War of words with Rwanda continued as rebels reportedly supported by Kigali launched new attack; deployment of troops and militiamen to DR Congo (DRC) caused strains.

Tensions between Burundi and Rwanda continued to worsen amid rebel violence. Addressing diplomatic corps, President Ndayishimiye 3 Feb criticised what he termed Kigali’s “hypocrisy” in regional peace initiatives, citing unsuccessful negotiations for extradition from Rwanda of RED-Tabara rebel group leader. Meanwhile, govt 26 Feb reported RED-Tabara killed at least nine people including soldiers and civilians in Buringa village, Bubanza province previous day, and accused Rwanda of backing rebels; RED-Tabara claimed responsibility for attack, saying they had destroyed ruling party headquarters, and denied killing civilians.

Deployment of Burundian troops to DRC faced challenges. Reports emerged of soldiers and members of ruling party youth wing Imbonerakure refusing deployment to DRC due to concerns over payment and benefits. SOS Media Burundi 23 Feb reported 242 Burundian soldiers detained in Bururi, Rumonge, Ruyigi and Ngozi provinces for allegedly refusing to combat M23 rebels alongside Congolese army in eastern DRC.

Crackdown on opposition persisted, judiciary handed heavy sentence to journalist. Representatives of National Intelligence Service 8 Feb reportedly arrested National Congress for Freedom (CNL) opposition party member, Desire Bizimana, in Bubanza province, taking him to undisclosed location in capital Bujumbura. In blow to press freedom, Supreme Court 13 Feb upheld ten-year prison sentence against journalist Floriane Irangabiye for allegedly collaborating with armed groups.

With peace talks stalled, Anglophone separatist militants hardened stance against civilians who violate their “ghost town” orders and UN humanitarian agencies.

Anglophone conflict continued to take heavy toll on civilians. Separatist groups 10-12 Feb violently enforced lockdowns in various towns of Anglophone North West (NW) and South West (SW) regions to prevent smooth running of National Youth Day activities on 11 Feb. Notably, bomb attack in Nkambe city, Donga Mantung division (NW), 11 Feb killed one school child and injured at least 40 people. Govt forces 15-17 Feb attacked separatists in and around Mamfe city, Manyu division (SW), killing four. Separatist factions from late Jan also hardened stance toward internationally-backed humanitarian and reconstruction efforts. Ambazonia Governing Council (AGovC) unveiled plans to destroy World Bank-funded projects, while Interim Govt-Maryland group announced severing cooperation with several UN bodies, accusing them of thriving on status quo while making no effort to find political solution to conflict. Meanwhile, alliance between separatist groups in Ambazonia and Nigeria continued to raise tension: clashes between Nigerian Biafra separatists and Cameroonian soldiers reported 29 Jan and 4 Feb in Bakassi Peninsula.

Boko Haram conducted deadly attacks in Far North region. Suspected Boko Haram militants 5 Feb kidnapped fourteen herders of Fulani and Choa Arab ethnic groups in Limani town, Mayo-Sava division. Boko Haram militants 12-18 Feb attacked several neighbourhoods and villages in Kolofata, Limani (both Mayo-Sava) and Blangoua (Logone-et-Chari division) communes, stealing cattle, food, vehicles and kidnapping civilians. Govt forces 18 Feb repelled Boko Haram attacks on military bases in Limani and Amchide towns (both Mayo-Sava) on Nigerian border, with unknown number of casualties. Boko Haram roadside bomb explosion 27 Feb killed five elite forces soldiers in Gossi locality (Mayo-Tsanaga division).

AU endorsed Cameroonian candidate for UN General Assembly presidency. African Union 14 Feb endorsed former PM Philemon Yang as candidate for one-year presidency of 79th UN General Assembly; Yang’s UN posting could be used by Yaoundé to show govt rewards those who remain loyal and to closely monitor diplomatic moves ahead of 2025 elections.

Russia doubled down on military support to Bangui amid struggle for influence with U.S.; rebel groups continued to stage attacks in hinterland.

Struggle for influence between U.S. and Russia continued. Recent announcement of U.S. private security company Bancroft’s operations in CAR gave new impetus to Russia’s military support to President Touadéra amid struggle for influence. Notably, Russian govt late Jan delivered seven fighter jets to CAR’s national security forces, and presidential adviser Pascal Bida Koyagbélé around 1 Feb confirmed opening of Russian military base in Berengo (Lobaye prefecture), where Russian paramilitary Wagner Group already operates training camp for CAR army; base could host up to 10,000 troops, increasing Russia’s capacity for sub-regional projection. Meanwhile, Russian propaganda campaign against U.S. intensified, supported by pro-Wagner Committee for Initiative, Control and Investigation of U.S.’s Actions in CAR. Notably, anti-U.S. caravan 26 Feb circulated in capital Bangui on tour that appears to have received significant financial support.

Despite army’s efforts to control hinterland, security situation remained precarious. In Ouham-Pendé prefecture (north west), govt forces 8 Feb attacked 3R fighters who were reportedly mediating in dispute between farmer and herder north west of Bocaranga city, killing two rebels and seizing vehicles and weapons. In retaliation, 3R fighters next day burnt dozen houses in same area and forced residents to flee, with no reported casualties. In Nana-Mambéré prefecture (also north west), 3R fighters 11 Feb kidnapped three miners and seized gold during raid on mining site near Baboua town. Fighters from Unity for Peace in the Central African Republic (UPC) and Azandé Ani Kpi Gbé militia around 22 Feb engaged in several days of fighting near Zémio town, Haut-Mbomou prefecture (east), leading to several deaths and population displacement whose extent is not yet assessed. Meanwhile, President Touadéra 7 Feb inaugurated new Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR) of national army, which was trained in Bangui by Rwandan bilateral troops; BIR’s commander, Captain Listher Lazaret, like majority of battalion’s soldiers, belongs to Touadéra’s Mbaka-Mandja ethnic group. BIR is reminiscent of notorious Escadron blindé autonome created by President André Kolingba in 1980s, which later became brigade of ethnic repression.

Gunfire erupted in capital N’Djamena, with security forces killing staunch opponent and cousin of transitional President Déby, Yaya Dillo, as major cracks emerged within ruling elite ahead of presidential election scheduled for May.

Security forces killed staunch opponent, exposing divisions within ruling elite. Transitional President Mahamad Déby’s uncle, Gen. Saleh Déby, 10 Feb left ruling party to join Socialist Party without Borders (PSF), led by Mahamat Déby’s cousin Yaya Dillo. Defection, together with expressions of dissent by other members of Zaghawa clan (which is Mahamat Déby’s father, former President Idriss Déby’s ethnic group), raised tensions within ruling elite. Secret intelligence 27 Feb reportedly arrested and injured senior PSF official Ahmed Torabi, accusing him of murder attempt against Supreme Court president. Victim’s relatives overnight 27-28 Feb allegedly tried to storm National State Security Agency in N’Djamena; after security forces intervened, govt said situation was “under control” and confirmed several fatalities. Security forces 28 Feb also surrounded PSF headquarters in N’Djamena, leading to heavy gunfire; authorities later said Yaya Dillo and twelve others had died in shootout, while Saleh Déby had been arrested. Situation next day remained tense in N’Djamena with security forces deployed in key locations and internet services cut off.

Presidential vote scheduled for May, opposition questioned legitimacy of electoral bodies. Election agency 27 Feb announced first round of presidential election will take place 6 May, followed by second round on 22 June; polls aim to end three-year transitional period and return country to constitutional rule; no date announced for legislative elections. Alliance of fourteen political parties, Consultative Group of Political Actors, 8 Feb questioned Constitutional Council and National Electoral Authority’s legitimacy after Gen. Déby late Jan appointed ruling party spokesman Jean-Bernard Padaré as Constitutional Council president and named several people affiliated to ruling party as members of these two bodies.

Social tensions ran high amid rising cost of living. Public sector workers 6 Feb threatened to go on strike over govt’s lack of commitment to their demands, including lifting of freeze on raises and advancements. Opposition and civil society coalition “Nous le people” 26 Feb launched ghost town operation in N’Djamena and other cities to protest rising cost of living.

Advance of M23 rebels on strategic town of Sake in North Kivu caused mass displacement amid major uptick in fighting involving sophisticated weapons.

Rebels surrounded strategic town of Sake, considered last barrier before Goma. In North Kivu’s Masisi territory, M23 early Feb engaged in fierce fighting with Congolese army and allied Wazalendo militiamen, supported by foreign security contractors and Southern African bloc (SADC) troops, around Sake town (25km north west of Goma), which came under attack 7 Feb. Fighting also reported in villages south of Sake, notably Shasha, Kirotshe and Bweremana, with reports of M23 and allied forces deploying armoured vehicles equipped with surface-to-air missiles. After brief lull, violence 25 Feb resumed on outskirts of Sake. Army and allies late Feb retained control of Sake, while rebels occupied surrounding hills and controlled access, except for road to Goma. NGO Médecins sans Frontières late Feb said fighting and shelling had triggered displacement of 180,000 civilians toward Goma and Minova town in South Kivu province since 7 Feb. Tensions with Kigali remained high, with Congolese military saying Rwandan drone attack 17 Feb targeted Goma International Airport.

Kinshasa continued to track down M23 allies. Amid concerns of broader opposition alignment with M23, Kinshasa intensified efforts to arrest individuals suspected of ties to former head of electoral commission Corneille Nangaa, who in Dec 2023 created pro-M23 politico-military group Congo River Alliance. Notably, military intelligence 13 Feb arrested three National Intelligence Agency officials and military governor’s spokesman in North Kivu for alleged complicity with M23.

Civilians continued to face other armed groups’ attacks notably in Ituri province. Suspected Islamic State-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) militants around 5 Feb allegedly killed eighteen people in Mambasa territory, and 17-18 Feb killed at least thirteen people in Badibongo Siya groupement, Irumu territory. CODECO militia, which claims to defend interests of Lendu ethnic group and often targets people from rival Hema tribe, 14 Feb killed twelve people and 17 Feb killed another fifteen in Djugu territory.

In another important development. PM Jean-Michel Sama Lukonde 20 Feb resigned, prioritising his new mandate as MP in Kasenga constituency in compliance with legal requirement against dual-office holding.

International actors hardened their stance against Rwanda’s actions in eastern DR Congo as M23 conflict escalated.

Criticism grew of Kigali’s backing of rebel group in DR Congo (DRC). Amid M23 rebel group’s advance on North Kivu regional capital in DRC (see DR Congo), U.S. state dept 17 Feb condemned M23 violence and urged Rwanda to withdraw soldiers and remove surface-to-air missile systems from eastern DRC; Rwanda’s foreign ministry next day rejected U.S. call, citing defensive measures against DRC’s perceived “dramatic military build-up”, and said U.S. statement “distorts” reality. France 20 Feb also expressed grave concern over security situation in North Kivu, urged Rwanda to cease support for M23 and withdraw from Congolese territory. In response, Rwanda’s govt next day pointed to France’s responsibility for longstanding conflict in eastern DRC.

Govt opposed UN support for southern African mission in DRC. Kigali 13 Feb objected to UN plan to provide logistical and operational support to southern African bloc (SADC) mission in eastern DRC, whose deployment started in Dec 2023, alleging it is aligned with anti-Rwanda groups, and warned of pre-emptive and defensive measures against perceived threats from DRC and Burundi.

Fresh reports of Eritrean forces in Ethiopia’s Tigray region surfaced, and President Isaias Afwerki held talks with Italian officials during extended stay.

Ethiopia-Eritrea relations remained strained. News agency Associated Press 2 Feb revealed memo prepared late Jan by Ethiopia Health Cluster – international, local organisations and UN agencies coordinating health responses for people affected by humanitarian emergencies – alleging that Eritrean troops have abducted farmers and stolen hundreds of livestock in Ethiopia’s Tigray region; Eritrea’s information minister Yemane Gebremeskel same day denied allegations. Meanwhile, performance during nationally televised celebration marking 34th anniversary of Massawa city’s capture from Ethiopia 10 Feb implicitly mocked Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed, in further sign of deteriorating relations with Addis after Abiy vowed to restore Ethiopia’s sea access; Eritrea viewed remarks as threat to its sovereignty.

In other important developments. After attending Italy-Africa summit late Jan in Italy’s capital Rome, President Isaias extended stay until 8 Feb, holding meetings with investors and Italian officials, including PM Meloni and Defence Minister Guido Crosetto; Information minister Yemane 3 Feb said discussions focused on strengthening economic cooperation and security in Red Sea region. Isaias 24-27 Feb visited Egyptian capital Cairo for talks on bilateral cooperation and regional security.

Govt discussed preparations for police deployment to Haiti while tensions between President Ruto and courts continued.

Govt continued preparations for police deployment to Haiti. After court late Jan blocked deployment of 1,000 Kenyan police to lead UN-backed multinational mission in Haiti, U.S. 2 Feb reiterated “commitment to collaborating with Kenya” as it leads mission. Kenyan, Haitian and U.S. officials 12-14 Feb met in U.S. to discuss preparations, and Haiti 14 Feb said it was working on reciprocal agreement with Kenya, main point of Kenyan court’s opposition. Haiti’s acting PM Ariel Henry 29 Feb visited Kenya and met with Ruto to “finalise modalities” for agreements between two countries on deployment.

Tensions between judiciary and executive persisted. Following Court of Appeals late Jan decision to suspend govt tax that President Ruto said he would appeal, concerns grew that current administration would threaten judiciary’s independence and ignore court ruling related to Kenyan police deployment to Haiti.

Authorities continued to combat Al-Shabaab, banditry-related violence. Interior Cabinet Secretary Kithure Kindiki 15 Feb said govt would begin upgrading security equipment and give priority to forces in unstable areas, including locations vulnerable to Al-Shabaab attacks near Somalia border and North Rift regions subject to banditry.

Al-Shabaab conducted significant attacks, authorities launched contentious constitutional review process, and Ethiopia-Somaliland port deal continued to fuel tensions.

Al-Shabaab militants continued to pose major threat amid high-profile attacks. In main theatre of govt’s offensive in southern Mudug region (centre), group launched attacks on several areas security forces recently retook, including 3 Feb in Shabellow village, with reported high casualties on both sides but no significant territorial shift. Militants also claimed 10 Feb killing of four Emirati and one Bahraini military trainer at General Gordon military camp in capital Mogadishu; attack was reportedly carried out by undercover insurgent who had claimed to have defected from group. Govt’s efforts against Al-Shabaab during month consisted mainly of sporadic air operations supported by foreign partners in southern regions of Lower Juba and Lower Shabelle, and central regions of Galgaduud and Hiraan. Meanwhile, AU mission (ATMIS) announced 2 Feb official completion of second phase of withdrawal. Govt 15 Feb signed agreement with U.S. to build five bases for 3,000-strong U.S.-trained Danab commando unit.

Domestic tensions emerged over constitutional review process. Parliament 12 Feb initiated constitutional review process, one of President Mohamud’s priorities, amid significant domestic opposition. Notably, Puntland state rejected proposals, and former presidents 13 Feb announced failure of mediation attempt between Mogadishu and Garowe. In speech to parliament, former President Sheikh Sharif 19 Feb also denounced constitutional review process.

Govt continued to push back against Ethiopia-Somaliland port deal. Mogadishu remained focussed on diplomatic efforts to pressure Addis Ababa to walk back its Jan agreement with Hargeisa that potentially paves way for Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland’s independence. Mohamud 16 Feb travelled to Ethiopian capital for AU summit, lobbying for support; Mohamud next day alleged Ethiopian security forces tried to bar him from attending closing session of AU summit, which Ethiopian govt denied, and again accused Ethiopia of trying to annex part of Somalia’s territory. Meanwhile, amid tensions with Somaliland over deal, airspace control became battleground between Mogadishu and Hargeisa (see Somaliland).

In another important development. Amid tensions with Ethiopia, govt 8 Feb signed deal with Ankara for Türkiye to help Somalia defend its territorial waters by providing support to Somali navy.

Intercommunal violence escalated across much of South Sudan, killing hundreds; pipeline damage and Sudan war disrupted oil exports, threatening economy and regime stability.

Intercommunal violence killed hundreds. Deadly clashes between Twic Dinka from Warrap state and Ngok Dinka from Abyei Administrative area continued; notably, Twic Dinka 3-4 Feb attacked villages in southern part of Abyei, killing 37. Overcrowding and insufficient grazing land in parts of Warrap state heightened tensions between Dinka from Tonj county, Warrap, and Lou from Jur River county, Western Bahr al-Ghazal state; Dinka 5 Feb attacked police station protecting Lou community in Jur River, killing over twenty. In Jonglei state, Murle youth 4 Feb attacked Thep cattle camp, killing seven Lou Nuer youth; Lou Nuer from Uror, Akono and Nyriol counties reportedly contemplating joining Dinka from Duk and Twic East counties to attack Greater Pibor Administrative Area, where Murle hail from. UN Envoy 26 Feb warned that intercommunal fighting will undermine ability to hold elections in December. Meanwhile, rebel group National Salvation Front 25 Feb claimed attack on army ammunition store in capital Juba.

Pipeline damage and Sudan war disrupted oil exports. Sudanese Bashayer Pipeline Company 12 Feb reported loss of pressure in oil pipeline running from Upper Nile state to Port Sudan city in Sudan; 16 Feb reportedly fixed issue, but lack of maintenance and regular supply of diesel to run pumping stations, many of which run through territory controlled by Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, will potentially lead to other problems that could cause irreparable damage to pipelines; building new ones amid Sudan war would be logistically challenging. Meanwhile, UN Envoy 20 Feb warned of indications that Sudanese warring parties were recruiting in South Sudan.

Economic crisis weighed heavily on political apparatus. Permanent shutdown of oil exports from Upper Nile, which account for 60% of oil production, would threaten economy and President Kiir’s patronage system. Minister of Finance Bak Barnaba 18 Feb said govt was unable to pay civil servants and soldiers, called for drastic austerity measures as value of South Sudanese pound dropped; govt 26 Feb blamed economic crisis in part on impact of Sudan war on oil exports.

Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) launched offensives against paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), both sides faced internal challenges, and U.S. named special envoy in push to end war.

SAF offensives yielded some success, RSF advanced in North Kordofan. Following months of setbacks, SAF made gains in Omdurman city, Khartoum state, 16 Feb claimed to have broken RSF siege on Engineers and Medical Corps there. SAF also defended positions in West Kordofan state’s Babanussa town, splitting Misseriya community’s allegiance to RSF. Reports of summary executions of alleged RSF supporters, however, increased opposition to SAF. Meanwhile, RSF 17 Feb claimed capture of SAF’s Jebel Al Daier base in North Kordofan, leaving paramilitary in control of state apart from state capital and paving way for expansion into White Nile state. In South Kordofan, SAF, rebel group Sudan People’s Liberation Army-North (al-Hilu) and SAF-affiliated Public Defence Forces, mostly from Nuba community, 9-10 Feb attacked RSF in Habila town; RSF counterattack 9 Feb killed over twenty as fighting turned into communal conflict between RSF-affiliated Arab tribes and Nuba.

SAF faced internal divisions and RSF struggled to administer areas it controls. SAF 6 Feb arrested officers in Omdurman, sparking flurry of rumours including that army had foiled coup attempt, laying bare divisions within SAF and raising fears of breakdown in command and control. Meanwhile, RSF faced mounting opposition among local communities in Gezira state and struggled to enforce law and order in South Darfur; it also struggled to protect Reziegat communities in North and South Darfur from SAF bombardment, fuelling discontent among paramilitary’s main support base.

U.S. appointed special envoy for Sudan. U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken 26 Feb announced appointment of Special Envoy for Sudan, signalling stepped-up efforts to end war following months of failed mediation. Humanitarian situation remained dire; SAF late Jan-early Feb reportedly blocked aid to RSF-controlled areas, while RSF and SAF traded blame for early Feb disruptions to telecommunications networks that impacted aid deliveries. UN Human Rights Office 23 Feb issued report detailing abuses by both sides, some of which UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk said “would amount to war crimes”.

President Museveni’s son attempted to consolidate support and broaden appeal ahead of 2026 presidential election.

Succession battle continued. MK Movement, created in 2022 to support political ambitions of President Museveni’s son, Lt-Gen. Muhoozi Kainerugaba, 7 Feb rebranded to Patriotic League of Uganda (PLU) in lead-up to Muhoozi’s expected candidacy for 2026 presidential election. While newly appointed PLU chairman, Michael Mawanda, described it as civic non-partisan entity, ruling party National Resistance Movement (NRM) Secretary General, Richard Todwong, said PLU was part of teams mobilising for ruling party. But opposition to Museveni’s son among elite remained present; Internal Affairs Minister Maj. Gen. Kahinda Otafiire 20 Feb reiterated he did not support Muhoozi becoming president.

Army continued anti-ADF operations. Army continued counter-insurgency operations around Rwenzori mountains. Notably, security forces 19 Feb arrested suspected Islamic-State-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) rebel Abdul Razak Bahati in Kasese district near Congolese border.

Uganda faced allegations of collusion with M23. Military 15 Feb said only Ugandan troops left in DR Congo are those deployed under Operation Shujaa to hunt down ADF; comments came after allegations by Congolese civil society in Rutshuru territory and Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) armed group that Ugandan forces are deployed in Rutshuru alongside Rwandan troops to support M23 armed group.

By-election wins cemented govt’s parliamentary control amid opposition disarray; mass evictions targeted those living on state-owned land.

Ruling party won all by-elections seats as opposition split further. Amid low turnout, ruling ZANU-PF party 3 Feb won all six National Assembly seats in controversial by-elections triggered after recall of CCC elected officials by self-proclaimed secretary-general of main opposition party Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) Sengezo Tshabangu; victory restores ZANU-PF two-thirds majority in parliament lost in Aug general elections, amid opposition and civil society fears that party will alter Constitution and extend presidential term limits. Recalls further weakened CCC. After Nelson Chamisa late Jan resigned from position as CCC president, another CCC heavyweight Job Sikhala 8 Feb announced leaving party and creating new, as yet unnamed political movement. CCC 17 Feb reportedly named Chamisa’s long-time rival, Welshman Ncube, as well as two other senior CCC members, Tendai Biti and Lynette Karenyi-Kore, as acting co-presidents of party, fuelling rumours that Ncube and Biti worked with ZANU-PF and Tshabangu to remove Chamisa.

Govt carried out mass evictions as EU renewed sanctions. Authorities mid-Jan to mid-Feb evicted hundreds of residents from rural areas and informal settlements in peri-urban areas, particularly in Masvingo province, in campaign targeting “illegal” dwellings on state-owned land, drawing condemnation from traditional leaders and civil society. Amid continued concerns over human rights, EU Council 2 Feb extended sanctions including arms embargo and targeted asset freeze against one entity by one year.

Violence reached levels unseen since jihadist insurgency started in 2015, with hundreds killed in one day as militants launched nine simultaneous attacks and govt forces and allies reportedly conducted large-scale massacres.

Violence reached levels unseen since 2015, leaving hundreds dead. Jihadist militants from al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) and Islamic State Sahel Province 25 Feb launched nine attacks across country, notably targeting places of worship. Raid on mosque in Natiaboani town, Gourma province (East region), left up to 100 dead, including civilians, soldiers and civilian auxiliaries (VDPs), and attack on catholic church in Essakane village, Oudalan province (Sahel region) killed at least fifteen people. Jihadist militants same day also targeted military, notably killing 51 soldiers in Tankoualou area, Komandjari province (East region). Suspected army and VDPs also 25 Feb allegedly attacked three villages in Yatenga province (North region), with provisional toll of around 170 people killed. Reports of attacks on two villages in Gayéri area of Komandjari province (East) late Feb also emerged, with unconfirmed death toll of 150.

Silencing of dissent continued. National council of lawyers 15 Feb led countrywide strike to demand release of lawyer and civil society activist Guy-Hervé Kam, who was arrested in Jan on undisclosed charges. Rights defender Daouda Diallo, former FM Ablassé Ouédraogo and civil society leader Issiaka Ouédraogo 18 Feb appeared in videos circulated on Internet in combat gear, confirming they have been forcibly enrolled as VDPs since their arrest in late 2023.

ECOWAS urged govt to reconsider decision to leave group. After Burkina Faso alongside Mali and Niger late Jan announced withdrawal from Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), regional bloc 8 Feb called on trio to “prioritise dialogue and reconciliation”, and ECOWAS chairman, Nigerian President Tinubu, 24 Feb urged departing countries to “reconsider the decision”. Tinubu’s comments were made at extraordinary summit of ECOWAS heads of state, during which bloc lifted most sanctions imposed on Niger in 2023 (see Niger). Conciliatory approach has yet to bear fruit, however. Notably, Ouagadougou, Bamako and Niamey 15 Feb discussed framework to create three-state federation at Alliance of Sahel States ministerial summit, said decision to leave ECOWAS was irreversible.

Govt articulated commitment to stability and fair elections, reaffirmed U.S. partnership.

Preparations for 2025 elections continued. President Ouattara 14 Feb emphasised measures would be put in place to maintain and strengthen cohesion ahead of 2025 presidential election. Both ruling Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace (RHDP) and main opposition party Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) sought to build election campaigns and gain popular support, including focussing on youth mobilisation; senior RHDP official Roger Adom 19 Feb attended meeting presenting new leader of party’s youth wing, saying “We are counting on you” in vote. After Senate President Kandia Camara 31 Jan announced 2024 revision of six legislative bills, including Electoral Code and Nationality bill, PDCI President Tidjane Thiam 21 Feb stressed need for electoral reform to create more representative democratic system.

U.S. and govt reaffirmed security cooperation. Interior and Security Minister Vagondo Diomandé and U.S. Under-Secretary of State for Civil Security, Democracy and Human Rights Uzra Zeya 2 Feb met in Abidjan city, discussing themes including justice sector reform, fight against corruption and terrorism; Zeya emphasised role of Côte d’Ivoire in maintaining regional stability, and importance of mutual cooperation in confronting security challenges.

In another important development. NGO Amnesty International 20 Feb called on authorities to enforce anti-corruption laws and protect human rights defenders, citing Ivorian perceptions of pervasive corruption.

Tensions peaked as junta dissolved govt amid internal power struggles and trade unions launched nationwide general strike that paralysed country.

Junta dissolved govt and restricted movement of sacked ministers. Presidency’s Secretary General Amara Camara 19 Feb announced dissolution of govt, granting administrative power to directors of cabinet, secretary generals and deputies until as yet unannounced formation of new govt; measures also saw President Doumbouya-led junta temporarily close all borders and restrict activities of sacked ministers through seizure of travel documents, revocation of official vehicles and freezing of bank accounts. Announcement lacked official explanation but may be linked to tensions between PM Goumou and Justice Minister Charles Wright, and to Doumbouya’s attempts to bolster authority amid increasingly open power struggles in govt. Authorities 27 Feb appointed former minister Amadou Oury Bah as PM.

Nationwide strike caused turmoil, saw violent unrest. Trade unions including National Confederation of Workers of Guinea 26 Feb began indefinite nationwide general strike, shuttering schools, banks, and businesses and reducing hospital services, paralysing country; strikers demanded release of Sékou Jamal Pendessa, Secretary General of Union of Guinean Press Professionals arrested in Jan on charge of “participation in non-authorised protest”, lifting of ongoing internet restrictions and reduction in cost of basic goods. In capital Conakry, unrest saw demonstrations and barricades established on city’s main highway, while police reportedly killed two demonstrators during clashes on first day of strike. Unions 28 Feb suspended strike after Pendessa’s release that day.

Dissatisfaction with govt continued on other fronts. Dozens of women in Coronthie neighbourhood of Conakry 1 Feb blocked roads and protested govt’s failure to provide aid after mid-Dec gas depot explosion that killed at least 23; other demonstrators joined, citing increased cost of living, political repression and internet restrictions.

In another important development. West African regional bloc ECOWAS 24 Feb announced lifting of financial and economic sanctions on govt but gave no further details.

West African regional bloc urged govt to remain within group as Bamako insisted exit was immediate; authorities remained embroiled in conflict with 2015 peace agreement signatories and jihadist groups.

ECOWAS took conciliatory approach to Sahel trio’s exit. After Mali, alongside Niger and Burkina Faso, late Jan announced withdrawal from Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), regional bloc 8 Feb called on trio to “prioritise dialogue and reconciliation”, and ECOWAS chairman, Nigerian President Tinubu, 24 Feb urged departing countries to “reconsider the decision”. Tinubu’s comments were made at extraordinary ECOWAS summit, during which bloc lifted most coup sanctions on Niger (see Niger) and restrictions on recruitment of Malians into ECOWAS institutions. Conciliatory approach has yet to bear fruit, however, with Bamako 7 Feb arguing trio does not need to respect one-year withdrawal period, and all three countries 15 Feb reiterating decision to leave ECOWAS was irreversible.

Conflict between govt forces and rebel groups continued in north. After terminating 2015 Algiers peace agreement in Jan, transitional president, Col. Goïta, 5 Feb installed steering committee in charge of preparing inter-Malian dialogue for peace and reconciliation; committee president 20 Feb said armed groups “must lay down arms” to participate. Under pressure from community leaders and economic operators, coalition of 2015 Algiers Accord signatory armed groups, Permanent Strategic Framework, 11 Feb lifted two-month blockade on Timbuktu and Gao towns.

Jihadist violence remained high in north, centre and west. After al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) late Jan intensified attacks in north, notably targeting two army positions in Timbuktu region, govt forces and Russian paramilitary Wagner Group reportedly stepped up violence against civilians, with seven killed 1 Feb in Djounhane village, Kidal region, and at least eight others killed 5 Feb in Dianké town, Timbuktu region. In centre, JNIM 3 Feb attacked N’Donuna village in Ségou region, leaving ten Dozo militiamen dead, and 8, 20 Feb raided army positions in Melga village, Kayes region, and Niono town, Ségou region, killing at least five soldiers. In neighbouring Nara region, sophisticated jihadist attack on Kwala military outpost reportedly left 30 soldiers reportedly killed.

West African regional bloc lifted most sanctions imposed on Niger following 2023 coup and urged govt to reconsider decision to leave group.

ECOWAS took conciliatory approach to Sahel trio’s exit. At extraordinary summit of heads of state held 24 Feb, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) lifted most sanctions imposed on Niger following 2023 coup, including no-fly zone, border closures and asset freezes; ECOWAS chairman, Nigerian President Tinubu, same day urged Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso to “reconsider the decision”, announced in Jan, to withdraw from regional bloc and said trio should “not perceive our organisation as the enemy”. Earlier in month, ECOWAS 8 Feb called on all three countries to “prioritise dialogue and reconciliation”. Conciliatory approach has yet to bear fruit, however. Niamey, Bamako and Ouagadougou 15 Feb discussed framework to create three-state federation at Alliance of Sahel States ministerial summit, and reiterated decision to leave ECOWAS was irreversible. Transitional President Gen. Tiani 11 Feb contemplated leaving West African Economic and Monetary Union and creating new currency.

Anti-junta armed group clashed with army for first time. Patriotic Liberation Front (FPL) fighters and govt forces 7 Feb clashed near Arlit town in Agadez region for first time since creation of armed group following 2023 coup. Authorities reported ten FPL members killed and one captured, with several soldiers wounded; FPL claimed killing 27 soldiers, while acknowledging loss of five fighters.

Jihadist-related violence persisted in Tillabery, Diffa regions. In Tillabery region (south west), military 3 Feb carried out counter-insurgency operation in Kokoloukou area of Torodi department, allegedly killing 50 suspected al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) militants; suspected jihadist militants next day attacked several villages of Méhana commune, Téra department, killing nine civilians. In Diffa region (south east), Islamic State West Africa Province militants 19 Feb attacked national guard position in Assaga Koura (Diffa department), with two guards and unspecified number of militants killed; incident came after militants late Jan attacked special intervention batallion at N’guigmi airport (N’guigmi department), leaving ten soldiers injured.

Islamic State affiliate launched series of explosive device attacks in North East; bandit groups continued killings and kidnappings for ransom in much of north.

Despite security operations, jihadist violence continued in North East. Series of incidents from late Jan through Feb highlighted Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) militants’ increased use of improvised explosive devices in Borno state, causing dozens of casualties, restricting humanitarian services and hindering resettlement programs. Also in Borno, security forces 2-3 Feb repelled suspected ISWAP attack on Gajiram town in Nganzai area, with at least four police officers killed. In Yobe state’s Damaturu area, ISWAP 4 Feb killed two and abducted three others in Kukareta town, while in nearby Maltari village soldiers 18 Feb killed three militants forcefully collecting levies from residents; insurgents 24 Feb also blew up two transmission towers in area, cutting electricity supply to parts of Yobe and Borno states.

Criminal groups continued attacks and kidnappings for ransom across north. Notably, in Sabuwa area of Katsina state, armed group 1 Feb abducted bride and more than 60 other women and children, killing four vigilantes escorting them and demanding ransom payment. State’s governor Dikko Umaru Radda 9 Feb urged citizens to organise self-defence groups. Many other attacks, kidnappings and looting of villages by criminal groups occurred in Kaduna, Katsina, Nasarawa, Niger and Zamfara states throughout month, killing scores and leaving hundreds abducted.

North Central and North East zones saw incidents of herder-farmer violence. Armed attacks in Apa area of Benue state 14-16 Feb reportedly killed ten and displaced thousands; locals blamed raids on herders. In Yobe state, police said herders 12 Feb killed two people, forcing 1,500 to flee, in Gurjaje village in Fika area in apparent reprisal for Sept 2023 herder-farmer clash.

South East remained fragile despite lull in attacks by Biafran separatists. Gunmen 12 Feb attacked correctional facility in Umualomoke village in Imo state, killing officer, freeing seven inmates and abducting facility’s head.

In other important developments. National Bureau of Statistics 15 Feb reported Jan inflation rate at 29.9%, highest since 1996; economic hardship throughout month led to sporadic protests in several cities while workers union 27 Feb organised nationwide protest.

Authorities extended state of emergency in Amhara region amid ongoing violence, insurgency continued in Oromia, and tensions between Tigray authorities and federal govt rose over peace process.

Federal govt extended state of emergency in Amhara. Clashes between federal forces and Amhara nationalist militias known as Fano persisted, prompting govt 2 Feb to extend state of emergency by four months. Human Rights Commission 5 Feb said federal forces late Jan killed at least 45 civilians in Merawi town, North Gondar; govt 6 Feb denied targeting civilians. Federal drone 19 Feb reportedly killed at least 30 near North Shewa’s Sasit town. Fano 24 Feb briefly took control of Merawi town, sparking heavy fighting. Fano forces 29 Feb reportedly entered regional capital Bahir Dar city.

Fighting in Oromia region persisted. Counterinsurgency operation against Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) that was launched late Jan continued, with federal forces 10 Feb claiming to have killed 70 OLA members in Oromia’s West Shewa zone; 20 Feb reportedly killed around 50 fighters, including four leaders, in North Shewa zone. Meanwhile, security forces 22 Feb arrested French journalist for allegedly conspiring with OLA and Fano to incite unrest in capital Addis Ababa, released him 29 Feb.

Tigray leaders met with PM Abiy amid rising tensions over peace process. Tigray leaders 9 Feb met with PM Abiy to discuss peace process and humanitarian crisis. Key sticking points of peace process, including lack of progress on disputed territories, Tigray People’s Liberation Front party’s unregistered status and delayed demobilisation, demilitarisation and reintegration process, have heightened federal-Tigray tensions and cast doubts on holding local elections as per agreement. Interim Tigray President Getachew Reda 10 Feb acknowledged lingering mistrust between Addis and his administration. Tigray administration 29 Feb said it would only engage with federal govt on peace process through African Union.

Relations with Somalia remained tense. Somali President Mohamud 17 Feb again condemned 1 Jan Ethiopia-Somaliland deal, which grants Addis access to Somaliland coastline and potentially paves way for Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland’s independence; Mohamud accused Ethiopia of attempting to annex Somali territory and alleged Ethiopian security forces blocked his entry to African Union summit in Addis Ababa, which Ethiopia denied.

Election-related dispute kept domestic politics tense ahead of Nov polls, while fallout from port deal with Ethiopia continued to loom large.

Electoral uncertainty persisted. House of Elders and House of Representatives 17-18 Feb passed revised electoral law paving way for presidential and political party elections in Nov. President Bihi has 21 days to sign bill, but opposition remains concerned that he will not do so and instead seek to delay vote, reneging on Aug 2023 govt-opposition deal.

Fallout from deal with Addis Ababa continued. As Bihi 22 Feb vowed to implement agreement with Ethiopia to lease stretch of Somaliland’s coastline to establish naval base and commercial maritime services in return for potential acknowledgement of Somaliland as sovereign state, Mogadishu-Hargeisa tensions remained high over agreement. Series of suspicious deaths in Mogadishu of civilians originally from Somaliland further stoked tensions, while airspace control, which currently falls under Somalia’s purview, became battleground. Somalia around 23 Feb accused Somaliland of interfering in communications with flights, while Somaliland around 25 Feb claimed contradictory instructions from Somalia 24 Feb nearly led to mid-air collision.

Jihadists advanced south in Cabo Delgado province and threatened to cross into Nampula province as attacks caused mass displacement; preparations began for Oct general elections.

Islamic State-affiliated militants attacked southern districts of Cabo Delgado. Following uptick in Islamic State Mozambique Province (ISMP) violence in Jan, group continued to target security forces and civilians with at least sixteen attacks between late Jan and 16 Feb, including 9 Feb raid on security forces near Mucojo village, Macomia district that killed at least twenty soldiers. Militants advanced into south-eastern districts of Cabo Delgado province close to provincial capital Pemba, including Ancuabe, Chiure, Mecufi, and Metuge. Notably, ISMP 19 Feb killed four in Chiure amid reports suggesting group burnt public buildings including churches and forced some residents to convert to Islam. New reports also emerged of military indiscriminately targeting civilians including arbitrary arrests and beatings on suspicion of supporting or being militants. UN 28 Feb reported violence 8-27 Feb displaced over 68,000 people predominantly from Chiure districts. ISMP advance took advantage of disarray of military and withdrawal of Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), due to be completed by July; militants may also be avoiding Rwandan troops who have been effective in fighting group in northern districts.

Militants reached border of Nampula province. Some insurgents reached southern border of Cabo Delgado province and may attempt to cross Lùrio River to enter Nampula as part of recruitment drive; ISMP, whose size has reduced from around 3,000 at peak in early 2021 to 200-500 currently, may attempt to capitalise on Nampula’s socio-political and economic grievances, compounded by large refugee influx from Cabo Delgado. Opposition 22 Feb demanded govt find mechanism for dialogue with insurgents.

Preparations began for vote expected to be contentious. Ahead of general elections due to be held 9 Oct, electoral commission 7 Feb announced tentative electoral calendar with voter registration starting 15 March. Political tensions are expected to remain high in lead-up to polls that include vote for president, with both ruling FRELIMO and main opposition RENAMO parties struggling to designate their respective presidential candidate.

Electoral tensions continued to run high in KwaZulu-Natal province ahead of general elections set for May.

President Ramaphosa’s office 20 Feb scheduled general elections to elect new National Assembly and legislature in each province for 29 May. Meanwhile, electoral violence persisted amid steep competition in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) province, key battleground for May elections. Unidentified gunmen 7 Feb killed Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) councillor of Nongoma local municipality, KZN, bringing total number of reported political assassinations in province since July 2023 to six. Police same day said political killings task team is investigating cases. Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) early Feb dismissed former President Jacob Zuma’s claims that IEC is colluding with ruling African National Congress (ANC) to rig elections, challenging him to produce evidence, and urged all political leaders to exercise restraint; comments came after Zuma – who is campaigning mainly in KZN for newly formed uMkhonto weSizwe party – and his allies late Jan doubled down on criticism of ANC and IEC.

Constitutional crisis erupted after authorities postponed presidential election amid violent protests and international alarm.

Election delay sparked constitutional crisis. National Assembly 5 Feb formally extended President’s Sall mandate beyond constitutional deadline of 2 April and delayed presidential vote from 25 Feb until 15 Dec; move came after Sall 3 Feb repealed decree convening electoral body, saying “crisis” between parliament and Constitutional Court over disqualification of potential candidates motivated decision. In wake of announcement, several high-level govt officials resigned, including govt’s secretary-general and one state minister. Opposition leaders, civil society activists and former ministers condemned delay and questioned its legality. Notably, leading opposition figure and former mayor of capital Dakar, Khalifa Sall, 3 Feb denounced “constitutional coup d’état”. Following petition by collective of opposition candidates, Constitutional Court 15 Feb ruled law postponing elections was unconstitutional and overturned Sall’s decision to change electoral calendar, calling on authorities to hold elections “as soon as possible”. Sall next day vowed to respect ruling, and 22 Feb said his mandate would end as planned on 2 April; national dialogue sponsored by president and attended by only four of nineteen presidential candidates 27 Feb proposed 2 June as new election date.

Security forces cracked down on opposition protests, leaving several dead. Govt forces 4 Feb violently repressed demonstrations in capital Dakar, arresting high-profile opposition figures Aminata Touré and Anta Babacar Ngom, and 6 Feb arrested at least two opposition MPs as they attempted to organise protest in Dakar’s suburbs. Gendarmes and police 9-10 Feb used tear gas to repress protests nationwide, arresting around 250 people as clashes left at least three people dead. Following talks between Sall and opposition leader Ousmane Sonko, govt 1-17 Feb released some 250 imprisoned members of Sonko’s dissolved PASTEF party and other opposition and civil society groups. In apparent attempt to de-escalate tensions, Sall 26 Feb announced plans for general amnesty for political demonstrators from 2021 to 2024.

International actors denounced election delay. Notably, West African bloc ECOWAS 3 Feb expressed “concern” over Sall’s announcement, and three days later urged authorities “to restore the electoral calendar”.

Govt called for unity as Sahel states’ announced withdrawal from ECOWAS dealt blow to regional integration.

President Talon underlined ECOWAS significance, warned against sanctions. Talon 8 Feb lamented Jan-announced withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger from West African regional bloc ECOWAS, stressing importance of body in maintaining wider stability; Talon also cautioned against harsh sanctions against three govts, arguing measures disproportionately harm local populations, and suggested withdrawal of sanctions may mean Jan decision to “separate peoples” will remain just “declaration” (see Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger). In same speech, Talon reiterated he will not run for third term and would respect parliament’s upcoming decision over changes proposed by ruling coalition members to Constitution and Electoral Code; reforms have sparked tensions, including over whether to hold 2026 presidential vote ahead of legislative elections.

Jihadist violence and security operations continued. After military late Jan conducted operations against al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) militants in Alibori and Atacora provinces, JNIM 22 Feb claimed it had killed four soldiers 17 Feb near border with Burkina Faso.

In another important development. UN Sec Gen spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric 29 Feb said Benin had pledged to contribute at least 1,500 personnel to Kenyan-led multilateral police mission to Haiti (see Haiti).

Ahead of U.S.-South Korea military drills in March, North Korea tested missiles and maritime tensions persisted with Seoul, while Moscow publicly flouted UN sanctions in sign of eroding enforcement and adherence. 

North Korea tested missiles in east amid maritime tensions in west. South Korea 14 Feb said North Korea had fired multiple cruise missiles in waters off its eastern port of Wonsan. North Korean state media next day confirmed leader Kim Jong Un supervised “evaluation test-fire of new-type surface-to-sea missile Padasuri-6”. After Kim in Jan announced north would no longer recognise de facto maritime boundary in West Sea known as Northern Limit Line, state media 15 Feb quoted Kim accusing Seoul of frequently violating north’s sovereignty by insisting on boundary, warning “if the enemy violates what we consider as our maritime border lines, we will take that as a violation of our sovereignty and an armed provocation”, vowing to “defend our maritime sovereignty by force of arms and actions”. 

U.S. and South Korea prepared for March’s military drills. North Korea is expected to respond to alliance military exercises – set to begin 4 March – but it is not clear whether Pyongyang is keen to be, by its standards, highly provocative at this moment, given that it is focused on relations with Russia. 

Russia gifted luxury car to Kim, violating UN sanctions. In sign of deepening ties between Russia and North Korea, President Putin 18 Feb gifted Kim luxury car – violating UN Security Council resolutions on North Korea. After South Korea and U.S. criticised move, Moscow retorted: “If Seoul has concerns about the ‘adherence to U.N. sanctions’ regarding North Korea, then it should address it directly at the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee, rather than rushing to the microphones”. Episode underscores lack of security council unity in enforcing and adhering to sanctions resolutions. Meanwhile, South Korea 26 Feb said Pyongyang had shipped 6,700 containers carrying millions of munitions to Russia since July. 

Seoul established formal relations with Cuba. In unanticipated step, South Korea and Cuba 15 Feb forged diplomatic ties, marking apparent setback for North Korea that has historically emphasised fraternal socialist connections with Caribbean island.

China commenced regular law enforcement patrols in Kinmen waters to challenge Taiwan’s jurisdiction after drowning of two Chinese fishermen; U.S. and China continued talks to manage competition. 

Beijing seized maritime incident to challenge Taipei’s authority in Kinmen waters. Two Chinese fishermen 14 Feb drowned as result of chase by Taiwan’s Coast Guard off coast of Taiwan’s Kinmen Island, located close to China’s mainland, after Chinese vessel allegedly sailed approximately one nautical mile off Kinmen’s coast. Chinese officials 17 Feb denied existence of prohibited and restricted waters around Kinmen, declared by Taiwan, and 18 Feb announced regular patrols around Kinmen, which began next day. Chinese coast guard vessel 19 Feb briefly boarded Taiwanese tourist boat. Taiwan’s coast guard 20 Feb said it had expelled Chinese coast guard vessel in waters near Kinmen by verbally telling vessel to leave. Five Chinese coast guard vessels 26 Feb entered Kinmen’s prohibited or restricted waters. China 28 Feb said Taiwan’s ruling party lied about drowning incident, called on Taipei to meet demands of, and apologise to, victims’ families. 

China continued military activity. As of 28 Feb, Taiwan detected 275 Chinese military aircraft around island, of which at least 84 either crossed unofficial “median line” or were seen in Taiwan’s de facto air defence identification zone; Taiwan spotted 256 Chinese naval vessels in surrounding waters. According to Japanese officials cited by media, China has four warships constantly deployed around Taiwan, aiming to pressure Taipei and prevent U.S. ships from approaching in case of regional conflict. 

U.S. and China continued diplomatic engagement. China’s top diplomat Wang Yi 16 Feb emphasised one-China principle in his meeting with U.S. Sec of State Antony Blinken, stating that stability in Taiwan Strait depends on U.S. not supporting “Taiwan independence”; meeting followed another between Wang Yi and U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan late Jan, where pair agreed to prevent relationship from veering into conflict. 

Beijing emphasised progress toward peaceful unification. In annual meeting on Taiwan, senior Chinese leader Wang Huning 23 Feb stated China “must resolutely combat” Taiwan independence and “further grasp the strategic initiative to achieve the complete reunification of the motherland.”

UN reconsidered political process after failure of Sec-Gen’s meeting in Qatar that exposed international divisions, while World Bank resumed development funding after long pause. 

UN convened international actors to discuss how to engage with Afghanistan. UN Sec Gen Antonio Guterres 18 Feb convened meeting in Qatari capital Doha to discuss path forward following UN Security Council resolution 2721 (2023), which called for appointment of UN Special Envoy for Afghanistan. Taliban boycotted meeting after UN rejected its demand to attend as sole representatives of Afghanistan; opposition groups – including National Resistance Front, Afghan Freedom Front and others – had prior to meeting issued joint statement contesting Taliban’s claim to be legitimate govt. Doha meeting disappointed UN officials who had hoped to draw Taliban into high-level talks, and exposed widening gap between regional and Western actors, with most regional states seeking to forge ahead with closer engagement as Western states hope to alter Taliban behaviour through isolation; Guterres said that more work is required on political process “in order to make it attractive from the point of view of the Taliban.” 

World Bank restarted projects in major strep, amid regional economic coordination. In significant move, World Bank 15 Feb announced “Approach 3.0”, which will provide support for basic services and economic revival; package allows for resumption of Central Asia-South Asia Electricity Transmission and Trade Project (CASA-1000), $1.2bn project to bring electricity from Central Asia to Pakistan via Afghanistan. Underlining growing economic coordination with regional actors, Defence Minister Mullah Yaqoub 1 Feb also met Uzbekistan’s chief of intelligence to discuss border issues and implementation of development projects, and FM Amir Khan Muttaqi 25 Feb visited Turkmenistan to discuss economic activities. Meanwhile, energy authority 6 Feb announced it had paid off all loans, totalling $627mn, and prepaid future electricity imports. Deputy PM Salam Hanafi 15 Feb asserted govt was paying salaries to some 1.2mn public servants. 

In another important development. UN Sanctions Monitoring Team 29 Jan assessed Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) retained capacity to conduct external operations. Still, ISKP related fatalities remained at historic lows.

Political tensions appeared to ease following Jan election, signs of communal conflict surfaced in Chittagong Hill Tracts, and conflict in Myanmar imperilled border and displaced more Rohingya. 

Authorities released two senior opposition leaders. Court 15 Feb released two senior Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) officials on bail more than three months after they were detained, possibly signalling softer position from ruling Awami League (AL) toward opposition after it dominated parliament following 7 Jan flawed election. Internal fighting continued to wrack AL as rival factions of Chittagong University branch 14-16 Feb clashed, injuring four including police officer. 

Tensions rose in Chittagong Hill Tracts in south east. Kuki-Chin National Front (KNF) – which claims to represent six Kuki-Chin subgroups, largest of which is Bawm – 7 Feb briefly detained six Marma minority group residents in Bandarban’s Ruma Upazila. Marma leaders accused KNF of shooting Marma man in Ruma Upazila on 13 Feb; local Marma protests next day turned against several Bawm people-owned homes and shops in Ruma. KNF accused rival insurgent group Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS) of being behind protests, raising prospect of clashes. 

Hostilities in Myanmar spilt over border, Rohingya refugees faced violence in camps. As Arakan Army consolidated control along Myanmar-Bangladesh border (see Myanmar), shells crossed border and 6 Feb killed two civilians, prompting evacuation of hundreds. Conflict could force more Rohingya to flee. Govt 14 Feb rejected UN request to permit entry to 900 refugees. As of mid-Feb, thousands of Rohingya waited in small boats on Myanmar side of Naf River, with security forces pushing back hundreds who attempted to cross. Meanwhile, Rohingya in refugee camps continued to endure high levels of violence. Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army 6 Feb killed member of rival Rohingya Solidarity Organisation. Ten masked men 11 Feb shot dead Rohingya refugee, with another stabbed to death 17 Feb. Security forces 6 Feb detained 23 armed Rohingya at border in Cox’s Bazar’s Ukhiya district. Refugees sought to flee camps: authorities 14 Feb voluntarily transferred 1,500 to Bhasan Char island in Bay of Bengal, marking largest transfer since March 2022.

Militants staged first deadly attack this year on non-local residents in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), while PM Narendra Modi claimed “progress” in region despite signs of mounting local anger. 

Militants killed two non-local labourers in J&K. Marking first killing of non-local residents in Kashmir Valley in 2024, militants 7 Feb shot dead two carpenters from Punjab in Srinagar city; militants have regularly targeted non-local workers in valley since J&K’s special status was scrapped in 2019. Former Chief Minister Omar Abdullah same day said continued attacks in heart of Srinagar city are proof that situation is not normal as govt claims. Meanwhile, security forces 2 Feb busted militant hideout in Jammu’s Poonch district and 15 Feb arrested militant associate in North Kashmir’s Kupwara district. Security forces 12 Feb shot down drone allegedly entering Poonch district from Pakistan. 

PM Modi visited Jammu, claiming progress in development. Ahead of national elections due to be held by May, PM Modi 20 Feb visited Jammu and kickstarted construction of numerous projects in several sectors, including education, health, aviation, roadways and railways; Modi’s claim that “In the past, only sad news, like bomb blasts, kidnappings and separatism, would emerge from Kashmir” but now “J&K is on the path of progress and development” appeared to contrast with feelings of widespread alienation, anger and frustration among local population. 

Authorities prevented chief cleric of J&K addressing Friday prayers. After local authorities 9 Feb blocked chief cleric of J&K, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, from delivering special sermon meant to mark Islamic celebration Shab-e-Mehraj at Srinagar’s Jamia Masjid, Farooq approached High Court challenging continued restrictions on his religious duties; reports indicated govt is concerned cleric may address Israel-Palestine conflict and spark protests, which could morph into political mobilisation on other local issues. 

In another important development. Locals in Ladakh 3 Feb held large-scale protest and observed complete shutdown in Leh city to demand constitutional safeguards, protection of cultural identity and statehood for union territory created in 2019.

Disputed national election results triggered protests and deepened political crisis, as surge in militant attacks in provinces bordering Afghanistan killed dozens.

Election results triggered fraud allegations and protests. Voters 8 Feb went to polls as govt imposed communication blackout nationwide, citing security threats, which raised widespread concerns that vote was neither transparent nor fair. Election Commission, after some delay, announced no party won simple majority (169 seats) but in shock result, candidates backed by former PM and imprisoned leader of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) Imran Khan secured largest bloc with 93 seats, while Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) came second with 75 seats and Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) won 54. PTI disputed results, insisting it had won 190 seats but was deprived victory in federal and Punjab parliaments through electoral fraud, and called for vote recount as party lodged appeals with courts and election commission; PTI held public protests alongside other parties, such as Jamaat-e-Islami. U.S. 9 Feb noted “undue restrictions on freedoms” and called for investigations into “claims of interference or fraud”, while UK and EU raised questions about vote’s “credibility” and “lack of fairness”. 

PML-N sought to lead new govt. Amid protests in various provinces over results, PML-N and PPP 21 Feb struck agreement on forming coalition govt with PML-N nominating Shehbaz Sharif as PM; with its credibility damaged by deeply flawed elections, govt is set to govern over deeply-fractured polity, with political polarisation undermining its ability to address crises, including on economic front. 

Militants ramped up deadly attacks around election, killing dozens. In bid to disrupt voting, Baloch militant groups and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) conducted over 50 attacks in run up to vote on political rallies, election offices, and homes of candidates in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces. Notably, militants 1 Feb conducted at least ten bomb and grenade attacks across Balochistan. Militant attack on Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Dera Ismail Khan district 5 Feb killed ten police officers. In deadliest attack of month, bomb blasts outside election offices in Balochistan’s Pishin and Qila Saifullah districts 6 Feb killed 28 and injured over 50.

Opposition challenged President Wickremesinghe’s pursuit of authoritarian legislation, as speculation grew over potential delay to presidential election and govt touted economic recovery. 

Opposition challenged govt and parliamentary Speaker over constitutionality of recent actions. Main opposition party Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB) 26 Feb, later joined by other parties, began effort to bring no-confidence motion against Speaker Mahinda Yapa Abeywardana for his decision to certify enactment of widely-criticised Online Safety Act (OSA) on 24 Jan, pointing to law’s failure to incorporate amendments required by earlier Supreme Court judgment. Supreme Court 29 Feb dismissed Tamil parliamentarian M.A. Sumanthiran’s “fundamental rights” petition challenging law’s validity on same grounds; govt 13 Feb had announced plans to amend law without specifying how. Parliament 20 Feb received Supreme Court ruling approving constitutionality of main thrust of proposed Anti-Terrorism Act, while requiring amendment of some clauses. Other legislation likely to restrict political freedoms remained in pipeline, including tighter controls on NGOs and community groups. Meanwhile, SJB leader Sajith Premadasa 26 Feb challenged validity of Constitutional Council’s appointment of Deshabandu Tenakoon as head of Police Service, arguing Speaker had no right to cast decisive vote. 

Uncertainty rose regarding upcoming presidential election. Feb saw renewed public speculation that govt may postpone presidential election – mandated by constitution between 18 Sept and 17 Oct. Former president Maithripala Sirisena 11 Feb claimed Wickremesinghe had convened group of lawyers to advise him on options for abolishing executive presidency. In response, Wickremesinghe’s media division 13 Feb asserted election will be held within mandated period. Public concern about possible postponement of election comes in wake of opinion polls showing Wickremesinghe receiving support from just 9% of those polled in Dec 2023. 

Wickremesinghe boasted of economic progress. Wickremesinghe 7 Feb gave strikingly upbeat assessment of economy in speech to parliament, citing improvements in multiple macroeconomic indicators, even as govt 28 Feb announced plans to expand beneficiaries of its flagship welfare program to nearly 40 percent of population; speech laid out ambitious agenda for deep structural changes to economy unlikely to be accepted easily by powerful constituencies. U.S. Assistant Sec of State Donald Lu 15 Feb praised country’s “historic comeback” from economic crisis.

Arakan Army won string of victories against regime in Rakhine state, while ceasefire in Shan state permitted regime to reclaim territory in centre as it activated conscription law amid battlefield losses. 

In Rakhine state, Arakan Army maintained battlefield momentum. Following its capture of towns and military camps in Jan, Arakan Army evicted military from several key strongholds and gained control over four more towns, as well as seizing huge quantities of arms and ammunition. Notably, Arakan Army 8 Feb captured Mrauk-U town – marking highly symbolic victory given town’s status as capital of Rakhine kingdom until 18th century. Group now enjoys firm grip on much of northern and central Rakhine state, with state capital Sittwe possibly within reach. Hostilities in Rakhine raised prospect of spillover into Bangladesh, including thousands of Rohingya fleeing from Myanmar (see Bangladesh). Likewise, India’s foreign ministry 1 Feb voiced “concern over deteriorating situation in Myanmar”, with hundreds of regime soldiers having fled into India to escape Arakan Army. 

Limited ceasefire held in Shan state, as military turned focus to central Myanmar. Military, Ta’ang National Liberation Army and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army all largely observed 11 Jan ceasefire during Feb, while Kachin Independence Army continued attacks in region. Military launched offensives in country’s centre to recapture several towns lost to resistance forces since early Nov. Notably, regime 10 Feb recaptured Kawlin town – largest to come under resistance control – after week of heavy fighting. 

Regime activated old conscription law. Regime 10 Feb announced it had put into effect People’s Military Service Law more than decade after it was enacted, enabling men aged 18-35 and women aged 18-27 to be conscripted for five years; measure raises questions about military’s troop levels given heavy losses it has endured in recent months and difficulties it has faced recruiting since coup. Activation of law caused panic, with thousands of young men trying to flee country, despite regime claims that it would only conscript 5,000 per month out of 10mn people potentially eligible for service. 

In another important development. UN Security Council 5 Feb held closed-door meeting with ASEAN Special Envoy following his Jan visit to Myanmar.

Peace process remained on track in south amid low-level violence, while govt forces continued to clash with Communist rebels. 

Insecurity persisted in Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM). Peace process remained on track as govt and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) peace delegations 10 Feb met for first time since Aug 2023, but no major agreement on vital issues was reached; sides, however, committed to continuation of peace process and general agreement on compensation packages for demobilised guerrilla fighters. Meanwhile, in Lanao del Norte province, military operation 19 Feb left state soldiers and three suspected Maute Group/Daulah Islamiyah militants dead in Munai municipality. Authorities 15 Feb arrested 32-year-old woman, suspected of facilitating transfer of funds to Islamic State (ISIS), in Sulu province. 

Clashes continued between Communist rebels and military. Fighting between govt forces and Communists in Luzon Island (Camarines), Mindanao Island (Misamis and Surigao) and Visayas Islands (Leyte and Negros) killed at least nineteen combatants and civilians, and injured at least seven, in Feb. After govt and communist group New People’s Army struck agreement in Norway to restart talks, both sides continued constituting panels to launch dialogue.

Govt and main southern separatist group resumed dialogue after more than year, amid surge in attacks in deep south; Move Forward Party (MFP) faced prospect of dissolution, which could spark resurgence of 2020 protests. 

Peace process with main southern separatist group resumed amid surging attacks. In first meeting in over a year, delegations of govt and main southern separatist armed group Barisan Revolusi Nasional 6-7 Feb held seventh round of talks in Malaysian capital Kuala Lumpur; two sides discussed revised “Joint Comprehensive Plan towards Peace”, submitted by Thai delegation. Although Malaysian facilitator 7 Feb described outcome as “major breakthrough”, sides appeared only to agree in principle to peace plan, with more technical talks scheduled 7-8 March. Meanwhile, militants in deep south stepped up attacks. Notably, gunmen 2 Feb killed former assistant village headmen in Saiburi district, Pattani province. Former insurgent leader, Wae Ali Copter Waeji, was found shot dead 3 Feb in Reuso district, Narathiwat province. Militants 6 Feb threw grenade at police apartments and killed officer in Reuso district. Six militants 18 Feb killed two defence volunteers in Tak Bai district, Narathiwat. 

Possible ban of election-winning party raised spectre of major street unrest. After Constitutional Court 31 Jan ruled that election-winning party MFP’s proposal to reform lèse-majesté constituted effort to overthrow Thailand’s “system of government”, former senator 1 Feb filed petition with Electoral Commission seeking MFP’s dissolution via Constitutional Court; chairman 16 Feb said commission was examining case. MFP’s dissolution could trigger mass protests, considering ban of MFP’s progenitor, Future Forward Party, sparked months-long nationwide demonstrations in 2020. Pathumwan District Court 5 Feb sentenced MFP leader Pita Limjareonrat and Future Forward Party founder Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit to four months in prison, suspended for two years, for violations in connection with protest in 2019. 

Authorities freed former PM Thaksin Shinawatra. After six-month stay in police hospital upon returning to Thailand after fifteen years in exile, authorities 18 Feb released former leader of Pheu Thai party Thaksin on parole; release appears to result from undisclosed deal with military and royalist establishment set on confronting MFP challenge.

China maintained naval activity in East China Sea as U.S. and Japan held joint exercises in wider region. 

Beijing continued maritime presence. As of 28 Feb, Japan spotted 106 Chinese vessels in Japan’s contiguous zone, while four vessels were detected within Japan’s territorial sea. Japan’s Coast Guard 6 Feb urged the four Chinese vessels to leave its territorial waters, which after almost two hours sailed northward. According to Japanese officials cited by media, Chinese authorities have ships constantly stationed north west of disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in East China Sea, which Japan claims as its territorial waters. 

Japan and U.S. held joint exercises. U.S. and Japan 1 Feb conducted joint military exercises in Philippine Sea, demonstrating their ability to respond to contingencies across regional waters; exercises involved dozen warships, including two U.S. aircraft carriers. Japanese Self-Defense Forces and U.S. military 2 Feb identified China as hypothetical enemy in their joint command post exercise for first time, reflecting growing concerns over potential future invasion of Taiwan by Beijing. 

Japan sought to deepen maritime cooperation across region. Reports mid-month indicated Japan is drawing up new ten-year plan to improve maritime capabilities of four nations in Southeast Asia that are struggling to resist growing encroachment into their territorial waters by China.

Ethnic conflict in Manipur in far north east continued, Maoists staged attacks in centre and relations with China remained under strain amid border dispute. 

Manipur continued to be roiled by deadly unrest. Separate shootings 13 Feb killed three in Imphal East and Kangpokpi districts. Mob same day broke into camp of paramilitary force 5th Indian Reserve Battalion in Chingarel district, looting arms and ammunition. Following suspension of police constable from Kuki-Zo tribal community, mob 15 Feb stormed govt complex housing senior police in Churachandpur district, killing two and injuring 30. Around 200 members of radical Meitei group Arambai Tenggol 27 Feb abducted senior police officer after he had arrested six members of group in Imphal East district. After Manipur Chief Minister 3 Feb met Union Home Minister in capital New Delhi, home minister announced decision to suspend Free Movement Regime with Myanmar under which hill tribes can cross border with relative ease, citing need to “ensure internal security” and “maintain demographic structure”; move reflects Chief Minister’s inflammatory rhetoric that Kuki-Zo are illegal immigrants. 

Maoist militants continued attacks in centre. After over 500 Maoists 30 Jan killed three police members in Chattisgarh state (centre) in bid to resist deployment to security camps established by authorities, two Maoists 18 Feb hacked to death armed forces officer in Chattisgarh’s Bijapur district. IED blast 25 Feb killed security forces member in Bijapur. Security forces 27 Feb killed four Maoists in Bijapur. 

Relations with China remained under stress. Marking first meeting in more than six months, FM S. Jaishankar 17 Feb met Chinese counterpart Wang Yi on sidelines of Munich Security Conference. Indian and Chinese corp commanders 19 Feb held 21st round of talks over disputed boundary known as Line of Actual Control; India said discussions sought “complete disengagement” in eastern Ladakh, referring to two remaining friction points at Demchok and Depsang. Defence secretary 21 Feb referred to China as “a bully”. 

In another important development. Farmers from Punjab state (north) 13 Feb commenced protest march to New Delhi to demand guaranteed minimum crop prices, following last round of protests in 2021; authorities 21 Feb deployed force to prevent farmers marching on capital, killing young farmer.

Tensions persisted in South China Sea (SCS) between Philippines and China, while Manila signed off on expanding defence budget and continued to deepen cooperation with U.S. 

China continued presence near disputed feature, stoking tensions with Manila. Chinese military 9 Feb announced it conducted routine patrols in SCS. China’s coast guard 22 Feb said it drove away Philippine govt vessel for “illegally intruding” into waters near Scarborough Shoal; Manila same day called claim “inaccurate”. Manila 27 Feb reported patrol of Chinese aircraft near Scarborough Shoal for first time in recent years. Philippine President Marcos Jr 28 Feb labelled China’s presence in SCS “worrisome”. During state visit to Australia beginning 29 Feb aimed at deepening security ties, Marcos Jr vowed to resist “any attempt by any foreign power to take even one square inch of our sovereign territory”. Meanwhile, USS John Finn and USS Gabrielle Giffords 8 Feb conducted trilateral operations with Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and Royal Australian Navy in SCS. 

Manila continued to bolster defence posture and ties with Washington. Marcos Jr 1 Feb approved third phase of military’s modernisation plan, which includes purchase of country’s first submarine, to defend its maritime sovereignty in SCS; plan is estimated to cost 2 trillion pesos ($35.62 bn), reflecting shift in strategy from internal to external defence. Philippine Navy mid-Feb deployed BRP Emilio Jacinto, an upgraded patrol vessel, to waters off Palawan province in effort to bolster its forces. Media reports indicated U.S. and Philippines plan to hold meeting between top officials in coming months to address Beijing’s aggressive actions in SCS; meeting aims to reaffirm U.S. commitment to defend Philippines under their mutual defence treaty, amid China’s disruptive tactics against Philippine military’s resupply mission to Second Thomas Shoal.

Tribal clashes in restive Highlands Region killed over 40 people. 

Police commander in Enga province, in Highlands Region, reported that two tribes and their respective allies 18 Feb clashed with reported automatic and heavy weaponry in Middle Lai area, killing at least 49 by some estimates, likely marking deadliest upsurge in tribal violence in region in recent years; police said Amublin tribe had set up ambush on rival Sikin tribe after allegedly anticipating planned attack. Enga Governor Peter Ipatas claimed as many as seventeen tribes were involved in long-running escalation in region, describing it as “probably the biggest tribal fight we’ve ever had”.

Chorus of voices protested draft law on “foreign representatives”, Bishkek and Dushanbe advanced toward border deal, and UN, EU and Central Asian officials held talks on Afghanistan. 

Criticism of “foreign representatives” bill continued. Parliament 22 Feb approved second reading of controversial ‘foreign representatives’ bill amid chorus of voices underscoring risks to civil society and free speech. Notably, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 7 Feb warned it “would have an overwhelmingly negative impact on civil society, human rights defenders, and the media”, while rights group Amnesty International 8 Feb said proposed legislation and amendments bill “mimic the infamous Russian ‘foreign agents’ law”. President Japarov 9 Feb responded to Jan letter from U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken expressing concern about bill, accused U.S. of “interference” in country’s internal affairs.

Bishkek and Dushanbe advanced toward final border agreement. Tajik state news agency Khovar 5 Feb reported that Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan had agreed on another 3.71km of state border, as sides inched closer toward final agreement. Tajik President Emomali Rahmon same day met with FM Kulubayev in Tajik capital Dushanbe; pair reportedly discussed recent progress on border delimitation, as well as water resource management. 

Kyrgyzstan hosted talks on Afghanistan with UN, EU and regional officials. Bishkek 14 Feb hosted UN Special Representative for Afghanistan Roza Otunbaeva, along with officials from all five Central Asian nations and EU, for talks ahead of UN-sponsored conference on Afghanistan 18-19 Feb in Qatar. Meeting came amid efforts among regional powers for closer engagement with Kabul, and reportedly focused on current challenges obstructing assistance to Afghanistan and how to ensure country’s long-term peace and stability.

Tajikistan made progress on border deal with Kyrgyzstan and sought to improve water resource management with Uzbekistan; UN, EU and Central Asian officials held talks on Afghanistan. 

Dushanbe pursued border talks with Bishkek and opened water-monitoring station with Tashkent. State news agency Khovar 5 Feb reported that Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan had agreed on another 3.71km of state border as sides inched closer toward final agreement. President Rahmon same day met with Kyrgyz FM Kulubayev in capital Dushanbe; pair reportedly discussed recent progress on border delimitation, as well as water resource management. Meanwhile, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan 23 Feb installed two new measuring stations along border to monitor transboundary water flows in effort to improve cooperation on water resource management. 

Officials attended talks on Afghanistan. Tajik representatives 14 Feb attended meeting in Kyrgyzstan along with UN Special Representative for Afghanistan and other Central Asian, EU officials ahead of UN-sponsored conference on Afghanistan 18-19 Feb in Qatar. Meeting came amid efforts among regional powers for closer engagement with Kabul, and reportedly focused on current challenges obstructing assistance to Afghanistan and how to ensure country’s long-term peace and stability.

Uzbekistan sought to improve water resource management with Tajikistan; UN, EU and Central Asian officials held talks on Afghanistan.

Uzbekistan and Tajikistan 23 Feb installed two new measuring stations along border to monitor transboundary water flows in effort to improve cooperation on water resource management. Meanwhile, Uzbek representatives 14 Feb attended meeting in Kyrgyzstan along with UN Special Representative for Afghanistan and other Central Asian, EU officials ahead of UN-sponsored conference on Afghanistan 18-19 Feb in Qatar. Meeting came amid efforts among regional powers for closer engagement with Kabul, and reportedly focused on current challenges obstructing assistance to Afghanistan and how to ensure country’s long-term peace and stability.

Newly-appointed UN personal envoy kickstarted first round of deliberations in search of common ground between parties. 

UN Sec-Gen’s new Personal Envoy for Cyprus, Maria Holguin Cuellar, 30 Jan commenced visit to Cyprus, stating that her first mission would be to investigate whether there is “common ground” and “listen attentively” to parties’ positions; Cuellar early Feb met Republic of Cyprus President Christodoulides and “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”) leader Ersin Tatar before visiting Athens, Ankara and London. Notably, Turkish Cypriot leadership remained sceptical of prospects of new negotiations, as de facto FM Tahsin Ertuğruloğlu suggested he did not expect Holguin to finish her mandate and that there was no common ground to be found. “TRNC” seeks recognition of existence of “two states and two democracies” on island, while Republic of Cyprus seeks return to dialogue on basis of 2017 framework.

Hostilities with Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) remained concentrated in northern Iraq and northern Syria, while govt retained pressure on Islamic State (ISIS) at home and improved ties with regional states. 

Amid clashes with PKK and its affiliates, Ankara engaged with Iraqi authorities and local actors. Military carried out airstrikes targeting PKK in northern Iraq and People’s Protection Units (YPG)/Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) members in northern Syria as well as critical infrastructure belonging to groups. Notably, Turkish defence ministry 4 Feb announced killing or capturing of five PKK fighters in northern Iraq, while Turkish drones 11 Feb struck targets in northern Syria’s Qamishli, killing two high-ranking SDF members (see Iraq and Syria). Meanwhile, Defence Minister Yaşar Güler and Army Chief of Staff Metin Gürak 6 Feb visited Iraq’s capital Baghdad and Iraqi Kurdistan regional capital Erbil, reportedly to propose new defence treaty that includes measures to safeguard security and strengthen cooperation against PKK. In capital Ankara, FM Fidan 19 Feb met with Falih Alfayyadh, chairperson of Iran-backed Iraqi paramilitary coalition Hashd al-Shaabi. 

Authorities conducted operations against alleged ISIS members in Türkiye. Security forces during Feb apprehended over 400 individuals with suspected links to ISIS. Notably, police 13 Feb detained alleged ISIS operative working at Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant construction site, Mersin province, under fake identity. 

Ties with Greece, U.S. and Egypt remained on track for improvement. FM Hakan Fidan 7 Feb said that inherited disputes with Greece can be “set aside” as negotiations on other bilateral issues continue; Fidan and Greek counterpart Giorgos Gerapetritis 18 Feb met on sidelines of Munich Security Conference to discuss progress on bilateral issues and Greek PM Mitsotakis’ upcoming visit to Ankara currently scheduled for later this year. U.S. Congress 10 Feb approved sale of 40 F-16 fighter jets and 80 modernisation kits to Ankara; U.S. ambassador Jeff Flake 13 Feb emphasised Türkiye’s strategic importance. U.S. Senators Jeanne Shaheen and Chris Murphy 20-21 Feb visited Ankara and met President Erdoğan and Fidan. Erdoğan 15 Feb visited Egypt for first time since 2013 coup, signalling Ankara’s efforts to normalise ties with former adversaries.

Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers met for German-facilitated talks following deadly escalation along border; PM Pashinyan’s calls for new constitution triggered criticism.  

Deadly border clashes shattered months of relative calm. Azerbaijan’s State Border Service 12 Feb reported that Armenian troops fired at Azerbaijani positions in its Zangelan district, wounding one soldier. Situation escalated as Azerbaijan’s State Border Service 13 Feb announced “retaliatory operation” that left four Armenian soldiers dead, one wounded and an army post near Nerkin Hand village in southern Syunik region destroyed. EU High Representative Josep Borrell 13 Feb condemned Baku’s “disproportionate” response to shooting and reiterated that EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA), tasked with monitoring situation along Armenian side of border, had been reinforced; announcement came amid growing dissatisfaction from Baku with EUMA, whom it 12 Feb accused of facilitating visits by European officials and unofficial delegations to border. Risk of further small-scale clashes persists. 

Armenian, Azerbaijani leaders met in Munich, paving way for talks between FMs. Pashinyan, Aliyev and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz 17 Feb held tripartite meeting on sidelines of Munich Security Conference. Less than two weeks later, German FM 28-29 Feb hosted her Armenian and Azerbaijani counterparts for talks focused on peace treaty; pair vowed to continue negotiations. 

Pashinyan’s calls for new constitution ignited controversy. Pashinyan 1 Feb reiterated mid-Jan call for fresh constitution, citing “new geopolitical and regional realities”. Among other reforms, Pashinyan said it should remove provision calling for unification of Armenia with (now former) Nagorno-Karabakh. Aliyev same day weighed in, stating peace could be achieved if Yerevan amends constitution and other laws, which he said make claims on Azerbaijani territory. Comments prompted critics to accuse Pashinyan of bowing to Azerbaijani demands, and may lead to renewed calls for his resignation or fresh protests. 

In other important developments. Pashinyan 22 Feb announced Yerevan had frozen membership in Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization amid souring ties with Moscow, though latter same day said Yerevan had not launched formal process to suspend membership. Armenia and France 23 Feb struck defence deal.

Azerbaijani and Armenian foreign ministers met for German-facilitated talks following deadly escalation along border; President Aliyev won landslide victory in snap poll.  

Deadly border clashes shattered months of relative calm. State Border Service 12 Feb reported that Armenian troops fired at Azerbaijani positions in Zangelan district, wounding one soldier. Situation escalated as State Border Service 13 Feb announced “retaliatory operation” that left four Armenian soldiers dead, one wounded and an army post near Armenia’s Nerkin Hand village in southern Syunik region destroyed. EU High Representative Josep Borrell 13 Feb condemned Baku’s “disproportionate” response to shooting and reiterated that EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA), tasked with monitoring situation along Armenian side of border, had been reinforced; announcement came amid growing dissatisfaction from Baku with EUMA, whom it 12 Feb accused of facilitating visits by European officials and unofficial delegations to border. Risk of further small-scale clashes persists. 

Azerbaijani, Armenian leaders met in Munich, paving way for talks between FMs. Aliyev, Pashinyan and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz 17 Feb held tripartite meeting on sidelines of Munich Security Conference. Less than two weeks later, German FM 28-29 Feb hosted her Armenian and Azerbaijani counterparts for talks focused on peace treaty; pair vowed to continue negotiations. 

Aliyev secured fifth presidential term. President Aliyev won 7 Feb snap presidential election with 92% of vote. In lead up to poll, Aliyev mid Jan stated that Azerbaijan had regained full sovereignty and expressed readiness for peaceful future with Armenia, though subsequent border clashes laid bare challenges ahead.

Irakli Kobakhidze became new prime minister following ruling party reshuffle, and breakaway Abkhazia stepped up restrictions on international organisations and civil society. 

Parliament named new PM as Oct elections inched closer. Following resignation of former PM Gharibashvili late Jan and return to politics of ruling Georgian Dream party’s billionaire founder Bidzina Ivanishvili, parliament 8 Feb appointed Irakli Kobakhidze as new PM; move came as Georgia gears up for Oct parliamentary elections. Opposition same day dismissed reshuffle as little more than a swap between “Ivanishvili’s political puppets”. 

Concerns grew about deepening restrictions in breakaway Abkhazia. EU Special Representative Toivo Klaar 14 Feb met with key Georgian officials in capital Tbilisi to discuss situation in breakaway regions and EU’s conflict resolution efforts. Meetings came after Abkhazia late Jan declined Klaar’s request for visit to region, prompting concern about region’s reduced engagement with EU and, according to Klaar, “increasing restrictions being placed on our work and the work of UN agencies, international NGOs and local civil society organisations”. De facto presidential administration 7 Feb submitted draft “foreign agents” law to de facto govt, which mimics Russia’s increasingly repressive legislation on “foreign representatives”; if approved, bill would designate individuals and organisations that receive money from abroad (excluding countries that recognise Abkhazia as an independent state) “foreign agents”.

Congress of Deputies from breakaway Transnistria called for Russian protection from mounting Moldovan pressure. 

Congress of Deputies from Moldova’s breakaway region of Transnistria 28 Feb held extraordinary session – seventh in its history – amid intensifying dispute with Chișinău over customs duties. De facto lawmakers and officials adopted seven declarations, including appeal to Russia to “protect” region from growing pressure from Moldova; they stopped short, however, of calling on Moscow to annex region despite fears.

New currency regulation restricted use of Serbian dinar, sparking outrage among Kosovo Serbs and criticism from international actors. 

New currency rules came into force, fuelling tensions. Regulation establishing euro as only currency permitted for cash transactions came into effect 1 Feb; move bans financial institutions from using Serbian dinar, primary currency for cash and commercial transactions in Kosovo’s Serb-majority communities. European Commission 1 Feb warned that “short transition period for the regulation’s implementation, combined with a lack of information and practical solutions for all affected communities, risk seriously complicating their lives”. Authorities 6 Feb announced one-month transition period; Kosovo police, however, 3 Feb confiscated 4mn Serbian dinar and vehicle transporting it to distribute social benefit payments from Serbia, 7 Feb prevented entry of cash-transfer truck into Kosovo. Hundreds of Kosovo Serbs 12 Feb protested new regulation in North Mitrovica town. 

UN Security Council held briefing on currency issue. Speaking at extraordinary session of UN Security Council, Serb President Aleksandar Vučić 8 Feb argued new regulation “disables all medical, educational, social, cultural and other institutions that enable Serbs to live with a minimum of human dignity”; PM Kurti insisted regulation doesn’t prevent Belgrade from providing financial support to Kosovo Serbs, but “seeks to ensure the transparency and legality of cash imported into Kosovo”. Head of UN Mission in Kosovo Caroline Ziadeh said actions “exacerbate an environment of insecurity and mistrust”.

As war entered third year, Avdiivka town fell to Russia, marking significant setback for Ukraine as its forces felt sting of waning Western support and momentum swung toward Moscow. 

Russian forces captured Avdiivka and nearby settlements. Following months of intense bombardment, Ukraine 17 Feb announced withdrawal from eastern Donetsk region’s Avdiivka town; retreat marks country’s most significant setback since loss of Bakhmut town in May 2023 and, according to military analysts, is consequence of ammunition shortages and Western hesitancy to sustain military aid. During final days of fighting, Russia appears to have established localised air superiority for first time since invasion, hastening Ukraine’s loss of control. Ukraine late Feb withdrew from several settlements west of Avdiivka. In south, Russian forces 17 Feb launched forward operations on Zaporizhzhia region’s Robotyne village. With pressure mounting along frontline, Ukraine could lose more territory in coming weeks. 

Ukraine sunk two ships in Black Sea, Russian strikes continued. Ukrainian forces 1 and 14 Feb sunk two ships from Russian Black Sea fleet using domestically produced naval drones; 29 Feb reportedly shot down three Russian Su-34 jets. Russian airstrikes continued across country, increasingly featuring North Korean ballistic missiles. Media outlet The New York Times 9 Feb quoted warning from U.S. official that Ukraine could run low on air defence interceptors within weeks, which could lead to intensified Russian bombardments and more casualties. 

President Zelenskyy dismissed top general. Zelenskyy 8 Feb replaced commander of armed forces General Zaluzhnyy with Oleksandr Sirskyy following souring Zelenskyy-Zaluzhnyy relations over competing narratives of counteroffensive and former’s hesitancy to mobilise more soldiers. Govt continued work on mobilisation reform bill. 

Europeans pledged more military aid amid concerns about future of U.S. support. EU 1 Feb passed €50bn support package for Ukraine after long delays. Deadlock in U.S. Congress over support package persisted, however, amid opposition from staunchest supporters of Republican Party’s presumptive nominee for 2024 presidential election Donald Trump. Kyiv during month signed long-term security agreements with number of European countries amid fears U.S. support is drying up. Meanwhile, protests by Polish farmers and lorry drivers over cheap Ukrainian grain continued.

President Lukashenko revealed plans to run in 2025 presidential election as voters cast their ballot in parliamentary and local polls; crackdown continued. 

U.S. condemned “sham” elections. Voters 25 Feb cast their ballots in parliamentary and local elections, choosing candidates from four parties that all back President Lukashenko. U.S. same day condemned “sham” polls in which “all independent political parties were denied registration”. Election Commission 26 Feb announced that 73% of eligible voters turned out for ballot and that all 110 seats in parliament had been filled, further cementing Lukashenko’s rule. Day of election, president announced intention to run in 2025 presidential election. 

Crackdown continued, notably targeting LGBTQ+ community. European Council 19 Feb expressed “continued and deep concern” about human rights situation, stated readiness to take further targeted measures. Crackdown continued, however. Notably, state news agency Belta 19 Feb reported Minsk has prepared draft law proposing penalties for “promotion of non-traditional relationships”, referring to LGBTQ+ relationships. 

Lithuania sealed another border crossing with Belarus. Lithuania 21 Feb decided to seal off two checkpoints with Belarus, bringing total of closed border crossings to four; Vilnius’ Interior Minister announced decision was due to “risks associated with the increased activities of the Belarusian intelligence and security services against Lithuania and our citizens”.

Opposition leader Alexei Navalny died in penal colony weeks before presidential election, Moscow reiterated openness for Ukraine talks but on its terms, and West imposed more sanctions. 

Opposition leader died in prison. Weeks before 15-17 March presidential election, Alexei Navalny 16 Feb died in penal colony in northern Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous District, dealing blow to already weak opposition. Cause of death unknown, though opposition abroad and Navalny’s wife Yulia Navalnaya blamed President Putin. Commemorative rallies held 16-19 Feb in 39 cities; authorities detained 397 people. Navalnaya 19 Feb vowed to continue her husband’s work. Meanwhile, Election Commission 8 Feb refused to register opposition presidential hopeful Boris Nadezhdin’s candidacy for election. 

Russia alleged openness for Ukraine talks. As Russia gained battlefield momentum in Ukraine (see Ukraine), Putin 8 Feb expressed willingness for talks and claimed Kyiv refused negotiations with Moscow “under instructions from Washington”. FM Lavrov 14 Feb said Moscow was ready to settle conflict if Ukraine takes into account ground realities. During 29 Feb annual state-of-the-nation address, Putin praised battlefield advances in Ukraine and stated readiness for dialogue with U.S.; he also warned of “tragic” consequences should NATO military contingents be sent to Ukraine, after French President Macron 26 Feb refused to rule out sending troops there. Meanwhile, media company Bloomberg 20 Feb reported that U.S. told allies Russia is developing nuclear anti-satellite weapon, which could be launched into space in 2024. 

Ukraine war continued to be felt at home. Drone strikes targeting oil infrastructure continued, shelling into Belgorod region 15 Feb killed seven. Deputy Chairman of Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev 19 Feb claimed military had recruited 53,000 personnel since 1 Jan 2024. According to 15 Feb report by media outlet The New York Times, U.S. estimated roughly 300,000 Russian soldiers killed or injured since full-scale invasion. Mothers and wives of mobilised soldiers 3 Feb protested in capital Moscow, calling for return of soldiers from frontline. 

Western countries imposed more sanctions. EU 21 Feb agreed 13th sanctions package, U.S. 23 Feb announced over 500 new sanctions. Moscow 13 Feb added Estonia’s PM and others on wanted list.

Killings of political candidates raised fears of an uptick in violence ahead of 2 June polls; ruling party faced criticism for constitutional reform package and allegations of ties to criminal outfits.

Assassinations of political figures raised fears of violent electoral season. As 2 June elections drew closer, unknown gunmen 15 Feb assassinated ruling MORENA party hopeful for local congress in Misantla city, Veracruz state (east), 26 Feb assassinated two MORENA mayoral candidates in Maravatío, Michoacán (centre); nineteen potential candidates killed since June 2023, majority from MORENA. Amid govt failure to prevent criminal influence in elections or implement protective measures for other candidates, fears abound that campaign season beginning 1 March will see uptick in political violence as groups battle over territory and state access. 

Critics accused govt of weakening checks and balances before poll. President López Obrador 5 Feb presented constitutional reform package targeting autonomous federal institutions he accuses of serving “neoliberal” opposition forces, including National Electoral Institute (INE). Tens of thousands 18 Feb protested in capital Mexico City voicing support for INE, while political opponents accused MORENA of trying to orchestrate election result by weakening checks and balances. 

Ruling party faced more allegations of ties to criminal groups. Following late Jan allegations that López Obrador received criminal financing for his unsuccessful 2006 presidential bid, armed group Los Ardillos alleged in 15 Feb interview that Los Zetas crime group also contributed to his campaign. Media outlet The New York Times 22 Feb published further allegations about links between drug cartels and officials close to president; López Obrador same day attacked paper’s correspondent and published her mobile number, 24 Feb claimed his “moral and political authority” is “above the personal data protection law”. 

Criminal violence continued. In sign of criminal groups’ increasing use of explosive devices, bomb-laden drone 7 Feb killed civilian in Gabriel Zamora municipality, Michoacán state. Meanwhile, church officials in Guerrero state 14 Feb said four bishops met with leaders of Tlacos and Familia Michoacana criminal groups in bid to halt rising violence; priest 22 Feb said groups had agreed to respect each other’s territories. Similar informal negotiations growing in high-conflict areas to address violence.

Govt-ELN talks faced setback following ceasefire renewal; violence remained high across countryside. 

Govt-ELN talks faced challenges despite ceasefire renewal. After challenging discussions in Cuban capital Havana, govt and guerrilla group National Liberation Army (ELN) 5 Feb announced extension of bilateral ceasefire for further six months. Agreement includes unilateral commitment from ELN to end kidnapping for ransom and to release all those detained. Days later, however, group’s western front 10 Feb launched armed strike in Chocó department along San Juan, Sipí and Cajón rivers in order to block advance by rival armed group Gaitanista Self Defense Forces. New crisis erupted 20 Feb when ELN recalled its negotiators for consultations, accusing govt of trying to undermine national talks by sponsoring regional dialogue initiative in Nariño department; ELN’s central command objects to involvement of local ELN front in a regional process, as it undermines group’s coherency at national dialogue. Sides 26 Feb reaffirmed commitment to continue negotiations despite disagreement. 

“Total peace” efforts with FARC dissidents and other groups continued. Govt 1 Feb signed agreement to open talks with dissident Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) faction called Segunda Marquetalia. Separately, tensions mounted between govt and second dissident faction already in talks, known as FARC-EP Estado Mayor Central (FARC-EMC); FARC-EMC 15 Feb issued communiqué accusing security forces of advancing on its troops in Buenos Aires town, Cauca department (along Pacific coast). Meanwhile, two criminal groups in Buenaventura city 5 Feb extended truce; agreement includes crucial provision allowing for creation of monitoring mechanism. 

Gaitanistas clashed with army. Violence intensified mid-Feb between Gaitanista Self Defence forces and military, which is escalating pressure campaign against group. Clashes 16-17 Feb left five soldiers dead along border between Antioquia and Bolívar departments. President Petro 17 Feb issued ultimatum to group, saying security forces would dismantle it if forces are not willing to demobilise. 

Petro faced criticism for slow implementation of coca substitution programs. Major civil society and farmer’s organisations from Catatumbo region, home to some of Colombia’s highest density coca crops, 11 Feb sent letter to Petro urging his administration to accelerate coca substitution programs; protests likely if there is no govt response.

As presidential poll inched closer, crackdown deepened with arrest of prominent activist and expulsion of UN human rights monitors; govt prepared electoral timetable. 

Authorities detained high-profile activist. Security forces 9 Feb arrested lawyer and human rights activist Rocío San Miguel at airport in capital Caracas, holding her for over three days incommunicado. Chief Prosecutor Tarek W. Saab 12 Feb announced San Miguel had been charged with treason and terrorism in connection with alleged plot to assassinate President Maduro. Rights groups and international actors, including U.S., demanded her release. Arrest of San Miguel, a moderate who heads an NGO focused on defence and security, seen as govt message that dissent will not be tolerated. Meanwhile, discussions in govt-controlled National Assembly to restrict, or even eliminate, NGOs continued. 

Govt expelled UN human rights monitors in further sign of crackdown. FM Gil 15 Feb announced govt had given officials at Caracas office of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 72 hours to leave country. Decision came after OHCHR 13 Feb said San Miguel’s detention could amount to forced disappearance and called for her “immediate release”; Gil said comments violated Venezuela’s sovereignty and that office had become “private law firm of coup plotters and terrorist groups”. Expulsion bodes ill for govt cooperation with other outside monitors, including potential EU election observation mission for 2024 presidential vote. 

Govt held consultations on electoral calendar. Govt-controlled National Assembly 5-16 Feb held consultations with political parties, businesses, unions and others to suggest date for presidential election; opposition coalition Unitary Platform 4 Feb declined invitation, saying meeting contravened Oct 2023 govt-opposition Barbados Agreement, in which sides agreed to “jointly” present election authority with their proposal; it accused govt of planning election without adequate guarantees for free and fair vote. Consultations led to proposal 28 Feb that includes over twenty potential dates for poll; electoral authorities to finalise date in March. 

In other important developments. Tensions with Guyana continued over contested Essequibo, oil-rich region currently administered by Guyana, with Caracas reportedly bolstering troops near border and Georgetown receiving increased military assistance from Washington. Russian FM Lavrov 20 Feb visited Caracas to reaffirm ties.

Violent protests erupted calling for PM Henry’s resignation as gang violence, both between rival outfits and against govt, wreaked havoc in Port-au-Prince. 

Anti-Henry protests spread across country. Former coup leader Guy Philippe, who has urged Haitians to join him in peaceful revolution to remove acting PM Henry, 6 Feb joined anti-govt protests in Pétionville neighbourhood of capital Port-au-Prince. Demonstrations 7 Feb took place in over twenty cities, turning violent as protesters looted and set fire to state buildings; police killed five members of Brigade for the Security of Protected Areas, armed environmental agency led by close friend of Philippe. Henry that night urged calm and promised to hold meetings with opposition to organise elections. Leading politicians including Jean Charles Moïse, now allied with Philippe, and former PM Claude Joseph 18 Feb organised fresh protests in Port-au-Prince, Ouanaminthe and Les Cayes cities. CARICOM (body of Caribbean nations) 28 Feb announced Henry agreed to hold elections by Sept 2025. 

Resurgent gang rivalry displaced thousands, wave of attacks rocked capital. After two-month lull in fighting between G9 and Gpèp coalitions in Cité Soleil, at least three gangs from Gpèp 5 Feb launched attack on area controlled by rival gang from within G9 coalition; UN 13 Feb said fighting displaced almost 10,000. G9 leader Jimmy ‘Barbecue’ Chérizier 29 Feb claimed responsibility for wave of attacks on police stations and airport in Port-au-Prince; he stated it was coordinated offensive by gangs belonging to G9 and Gpèp to capture national police chief and govt ministers, and prevent Henry (on visit to Kenya – see below) from returning to Haiti. Apparent gang coordination suggests they could now be seeking to form united front and potentially join forces with Guy Philippe and his allies to oust PM in coming months.

Preparations for Kenyan-led multinational mission to Haiti continued. Henry 29 Feb visited Kenya amid efforts to overcome legal obstacles preventing Nairobi from instigating multinational mission to Haiti. Canada and other countries 22 Feb pledged another $120mn for mission amid funding concerns. U.S. ambassador to UN 26 Feb said Benin offered to contribute 2,000 troops to mission. 

In another important development. Judge 19 Feb charged 51 individuals in relation to 2021 killing of President Moïse.

U.S. sanctioned 100 officials in response to govt crackdown; Managua granted asylum to Panama’s former president. 

Crackdown on religious organisations, civil society and opposition persisted. Inter-American Court of Human Rights 1 Feb called for immediate release of Brooklyn Rivera and Nancy Henriquez, Indigenous political leaders of outlawed Yatama party who have been detained since late 2023. Meanwhile, targeting of religious organisations and civil society continued. Notably, govt 6 Feb shuttered five evangelical NGOs; state’s official gazette 16 Feb reported closure of Scouting Association of Nicaragua alongside seven other NGOs, four of them religious, said authorities would confiscate assets of all eight groups. U.S. 16 Feb announced visa restrictions on over 100 Nicaraguan municipal officials, accusing them of supporting a regime that “continues to engage in a repressive campaign that silences civil society and unjustly detains courageous individuals for exercising their fundamental freedoms”. UN 29 Feb accused Nicaragua’s govt of “serious systematic human rights violations, tantamount to crimes against humanity”. 

In another important development. Ortega 7 Feb granted asylum to former Panamanian President Martinelli, whose July 2023 conviction for money laundering was upheld by Panama’s Supreme Court 2 Feb; move in line with Managua increasingly offering asylum to former Central American officials accused of corruption.

President Bukele and his Nuevas Ideas party won landslide victory in elections marred by irregularities; authorities once again extended state of exception. 

Bukele secured presidency amid irregularities in vote count. Salvadorans 4 Feb cast their votes in elections to select president and congress, with Bukele on ballot despite constitution prohibiting immediate presidential re-election. As expected, electoral tribunal 9 Feb announced Bukele won with 82.66% of votes, 18 Feb declared his Nuevas Ideas party had secured 54 congressional seats out of 60. Election marred by irregularities, however, leading to allegations of fraud ostensibly aimed at making sure Nuevas Ideas secured large congressional majority. Notably, electronic electoral system failed, leading to manual vote count that Electoral Tribunal president Dora Martinez 6 Feb suggested could have been intentional. Several opposition parties 19 Feb claimed to have documented dozens of “anomalies” during count, including system failures when inputting opposition votes and duplication of votes in favour of Nuevas Ideas. However, Electoral Tribunal 22 Feb rejected petition by opposition parties to annul elections. Organization of American States’ Electoral Observation Mission 21 Feb said that, despite electoral process being “deficient, slow and disorganised”, results reflected will of voters. 

Authorities extended state of exception as mass trials continued. Legislative Assembly 9 Feb extended state of exception for additional thirty days. Earlier, Salvadoran courts 8 Feb began mass trials against 492 Mara Salvatrucha gang leaders, which human rights organisations have said violate due process and right to legal defence. Meanwhile, former national security advisor Alejandro Muyshondt, accused of being a double agent and sharing confidential information, 7 Feb died in state custody; his lawyer and mother 9 Feb claimed he had been tortured.

Deadly cross-border clashes between Hizbollah and Israel escalated further in scope, underscoring risk of expanded regional conflict during Ramadan in March.

Border clashes further expanded in scope, killing dozen civilians in Lebanon. Israeli strike 10 Feb killed two civilians and wounded senior Hizbollah commander in Jadra town, north of major city Saida. Missiles originating from Lebanon 14 Feb struck Israeli military base in Safed in northern Israel, killing soldier and wounding eight others. In retaliation, Israel unleashed widespread bombing in southern Lebanon, which killed at least ten civilians and several Hizbollah members. Israel 26 Feb launched strikes near Baalbek, in eastern Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley, some 100km from border – marking deepest attack inside Lebanese territory since 7 Oct; in response, Hizbollah claimed it fired 60 rockets at Israeli base in Golan Heights. Hamas 28 Feb said it fired two salvos of rockets from Lebanon into Israel. Israeli attacks since Oct have seriously damaged vital local infrastructure and agricultural assets, on which many households in south depend, and displaced at least 86,000 residents.

Amid conflict escalation risks, diplomatic engagement remained limited. Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant 26 Feb said attacks on Hizbollah would continue regardless of whether there is a ceasefire in Gaza. Hostilities risk propelling Israel and Lebanon’s strongest militant group toward open-ended, disastrous war, just as Israel faces significant public pressure to confront group more forcefully. Further heightening conflict risk, start of Ramadan on 10 March could see rising tensions between Palestinians and Israel – including at Jerusalem’s Holy Esplanade as Israel mulls restrictions on Muslim worshippers’ access to Al-Aqsa – which could provoke further violent actions by Hizbollah or Palestinian armed groups in Lebanon. While various diplomatic missions proposed potential terms for settlement, it appeared unlikely such efforts will bear fruit before ceasefire is reached in Gaza.

Executive vacuum and economic crisis persisted. Presidential vacuum that has prevailed since 1 Nov 2022 continued with little apparent prospect of resolution as parliament did not hold presidential election session, reflecting deadlock between political factions. Meanwhile, economic crisis remained severe. Notably, telecommunications workers and army retirees in Feb held strikes and demonstrations in protest of devalued wages and retirement benefits, respectively.

U.S. launched wave of retaliatory airstrikes against Iran-backed groups following killing of soldiers in Jan, Türkiye continued attacks on Kurdish targets, and clashes persisted between regime and rebels in north west.

In east, U.S. targeted Iran-backed groups, which continued attacks. In response to 28 Jan drone attack killing three U.S. soldiers in Jordan, U.S. 2 Feb launched most substantial retaliatory operation in Iraq and Syria since escalatory cycle began in Oct with strikes on more than 85 military targets, killing 29 Iran-backed militants in Syria; in show of restraint, U.S. allowed Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) officers to evacuate beforehand. Islamic Resistance in Iraq drone 5 Feb killed six U.S.-allied Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) at al-Omar base housing U.S. troops in Deir ez-Zor. Compounding risks of escalation, tribal militias backed by regime and IRGC 6 Feb targeted SDF. U.S.-led coalition 10 Feb intercepted six drone attacks targeting Conoco base, Deir ez-Zor. Meanwhile, Israel 2 Feb reportedly killed three Iran-backed militants in capital Damascus; 7 Feb struck Homs city, reportedly killing ten, including civilians; 21 Feb killed at least two in Damascus; IRGC reportedly scaled back deployment of senior officials and repositioned forces to western countryside.

In north east, Türkiye conducted repeated attacks on SDF. Notably, in Qamishli city, Hasaka province, Türkiye 11 Feb killed two SDF fighters and next day killed Kurdish administration official. With Türkiye seemingly taking advantage of U.S. preoccupation in east to destabilise Kurdish administration, SDF 12 Feb called on U.S. to strengthen its presence in region. Islamic State (ISIS) landmine 25 Feb killed fifteen civilians in Al-Raqqa’s eastern countryside.

In north west, regime forces and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) clashed. Regime forces, backed by Iranian proxies, targeted HTS with suicide drones in Idlib province: notably, 12 Feb killed two near Jisr al-Shughur city and 18 Feb killed and injured eight HTS fighters near Saraqib city.

Islamic State (ISIS) continued attacks; security forces killed protestor in south. ISIS 13 Feb reportedly killed nine soldiers near al-Sukhna town, Homs province. Security forces 28 Feb killed demonstrator at anti-govt protest in Suwayda city in first fatality since protests erupted in Aug.

Iran-backed “Axis of Resistance” groups and U.S./Israel continued confrontations across region, while UN’s nuclear watchdog expressed concern over govt’s nuclear advancement.

U.S. launched retaliatory strikes on Iran-linked groups. In response to 28 Jan drone attack killing three U.S. soldiers in Jordan, attributed to Iran-backed Islamic Resistance in Iraq, U.S. 2 Feb launched most substantial retaliatory operation in Iraq and Syria since escalatory cycle began in Oct with strikes on more than 85 military targets, killing estimated 40 (see Iraq and Syria); Tehran labelled strikes “strategic mistake”. U.S. 7 Feb killed Kata’ib Hizbollah commander known as Abu Baqr al-Saeedi in Iraq, allegedly “responsible for directly planning and participating in attacks on U.S. forces”. Following strikes, frequency of attacks against U.S. forces particularly in Iraq appeared to decline, reportedly with Iran’s encouragement, but it remains to be seen if relative lull will be sustained. Elsewhere, U.S. and UK continued strikes against Houthis (see Yemen); media reports 15 Feb indicated U.S. had carried out cyberattack against Iranian vessel suspected of intelligence gathering in Red Sea. Iranian media 2 Feb confirmed death of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) member in Syrian capital Damascus, marking another fatality in series of recent unconfirmed Israeli strikes (see Syria). In attack potentially portending greater Israeli covert operations on Iranian soil, reports attributed 14 Feb blasts damaging gas pipelines to Israel.

Concerns persisted over Iran’s nuclear program. International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Director General, Rafael Grossi, 1 Feb noted “a bit of slowing down” of growing stockpile of uranium enriched to 60%. Grossi 13 Feb reiterated concerns over Iran’s lack of transparency, given curtailed IAEA monitoring, and noted “loose talk” among Iranian officials on nuclear weapons capability. Serious diplomatic engagement between Tehran and Western powers remained absent ahead of IAEA Board of Governors meeting in March.

Washington’s sanctions continued to mount. Notably, U.S. 2 Feb blacklisted “network of prolific suppliers of materials and sensitive technology for Iran’s ballistic missile and [drone] programs”, as well as half dozen IRGC officials engaged in “malicious cyber activities”. U.S. 14 Feb sanctioned seven persons and entities, including Central Bank of Iran subsidiary.

U.S. launched wave of retaliatory airstrikes against Iran-backed groups following killing of soldiers in Jan, as calls grew for foreign troops’ expulsion; hostilities between Türkiye and Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) continued.

U.S. retaliated against Iran-backed groups, which appeared to cease attacks in Iraq. In response to 28 Jan drone attack killing three U.S. soldiers in Jordan, attributed to Iran-backed Islamic Resistance in Iraq, U.S. 2 Feb launched most substantial retaliatory operation in Iraq and Syria since escalatory cycle began in Oct with strikes on more than 85 military targets; in Iraq, targets included bases and weapons facilities of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Hashd al-Shaabi, and resistance factions. Notably, strikes killed sixteen Hashd fighters and one civilian and injured at least two dozen in al-Qaim and Akasht, Anbar province. Govt accused U.S. of breaching Iraqi sovereignty. In further escalation, U.S. drone strike 7 Feb killed Kata’ib Hizbollah commander Abu Baqr al-Saeedi and two others in Baghdad. Following Iran’s Quds Forces commander’s visit to Baghdad late Jan where he reportedly instructed armed groups to lie low, no attacks from Iran-backed groups were recorded, despite Kata’ib Hizbollah rescinding its late Jan suspension of attacks; for now, it appears that escalation has reached ceiling, although attacks conducted by Iraqi groups in Syria may continue.

U.S. attacks fuelled calls for withdrawal of foreign troops. Following U.S. assassination of al-Saeedi, resistance and Hashd al-Shaabi leaders demanded govt deliver timeline for ending U.S.-led coalition’s mandate. Over 100 parliamentarians 8 Feb signed motion to pass law expelling foreign troops; however, parliament 10 Feb failed to convene for vote on expelling U.S. troops, as Kurdish, Sunni, and almost half of Shia legislators boycotted session, indicating widespread reluctance for rushed withdrawal. Iraq and U.S 11 Feb resumed talks on drawdown of forces.

Türkiye-PKK conflict continued in north. Turkish defence ministry 4 Feb announced killing or capturing five PKK fighters. Turkish defence ministry 17 Feb announced PKK attack on base in northern Iraq killed Turkish soldier. Security officials said alleged Turkish strike 20 Feb killed two in Akre region, Dohuk governorate.

Riyadh reiterated that recognition of Palestinian state must come before normalisation with Israel, as regional diplomacy aimed at ceasefire in Gaza continued.

Riyadh continued diplomatic pressure for Palestinian state and Gaza ceasefire. Foreign Ministry 7 Feb said it will not resume diplomatic relations with Israel unless Palestinian state is recognised along 1967 borders. Riyadh 8 Feb hosted summit with FMs of Egypt, Jordan, United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Palestinian representative to discuss using reconstruction funding for Gaza as leverage for ceasefire. Saudi Arabia 16 Feb attended Munich Security Conference to discuss so-called “day-after” plans. Despite U.S. insistence that Houthi attacks on shipping in Red Sea are independent from Gaza, Saudi FM 13 Feb said attacks were linked and reiterated call for ceasefire (see Yemen).

Undeterred by U.S.-UK bombing campaign, Houthis continued attacks on international shipping as hostilities could escalate further in coming weeks; military build-up along frontlines threatened return to war between Houthis and govt forces.

Houthis could step up maritime attacks despite U.S.-UK airstrikes. Houthis launched near-daily attacks on shipping in Red Sea, expanding into Gulf of Aden, signalling ineffectiveness of U.S.-UK bombing campaign. Notably, U.S. and UK 3 Feb struck at least 36 Houthi targets in thirteen locations and 11 Feb struck Houthi weapons systems in Salif port, north of Hodeida city; 13 Feb expanded airstrikes to Hajjah province. Houthis 18 Feb attacked Belize-flagged and UK-registered vessel in Gulf of Aden loaded with 41,000 tons of fertilizer, which is critically endangered and poses substantial threat of environmental catastrophe if ship sinks. EU 19 Feb officially launched Red Sea maritime mission to ensure “freedom of navigation”, which Houthis may target when mission becomes operational; Houthi leader 29 Feb threatened military “surprises” in upcoming Red Sea operations.

Military build-up raised spectre of escalation in Marib, Shabwa, Taiz. Houthis reinforced forces along several frontlines, while govt forces showcased preparedness to confront Houthis, seeking assistance from U.S. and others impacted by Houthi maritime actions. Notably, Houthi artillery 15 Feb targeted Al-Miriyah area in Al-Dhale province. Bomb targeting separatist Southern Transitional Council leader next day killed two in Aden. Houthis 17 Feb killed three govt soldiers in Saada province; 19 Feb attacked military site in Taiz province. Risk of wider ground fighting loomed as Houthis may initiate new major offensive, particularly if external actors provide support to anti-Houthi groups.

UN continued efforts to avoid peace process derailing. UN Envoy Hans Grundberg met local and regional leaders during Feb in effort to keep peace process alive, including Iranian, Saudi Arabian and Emirati officials as well as Presidential Leadership Council VP Aiderous al-Zubaidi and Chairman al-Alimi and leader of National Resistance Forces Tareq Saleh in Mocha city.

In another important development. U.S. designation of Houthis as Global Terrorist organisation 16 Feb came into effect amid increasing food prices and suspension of operations by World Food Program in Houthi-controlled areas, and rising inflation in govt-controlled areas.

Israel killed thousands more in Gaza, as over half a million faced famine, and threatened all-out Rafah attack that could decimate 1.5m there; Israel’s Ramadan restrictions could fuel violence in West Bank and beyond.

Israel targeted Gaza’s south, as aid restrictions increased risk of mass starvation. Israeli forces continued massive bombardment and operations across strip, bringing Palestinian death toll to over 30,000 as of 29 Feb. Israel expanded attacks on Rafah in south that hosts over half of strip’s population, vast majority of which is displaced. Even as Israeli military intelligence warned Hamas will remain intact as guerrilla group, war cabinet repeatedly insisted on large-scale ground offensive in Rafah to take out remaining Hamas battalions and 18 Feb said all-out offensive would commence if hostages were not released by Ramadan on 10 March; operation will likely be bloodbath, worsen already-catastrophic conditions and fuel further displacement, including potentially into Egypt (see Egypt). Israeli forces also battled Palestinian militants in Jabalya and Gaza city (north), Deir el Balah (centre) and Khan Younis (south), as rockets into Israel continued. Risk of mass starvation rose further, as aid inflow fell by half in Feb and UN reported 90% of population facing high level of acute food insecurity and almost 600,000 “one step away from famine”; report by U.S./UK universities 19 Feb estimated tens of thousands could die in next six months due to collapsed services. UN special rapporteur on right to food 27 Feb asserted Israel is intentionally starving Palestinians and declared “situation of genocide”.

Ceasefire negotiations continued. After PM Netanyahu 7 Feb rejected Hamas ceasefire proposal as “delusional”, Israel and Hamas late Feb continued negotiations via mediators, offering hope ceasefire could avert Rafah offensive and release hostages; Netanyahu vowed any ceasefire would merely delay Rafah invasion.

West Bank braced for heightened turmoil during Ramadan. Israel mulled restrictions on Muslim worshippers’ access to Al-Aqsa mosque complex in Jerusalem during Ramadan, which could inflame tensions across West Bank and connect arenas by provoking violent actions by Hizbollah/Palestinian factions in Lebanon. Israeli settler violence could escalate, fuelled in part by extremists’ fears that international community may recognise Palestinian state.

Israel-Hizbollah hostilities continued. Deadly cross-border strikes persisted, underscoring lingering risk of wider war (see Lebanon).

Algiers conducted military exercise near Malian border amid diplomatic strains with Bamako and announced free-trade zones in bid to maintain influence in Sahel region.

Algeria conducted military exercise near Malian border. Malian religious leader Mahmoud Dicko, whom Bamako accuses of backing Tuareg rebels, around 25 Feb reportedly visited Algeria for second time since Dec. Mali’s PM Choguel Kokalla Maïga next day reiterated condemnation of alleged Algerian interference in Malian affairs. Algerian army Chief of Staff Said Chengriha 27 Feb oversaw live-ammunition military exercise in Bordj Badji Mokhtar area near Malian border; defence ministry described exercise as preparation to “destroy a non-conventional enemy”.

Algeria announced creation of free-trade zones with Sahel countries. President Tebboune 13 Feb announced plan to open free trade zones with neighbouring countries, starting with Mauritania and expanding to Sahel countries like Mali and Niger, followed by Tunisia and Libya. Move, which comes after Morocco in late 2023 launched initiative aimed at providing Atlantic access to three landlocked Sahelian countries, is part of Algeria’s efforts to maintain influence in Sahel despite diplomatic tensions with Bamako, in context that favours intervention of more dynamic and aggressive players, including Russia.

Country started gearing up for election year. Ahead of presidential election due to be held by year’s end, political parties close to ruling elites displayed semblance of opposition to Tebboune’s still unconfirmed candidacy in bid to provide veneer of legitimacy to predictable ballot. Abdelkader Bengrina, president of Islamist movement El-Bina, 12 Feb advocated for transfer of power to new generation. President of centre-left party Rally for Culture and Democracy, Atmane Mazouz, 17 Feb urged authorities to release all prisoners of conscience and establish “democratic minimum” to avoid “sham election”.

Cairo continued to grapple with repercussions of Israel’s war on Gaza, reportedly preparing for refugee influx in case of ground offensive on Rafah; Cairo and UAE signed major investment deal, alleviating Egypt’s foreign currency shortage.

Egypt reportedly built security zone in Sinai anticipating refugee influx from Gaza. Responding to speculation that Egypt was ready to suspend peace treaty with Israel if latter launches ground offensive on Gaza’s southern city of Rafah, FM Sameh Shoukry 12 Feb said Cairo remained committed to agreement as long as Israel was, too. NGO Sinai for Human Rights 14 Feb said Egypt was building fortified buffer zone along border with Gaza to accommodate refugees in case of mass exodus from Gaza, while isolating them from rest of Sinai Peninsula. North Sinai governorate 17 Feb refuted report, claiming ongoing construction works were meant to create logistics zone to manage humanitarian aid. Meanwhile, efforts to broker truce in Gaza picked up pace. After Egypt, Israel, Qatar, and U.S. representatives met in French capital Paris, White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan 25 Feb said parties “came to an understanding” on basic contours of hostage deal and ceasefire; senior Hamas official 27 Feb however said “big gaps” remained on major issues, notably length of truce.

UAE signed agreement for largest foreign direct investment in Egypt’s history. Egypt 23 Feb announced mega-deal with United Arab Emirates sovereign wealth fund for development of real estate on Mediterranean coast; deal will bring in $35bn, virtually solving Egypt’s liquidity problems. International Monetary Fund Director Kristalina Georgieva 2 Feb said talks over new loan were in final stretch. Exchange rate devaluation likely to take place before IMF disburses first tranche of new loan.

Turkish president’s visit marked culmination of rapprochement between Cairo and Ankara. Turkish President Erdoğan 14 Feb met with President Sisi during first official visit to Egypt since 2012, marking further step in diplomatic reconciliation between two countries and offering opportunities for understandings on issues including East Mediterranean and Libya. Sisi expected to visit Türkiye in April.

New initiatives to facilitate transfer of money from Tripoli to east reduced financial incentives to agree on political solution; Tripoli-based govt struck deal with militias for regular forces to police city.

Rival authorities continued to strike arrangements to maintain status quo. Eastern-based parliament, House of Representatives (HoR), 5 Feb established Libyan Development and Reconstruction Fund tasked with leading reconstruction efforts across country, and funded directly by Central Bank in capital Tripoli; HoR 19 Feb appointed at its helm east-based military strongman Khalifa Haftar’s son, Belqasem. HoR early Feb also established new financial committee that will sign off on countrywide budgetary disbursements; Tripoli’s position on move unclear. Meanwhile in address to UN Security Council, UN envoy Abdoulaye Bathily 15 Feb warned Libya could slide into “disintegration” if unable to form unified govt and move toward elections. UN Security Council 27 Feb reiterated call for elections “as soon as possible”.

Eastern forces reportedly prepared for show of force and received Russian tanks. Libyan news outlets 12 Feb reported 40 Russian T72 tanks were unloaded in eastern port of Tobruk, allegedly to support Haftar-led Libyan National Army (LNA). Pro-LNA official in following days confirmed reports, adding they expected to receive more fighter jets from Russia. Ahead of thirteenth anniversary of toppling of former leader Muammar Qadhafi on 17 Feb, Haftar-led forces reportedly dispatched military vehicles to Qadhafi’s hometown of Sirte (north) to conduct military exercises there, allegedly with Russia’s support.

Militias agreed to leave Tripoli after series of clashes in recent months. Tripoli-based Interior Minister Imad Trabelsi 21 Feb said at least five militias that have been controlling Tripoli for past ten years agreed to return to their barracks by 9 April; Trabelsi said regular forces will police Tripoli again. Earlier in month, inter-militia clashes continued in western Libya. Notably, apparent revenge attack against militiaman 17 Feb left ten people dead in Tripoli’s Abu Salim neighbourhood.

In another important development. Petroleum Facilities Guard militiamen 25 Feb shut down oil facilities across country in dispute over pay, next day suspended strike after Tripoli-based PM Dabaiba agreed to raise their salaries.

Judicial authorities sentenced several govt critics to prison, including Islamist leader Rached Ghannouchi; President Saïed sent mixed signals on economic policy.

Judicial repression of opposition intensified. Tunis Court 1 Feb sentenced Rached Ghannouchi, imprisoned president of Islamist-inspired An-Nahda movement, and Rafik Abdessalam, his son-in-law and former FM, to three years’ imprisonment on charges of illegal foreign financing of their party. Five imprisoned senior politicians, including members of opposition coalition National Salvation Front, 11 Feb went on hunger strike to protest arbitrary detention; Ghannouchi 19 Feb announced joining strike in solidarity. Tunis courts 23 Jan sentenced former President Marzouki to eight years in prison in absentia for allegedly attempting to overthrow govt; next day sentenced prominent opposition figure Jawher Ben Mbarek to six months in prison on charges of conspiring against state security. Authorities 29 Feb arrested Tunisian General Labour Union’s deputy secretary-general, Tahar Mezzi, on undisclosed charges, before releasing him next day.

Election cycle proceeded despite widespread voter disaffection. Second round of local council elections, which will determine composition of second chamber of parliament, 4 Feb took place in 800 of 2,155 electoral districts. Amid boycott from opposition parties, voter turnout reached just 12.44%, almost as low as in first round. Independent High Authority for Elections 12 Feb said presidential election would be held in 2024 in accordance with Constitution.

Saïed sent mixed signals on economic policy. Parliament 6 Feb adopted amendment allowing “exceptional” direct financing of budget by Central Bank, sparking concerns over latter’s independence, as well as fiscal stability and debt burden. Authorities in following days used foreign currency reserves to pay for $850mn Eurobond, leading to 20% fall in foreign currency reserves by mid-Feb. Meanwhile, Saïed 15 Feb appointed Fethi Nouri as new Central Bank governor to replace Marouane Abassi, whose mandate expired; Nouri has demonstrated commitment to orthodox economic policies as member of Central Bank’s board of directors since 2016.

UN Envoy continued consultations to revive peace process as international pressure on Morocco and Polisario Front independent movement continued to fade.

De Mistura’s South Africa visit drew Morocco’s ire. UN Envoy Staffan de Mistura 1 Feb visited South Africa, one of Polisario Front independence movement’s main sponsors, in likely attempt to explore what leverage he has over Polisario and put pressure on Rabat by broadening his consultations. Moroccan ambassador to UN, Omar Hilale, 3 Feb condemned trip, said de Mistura ignored Rabat’s “categorical opposition” to visit and “rejection of any interaction with Pretoria on the subject of the Moroccan Sahara question”.

Growing gap between Polisario leadership and more radical activists came to fore. In interview to Spanish left-wing outlet, Nueva Revolución, Mansur Omar, Polisario Front representative to European Union, 10 Feb said Polisario was trying to contain intensity of conflict with Morocco to avoid stoking regional tensions and broaden conflict. Statement, which contradicted conclusions of Jan 2023 Polisario congress calling for military escalation with Morocco, triggered vocal opposition from some Polisario activists, who accused Omar and Polisario leadership of letting down fight for independence of Western Sahara.