexico City, calling on govt to take action. 

Critics accused govt of using state functions for campaigning. As 2024 presidential election edged closer, López Obrador 8 Jan announced doubling of pension payments and urged senior citizens to vote for party for benefits to continue. Use of state bodies and resources to campaign for MORENA is banned by constitution, and 47 such complaints against both govt and opposition are pending before National Electoral Institute (INE). Meanwhile, former head of recently dissolved state news agency NOTIMEX 9 Jan accused Labour Secretary of asking channel to divert 20% of employee payouts into campaign of MORENA presidential candidate Claudia Sheinbaum in return for kickback. López Obrador next day denied accusations, while opposition candidate Xóchitl Gálvez 11 Jan filed complaint with INE to investigate. Lopez Obrador 31 Jan rejected allegations that his unsuccessful 2006 presidential campaign received criminal financing. 

Govt renewed ceasefire with FARC dissident faction and resumed talks with ELN, with latter discussions focused on continuation of six-month ceasefire; confrontations between armed groups persisted. 

Govt renewed ceasefire with FARC dissident group. Providing important continuity for Petro’s “total peace” policy, govt and dissident Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) faction known as FARC-EP Estado Mayor Central (FARC-EMC) 14 Jan agreed on six-month extension of bilateral ceasefire. During negotiations in capital Bogotá, parties reiterated commitments to protect civilians, release kidnapped persons and end kidnap-for-ransom, work toward environmental protection, increase community participation in talks and create joint agenda, though specifics remained unclear. In further positive step, govt and rebels 4 Jan inaugurated joint monitoring mechanism that will eventually have national as well as regional chapters, and is intended to receive information about possible ceasefire infractions and prevent or de-escalate clashes. 

Govt and ELN resumed talks but did not agree on six-month ceasefire renewal. Govt negotiations with National Liberation Army (ELN) 22 Jan resumed in Cuban capital Havana; group said it would end kidnappings if ceasefire is renewed, but conditioned on govt filling gap in financing that lack of ransom payments would incur for rebels; sides 29 Jan said they would extend bilateral ceasefire for seven days while they determine if and under what terms to continue truce for another six months. UN 11 Jan presented report to Security Council detailing 170 possible incidents of ceasefire violation from both sides since 30 Nov, though none officially adjudicated. Meanwhile, govt and country’s largest armed organisation, Gaitanista Self Defense Forces, 21 Jan expressed willingness to enter dialogue, though lack of mutual trust could hinder prospects for talks. 

Armed violence between rival groups continued in several regions. ELN and FARC dissident group Segunda Marquetalia 13 Jan announced alliance in Nariño department in apparent attempt to stem advance of FARC-EMC; fighting between these groups in south west displaced at least 3,000 people in first two weeks of Jan. ELN mid Jan clashed with Jaime Martínez faction of FARC-EMC on southern outskirts of Colombia’s largest port city, Buenaventura, Valle del Cauca department, displacing and confining hundreds. Fighting between Gaitanistas and ELN in Chocó confined 9,000 families.

President Noboa declared first-ever “internal armed conflict” in country’s history after criminal groups unleashed wave of violence in prisons and cities nationwide. 

Violence spiked following disappearance of crime boss. Police in Guayaquil city 7 Jan reported disappearance of Adolfo ‘Fito’ Macías, imprisoned boss of Los Choneros gang, who was due for transfer to high-security jail. As authorities commenced hunt involving 3,000 police and army officers, rival criminal factions capitalised on chaos. Prison riots erupted across country, with inmates from seven prisons taking 178 staff hostage, while at least 30 prisoners 9 Jan escaped from Riobamba facility, including leader of “Los Lobos” group Fabricio Colón Pico, who authorities 5 Jan arrested over kidnapping and alleged plot to murder Attorney General Diana Salazar. Meanwhile, violence escalated mostly in capital Quito and Guayaquil as criminal groups looted stores and detonated explosives; gunmen 9 Jan stormed television studio in Guayaquil during live broadcast, though police quickly regained control. Gang members 21 Jan attempted to take over hospital in Yaguachi town (Guayas province) where one of their members was receiving treatment; police same day arrested 68 suspects involved. Over 200 violent deaths reported since 9 Jan, including prosecutor leading investigation into television studio attack. 

President Noboa declared first-ever “internal armed conflict”. Noboa 8 Jan declared 60-day state of emergency, facilitating military and police interventions in prisons nationwide. But amid spiralling violence and worldwide media coverage of television studio raid, Noboa 9 Jan declared Ecuador’s first ever “internal armed conflict” and announced use of lethal force and military assets to combat 22 criminal groups, now labelled terrorists. Move raised fears that intensified security operations could prompt violent backlash from criminal groups. 

International partners offered support to embattled nation. Peru 9 Jan and Colombia 10 Jan bolstered troop presence along border, while around 40 countries offered military assistance to Quito, including Argentina, U.S. and Brazil. U.S. 11 Jan announced it would send officials to assist Ecuador with criminal investigations. Govt 21 Jan signed security cooperation agreement with fellow members of regional bloc Andean Community, aimed at tackling transnational criminal networks.

In blow to prospects for competitive election, Supreme Court upheld decision banning opposition’s candidate María Corina Machado from standing for office, while authorities cracked down on armed forces and civil society. 

Supreme Court reaffirmed opposition candidate’s ban from running for office. Despite govt-opposition agreement in Barbados in Oct 2023 to improve electoral conditions, govt-controlled Supreme Court 26 Jan upheld ban on opposition leader María Corina Machado’s candidacy, meaning she cannot run in 2024 presidential poll. Opposition coalition Unitary Platform dismissed decision as illegal and in breach of Barbados deal, while platform’s chief negotiator Gerardo Blyde appealed to presidents of France, Brazil and Colombia to convince Maduro to reverse it. EU and U.S. expressed deep concern, along with many of Venezuela’s neighbours; U.S. 29 Jan announced it will begin reinstating sanctions, having eased them following Barbados; govt next day called decision “blackmail”. 

Govt clamped down on security forces and civil society. Police 17 Jan raided office of teachers’ union in Barinas state (west) and arrested union leader Victor Venegas for alleged involvement in anti-govt conspiracy. Attorney General Tarek Saab 22 Jan announced authorities had arrested at least 32 civilians and former military personnel and issued warrants against eleven others for allegedly conspiring against govt in several different plots; govt claimed plans were backed by U.S. and implicated Machado. National Assembly 23 Jan approved law that could severely curtail activity and, in some instances, lead to closure of NGOs, sparking condemnation from civil society and human rights groups. 

Opposition prepared for 2024 elections despite uncertainty. Ahead of Supreme Court announcement, Machado 23 Jan announced alliance of political parties and civil society groups to organise electoral campaign and called on govt to announce exact date of poll. 

Caracas-Georgetown talks continued over disputed region. Govt and Guyana 25 Jan agreed to continue diplomatic efforts over contested Essequibo area, oil-rich region currently administered by Guyana, during talks in Brazilian capital Brasília.

Country saw transfer of power as planned, with Bernardo Arévalo assuming presidency after months of tireless efforts to block August election result and turbulent inauguration. 

Arévalo assumed office after last-ditch attempt by opposition to stall proceedings. Following months of relentless attempts to overturn election result, Bernardo Arévalo and Karin Herrera 15 Jan were sworn in as President and VP. Inauguration started nine hours later than scheduled after outgoing Congress 14 Jan tried to stall swearing in of new members of legislature; it also decided that, due to ongoing legal cases, incoming deputies from Arévalo’s Movimento Semilla party would be considered “independent”, leading to confrontations among lawmakers. Legislative body eventually sworn in after hours of delays, however, with Semilla’s Samuel Pérez selected as President of Congress; Pérez immediately reinstated deputies into party, while Arévalo was sworn in to presidency. Thousands of supporters celebrated in capital Guatemala City as Arévalo thanked Ancestral Authorities for leadership during transition; Indigenous leaders ended 106-day-long strike. Constitutional Court next day invalidated election of Congress’ leadership and in new vote 19 Jan Partido Azul’s Nery Abilio was elected its president. 

International community signalled support for Arévalo. Representatives from countries across the world attended swearing in ceremony, including heads of state from Colombia, Honduras, Chile and Paraguay, exerting pressure on Congress to allow transfer of power. Following inauguration, U.S. aid agency chief Samantha Powers 15 Jan announced $6mn for program to develop rural areas while U.S. State Department 17 Jan sanctioned former President Giammattei for corruption. EU High Representative Josep Borrel 16 Jan announced €50mn investment to support Indigenous communities and cooperation with Arévalo administration on strengthening democracy, and combating climate change and corruption.

Former rebel leader rallied support for protests to topple acting PM Henry, raising risk of instability in coming weeks. 

Former rebel leader sought to oust PM. With acting PM Henry due to step down on 7 Feb but unlikely to stick to his pledge, supporters of former rebel leader Guy Philippe 15 Jan launched protests in several cities demanding Henry’s resignation. Philippe, meanwhile, expanded alliances with security forces and political actors as he called on “all sectors” to join “revolution” to transform Haiti. Most notably, he forged alliance with several units of Brigade for the Security of Protected Areas (BSAP), armed body attached to National Agency for Protected Areas led by his close friend Jeantel Joseph. Joseph took part in several anti-govt demonstrations and promised to bring protests to capital Port-au-Prince to oust Henry, prompting govt 23 Jan to sack him; move angered BSAP members, who 24 Jan clashed with police in north east Ouanaminthe commune. Govt 29 Jan ordered all BSAP workers to report to nearest Ministry of Environment office for registration. Philippe’s movement could gain steam in coming weeks, especially if gangs join alliance, raising risk of clashes in Port-au-Prince and other cities. 

Gang-related insecurity persisted in capital and in south. In Mariani village south west of Port-au-Prince, police operations failed to oust gang led by alias Bout ba, whose members throughout Jan kidnapped dozens along National Route 2 and attacked people travelling by boat to avoid route. In Port-au-Prince, members of Bel-Air gang led by Kempès Sanon 16 Jan launched several days’ attack on Solino neighbourhood, trapping residents in their homes and killing unconfirmed number. Clashes between G9 coalition and at least two gangs that defected from coalition 28 Jan broke out in capital. 

Kenyan court prohibited police deployment to Haiti. Kenya’s High Court 26 Jan prohibited deployment of police officers to Haiti, saying National Security Council lacked authority to dispatch police beyond Kenya’s borders and that no “reciprocal agreement” exists between two nations; Kenyan President William Ruto 30 Jan, however, said mission “is on course” and could go ahead “as soon as next week”.

Govt released nineteen members of Catholic Church and handed them to Vatican; opposition leader suffered assassination attempt. 

Managua handed over nineteen religious leaders to Vatican. Pope Francis 1 Jan used New Year’s Day address to express concern about Ortega regime’s targeting of Catholic Church, saying he was “following with concern what is happening in Nicaragua, where bishops and priests have been deprived of their freedom”, and expressed hope for “dialogue to overcome difficulties”. Govt 14 Jan released nineteen jailed religious leaders, including Bishop Rolando Álvarez, following negotiations and handed them over to Vatican. Meanwhile, govt 16 Jan cancelled legal status of sixteen NGOs, some of them Catholic organisations. 

Opposition leader suffered assassination attempt. Unknown gunmen 10 Jan shot and wounded opposition leader Joao Ismael Maldonado Bermúdez, who has lived in Costa Rica since 2018 govt crackdown, and his partner; attack marked second assassination attempt on Maldonado since his exile. Members of Exiled Nicaraguans in Unity in Costa Rica 12 Jan attributed attack to “hired assassins” of regime.

Govt extended state of exception and political crisis eased. 

Authorities again renewed tough security measures. Executive 1 Jan renewed state of exception for ninth time until 15 Feb amid continued concern about measure’s impact. Violence against women remained particularly acute. Notably, human rights secretary Natalia Roque and UN Coordinator in Honduras Alice Shackelford 10 Jan expressed particular concern over impunity in femicide cases following discovery previous day of bodies of three women on Honduran island, Roatán. Meanwhile, Colonel Ramiro Muñoz 16 Jan announced closure of three prisons – La Esperanza, Trujillo and Cortés – due to “deplorable conditions”, said inmates would be transferred to other prisons. 

Political crisis eased. Following months of congressional paralysis, lawmakers 16 Jan elected 2024-2026 Board of Directors for Congress in extraordinary session; five political parties have representation but ruling LIBRE party has majority. Congress next day approved budget for next fiscal year, 30 Jan resumed deliberations to appoint officials to vacant posts such as Institute of Access to Public Information and magistrates for Superior Court of Accounts. 

President Bukele looked set for re-election in February; Minister of Justice announced start of trials against gang leadership as authorities again renewed state of exception. 

Poll suggested Bukele poised for victory in Feb election. Salvadorans will head to polls on 4 Feb to elect president, vice-president and legislative assembly, with possible runoff in March if no presidential candidate secures over 50% of vote. This appeared unlikely, however, after Francisco Gavidia University Centre for Citizen Studies 16 Jan presented their final poll prior to election day, which gave Bukele (who is constitutionally banned from seeking immediate re-election) 71% lead over his nearest rivals. 

Authorities renewed state of exception as trials of gang leadership began. Congress 9 Jan extended state of exception until 10 Feb amid continued criticism from human rights groups. Minister of Justice Gustavo Villatoro 4 Jan declared that El Salvador’s 2023 homicide rate was lowest in Latin America; he added that authorities had arrested 75,163 “terrorists” under measure and that approximately 18,000-20,000 gang members are still at large. Trial to prosecute 494 gang leaders 22 Jan commenced. Meanwhile, Legislative Assembly 3 Jan approved reform granting Attorney General capacity to declare persons or entities “national terrorists”, and to petition for their inclusion on UN Security Council terrorist list.

Cross-border hostilities between Hizbollah and Israel continued at high intensity as Israel stepped up pressure to secure Hizbollah’s withdrawal, highlighting risk of expanded regional conflict.

Amid deadly clashes, Israel warned of war. Lebanon continued to face spectre of all-out war as Israel’s campaign in Gaza continued (see Israel-Palestine). In notable escalation, Israeli strike 2 Jan killed senior Hamas leader Saleh al-Arouri and six companions in Hizbollah-controlled area of southern Beirut; in retaliation, Hizbollah 6 Jan attacked Israel’s Meron air control base some 5km from border. Israel 8 Jan killed Hizbollah commander Wissam al-Tawil 10km from border, marking most senior party figure to be killed since 7 Oct; Hizbollah next day claimed to strike Israel’s northern command HQ in Safed city. Anti-tank missile from Lebanon 14 Jan killed two Israel civilians who refused to evacuate border community of Yuval. Hizbollah 23 Jan again struck Mount Meron base. Israeli strikes brought number of displaced residents to at least 82,000, many of whom crowded into nearby urban centres such as Tyre. Meanwhile, Israeli govt continued to face pressure to confront Hizbollah’s presence south of Lebanon’s Litani River, which violates UN Security Council Resolution 1701. As Israel continued to threaten war on northern front, U.S. envoy Amos Hochstein 11 Jan met Lebanese leaders in Beirut to discuss diplomatic options for calming border tensions that could both allay Israel’s security concerns and prove acceptable to Hizbollah. Without immediate diplomatic off-ramp, however, risk of all-out conflict between pair remains pertinent as Israel has signalled willingness to escalate militarily against Hizbollah unless diplomacy succeeds soon. Adding to pressure, Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant 29 Jan warned Israeli forces will “very soon go into action” on northern front. 

Presidential vacuum persisted. Country’s presidential vacuum entered its fourteenth consecutive month in Jan with little prospect of breakthrough. Parliament 26 Jan approved budget within constitutional deadline for first time in twenty years but faced widespread criticism over its content. Unidentified hackers 7 Jan launched cyberattack at Beirut airport; Public Works Minister 12 Jan bemoaned 2024 budget’s paltry allocation to airport’s cybersecurity. 

Hostilities escalated as Iran-backed groups traded blows with U.S. forces, Israel killed Hamas and Iranian commanders, and Türkiye intensified attacks in north; killing of U.S. soldiers in Jordan could provoke retaliatory strikes in Syria.

In east, Iran-backed groups and U.S. exchanged tit-for-tat attacks. Iran-backed militias launched nearly 30 attacks on U.S. bases during Jan: notably, Islamic Resistance in Iraq 2 Jan announced attacks on Al-Shaddadi, Al-Rumaylan, Al-Malikiyah bases housing U.S. personnel in Hasakah province; 14 Jan attacked U.S. Kharab Al-Jir base in Hasakah province and Conoco base in Deir ez-Zor province. U.S. retaliatory attacks on 7, 8 and 14 Jan targeted Iran-backed groups in Al-Bukamal, Al-Mayadeen, and Deir ez-Zor cities. In major escalation marking first fatal strike on U.S. forces since Gaza war, Iran-aligned Iraqi militants – likely operating in Syria – 28 Jan killed three U.S. personnel in Jordanian base on Syrian-Iraqi border (see Jordan), raising prospect of imminent U.S. retaliation in Syria.

In south, Israel targeted Hamas and Iran, Jordan continued airstrikes. Iran-backed fighters 1 Jan reportedly launched rockets at Israeli-occupied Golan Heights; Israel next day struck Kanaker village in southern Damascus countryside. Israel 8 Jan killed Hamas commander Hassan Akasha in Beit Jinn village, Rif Dimashq. Israeli airstrike 20 Jan struck capital Damascus, killing five Iranian military personnel, including Iran’s head of intelligence in Syria, and several civilians; Iran vowed to respond. Presumed Israeli missile targeting IRGC base in Damascus 29 Jan killed seven, including three IRGC members and civilians. Israel 31 Jan struck army positions in Deraa city. In Suwayda province, Jordan continued airstrikes targeting trafficking.

In north, Türkiye intensified shelling as part of strikes on Kurdish militants. In response to killing of over a dozen Turkish soldiers in Iraq (see Iraq), Turkish military announced it 12-16 Jan conducted 114 airstrikes targeting Kurdish forces in Syria and northern Iraq; notably, Turkish drone 14 Jan killed three regime soldiers in Qamishli, Hasakah province. In north east, intensified Turkish shelling cut over 1mn off from electricity. 

In north west, hostilities persisted between regime and opposition. Deadly clashes between regime forces and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)/National Liberation Front 3, 9, 10, 18 and 19 Jan erupted along frontlines in southern Idlib province; shelling 1 Jan killed eleven civilians near Aleppo city. Meanwhile, Iran 15 Jan launched direct attack on alleged ISIS target in Idlib, in retaliation for deadly bombing (see Iran). 

Islamic State (ISIS) killed 80 in deadliest bombing in decades, while Iran struck Syria, Iraq and Pakistan in sign of increasingly assertive regional posture amid escalation on multiple fronts fuelled by Gaza war.

ISIS killed scores at ceremony for slain commander. ISIS 3 Jan conducted dual bombings at commemoration ceremony for Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani in Kerman city (south east), which killed over 80 and injured more than 200, marking deadliest terrorist attack in Iran since 1979 revolution. 

Tehran struck out at foes both east and west. IRGC 15 Jan announced it had launched ballistic missiles into Syria’s Idlib purportedly aimed at ISIS, and northern Iraq at sites it claimed were linked to Israeli intelligence. Iranian forces next day launched strikes on village in Pakistan’s Balochistan province, claiming to target “strongholds” of Jaish al-Adl – anti-Iranian Baloch militant group that 15 Dec conducted deadly attack in Iran’s Balochistan province; Pakistan condemned strike and claimed it killed two children. Pakistan 18 Jan launched strikes on village near Iranian border city of Saravan (south east), claiming to target Pakistani Baloch militants; pair took steps to de-escalate late Jan (see Pakistan). Unidentified gunmen 27 Jan killed nine Pakistani workers in Saravan.

Iran-aligned groups continued attacks across region amid Gaza war. Amid Houthi attacks in Red Sea and U.S.-UK retaliatory airstrikes (see Yemen), Iran 15 Jan disavowed involvement. Iran 21 Jan confirmed deaths of five IRGC members in alleged Israeli strikes in Syrian capital Damascus, as President Raisi pledged revenge. Attacks against U.S. and allied forces in Iraq and Syria by Iran-aligned groups continued, exceeding 160 incidents from mid Oct to late Jan (see Iraq and Syria). In significant escalation, drone strike 28 Jan, attributed by U.S. to Iran-backed militants, killed three U.S. service members in Jordan; U.S. pledged retaliation (see Jordan).

Iran expanded nuclear activities. After International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) late Dec announced Iran increased three-fold its production of uranium enriched up to 60%, IAEA chief Rafael Grossi 18 Jan stressed need for urgent diplomacy; nuclear expansion, hampered cooperation with IAEA and limited diplomacy with West bode ill for swift resolution of simmering nuclear crisis. 

Iran launched first direct attack in Iraq since Gaza war and hostilities between U.S. and Tehran-backed militias escalated; region braced for retaliation after Iraqi umbrella group killed U.S. troops in Jordan.

Gaza war continued to fuel escalation. In first direct Iranian attack since start of war in Gaza, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 15 Jan launched three missiles at house of prominent Kurdish businessman in Kurdistan’s regional capital Erbil, killing at least four; like similar strike in March 2022, Iran claimed attack targeted Mossad activities, which Kurdistan Regional Govt (KRG) denied. Meanwhile, U.S. 4 Jan struck Iran-backed Harakat al-Nujaba group in capital Baghdad, reportedly killing four, including commander of paramilitary coalition Hashd al-Shaabi. U.S. for first time acknowledged use of ballistic missiles by Iran-backed umbrella group Islamic Resistance in Iraq in 20 Jan attack on Ain al-Asad base in Anbar governorate, injuring several personnel. In major escalation marking first fatal strike on U.S. forces since Gaza war, drone attacks by Islamic Resistance in Iraq, likely operating in Syria, 28 Jan killed three U.S. personnel in north-eastern Jordan (see Jordan). U.S. and Iraq late Jan began formal talks on withdrawal of U.S. forces. Militant group Kataib Hizbollah 30 Jan announced suspension of attacks on U.S. forces “to prevent embarrassment” of Iraqi govt.

Türkiye-PKK attacks intensified in north. Late Dec spate of attacks on Turkish troops continued, as PKK 5 Jan killed five soldiers in attack on military base and clash 12 Jan killed nine Turkish soldiers. In response, Türkiye 12-16 Jan launched airstrikes in both northern Iraq and Syria, targeting PKK/People’s Protection Units militants. Ankara also increased attacks on Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), party based in Sulaymaniyah province; Turkish FM Hakan Fidan 16 Jan threatened “further measures” if PUK did not change its attitude toward PKK.

Baghdad and Erbil ended budget dispute; Islamic State (ISIS) maintained activity. After KRG President Barzani’s 13 Jan visit to Baghdad, govt next day agreed to allocate monthly funds to KRG, marking shift from previous arrangement of loans. Suspected ISIS militants 6 Jan reportedly attacked Hashd al-Shaabi forces in Salah al-Din governorate, killing two; 14 Jan killed three soldiers near Haditha town.

Iran-backed Iraqi umbrella group conducted first deadly strike on U.S. forces in region since Gaza war; Jordan’s military continued airstrikes in Syria aimed at combatting smuggling.

Iran-backed militants killed three U.S. troops at base in north east. In significant escalation, Tehran-aligned Iraqi umbrella group Islamic Resistance in Iraq – likely operating in Syria – 28 Jan launched drone strike on U.S. base in Jordan’s north east, known as Tower 22, killing three U.S service members and wounding at least 34; U.S. President Biden vowed retaliation, saying “we will hold all those responsible to account at a time and in a manner of our choosing”. Since Gaza war, militants have launched over 160 attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria, although causing no fatalities until 28 Jan.

Jordan-Syrian border remained wracked by instability. After deadly clashes erupted between Jordanian security forces and militants/drug smugglers from Syria in Dec, Jordanian jets 4 Jan launched airstrike in Syria’s Suwayda province and 9 Jan launched four airstrikes in same area; security forces 7 Jan killed five drug traffickers in gun battle on Jordanian-Syrian border. Jordan 18 Jan reportedly struck two houses in Syria’s Arman town in Suwayda, reportedly killing nine people, including children. Amman blames Iran-backed militant groups in govt-controlled areas of Syria for surge of cross-border smuggling activity.

Riyadh conditioned normalisation with Israel on Palestinian statehood, while Germany further loosened restrictions on exporting offensive weapons to kingdom.

Riyadh publicly toughened stance on price of normalisation with Israel. During regional tour, U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken 8 Jan met Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Al-Ula city to discuss war in Gaza and hostilities in Red Sea; Blinken said Saudi Arabia and other regional states remained opened to building diplomatic ties with Israel but Israel must first end Gaza war and work toward Palestinian state – marking first time senior U.S. official explicitly linked Palestinian statehood with normalisation. Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to UK, Prince Khaled bin Bandar, next day reiterated Riyadh was open to normalisation but “we can’t live with Israel without a Palestinian state”. Survey conducted by Washington Institute for Near East Policy in Nov-Dec found 96% of Saudis believe Arab countries should cut all ties with Israel in protest of Gaza war (see Israel-Palestine).

Germany supplied offensive weapons, citing Israel’s security. After U.S. officials late Dec announced preparations to loosen ban on offensive weapons sales to Saudi Arabia, German FM Annalena Baerbock 7 Jan said Germany would stop blocking sale of Eurofighters to Riyadh, citing its “constructive attitude toward Israel” amid reports Saudi Air Force had shot down Houthi projectiles fired at Israel (see Yemen). Germany 10 Jan announced it approved export of 150 Iris-T guided missiles, resuming arms sales banned in response to 2018 murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi.

U.S. and UK began bombing campaign against Houthis, risking wider escalation, as U.S. “terrorist” designation of group could compound humanitarian crisis and hamper peace process; frontlines displayed signs of possible renewed conflict.

U.S. and UK launched anti-Houthi airstrikes. In major escalation, U.S. and UK 11 Jan launched airstrikes against dozens of Houthi targets in Sanaa, Sa’adah, Taiz, Hajjah and Hodeida governorates, and 13-14, 16-20, 22, 24, 27 and 31 Jan struck locations in Hodeida, Taiz, Dhamar, al-Bayda, and Sa’adah governorates, citing Houthi attacks on international shipping. Houthis remained defiant, as strikes appeared to inflict limited damage on group’s capabilities or morale and proved counterproductive: Houthis 15, 17 Jan struck U.S.-operated ships in Gulf of Aden and vowed further action, raising prospect that attacks from both sides could escalate in coming weeks.

U.S. re-designated Houthis terrorist organisation. After removing group from “Foreign Terrorist Organisation” list in Feb 2021, U.S. 17 Jan designated Houthis “Specially Designated Global Terrorist”, citing need to impede funding. Designation may hamper international response to humanitarian crisis, further complicate peace talks between Riyadh and Houthis and dampen prospects of dialogue with other conflict actors.

Local fighting escalated in several regions, threatening to upend de facto truce. Houthi shelling 12 Jan killed two govt soldiers in Hodeida governorate. Houthi drone 14 Jan targeted Shabwa Defence Forces in Marib governorate, killing two soldiers. Houthis next day attacked border guards in al-Jawf governorate, killing two. Giants Brigade 23 Jan claimed it repelled Houthi offensive in Bayhan town, Shabwa, causing casualties. Risk of wider ground fighting along frontlines loomed as Houthis may initiate new major offensive, particularly if U.S. and UK provide support to anti-Houthi groups.

Eastern leaders formed new group; regional proxy competition continued. In move seen as countering separatist Southern Transitional Council’s attempts to assert control in east, prominent local leaders in eastern governorates (Hadramawt, al-Mahra, Shebwa and Socotra) 9 Jan announced formation of single entity to counter external influence and advocate equal representation in any political settlement. Highlighting competition between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates-backed Hadhrami Elite Forces 16 Jan blocked entry of Saudi-backed Nation Shield Forces into Mukalla city.

Israel intensified assault on southern Gaza amid widespread starvation and disease, as momentum built toward possible ceasefire; West Bank braced for further turmoil and risk of wider conflict with Hizbollah loomed.

War approached fifth month. Israel’s assault on Gaza, which passed its 100th day, displaced 85% of population and killed over 27,000 Palestinians; Israeli soldier death toll reached 218 as of 30 Jan, with 22 Jan marking Israel’s deadliest single day of war. Israel stepped up bombardment in Khan Younis city, including zones it declared “safe”, and indicated plans to expand operations to Rafah, which hosts huge proportion of 2mn displaced. Israel also signalled intent to control Philadelphi Corridor between Gaza and Egypt, fuelling tensions with Cairo who warned of “serious threat” to relations and raising risk of mass casualties or mass expulsion. Hamas continued ambush attacks and rocket fire, as reports late Jan suggested group had reconstituted in northern Gaza. Amid collapsing and besieged health services, starvation risks rose: after U.S. and other states suspended funding to relief organisation UNRWA, following allegations of staff involvement in 7 Oct attacks, UN special rapporteur on right to food 28 Jan said “famine is now inevitable”.

Hamas mulled latest ceasefire proposal; Israeli cabinet grew divided. Amid talks in Paris, Hamas 30 Jan said it was considering new ceasefire and hostage release proposal, signalling some diplomatic progress and fuelling hope of possible multi-stage truce. Public and international pressure mounted as Israel appeared no closer to achieving its two main objectives – destroying Hamas and liberating hostages – and war cabinet grew visibly conflicted over path forward: PM Netanyahu 18 Jan rejected two-state solution, openly contradicting Washington. International Court of Justice 26 Jan found it plausible Israel’s acts amount to genocide and ordered Israel to prevent committing/inciting genocide acts. 

Violence in West Bank continued. Israeli forces and settlers have killed 370 Palestinians since 7 Oct; Israeli air strike 7 Jan killed seven Palestinians in Jenin. Reports mid Jan indicated Israeli security agency Shin Bet had warned Palestinian Authority at risk of financial collapse and territory on brink of explosion of violence.

Israel-Hizbollah hostilities continued. Risk of expanded conflict on northern front grew (see Lebanon).

Ruling party confirmed ambition to play active role in President Tebboune's re-election campaign after years on the sidelines; amid strained bilateral relations, Bamako denounced Algiers-sponsored 2015 peace accord.

Ruling party and military asserted support for Tebboune’s re-election bid. At Central Committee session, National Liberation Front’s new secretary general, Abdelkrim Benmbarek, 7 Jan expressed support for President Tebboune’s candidacy in presidential election due to be held before year’s end; stance confirms party’s comeback on political stage after being sidelined in wake of 2019-2021 Hirak protest movement. Army also expressed support for Tebboune. During inspection visit to second military region (west), army chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Saïd Chengriha, 15 Jan called on citizens to adhere “to the project of the rebirth of a new Algeria, led … by Abdelmadjid Tebboune”.

Algeria-Mali diplomatic tensions remained elevated. Mali’s junta 25 Jan revoked Algiers-sponsored 2015 peace deal with separatist rebels, citing “increasing number of unfriendly acts, instances of hostility and interference in Mali’s internal affairs” by Algiers. Foreign ministry next day denounced Mali’s “use of international mercenaries” and rearmament program “funded by third countries”. Earlier in month, Algerian ambassador to Mali and Malian ambassador to Algiers 5 and 7 Jan returned to their posts two weeks after being recalled for consultations; diplomatic row erupted in Dec over Algiers’ consultations with rebel leaders and Tebboune’s meeting with Malian opposition leader Mahmoud Dicko. 

Algeria took seat on UN Security Council. Algeria’s two-year term as non-permanent member of UN Security Council started 1 Jan, with Western Sahara and Palestine as priority issues on country’s agenda.

Amid Gaza war, tensions between Egypt and Israel continued to rise; IMF held talks with Cairo to expand $3bn loan and potentially soften reform program. 

War in Gaza continued to strain Egypt-Israel relations. Israel’s request to occupy fourteen-kilometre-long buffer zone on Egypt’s border with Gaza, known as Philadephi Corridor, with a view to halting weapons smuggling route from Egypt into Gaza, ratcheted up tensions. Cairo, which currently patrols area, 22 Jan issued warning to Israel, saying any move to control Philadelphi Corridor would pose serious threat to bilateral relations. Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) director Ronen Bar 29 Jan met with head of Egypt’s General Intelligence Directorate Abbas Kamel in Cairo to discuss tensions over control of Philadelphi Corridor. Meanwhile, security situation remained precarious along border with Gaza and Israel. Egyptian forces reported preventing drug smuggling attempt 15 Jan on Egyptian-Israeli border near Awja crossing, with six suspected smugglers arrested; Israeli army reported one soldier wounded same day in exchange of fire with armed individuals near Awja. Anonymous military source quoted next day by The New Arab website said they were not smugglers, but pro-Hamas militants attempting to infiltrate Gaza.

IMF showed readiness to expand loan amid economic impact of Gaza war. Insecurity in Red Sea impacted shipping traffic through Suez Canal. Osama Rabie, chairman of Suez Canal Authority, 11 Jan said traffic since 1 Jan had dropped by 40% compared to a year prior, inflicting damage to key source of foreign reserves. Drop in Suez Canal traffic also contributed to further weakening of Egyptian pound on black market. Egyptian media outlet Al Ahram 14 Jan reported exchange rate on black market had shot up to record high level of close to 60 pounds to the dollar. International Monetary Fund (IMF) confirmed readiness to help Cairo. Financial institution 11 Jan said increasing size of IMF loan to Egypt was “critical”, and delegation led by IMF Egypt Mission Chief Vladkova Hollar mid Jan travelled to Cairo to discuss $3bn loan and reform program.

Tripoli-based govt’s decision to lift fuel subsidies sparked backlash, and latest UN-sponsored national dialogue initiative aimed at resolving political stalemate remained stalled.

Public debate revolved around financial and economic feuds. Tripoli-based PM Abdulhamid Dabaiba 10 Jan announced controversial plan to remove fuel subsidies, in likely attempt to curb smuggling of subsidised fuel. Move created uproar among constituencies and politicians who have ties to smuggling rackets, and eastern-based govt in following days called decision “null and void”. Amid opposition and concern that removal of subsidies without proper compensation plans could cause significant inflation and impact ordinary Libyans, Dabaiba 17 Jan said issue will be put to referendum. 

More controversies affected oil sector. National Oil Corporation (NOC) 7 Jan declared force majeure at Sharara Oil Field after protesters closed site in uproar over deteriorating economic conditions in southern region; NOC 21 Jan lifted force majeure after deal with protesters.

UN envoy initiative to resolve political stalemate found no traction. U.S. ambassador to Libya, Richard Norland, in Jan visited capital Tripoli and eastern city of Benghazi to mobilise support for UN envoy Abdoulaye Bathily-sponsored meeting of Libya’s five main political stakeholders to settle “issues impeding progress toward elections”. Speaker of eastern-based House of Representatives (HoR), Aguila Saleh, 23 Jan met with Norland in Benghazi and confirmed rejection of Bathily’s invitation, insisting that first step toward unification should be appointment of new unity govt. Norland same day also met with Libyan National Army (LNA) leader Khalifa Haftar in Benghazi to discuss political stalemate. Following meetings with Norland, Dabaiba and head of Tripoli-based advisory body High Council of State, Mohamed Takala, around 25 Jan announced accepting Bathily’s invitation. Bathily also held series of meetings, including with Haftar 30 Jan and Saleh next day, who reiterated his side would not attend UN-brokered political dialogue unless govt appointed by east-based parliament was present, or both govts were excluded. Meanwhile, Presidency Council pushed separate initiative, National Reconciliation Conference, with preparatory committee meeting held 14 Jan in Zuwara city; conference would supposedly be held in Sirte city in April and include members of former Qadhafi regime. 

Crackdown on free speech continued with judicial harassment of journalists, and IMF for first time placed Tunisia on so-called black list.

Repression of dissent continued. Tunis court 10 Jan gave journalist and columnist Zied el-Heni six-month suspended prison sentence for allegedly insulting minister during radio broadcast, and released him from prison, where he had been held since 28 Dec. Authorities 3 Jan arrested Al Jazeera journalist Samir Sassi on suspicion of belonging to “terrorist organisation”, before releasing him few days later. Interior ministry note leaked on social media 13 Jan requested opening of investigation against twenty public figures (most of whom are likely to stand in presidential election due to be held by year’s end) on allegations of money laundering. 

Protesters took to streets on different occasions. Demonstration in support of Palestinians 11 Jan took place in front of South Africa embassy in capital Tunis; protesters expressed support for Pretoria’s genocide case against Israel at International Court of Justice. Hundreds of people 14 Jan demonstrated in Tunis to mark anniversary of 2011 uprising that led to ousting of then-President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, and to demand release of jailed opposition leaders. Demonstrations 17-18 Jan broke out in El Hencha village, north of Sfax city, after boat carrying 37 residents attempting to cross Mediterranean Sea went missing.

In another important development. Tunisia 5 Jan appeared on International Monetary Fund’s “negative list” of countries with over eighteen-month delay in completion of consultations with financial institution. President Saïed late Jan extended state of emergency by eleven months until 31 Dec 2024. 

Reports of Moroccan artillery movement fuelled speculation of possible military operation in Western Sahara; Rabat secured chairmanship of UN Human Rights Council.

Media reports emerged of possible Moroccan military operation in buffer zone. Spanish newspaper La Razón 16 Jan reported movement of heavy artillery in Bir Gandouz area in Morocco-controlled Western Sahara. Local sources indicated Morocco might be preparing limited operation against Polisario Front independence movement inside UN-monitored buffer zone, while Moroccan press speculated Rabat may want to take over buffer zone, which could spark escalation with Algeria. Meanwhile, drone allegedly fired by Moroccan military 31 Dec killed three Mauritanian civilians in Guerguera area, Morocco-controlled Western Sahara. In retaliation, Mauritania early Jan reportedly increased customs duties applied to Moroccan goods entering Mauritania through Guerguera border crossing.

Rabat scored symbolic win at UN Human Rights Council. Morocco 10 Jan secured chairmanship of UN Human Rights Council despite strong opposition from Algeria and South Africa, who argued situation in Western Sahara and Rabat’s human rights record make country unfit to preside over intergovernmental body.