Politically motivated violence continued, while relations with Rwanda improved further.

Political opposition continued to face harassment and violence. Locals 6 April discovered lifeless body of main opposition party National Congress for Freedom (CNL) activist, Gilbert Ndacayisaba, in Ngozi province (north); witnesses claimed Ndacayisaba had been under pressure from ruling party’s youth militia Imbonerakure to join their ranks. CNL was also subject to bureaucratic obstruction: party congress scheduled for 14 April was postponed after govt refused permission due to administrative error.

Burundi’s relations with Rwanda thawed further. Ruling party 2 April sent high-level delegation to Kigali to attend 35th anniversary celebration of Rwandan President Kagame’s Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF); visit marked new step toward reconciliation following series of high-level bilateral talks (see Rwanda).

In other important developments. Security forces 18 April discovered three bodies reportedly tied together in Cibitoke province (north west); locals said bodies might be those of anti-Kigali rebels from National Liberation Forces. Also in Cibitoke, locals 22 April found two bodies wearing army uniforms. Authorities 21 April detained former PM Alain Guillaume Bunyoni (2020-2022) on accusations of “undermining state security”; NGO Amnesty International 26 April welcomed “opportunity for the Burundian authorities to ensure accountability for serious human rights violations”, however expressed concern over “lack of transparency” around detention.

Amid sustained fighting between army and separatists, local authorities in Anglophone regions warned of renewed herder-farmer tensions; jihadist violence increased in Far North region.

Anglophone separatists and govt forces continued to engage in clashes. In North-West region (NW), army 4 April ambushed and killed three armed separatists in Bafut commune (Mezam division); separatist militia 27 April detonated IEDs in Bamenda city, with unknown number of casualties. In South West region (SW), suspected separatist combatants 5 April killed two soldiers in Mamfe city (Manyu division); govt forces 18 April killed two separatist fighters and arrested eight civilians suspected of working with separatists during raid in Mamfe.

Tensions between Nigerian pastoralists and Cameroonian farmers rose again. In NW, armed men 1-2 April abducted about 25 people and destroyed properties in Ako town (Donga-Mantung division) near border with Nigeria’s Taraba state; local officials blamed attack on Fulani herders from Nigeria, who have crossed border into Cameroon and clashed with local farmers in the past. Local authorities in neighbouring SW region had in March warned of similar incursions in Akwaya town (Manyu division).

Jihadists stepped up attacks in Far North region. Boko Haram militants overnight 5-6 April clashed with army and vigilantes in Malika and Kerawa localities (both Mayo-Sava division), leaving two militants dead; 16 April attacked Zeleved military post (Mayo-Tsanaga division), killing at least one soldier and displacing hundreds of civilians; 18 April killed at least one civilian and set houses ablaze in Mozogo town (Mayo-Tsanaga) before being pushed back by military. IED planted by Boko Haram 24 April killed six soldiers in Tchébé-Tchébé village (Mayo-Tsanaga).

Senate elections cemented one-party rule, media freedom remained under threat. After ruling party in March won all 70 Senate seats open for election, Biya 31 March appointed another 30 senators, with only five from opposition parties, meaning ruling party now holds 95% of Senate seats. Meanwhile, Cameroon Journalists’ Trade Union 8 April accused Maroua city (Far North region) mayor of threatening to kill journalists investigating corruption in road construction projects.

Amid persistent rebel violence, conflict in Sudan started affecting border region; emergence of self-defence militia increased risk of intercommunal tensions in south east.

Rebels sustained offensive notably in west and north east. In west, 3R rebel group, a member of Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC), 4 April wounded three soldiers and seven Russian paramilitaries in Bossemptélé town (Ouham-Pendé prefecture). CPC fighters 7 April killed three soldiers and wounded another in ambush near Boda town, confirming rebels’ redeployment in Lobaye prefecture where they have not been present since 2021. In north-eastern Vakaga prefecture, CPC rebels 1 April wounded two artisanal miners 60km from Ouanda-Djallé town, while armed forces 16 April lost five soldiers in clash with pastoralists near Sikikédé locality. In neighbouring Bamingui-Bangoran prefecture, CPC 11 April killed two soldiers near border with Chad.

Conflict in Sudan affected dynamics in border region. After conflict erupted in neighbouring Sudan between Sudanese army and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Vakaga prefecture (located along border) recorded increased presence of Sudanese militiamen. Notably, about 40 RSF fighters 25 April reportedly crossed into CAR near Amdafock village. Conflict hampered RSF’s capacity to protect border, offering greater latitude to CPC rebels smuggling weapons and men into CAR going forward. Meanwhile, 500 people fleeing violence in Sudan 26 April arrived in Amdafock.

New self-defence militia launched first attack against govt forces in south east. In Haut-Mbomou prefecture (south east), Azandé Ani Kpi Gbé militia, newly created to protect Zandé ethnic group (the majority locally) from Union for Peace (UPC) rebels, launched first attack on armed forces positions in Obo town, leading to population displacement. Intercommunal tensions could intensify in area, as Zandé militia is hostile to Muslim traders and Fulani herders it perceives as affiliated with UPC. Militia 22-23 April reportedly engaged in fighting with South Sudanese soldiers near Bambouti, leaving unknown number of people dead.

International NGO denounced democratic regression. NGO Human Rights Watch 4 April warned of “potential for human rights violations and the narrowing of democratic space and free expression” as President Touadéra continues to push for constitutional change that would let him run for third term in 2025.

Conflict in neighbouring Sudan sparked concern of regional destabilisation, and intercommunal violence resurged in southern regions.

Violent power struggle in Sudan raised risk of heightened instability in Chad. After fighting 15 April erupted in neighbouring Sudan between Sudanese army and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, Chad same day closed shared border in attempt to reduce risk of movement of rebel groups and militias that might support either side. Defence ministry 19 April however announced 320 Sudanese soldiers had fled into Chad, while UN refugee agency around 21 April reported up to 20,000 people had found refuge in Chad since conflict started in Sudan. Influx raised concern about humanitarian crisis as World Food Programme 14 April announced it would from May onward not be able to feed hundreds of thousands of refugees already in Chad.

Intercommunal violence flared in country’s south. Suspected herders 8 April attacked Kagbé village (Mandoul region), leaving two people killed and six injured. Clashes between Fulani herders and Kodo farmers around 18 April left at least 22 people dead in several villages of Monts de Lam department (Logone Oriental region).

Govt entered diplomatic spat with Germany. Authorities 7 April expelled German ambassador to N’Djamena, citing latter’s “discourteous attitude” and actions “incompatible with diplomatic practice”; expulsion reportedly followed ambassador’s comments condemning authorities’ decision to allow interim president, Mahamat Déby, to run for permanent office in next election. In response, Germany 11 April expelled Chadian ambassador, and European Union next day condemned N’Djamena’s “hostile gesture”.

In other important developments. French media outlet RFI 15 April said committee in charge of organising constitutional referendum was expecting to hold vote on 19 Nov, though report cast doubt on timeline’s feasibility. Cabinet 24 April adopted electoral bill relating to organisation of referendum.

ADF and CODECO attacks surged in eastern provinces, while full deployment of regional force coincided with lull in fighting between govt forces and M23 rebels in North Kivu.

ADF and CODECO attacks killed scores of civilians in Ituri and North-Kivu. UN humanitarian office 18 April said “persistent attacks” by armed groups in Ituri province’s Djugu, Irumu and Mambasa territories had killed around 150 civilians since early April. Most notably, Islamist militia Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) 2-3 April killed 30 civilians in several attacks on border between Mambasa and Irumu, while CODECO coalition of mostly Lendu militias 13-14 April killed nearly 50 people in Banyali-Kilo sector, Djugu. Meanwhile in neighbouring North Kivu province, ADF 7-20 April killed at least 30 people and took multiple hostages in Beni and Lubero territories.

M23 continued to vacate positions as ECA force completed deployment. North Kivu experienced fragile lull in fighting between M23 rebels and govt forces as East African Community regional force early April completed deployment (see Uganda). Notably, Ugandan contingent late March-early April took control of Bunagana border town, Rutshuru city, and Kiwanja town after M23 withdrawal. Claims of M23 attacks on civilians however resurfaced. Local authorities in Rutshuru territory 26 April claimed M23 in previous days killed 60 civilians in Bwito area. Kenya 27 April replaced regional force commander amid rising tensions with Kinshasa over force’s mandate.

Tensions between Kinshasa and Kigali remained elevated. After President Tshisekedi 13 April excluded direct negotiations with M23, group same day responded that “there will also be no cantonment, disarmament and demobilisation until there is direct political dialogue”. Kagame 15 April blamed M23 crisis on colonial era border delineation, saying “a big part of Rwanda was left outside in eastern Congo and southwestern Uganda”. In response, Kinshasa blamed Kagame for “all the problems” in eastern provinces over last 20 years (see Rwanda).

In other important developments. Ahead of general elections scheduled for Dec 2023, prominent opposition presidential candidates 14 April pledged to work together and scheduled march for 13 May in capital Kinshasa to protest “chaotic electoral process”. Voter registration 25 April closed countrywide; election commission however mentioned possibility of additional registration drives in conflict-ridden territories.

Tensions with DR Congo continued to run high, while Kigali offered military support to help Benin counter jihadist threat.

Kigali and Kinshasa continued to trade blame for conflict in eastern DR Congo. President Kagame 15 April blamed M23 crisis on colonial era border delineation, stating that “a big part of Rwanda was left outside in eastern Congo and southwestern Uganda”; also defended M23 rebels stating “these people continue to be denied their rights in Congo” and “the Congo problem, the regional problem, or the Rwanda problem is not M23”. In response, Kinshasa denounced “new provocation”, saying Kagame was responsible for “all the problems” in the east over last 20 years and “must never forget that [DR Congo] will defend every inch of territory”. Earlier in month, Kagame and Kenyan President Ruto 4 April pledged “to find a lasting solution to the conflict” in eastern DR Congo during Ruto’s visit to Rwanda (see DR Congo).

In other important developments. Kagame re-elected 2 April as chairman of ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Burundi’s ruling party delegation same day attended RPF’s 35th anniversary ceremony in capital Kigali, confirming improved relations between neighbours (see Burundi). During visit to Benin, Kagame 15 April met with Beninese President Talon; two leaders signed agreement for Rwandan military help in securing Benin’s borders (see Benin).

Military delegation travelled to Ethiopia amid stepped-up regional engagement.

High-level delegation visited Ethiopia as Asmara sought to consolidate ties. Military delegation led by National Security Agency chief Abraha Kassa 3-5 April visited Ethiopia’s capital Addis Ababa. Possibly seeking to demonstrate strong bilateral ties following Ethiopia’s peace deal in Tigray, Minister of Information Yemane Gebremeskel 5 April said Ethiopian military chief Birhanu Jula praised Eritrea’s support during Tigray war, saying it “can never be compensated”, while Abraha Kassa 5 April said Eritrea’s “aspirations” are for “durable peace” in Ethiopia. Trust-building visit could presage further Eritrean troop withdrawals from Tigray region, provided Asmara is satisfied with progress on disarmament of Tigray People’s Liberation Front.

Engagement with other regional actors continued. Delegation led by FM Osman Saleh and Presidential Adviser Yemane Gebreab 3 April arrived in South Sudanese capital, Juba, meeting with country’s President Salva Kiir. Sides reportedly focused on bilateral ties and regional developments amid worrying deterioration in Sudan (see Sudan), as well as Eritrea’s interest in promoting “peace and reconciliation among the people of South Sudan”. Same delegation 11 April met with Kenyan President William Ruto in Kenya’s capital, Nairobi.

Major points of contention persisted between govt and opposition despite positive steps toward de-escalating tensions; resource conflict fuelled by drought continued in northern counties.

Opposition entered fragile talks with govt but called for new protests. Opposition leader Raila Odinga 2 March suspended anti-govt protests after President Ruto same day agreed to form bipartisan committee to review selection process for election commissioners. Country’s top prosecutor next day dropped charges of unlawful assembly levelled in March at several opposition lawmakers; govt however refused to engage on other opposition demands, including cost of living and audit of Aug 2022 election servers. In attempt to increase pressure, Odinga 13 April announced protests would resume after holy month of Ramadan, and 23 April scheduled protest for 2 May. Bilateral talks 20 April kicked off but Odinga’s coalition 25 April suspended participation amid disagreement over composition of negotiating delegations and topics to be discussed.

Violence over cattle and land resources continued in north amid historic drought. Cattle theft and banditry continued in Rift Valley despite military operation. Notably, raiders believed to be from Turkana county 6 April killed five people and injured another in Lami Nyeusi village in West Pokot county, also stealing goats.

In other important developments. President Ruto’s senior economic adviser David Ndii 8 April suggested govt might need to take further austerity measures to avoid debt default and stabilise economy; govt is struggling to pay public servants’ salaries and basic imports as debt service consumes over 60% of govt revenue. Ruto 4-5 April visited Rwandan capital Kigali for talks on eastern Democratic Republic of Congo with Rwandan counterpart Kagame (see DR Congo). Intergovernmental Authority on Development regional bloc 16 April appointed Ruto to mediate conflict in Sudan, along with South Sudanese and Djibouti counterparts (see Sudan).

Following announcement of phase two of offensive against al-Shabaab, central regions continued to be main theatre of operations; humanitarian situation remained dire amid extreme weather events and conflict.

Second phase of offensive against Al-Shabaab got off to slow start. After President Mohamud in March announced second phase of anti-Al-Shabaab offensive, progress in April remained limited in southern regions. In South West state, security forces 17 April recaptured several small villages north of Baidoa city in Bay region, including Adegeow and Tarabow. In Jubaland state, preparations continued with President Ahmed Madobe 10 April visiting recently recovered town of Janay Abdalle. Focus of operations remained country’s centre. In Galmudug state’s Galgaduud region, govt forces 7 April recaptured Galcad town and 15 April took control of Bud Bud village, which Al-Shabaab had controlled for over six years; reports suggested govt may aim to retake Ceel Buur, insurgents’ last remaining major city in area, and establish new front in western Hiraan region (Hirshabelle state). Meanwhile, Al-Shabaab continued to challenge govt’s efforts to project its authority. In Galgaduud, militants 19 April launched raid on military base near Bud Bud, and 22 April attacked Masagawaay village causing unconfirmed number of casualties.

Govt continued efforts to secure regional support for offensive’s second phase. After Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti in Feb agreed to support Somali forces in fighting Al-Shabaab, govt early April held second “front-line states” summit, with deliberations focused on detailing plans for joint regional offensive. Countries contributing to AU transition mission 27 April agreed on procedures for drawdown of 2,000 troops by 30 June as part of mission’s coordinated exit by Dec 2024.

UN Sec Gen highlighted humanitarian crisis amid prolonged drought. UN Sec Gen António Guterres 11-12 April visited Mogadishu and camp for internally displaced persons in Baidoa city (South West state), called for increased support for 2023 humanitarian response plan for Somalia as country grapples with effects of extreme weather events and conflict. Current rainy season expected to see below average rainfall for unprecedented sixth consecutive time, while flooding in Gedo and Bay regions (both south) between mid-March and mid-April displaced 140,000.

South Sudan felt effects of Sudan crisis as economy suffered, refugee flows increased and Sudanese fighters crossed border; violence persisted and opposition forces formed new alliance.

Outbreak of fierce fighting in neighbouring Sudan had immediate knock-on effects. Fighting that erupted 15 April in Sudan (see Sudan) had significant implications for its southern neighbour. On economic front, conflicting reports emerged that clashes in Port Sudan between Sudan’s army and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) damaged port and oil pipelines, threatening oil exports that make up 85% of South Sudanese govt’s revenue; South Sudanese pound, meanwhile, 15-22 April lost almost 10% of its value compared to USD. On security front, group of dislodged RSF fighters 19 April entered Renk county, Upper Nile state, prompting army same day to issue ultimatum for group to disarm or leave; incident demonstrated risk of conflict spillover. On humanitarian front, authorities in Renk county 24 April reported 10,000 refugees had crossed border as Sudanese fled fighting. Meanwhile, Intergovernmental Authority on Development 16 April appointed President Kiir, along with Kenyan and Djiboutian counterparts, to mediate conflict in Sudan.

Violence persisted in several states. In Jonglei state, armed youths 3 April reportedly killed two and stole 2,000 head of cattle in separate incidents in Wickol and Padiek areas; unknown gunmen 27 April attacked World Food Programme convoy. In Abyei Administrative Area, govt official 9 April reported alleged rebels loyal to Gen Stephen Buay Rolnyang, leader of South Sudan People’s Movement-Army, 7 April killed 11 Nuer youth in Rumamer county. In Central Equatoria state, unknown assailants 11 April killed four in Mangalla Payam area.

In other important developments. Armed groups and opposition entities not party to 2018 revitalised peace agreement 12 April signed Memorandum of Understanding in Sudanese capital Khartoum, forming new alliance dubbed South Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance; in statement issued same day, actors cited “need for united opposition” to “change the regime in Juba”. Meanwhile, Juba 2-3 April deployed around 345 additional soldiers to Democratic Republic of Congo as part of East African regional force’s fight with M23 rebel group.

Fighting erupted between army and paramilitary force, killing hundreds and triggering humanitarian crisis; conflict could slide into all-out war, drawing in new actors and spilling into neighbouring countries.

Deadly fighting broke out between rival security forces. Longstanding power struggle between Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who leads Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), and Mohamed “Hemedti” Hamdan Dagalo, who controls paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), 15 April descended into violent clashes in capital Khartoum, derailing transition toward restored civilian rule. Hostilities came amid rising tensions over negotiations to merge RSF into army, notably regarding timeline and leadership structure of integrated force. Fighting spread across country, notably to North, Central, West and South Darfur, North Kordofan, Kassala, Gedarif, Red Sea states. Army seized control of number of cities, including Kassala and Port Sudan in east, while RSF had upper hand in Darfur. In most other places, particularly Khartoum, momentum swung back and forth.

Fighting precipitated humanitarian crisis. Hostilities killed hundreds of civilians while millions in Khartoum remained trapped amid food, water and electricity shortages. Dozens of hospitals across Sudan shuttered due to fighting and dwindling supplies, while looting and vandalism were widespread. World Food Programme 16 April suspended operations after three employees were killed in North Darfur. As of 28 April, UN refugee agency estimated over 50,000 people had fled to neighbouring countries.

Mediation efforts failed to halt fighting. International actors called for end to hostilities, while Intergovernmental Authority on Development 16 April appointed Kenyan, South Sudanese and Djibouti presidents to broker ceasefire. Successive attempts to enforce humanitarian truces 18, 19, 21 April failed as foreign govts scrambled to evacuate citizens. U.S. and Saudi Arabia brokered 72-hour ceasefire starting 25 April, extended several times. With sides fighting on despite ceasefires, however, conflict risks descending into protracted civil war that draws in other armed groups and communal militias; in West Darfur state, there were indications tribal militias were already being drawn in. Risk of spillover into neighbouring countries or involvement of regional players also high, particularly due to presence of cross-border militias.

Far-reaching iron sheets corruption case resulted in arrest of govt officials; military reported progress against armed groups in eastern DR Congo.

Iron sheets corruption case continued to engulf govt. Authorities 4-18 April detained and charged Karamoja affairs minister, Mary Goretti Kitutu, her deputy Agnes Nandutu, and finance minister, Amos Lugoloobi, for allegedly diverting iron sheets that were part of $10mn relief package originally intended for locals in Karamoja sub-region. President Museveni 3 April pledged to “take political action” against govt officials found guilty of “theft”.

Authorities cracked down on Kenyan herders, causing tension with Nairobi. Ugandan forces 8 April conducted raid against Kenyan nationals suspected to be holding guns in Moroto district; Kenya claimed seven killed while Uganda confirmed one death and six injuries. Additionally, Ugandan military court around 12 April sentenced 32 Kenyan herders to 20-year prison terms for illegally possessing firearms; pastoralists from Kenya’s Turkana county often cross to Uganda during dry spell in search of water and pasture. Turkana officials 13 April protested sentence, saying there was “no fairness and justice for our people”.

Ugandan forces reported gains against M23 and ADF in eastern DR Congo. Ugandan forces 10 April said they had recovered three towns vacated by M23 rebels in Rutshuru territory since 1,000-strong contingent of East African Community regional force late March deployed to North Kivu (see DR Congo). Meanwhile, Uganda’s Chief of Defence Forces, Gen. Wilson Mbasu Mbadi, 6 April hailed achievements made by Uganda-DR Congo joint operations against Islamist militia Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in eastern DR Congo, saying “ADF is now scattered in smaller groups” and “can no longer come together”.

In other important developments. DR Congo nationals allegedly led by local chief from Ituri province’s Mahagi territory around 20 April entered Zombo district and claimed three Ugandan villages; Zombo and Mahadi officials in following days held talks, agreed to respect border demarcations.

Calls for postponement of upcoming general elections persisted, and authorities continued to criminalise dissent.

Controversy over constituency delimitation report cast doubt on 2023 vote. Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai (MDC-T) party leader Douglas Mwonzora (opposition) 3 April said electoral commission’s constituency delimitation report would produce “unfair and un-credible elections”; statement comes after MDC-T in March filed Constitutional Court application seeking postponement of general elections scheduled for summer. Local advocacy group Election Resource Centre 12 April said suspending elections would threaten country’s democracy, and constitution provides that old boundaries apply if new delimitation report is completed less than six months before elections or deemed unconstitutional. President Mnangagwa 19 April vowed to proclaim election date in late May. Ruling party Zanu-PF second secretary Kembo Mohadi 20 April said party had reached agreements with traditional leaders to secure votes. Main opposition party Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) deputy spokesperson Gift “Ostallos” Siziba few days later expressed concern about vote buying and exploitation of traditional leaders.

Opposition continued to face judicial harassment. Court 5 April sentenced CCC lawmaker and spokesperson, Fadzayi Mahere, to pay fine on charges of “communicating falsehoods”; however acquitted her of “promoting and inciting public violence”. NGO Amnesty International next day said sentence showed “escalating assault on freedom of expression”, 18 April lamented “rapidly shrinking civic space”, including criminalisation of dissent and targeting of political activists and human rights defenders. Mahere 26 April filed appeal. Court in Harare 28 April sentenced Transform Zimbabwe opposition party activist Jacob Ngarivhume to four years in prison (including one suspended) for “inciting public violence” in 2020.

Amid sustained fighting between govt forces and jihadist groups countrywide, both sides conducted large-scale massacres of civilians, while govt continued to restrict fundamental freedoms as part of total war strategy.

Govt forces and jihadists carried out massacres of civilians. In North region, suspected soldiers around 20 April raided Karma and nearby villages in Yatenga province, reportedly killing at least 136 civilians. Both govt forces and jihadists launched suspected retaliatory attacks on civilians in Sahel region’s Séno province: military 4-6 April allegedly killed seven civilians in Dori town; and suspected Islamic State Sahel Province combatants overnight 6-7 April stormed Kourakou and Tondobi villages, leaving 31 and 13 civilians dead, respectively.

Fighting between govt forces and jihadists continued. As part of more offensive approach against jihadists, military in March-April reportedly conducted major operation against al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) positions notably in Sahel, North, Centre-North and Boucle du Mouhoun regions, with unclear results. Meanwhile in North region, JNIM combatants 15 April attacked military detachment and civilian auxiliaries (VDPs) near Aorema village, close to Ouahigouya town in Yatenga province, reportedly leaving at least eight soldiers and 32 VDPs dead; govt reported 50 assailants also killed. In Centre-East region, JNIM 10 April ambushed security forces near Zambanega village, Boulgou province; eight soldiers, three VDPs and ten militants reportedly killed. In East region, suspected jihadists 27 April killed 33 soldiers in attack on military detachment near Ouagarou town in Gnagna province, reportedly losing 40 of their own.

Authorities continued to restrict civic space as part of total war on jihadists. Among other measures aimed at boosting country’s military capabilities, interim president, Capt. Traoré, 7 April announced new civilian “watch and development committees” at local level, reportedly responsible for alerting authorities about any suspicious movements and acting for development of their communities; 13 April declared “general mobilisation”, giving authorities wide legal latitude to restrict rights and freedoms if deemed necessary to combat insecurity. Meanwhile, authorities 1 April expelled Burkina Faso correspondents for French newspapers Le Monde and Libération; move came after Libération confirmed video showing men executing children in military barracks as authentic.

Authorities set date for local and regional elections, widely seen as warm-up for 2025 presidential election; govt took new steps to counter growing jihadist threat.

Political heavyweights continued to mobilise supporters in run-up to elections. In likely popularity test ahead of 2025 presidential election, former President Gbagbo 1 April met with youth representatives of his party in economic capital Abidjan. Authorities 19 April scheduled municipal and regional elections for 2 Sept. Several parties in following days disclosed lists of candidates, with President Ouattara’s Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace selecting 11 members of govt among 31 candidates for regional elections.

Jihadist expansion from Sahel region remained major concern. Ivorian and Burkinabe legislative branch presidents, respectively Adama Bictogo and Ousmane Bougouma, 4 April met on margins of continental conference of French-speaking Parliamentary Assembly in Abidjan to discuss security cooperation, confirming renewed dialogue between neighbours; Bougouma expressed “high expectations” regarding Ivorian support to Ouagadougou in fighting jihadists. Meanwhile, Ivorian National Security Council 12 April announced creation of two “transit sites” for Burkinabé refugees in border departments of Ouangolodougou (north) and Bouna (north east); initiative will allow security services to monitor influx and conduct identity checks as authorities fear militants could infiltrate country among displaced people.

No breakthrough in talks between transitional authorities and opposition parties; meanwhile, protests erupted against power shortages.

Fragile talks proceeded between govt and opposition parties. Following first round of talks in March as part of mediation led by religious leaders, PM Bernard Goumou and Forces Vives de Guinée (FVG) – large opposition coalition including outlawed National Front for the Defence of the Constitution, opposition leader Cellou Dallein Diallo’s party and deposed President Condé’s Rally of the Guinean People (RPG) – in April held several rounds of talks in capital Conakry but failed to make tangible progress to ease political crisis. FVG continued to demand release of detained opposition figures, lifting of protest ban and new national dialogue supervised by Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), while Goumou reportedly failed to secure strong support for talks from key officials linked to military govt. Collapse of talks could lead FVG to call for renewed street protests.

Spontaneous protests erupted over power shortages. Youths protesting power cuts late March-early April occupied roundabouts and clashed with police in several neighbourhoods of Kankan city – both an RPG stronghold and interim president Col. Doumbouya’s birthplace. Govt 2 April sent security reinforcements to restore order, and 5 April suspended governor of Kankan region. Court in Kankan 13 April sentenced 15 protesters to jail terms on charges of “participating in non-authorised gathering” and “destruction of public buildings”. Situation eased in following days, but Kankan and other cities could see new violence amid recurrent power shortages.

Tensions continued to mount between transitional govt and coalition of northern armed groups signatory to 2015 Algiers peace accord, and Islamic State gained further ground in Ménaka region.

Relations between govt and Algiers Accord signatory groups deteriorated further. Army aircraft 5 April flew over Kidal city (Kidal region in north), headquarters of coalition of former rebel groups Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA); CMA responded with warning shots, and same day denounced ceasefire “violation” and “grave provocation”. In effort to reboot peace process, accord’s international mediation mechanism (led by Algeria) 9 April proposed meetings with interim govt 17 April, and with govt and signatory groups 24 April, which Bamako declined. Further stoking tensions, armed forces reported arresting on 23 April 12 “terrorists” in rare operation in Ménaka region (also north); CMA however claimed detainees were coalition members. Algerian FM Ahmed Attaf 27 April visited Bamako, held talks with interim president, Col. Goïta; in joint statement, leaders committed to reviving 2015 deal.

Islamic State pursued advance in Ménaka, violence continued in centre. Following weeks-long fighting with al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), Islamic State Sahel Province 11 April took control of Tidermène town (Ménaka), in effect encircling regional capital Ménaka and driving displacement. In Mopti region (centre), govt forces and allied Russia’s paramilitary Wagner Group elements 1 April reportedly killed nine civilians in Kourkanda-Peulh village; military claimed eight of those killed were jihadists. Suspected JNIM combatants 22 April launched suicide attacks in Sévaré town (also Mopti), leaving 10 civilians dead and over 60 wounded; military reportedly killed 28 assailants.

Tensions with UN resurfaced ahead of UN mission in Mali’s mandate renewal. UN Security Council members at 12 April meeting expressed concern about frozen peace process with northern armed groups and possible presidential election delay after Malian authorities in March indefinitely postponed constitutional referendum; ahead of vote on UN mission (MINUSMA)’s mandate renewal in June, UNSG Special Representative for Mali El-Ghassim Wane also urged Bamako to lift restrictions on MINUSMA operations. Meanwhile, as disinformation campaign sought to attribute 22 April attack to MINUSMA, angry mob 23 April assaulted and wounded two MINUSMA staff in Sévaré.

President Bazoum reshuffled military leadership as small-scale jihadist violence persisted, notably in south east; high-level visits showcased Niger’s new role as Western countries’ preferred partner in the Sahel.

Low-level violence continued in Diffa region and returned to Agadez region. In likely effort to place men closer to him in command of military, Bazoum 1 April named new army chief of staff, while defence minister 13 April named new chief of gendarmerie. Meanwhile in Diffa region (south east), IEDs likely planted by Boko Haram faction Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) 9-15 April killed several soldiers and one civilian in Diffa and Bosso departments. Also in Diffa, rival Boko Haram faction (JAS) 15-17 April abducted at least three civilians in N’Guigmi department. In rare attack in northern Agadez region, unidentified gunmen 9 April ambushed gold convoy under military protection near Arlit town, leaving five soldiers dead and another five wounded.

Court sentenced civil society leader to prison. Court in capital Niamey 14 April sentenced coordinator of opposition coalition M62, Abdoulaye Seydou, to nine months in prison for “disseminating information that could disturb public order” after he accused armed forces of killing civilians.

High-level visits from Western actors continued. German defence minister and economic cooperation minister 12 April met with Nigerien counterparts in capital Niamey, said Niger would be “the focus of our future military engagement in the Sahel” as Berlin plans to withdraw from UN mission in Mali by May 2024. German parliament 28 April approved deployment of up to 60 troops to Niger as part of planned EU training mission.

Surges in criminal, herder-farmer and communal violence left hundreds of people dead across country, with particularly heavy toll among civilians.

North West, North Central saw resurgence of deadly attacks, with over 300 killed. In Benue state, armed groups 3-7 and 25 April launched multiple attacks on civilians in Apa, Guma and Otukpo areas, killing at least 149 people. Armed groups also conducted deadly raids in Kaduna state, with at least 41 people killed 12 and 15 April in Zango Kataf area. Meanwhile in Niger state, vigilantes around 13 April killed about 50 bandits in Kainji National Park. In Nasarawa state, herder-farmer violence 18 April left twelve people dead in Kokona area. In Plateau state, armed groups 22-26 April killed 13 people in Barkin-Ladi, Jos South and Riyom areas. Armed group 30 April killed 40 people, including six security operatives in Danko-Wasagu area, Kebbi state.

North East recorded persistent jihadist threat and significant communal violence. Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) 13 April killed ten people in Dogsa village, Yobe state; Pretoria-based Institute for Security Studies same day warned ISWAP had started weaponising drones with a view to using them for attacks in Lake Chad basin. Troops 17-20 April killed 35 Boko Haram (JAS) fighters in Sambisa forest, Borno state. Meanwhile in Taraba state, clashes between Fulani and Kuteb ethnic groups in Ardo-Kola, Takum and Ussa areas 31 March-4 April left at least 32 people dead.

Kidnapping for ransom surged across country. In Zamfara state, gunmen 7 April kidnapped about 85 people, mostly children and women, in Tsafe area; 28 April released most of them after ransom payment. In Nasarawa state, gunmen same day abducted former deputy governor, Onje Gye-Wado, in Wamba area, releasing him few days later allegedly after ransom payment. In Rivers state, gunmen 17 April abducted senior lawyer and former Bar Association chairman Okey Wali in state capital Port Harcourt; released him two weeks later in unknown circumstances. Armed groups 25 April abducted at least 29 people in Federal Capital Territory.

Violence associated with Biafra agitation groups persisted in South East. Gunmen 6 and 21 April killed at least six policemen in Aboh Mbaise and Ngor Okpala area, Imo state. Separatist group Indigenous People of Biafra denied responsibility.

Violence spiked in Amhara over federal decision to dissolve regional paramilitaries, govt and Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) held peace talks, and Tigray-federal relations continued to improve.

Plans to disband regional paramilitary sparked deadly violence in Amhara region. Federal govt 6 April announced decision to dissolve regional special forces and integrate them into national army and police. Many in Amhara viewed move as threat to region amid concerns that PM Abiy allying with Oromo nationalists and strengthening ties with Tigray is isolating Amhara. Some special forces refused to comply with order, instead allying with Amhara nationalist militia known as Fano and clashing with federal soldiers in number of zones. Demonstrations also erupted, spreading throughout region, as protesters blocked roads, burned tires and chanted slogans against Abiy and ruling Prosperity Party. Abiy 9 April vowed to press ahead with plan as govt deployed troops, imposed curfew and cut off mobile internet services in parts of Amhara. Dozens were killed in unrest, which began to subside mid-April. Unidentified gunmen 27 April assassinated Girma Yeshitila, head of Prosperity Party’s Amhara branch, together with his entourage in North Shewa Zone; federal govt next day launched “decisive measures” to counter “extremist forces”.

Govt-OLA peace talks got under way in Tanzania. In positive step toward ending long-running OLA insurgency, PM Abiy 23 April announced peace talks with group starting 25 April in Tanzania; OLA same day confirmed news, saying federal govt had accepted its demands for third-party mediator. Fighting between security forces and OLA continued, however, and OLA continued kidnapping civilians.

Tigray’s leader named new cabinet as federal-Tigray relations improved further. Newly appointed leader of Tigray region’s Interim Regional Administration, Getachew Reda, 5 April unveiled 27-member cabinet to lead political transition. Cabinet is dominated by TPLF members, while military controls four posts; opposition Baytona for Greater Tigray Party took two positions amid frustration among Tigray opposition parties with excessive TPLF control. Meanwhile, Federal Ministry of Education delegation 6-7 April visited Tigray to discuss reopening region’s universities. National Rehabilitation Commission head Teshome Toga 14 April visited regional capital, Mekelle, to evaluate progress on disarmament. Prosperity Party VP Adem Farah 27 April led delegation to Mekelle.

Fighting continued between govt forces and local clan militias in Las Anod, while mediators tried in vain to resolve standoff.

Fighting between govt forces and local clan militias continued. Renewed heavy fighting reported early April on outskirts of Las Anod town, Sool region, between Somaliland forces and Dhulbahante militias. After authorities late March said they will go on offensive in Las Anod, local reports in April suggested both sides attempting to recruit reinforcements. Meanwhile, Dhulbahante committee in Las Anod 10 April announced suspending traffic between Sool, Sanaag and Cayn region and Somaliland from 15 April; move would isolate Las Anod from major port of Berbera and impede traffic between Somaliland and Somalia.

Mediation efforts to resolve dispute made little progress. Over a dozen international partners 15 April held virtual call with Somaliland President Muse Bihi but failed to secure pledge to withdraw forces from Las Anod. Clan elders from southern Somalia, who had travelled to Garowe city (Somalia’s Puntland state) and Las Anod in March, 25 April arrived in Somaliland’s capital Hargeisa for consultations.

Appointment of envoys hinted at resumption of Somalia-Somaliland talks. Somalia President Mohamud 1 April appointed former Galmudug state president and federal interior minister, Abdikarim Hussein Guled, as special envoy for Somaliland to “ensure the unity and solidarity of the Somali people”. Bihi around 18 April reciprocated by naming former Somaliland FM Edna Adan as envoy to stalled Somaliland-Somalia talks.

Relative calm persisted in northern Cabo Delgado province during rainy season and holy month of Ramadan; govt legalised local militia to help fight jihadists.

Islamic State insurgents staged limited number of attacks in Cabo Delgado. In first fatal attack since mid-March, Islamic State Mozambique Province (ISMP) 15 April assaulted two positions of govt forces and Local Forces (militias fighting alongside govt) around Miangalewa village in Muidumbe district; at least one Local Forces member was killed, despite Rwandan forces’ intervention. Attacks took place days after group of displaced people returned to Miangalewa, suggesting that holding territory and sustaining return of residents in Muidumbe will be significant challenge. Insurgents had been sighted in area in days prior to attack. Notably, Local Forces patrol 13 April encountered group of insurgents outside Litapata village, killing five; insurgents next day raided nearby Mandava village. Meanwhile, reports in April continued to emerge indicating that insurgent groups – sometimes numbering as many as 50 – are present along coast and trying to establish good relations with villagers, notably 19 April in Nazimoja village south of Mocímboa da Praia district capital, and around 20 April near Quiterajo and Ntoni villages (Macomia district); with new strategy, militants could secure durable support from communities, as national security forces are feared and distrusted.

Govt formalised relations with local militia fighting insurgents in Cabo Delgado. Council of Ministers 5 April approved decree providing legal authority to and regulating functioning of Local Forces in Cabo Delgado to help push back insurgents; step concludes legalisation process after parliament in late 2022 passed law recognising militia as govt-linked force. NGO Human Rights Watch 26 April expressed concern over partnership with “untrained and seemingly uncontrollable militia”, urged govt to prevent violations of international humanitarian laws.

Renamo called for exclusion of Mocímboa da Praia from municipal elections. Main opposition party Renamo continued to press electoral authorities to exclude Mocímboa da Praia district from municipal elections set for 11 Oct as voter registration 20 April started. With voting expected to be limited to municipal area of Mocímboa da Praia town due to security risks in rest of district, Renamo claims concentration of govt security forces in town could influence voter behaviour in ruling party’s favour.

Northern departments suffered several attacks attributed to jihadist groups despite authorities’ efforts to contain violence.

Attacks targeted civilians and military along Burkina Faso and Niger borders. Unidentified armed individuals 2 April killed four fishermen in Matéri commune, Atakora department near border with Burkina Faso. Unidentified gunmen overnight 3-4 April attempted to abduct civilians and steal cattle at Fulani camp near Porga commune (also Atakora); army intervened and reportedly forced assailants to flee, but some sources claim three civilians killed. Unidentified armed individuals overnight 15-16 April reportedly attacked military camp near Malanville city at Niger border in Alibori department; death toll unknown. Govt 12 April announced special recruitment of 5,000 soldiers to be deployed in northern areas affected by jihadist incursions.

Rwanda committed to providing military assistance to counter jihadist threat. President Talon 15 April met with his Rwandan counterpart, President Paul Kagame, in economic capital Cotonou; two leaders signed agreement for Rwandan military help in securing Benin’s borders, with Talon saying cooperation could include anything from “monitoring, coaching and training” missions to “joint deployment” of troops.

North Korea claimed successful solid fuel missile test and hinted at satellite launch, U.S. and South Korea boosted alliance with new accord, and Yellow Sea incident highlighted maritime tensions.

North Korea continued missile tests and indicated impending satellite launch. North Korea 13 April successfully carried out what it said was its first-ever flight test of solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) Hwasong-18, marking potentially significant milestone in regime’s efforts to shield country’s missile forces from pre-emptive attack. Meanwhile, leader Kim Jong Un 18 April reaffirmed Pyongyang’s intention to launch what country calls “military reconnaissance satellite” in coming months, which is one of Kim’s five military priorities announced in Jan 2021. Kim’s remarks implied that satellite launch could be timed to coincide with U.S.-South Korea military drills in June marking 70th anniversary of alliance; statement followed North Korean claim on 5 March that it had developed powerful rocket engine that could guarantee successful satellite launch but satellite imagery suggested that construction work continues at main North Korean rocket launch site Sohae, likely ruling out imminent launch.

U.S. and South Korea boosted alliance with “Washington Declaration”. In first state visit to U.S., President Yoon met President Biden in Washington where pair 26 April unveiled new steps to bolster their alliance as 70th anniversary approaches: sides established new group to consult on nuclear planning akin to NATO mechanism, Biden reaffirmed commitment to extended deterrence and agreed to deploy nuclear submarine to south, and sides pledged to expand training and exercises; Yoon reaffirmed country's commitment to nuclear non-proliferation following comments earlier this year suggesting interest in seeking nuclear weapons. In response to G7 statement on 18 April that called for North Korea to dismantle its nuclear capabilities, North Korean FM Choi Son Hui 21 April insisted on permanence and non-negotiability of country’s nuclear deterrent.

South Korea responded to North Korean maritime incursion. South Korean navy vessel 15 April broadcast warnings and fired ten warning shots as North Korean patrol boat that crossed Northern Limit Line – de facto maritime border that Pyongyang refuses to recognise – near South Korea’s Baengnyeong Island in Yellow Sea, before North’s vessel retreated.

China launched three-day military drills in response to meeting between President Tsai and U.S. House Speaker, fuelling temporary uptick in tensions.

China launched military drills as President Tsai met Speaker McCarthy. Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-Wen 5 April met with U.S. House Speaker Kevin McCarthy in California, where both reaffirmed strong partnership between countries. In response, China 8-10 April held military exercises around Taiwan; notably, Taiwan 10 April recorded 91 Chinese military aircraft and 12 naval ships around island, with record high 54 aircraft crossing unofficial demarcation “median line”. China’s reaction was relatively muted in comparison to military drills held in response to Speaker Pelosi’s visit in Aug 2022. Chinese military activity continued during month: as of 28 April, Taiwan detected 548 Chinese military aircraft in its air defence identification zone (ADIZ) and recorded 148 sightings of Chinese vessels in surrounding waters. French Navy frigate 8-10 April and U.S. guided missile destroyer 16 April transited Taiwan Strait; U.S. Navy P8-A Poseidon patrol plane 28 April flew through strait.

China protested U.S. support for Taiwan, Europe debated its role. China 14 April announced sanctions on U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee chair Michael McCaul for his recent visit to Taiwan. Beijing 19 April opposed Taiwan’s purchase of 400 Harpoon missiles from U.S. Following his state visit to China 5-8 April, French President Macron triggered controversy with remarks that France and Europe should not be drawn into conflict over Taiwan by U.S.; German FM Annalena Baerbock 13 April said conflict over Taiwan will have disastrous consequences and Europe cannot afford to be indifferent.

Former Taiwanese president concluded historic China visit, Taiwan's election campaigning picked up speed. Former Taiwanese President and opposition party Kuomintang member Ma Ying-Jeou 27 March-7 April visited China, becoming first former or current Taiwanese leader to visit mainland China since civil war; trip highlighted different approaches of Taiwan’s two main political parties with regards to cross-strait relations ahead of presidential election slated for Jan 2024. Meanwhile, Foxconn founder Terry Gou 18 April announced bid to become Kuomintang’s presidential candidate, while current Taiwan VP William Lai was officially confirmed as ruling Democratic Progressive Party’s candidate.

Taliban battled Islamic State’s local branch and resistance groups, humanitarian appeal faced funding shortfall amid threat of famine, and Taliban pursued regional engagement.

Taliban continued crackdown on Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) and raids on resistance groups. After Taliban late March allegedly killed ISKP’s number two and group conducted suicide bombing in capital Kabul, Taliban 1 April announced it had imprisoned approximately 1,700 ISKP fighters and killed over 1,100 since its takeover in 2021. U.S. officials 25 April announced that Taliban had killed ISKP mastermind behind 2021 Kabul airport bombing, which claimed lives of estimated 170 Afghans and 13 American troops. Taliban security forces 11 April announced killing of two top Afghanistan Freedom Front commanders in raid in Parwan province (north). National Resistance Front (NRF) spokesman 8 April announced his resignation, hinting at group’s fragmentation. NRF leader Ahmad Massoud 24 April attended anti-Taliban leaders meeting in Austrian capital Vienna.

UN sounded alarm of famine amid serious lack of funding. World Food Programme during month reiterated warning that country is at highest risk of famine in quarter century and its food distributions will dramatically decrease in coming months before ceasing altogether in June unless new funds are pledged. Prospect of additional funding, however, diminished after Taliban authorities 5 April banned UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan from employing Afghan women, effectively extending NGO ban on female employment; UN warned that unless ban is lifted, it might be unable to continue operations, and UN Security Council 27 April unanimously condemned ban. Meanwhile, Ministry of Finance 9 April announced it had generated approximately $2.2bn in revenue in last fiscal year, increase of 37% from previous year, likely due to rise in exports.

Taliban remained active on diplomatic front amid tensions with Pakistan. Russia 3 April reopened its consulate in Balkh province (north). Taliban 16 April claimed Kazakhstan was ready to accept Taliban diplomats following meeting with Kazakhstan’s Deputy PM in Kabul. Taliban FM Amir Khan Muttaqi 13 April attended Fourth Meeting of Foreign Ministers of Afghanistan’s Neighbours in Uzbekistan’s Samarkand city, where China, Iran, Pakistan and Russia expressed concern over rising security threats in Afghanistan. Pakistani defence minister 13 April warned Pakistan would target Pakistani Taliban hideouts inside Afghanistan (see Pakistan).

Violent clashes continued between govt and opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) supporters, while insecurity persisted in Rohingya refugee camps and Chittagong Hill Tracts.

Violence continued as BNP continued countrywide anti-govt campaign. BNP Sec-Gen 8 April urged Awami League govt to resign if it “wants to avoid conflicts”; in response, FM AK Abdul Momen ruled out dialogue ahead of Jan 2024 election. BNP continued anti-govt protests during month, notably staging sit-ins in 13 cities and around 650 other locations on 8 April to highlight ten-point demands, which include govt resignation and parliament’s dissolution; police and Awami League supporters same day clashed with protesters in Natore district, injuring scores. Suspected Awami League student supporters 7 April ransacked BNP office south of capital Dhaka. Assailants 13 April hacked to death BNP official in Chapainawabganj district in northwest. Dhaka court 13 April finalised corruption charges against BNP acting chairman Tarique Rahman and his wife. Following series of fires in Dhaka markets, PM Sheikh Hasina 15 April requested authorities investigate potential BNP involvement in attempt to “cripple the economy”.

Insecurity and food aid concerns persisted in Rohingya refugee camps. Security forces 11 and 14 April killed two Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) local commanders in Ukhiya camps. Residents blamed ARSA for 15 April killing of camp leader in Ukhiya. Border Guards 25 April announced record 22kg seizure of crystal methamphetamine in Cox’s Bazar area from Myanmar. Myanmar authorities 3 April said only 56,000 of 87,000 Rohingya who Bangladesh had proposed for repatriation had previously lived in Myanmar, heightening concerns Naypyitaw is unwilling to take back significant proportion of estimated 1.2mn Rohingya in Bangladesh. Washington 11 April announced $23.8mn in urgent aid to Rohingya refugees, amid World Food Programme’s funding shortfall.

Deadly clashes erupted between armed groups in Chittagong Hill Tracts. Authorities 7 April found bodies of eight members of Bawm ethnic minority – a Kuki-Chin subgroup – in Rawangchhari area; Kuki-Chin National Front (KNF) claimed seven were its members and blamed rival group for deaths, as police believed victims were killed in gunfight previous day that forced 250 people to flee. KNF and United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF) 25 April reportedly clashed in Bandarban district.

Pakistan protested India’s plans to host G20 meeting in May in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), while militants conducted deadliest attack since 2021, raising prospect of further attacks around summit.

Tensions persisted between New Delhi and Islamabad ahead of G20 meeting. Pakistan 11 April expressed “strong indignation” over India’s plans to host G20 summit in J&K’s capital Srinagar on 10-12 May, claiming India hoped to divert attention from its suppression of Kashmiris and accusing India of “self-serving measures to perpetuate its illegal occupation of Jammu and Kashmir”; militants may seek to stage attacks before or during summit of tourism ministers to garner international attention and spoil govt’s ambition to demonstrate its claimed success in restoring peace and order in valley. In response to comments by former J&K governor Satya Pal Malik on 15 April that Feb 2019 Pulwama suicide attack was result of intelligence failures, Pakistani foreign ministry next day said “his disclosures demonstrate how the Indian leadership has habitually used the bogey of terrorism from Pakistan to advance false victimhood narrative and the Hindutva agenda clearly for domestic political gains”; remarks came as opposition lawmakers questioned status of inquiry into attack. Indian border security forces 9 April exchanged fire with Pakistani intruders, claiming to have killed one and arrested two in Poonch district near Line of Control.

Insecurity persisted in J&K as militants staged deadly attack. In deadliest attack since Oct 2021, militants 20 April assaulted army truck in southern Rajouri sector of Kashmir, killing five soldiers and wounding one; attack, for which militants appeared to use NATO ammunition left behind in Afghanistan, cast shadow over G20 meeting next month. Earlier, security forces claimed to have arrested Laskhar-e-Tayyaba sympathiser in Bandipore district on 5 April and two Laskhar-e-Tayyaba militants in Baramulla district on 11 April.

Constitutional crisis over Punjab election dispute fuelled tensions between govt and Supreme Court, while security forces ramped up operations against militants in north west.

Tensions mounted between govt and Supreme Court over Punjab polls. Supreme Court 4 April fixed Punjab provincial polls for 14 May, ruling that Election Commission’s decision last month to delay vote until 8 Oct was “unconstitutional”; former PM Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party welcomed ruling, while PM Sharif called it “mockery” of constitution and rejected order to prepare for polls. National Assembly during month repeatedly rejected govt bill to allocate election funds. Compounding dispute, President Alvi (PTI member) 9 April rejected govt bill to limit Supreme Court chief justice’s powers; parliament next day, however, adopted bill but before it was enacted into law on 21 April, Supreme Court headed by chief justice 13 April halted bill – marking first time in Pakistan’s legislative history that court blocked law yet to be enacted. Parliament 14 April passed another bill granting right of appeal in specific cases. Further deepening controversy, defence ministry 18 April urged court to permit nationwide elections on 8 Oct; Supreme Court next day dismissed request and warned govt of “serious consequences” if funds and security were not provided. Court 20 April asked major parties to reach consensus within week on date for nationwide elections but backed down on deadline 27 April after National Assembly speaker 26 April denounced judicial interference. PM Sharif 27 April won vote of confidence, strengthening govt’s position as negotiations same day began with PTI on election date.

Govt ramped up military operations against militants in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. National Security Council 7 April reportedly agreed to launch “all-out comprehensive operation” against “terrorism”. Notably, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, two military operations 5 and 15 April killed 18 militants in South Waziristan, leaving three soldiers dead. Gun battle with militants 9 April killed soldier in North Waziristan. Militants 23 April killed senior ex-army officer in Lakki Marwat district.

Relations remained strained with Kabul. Defence minister 12 April criticised Kabul’s failure in “stopping the use of their territory in attacks on Pakistan”, warning of resorting to “some measures wherever [terrorists] are”.

Govt engaged international lenders on economic recovery amid strikes against austerity, while govt’s new “anti-terrorism” powers provoked widespread opposition.

Govt discussed plans for economic recovery with international stakeholders. International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank 10-16 April held annual meetings in Washington, U.S., where govt and Central Bank officials met wide range of international lenders and development agencies. Finance ministers of Japan, India and France 13 April announced formation of committee of bilateral creditor govts to pursue debt restructuring negotiations with Sri Lanka; Japan said negotiation platform was open to all creditors and expressed hope China – Sri Lanka’s largest bilateral creditor – would join amid concern over its absence. Private bondholders met officials on reworking over $12bn in outstanding bonds.

Parliament approved IMF recovery plans amid strike action. Parliament 26-28 April debated and approved non-binding resolution to support implementation of IMF’s Extended Fund Facility; largest opposition party abstained. In response to possible strike action by teachers, President Wickremesinghe 19 April threatened to use emergency powers to declare education essential service, where strikes are banned, and initiate legal action against teachers; Wickremesinghe 17 April declared power, fuel, postal and health as essential public services.

Govt paused controversial Anti-Terrorism Act, following strong domestic and international reaction. Govt postponed bill’s introduction and promised consultation on legislation that would establish exceptionally broad definition of terrorism and grant executive and security agencies unprecedented powers of arrest and proscription; bill has been denounced as attack on democratic rights by international and national human rights groups and faced reported diplomatic backlash from Western govts. Tamil political parties 25 April organised one-day general strike in Tamil areas to protest bill as well as “Sinhalisation” of Muslim and Tamil-majority areas in north and east, amid increasing allegations of govt-supported land grabs.

In other important developments. U.S. State Dept 26 April sanctioned former navy commander W. Karannagoda for his alleged role in abduction and murder of 11 Tamil and Muslim men in final years of civil war. Country 21 April commemorated fourth anniversary of Easter Sunday suicide bombings amid widespread protests and senior Catholic officials criticising perceived lack of justice and proper investigation.

Separatist fighters in Papua region killed four Indonesian soldiers amid operation to liberate kidnapped New Zealand pilot.

Separatists launched deadly ambush on soldiers in Papua. Members of West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB) – military wing of Free Papua Organisation – 16 April claimed ambush killed nine soldiers in remote, mountainous regency of Nduga, Papua province, where group in Feb kidnapped New Zealand pilot Philip Mehrtens. Indonesian armed forces 20 April confirmed that separatist attack on 36 military personnel searching for Mehrtens had killed four soldiers and wounded five, with one unaccounted for. Amnesty International 18 April expressed concern that military had raised operational status in Nduga to “combat alert”, citing heightened safety risks for civilians and pilot; Amnesty noted that “the potential for human rights violations with fatalities is also getting bigger”. In video released by TPNPB in late April, Mehrtens confirmed “I’m still alive – I am healthy”; TPNPB urged New Zealand to mediate and demanded security forces cease operations in region.

Security forces killed suspected jihadists in shootout in Sumatra. Counter-terrorism police 12 April killed two suspected militants of outlawed al-Qaeda-linked group Jemaah Islamiyah in gunfire exchange in Lampung province in southern Sumatra Island, part of broader crackdown on group amid reports that it is training and recruiting new members.

Regime launched deadly airstrikes as ethnic armed groups and resistance forces staged ambushes in north and southeast; authorities agreed to possible small-scale Rohingya repatriation and sentenced activists.

In north, regime airstrikes killed scores amid resistance ambushes. Continuing series of deadly airstrikes in late March, military 10 April bombed school in Chin National Defence Force (CNDF)-controlled Falam township, killing at least 11. Military next day conducted devastating air attacks during resistance ceremony in Kanbalu township, Sagaing region, killing at least 170, mostly civilians; UN human rights chief Volker Türk reiterated regime violations “may constitute crimes against humanity and war crimes”. Meanwhile, armed groups in Chin state stepped up lethal ambushes on military convoys: notably, Chin National Front 2 April attacked convoy between Falam and Hakha townships, inflicting casualties.

In southeast, heavy fighting resurged along Asian Highway, displacing thousands. People’s Defence Forces (PDF) and allied groups, including Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), late March began ambushes on regime outposts and along highway connecting to Thailand, claiming to have killed dozens of regime forces. Notably, KNLA-PDF “Cobra Column” 3-4 April inflicted heavy casualties in ambush on military truck and police station in Myawaddy. Fighting spread northward, as KNLA and resistance 5 April destroyed two Kayin State Border Guard outposts near Shwe Kokko town; clashes over subsequent week inflicted heavy casualties and forced 4,000 people to flee into Thailand.

Regime agreed to possible small-scale Rohingya repatriation, courts sentenced activists. Following months of negotiations, State Administration Council 3 April declared Myanmar would accept 1,100 Rohingya Muslim refugees and 30o Hindu refugees from Bangladesh; regime confirmed only 56,000 out of 87,000 refugees on list sent by Bangladesh (see Bangladesh). Meanwhile, court 6 April sentenced activist Wai Moe Naing to 34 years imprisonment and next day sentenced Kachin National Consultative Assembly leader Reverend Hkalam Samson to six years in prison.

Regime cemented ties to China and Russia. Senior Chinese official Wang Ning 2 April oversaw signing of agriculture, health and energy agreements with regime in capital Naypyitaw. Regime leader Min Aung Hlaing 3 April conferred honorary Thiri Pyanchi title on Russia’s deputy defence minister.

Sporadic violence and militant surrenders continued in south, while fighting persisted between Communist militants and military.

Insecurity persisted in Bangsomoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) and adjacent areas. Police 12 April conducted law enforcement operation in Tulunan town, Cotabato province, killing five private militia members. In Sultan Kudarat province, IED 17 April wounded seven passengers in Isulan municipality bus terminal; armed forces same day said blast site evidence showed explosives were consistent with those used by Mindanao-based and Islamic State-inspired group Dawlah Islamiyah. Security forces 19 April killed one Dawlah Islamiyah member in Pagayawan town, Lanao del Sur province. Unidentified gunman 17 April killed Datu Salibo town councillor Demson Silongan. Two Moro Islamic Liberation Front commanders from 118 Base Command 19 April clashed in Dabenayan village, killing two civilians. Unidentified assailants same day killed Maguindanao Electric Cooperative manager in Datu Odin Sinsuat town, Maguindanao del Norte. Militant surrenders continued; notably, two Abu Sayyaf Group members 12 April surrendered to military in Zamboanga City.

Clashes continued between Communist rebels and military. Military operations and some militant ambushes by communist New People’s Army (NPA) in Mindanao Island in south, Visayas Islands in centre and Luzon Island in north killed at least 21 combatants and civilians; military in April claimed it had dismantled two of four remaining Communist fronts in Samar Island, rebels’ last bastion. Communist Party of the Philippines 20 April confirmed deaths of party leaders Benito Tiamzon and Wilma Austria-Tiamzon in Aug 2022 in Samar Island, Visayas; party disputed military report that both were killed in boat explosion during encounter with military forces, alleging couple was tortured, killed, and dumped on boat that later detonated.

Militants in deep south stepped up attacks, casting shadow over dialogue process; meanwhile, country geared up for May general election that could oust establishment parties.

Security deteriorated in deep south amid surge in militant attacks. Militants escalated violence, including with platoon-strength assaults on defence outposts rarely attempted in recent years. In Yala province, some 20 insurgents 9 April attacked security outpost in Muang district with pipe bombs, grenades and small arms. In Narathiwat province, motorcycle gunmen 9 April killed Muslim defence volunteer in Tak Bai district; militants 13 April attacked security outpost in Sungai Padi district with pipe bombs and assault rifles, wounding three police officers. In Pattani province, IED attack 19 April wounded eight police officers in two-vehicle patrol in Saiburi district. Militants 14 April conducted near-simultaneous attacks in six locations across Pattani, Narathiwat and Yala, including: IED explosion on bridge in Muang; assault on security outpost in Reusoh district, Narathiwat; drive-by shooting on security outpost at Wat Chang railway station in Khok Pho district, Pattani; pipe bomb strike on ranger outpost in Raman district, Yala; and small arms assault on police at Cho Airong railway station, Narathiwat. Escalation comes after main separatist group Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) had advised Malaysian facilitator, following sixth round of Peace Dialogue Process in Feb, that it was suspending participation in dialogue until new Thai govt enters office after May general election.

Preparation for May elections continued. Ahead of 14 May general election, main opposition party Pheu Thai and progressive Future Forward Party led public opinion polls, dampening prospects for establishment parties led by incumbent leaders PM Prayuth Chan-ocha and Deputy PM Prawit Wongsuwan; convincing victory for opposition parties will complicate efforts by establishment parties to form new govt to preserve political status quo.

China continued maritime presence in Japan’s territorial waters as sides held talks in Tokyo, where both aired grievances and pledged to establish hotline.

Chinese maritime presence continued, Japan protested China’s satellite launch. As of 27 April, Japan detected 103 Chinese vessels inside Japan’s contiguous zone during month, while 11 vessels were detected within Japan’s territorial sea. Japan 19 April protested China’s “extremely regrettable” actions to launch weather satellite despite risk of falling debris in East China Sea and for announcing no-fly zones in area.

Tokyo and Beijing held maritime talks. Japan and China 10 April held first in-person maritime talks in Japanese capital Tokyo since 2019. Japan underlined importance of peace in Taiwan Strait, urged Beijing to stop its coastguard ships entering Japanese waters, expressed concerns about Beijing’s military activity near Japan and its coordination with Russia, and protested against China’s construction of two new structures in East China Sea discovered last year. For their part, Chinese officials criticised Japan’s recent “negative moves” regarding East and South China Seas, disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and Taiwan Strait and demanded Tokyo stop “all words and deeds” that violate China’s territorial sovereignty, undermine its maritime rights and interests, and meddle in Taiwan issue. In positive step, China and Japan made progress on setting up hotline to resolve maritime disputes; China pledged to speed up its use while Japanese media reports suggested hotline could begin operating as early as spring this year.

In other important developments. In joint statement, G7 18 April expressed concerns over situation of East and South China seas, and urged China to abstain from threats, coercion, intimidation, or use of force; China reacted harshly, accusing G7 of interfering in its internal affairs and issued demarche to Japan, which hosted G7 summit.

Tensions with China remained elevated over border dispute, while Maoists conducted deadly attack in centre.

Border dispute with China remained prominent as Beijing named disputed areas. China’s civil affairs ministry 2 April issued list of “standardised” names for 11 locations in areas claimed and administered by India as part of Arunachal Pradesh state (north east), marking Beijing’s third attempt since 2017 to rename places under Indian administration and control; govt 4 April rejected move “outright”. Home Minister Amit Shah 10 April visited Arunachal Pradesh to launch $585mn development scheme to bolster security of disputed border, in response to Chinese initiatives to develop villages along Line of Actual Control (LAC). After meeting Indian counterpart in New Delhi, Chinese defence minister 27 April remarked border was “stable overall”, while Indian statement said Beijing had eroded “entire basis” of relations.

Maoist violence continued in centre. In Chhattisgarh state (centre), Maoists 18 April attacked Legislative Assembly member in Bijapur district, who escaped unhurt; earlier same day, security forces killed Maoist and captured two during operation in Bijapur forests. Maoist IED 26 April killed ten security forces personnel and one civilian in Chhattisgarh’s Dantewada district. In Jharkhand state (east), Maoists declared 14-15 April shutdown after security forces killed five Maoists in Chatra district 3 April. Police 18 April arrested member of pro-Maoist organisation People’s Liberation Front of India from Jharkhand.

In other important developments. At 17 April India-Russia business dialogue in capital New Delhi and amid bilateral free trade agreement talks, FM S. Jaishankar said relations with Russia remained steady and suggested ties could expand further, reiterating that “we share a commitment to a multi-polar world” and “multi-polar Asia”.

U.S. and Philippines expanded defence cooperation and conducted largest-ever joint military drills, while tensions continued between Manila and Beijing.

U.S. and Philippines deepened defence ties amid large-scale exercises. Philippines 3 April announced location of four additional sites accessible to U.S. forces under Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement; three sites are situated in north, facing Taiwan. Announcement prompted local concern, as Cagayan provincial governor said U.S. presence could make areas a “magnet for an attack in case a war erupts”. U.S. and Philippines 11-28 April held 38th annual Balikatan exercises in largest-ever iteration and 11 April agreed to complete roadmap on delivery of U.S. defence assistance over next 5-10 years, and to finalise plans for combined maritime activities, including joint sails in SCS; pair also expressed concern over China’s land reclamation activities in Spratly Islands. USS Milius 10 April entered within 12 nautical miles of China-controlled Mischief Reef in Spratly Islands; U.S. Nimitz Carrier Strike Group 17 April operated in SCS en route to Thailand. Earlier, Japan 5 April revealed new guidelines to strengthen militaries of “like-minded countries”, with Philippines set to be among first beneficiaries, amid reports of possible U.S.-Japan-Philippines security framework.

Tensions persisted between Manila and Beijing amid regional diplomacy. China’s ambassador to Philippines 14 April said Philippines should oppose “Taiwan independence” rather than expanding U.S. access; Marcos 22 April met Chinese FM Qin Gang and pledged to “establish more lines of communication”. Philippine Coast Guard late month claimed more than 100 Chinese vessels were spotted nearby 18-24 April, and 28 April reported near collision between its patrol vessels and Chinese navy ship. Following his first official trip to China, Malaysian PM Anwar Ibrahim 3 April said Beijing expressed concern over Malaysian energy activities in SCS and next day stated Malaysia is prepared to negotiate with Beijing over dispute, prompting domestic political backlash. Malaysian foreign ministry 8 April clarified govt’s commitment to its own “sovereign rights and interests” in SCS. U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken 15 April met Vietnamese leader Nguyen Phu Trong in Vietnamese capital Hanoi in visit aimed at bolstering ties.

Authorities brought more charges against activists detained over border deal opposition; Russia planned to increase combat readiness of military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

Authorities charged imprisoned activists for attempting to seize power. Court in Bishkek 12 April ruled that five activists, detained Oct 2022 for protesting border deal that hands ownership of Kempir-Abad reservoir to Uzbekistan, should be placed under house arrest. Lawyers of activists 26 April said activists faced new charges, namely attempts to seize power.

Russia announced plans to boost combat readiness of military base in Kyrgyzstan. Speaking at Shanghai Cooperation Organisation meeting in India, Russian defence minister Sergei Shoigu 28 April announced plans to increase combat readiness of its military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, saying U.S. efforts to strengthen its presence there triggered move.

Security forces killed two militants near Afghan border, govt deepened ties with Azerbaijan, and Russia planned to boost combat readiness of military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

Militants killed near Afghan border. State Committee for National Security 26 April reported that security forces had killed two suspected militants belonging to “international terrorist organisation” in Vanj district near border with Afghanistan.

Azerbaijani and Tajik leaders sought closer ties. Azerbaijani President Aliyev 5 April arrived in capital Dushanbe for two-day state visit, meeting with President Rahmon. Sides struck number of agreements aimed at strengthening bilateral relations through deeper economic cooperation.

Russia announced plans to boost combat readiness of military base in Tajikistan. Speaking at Shanghai Cooperation Organisation meeting in India, Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu 28 April announced plans to increase combat readiness of its military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, saying U.S. efforts to strengthen its presence there triggered move.

Uzbeks voted on proposed constitutional amendments.

After lawmakers mid-March backed referendum on constitutional amendments proposed by President Mirziyoev, which among other things would allow him to seek third term in office and extend presidential term from five to seven years, Uzbeks 30 April began voting, amid expectations referendum will endorse proposals.

Republic of Cyprus pursued initiative to expand EU involvement to reignite talks, while Turkish Cypriots expressed strong opposition; sides continued dialogue under UN auspices.

Republic of Cyprus President Christodoulides advanced proposal for active EU role. After Christodoulides visited Belgian capital Brussels in March to propose greater EU involvement in Cyprus issue, Greek Cypriot FM Kombos 2 April explained country is expecting Turkish Cypriots to make next move. Christodoulides 22 April said “everything depends on how Turkey will act” following elections in May (see Türkiye), adding that Ankara’s post-earthquake steps toward rapprochement with West and regional countries, if continued, would pave way for diplomacy over Cyprus. Meanwhile, Christodoulides 5 April visited Egypt to hold talks with President Sisi on Cyprus issue, bilateral ties and energy, signalling country’s desire to enhance regional engagement.

Turkish Cypriots voiced opposition to Christodoulides’ initiative. After foreign ministry of “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”) in March voiced opposition to EU involvement given bloc’s “partial attitude”, de facto FM Tahsin Ertuğruloğlu 5 April said “TRNC” would review diplomatic status of EU’s office in north as well as relations with bloc given EU has not recognised “TRNC”. After Republic of Cyprus and U.S. late March signed partnership deal for cooperation on maritime security and other issues, “TRNC” 1 April condemned deal, saying it served to strengthen armament of Republic of Cyprus. “TRNC” 8 April condemned U.S. for anchoring attack submarine in Republic of Cyprus; Türkiye next day reiterated calls for U.S. to reconsider policies that disrupt balance on island. “TRNC” 27 April condemned Greek Cypriot navigation advisory for drilling preparations in contested economic zone in eastern Mediterranean. Meanwhile, “TRNC” 1 April deepened cooperation with Türkiye by signing $500mn Financial and Economic Protocol, which includes financial aid as well as funds for new schools, health facilities and national disaster centre.

Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots continued UN-facilitated dialogue. Under auspices of UN peacekeeping force, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot negotiators 11 April met as part of regular dialogue related to bicommunal Technical Committees and issues of shared concern; negotiators 27 April discussed future settlement prospects and Technical Committees.

Military targeted Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and affiliates, country prepared for May elections, and positive atmosphere persisted with Greece amid Ankara’s regional normalisation drive.

Military continued operations against PKK and affiliates. After PKK late March renewed commitment to unilateral ceasefire until 14 May elections, military conducted operations in Van, Iğdır, Şırnak and Diyarbakır provinces as well as northern Syria and Iraq. Notably, police 25 April detained 110 individuals in 21 provinces, including politicians, journalists and artists, allegedly affiliated with PKK. In northern Iraq, Suleimaniya officials 7 April claimed Türkiye carried out drone strike near airport, allegedly targeting Syrian Democratic Forces commander Mazloum Abdi’s convoy (see Iraq). In northern Syria, Turkish defence minister 17 April announced army killed ten People’s Defence Units (YPG)/PKK militants in Aleppo after alleged YPG/PKK attack previous day injured four Turkish soldiers (see Syria).

Authorities prepared for May elections, continued crackdown on Islamic State (ISIS). Amid heightened political tensions ahead of parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled for 14 May, unknown perpetrators 31 March and 6 April fired shots at opposition party offices in Istanbul and 21 April at ruling AKP office in Adana city. Meanwhile, security forces detained at least 141 individuals with alleged ISIS links.

Atmosphere of good-will persisted with Greece. Greek and Turkish defence ministers 4 April met in Hatay province to discuss earthquake response, aid and future relations. Greece 8 April announced gradual closure of Camp Lavrion – refugee camp that Ankara had described as “PKK training camp”. Greek FM Nicos Dendias 17 April said sides should discuss “sharing potentially profitable energy projects instead of fighting over them.”

Govt continued regional normalisation efforts. Deputy FMs of Russia, Türkiye, Syria and Iran 3-4 April met in Russian capital Moscow to advance Turkish-Syrian rapprochement; defence ministers and intelligence chiefs of four countries 25 April resumed talks in Moscow on security in Syria, Ankara-Damascus normalisation and Syrian refugees in Türkiye. FM Çavuşoğlu 25 April said Turkish forces will not withdraw from Syria unless terrorist threats are eliminated. Egyptian and Turkish FMs 13 April agreed to reopen embassies and organise presidential summit.

Tensions with Azerbaijan continued to escalate as fresh fighting along border left seven dead; international efforts to restart stalled peace talks persisted.

Border skirmish killed seven, Azerbaijani soldiers detained after entering Armenia. Baku and Yerevan 11 April reported that renewed fighting on Armenian side of border close to Lachin road killed four Armenian and three Azerbaijani soldiers, with sides exchanging blame for incident; EU 12 April deplored “armed clashes”. Azerbaijani foreign ministry 13 April said Armenia had captured two Azerbaijani soldiers who entered Armenian territory and claimed video circulating on social media showed one soldier (who allegedly praised Azerbaijani troops for beheading Armenians and was later charged with killing Armenian citizen) was subjected to “torture and inhumane treatment” by civilians. EU 13 April, U.S. and UK embassies 14 April criticised “unacceptable” treatment; ombudsman 17 April denied mistreatment. Prosecutor’s office 11, 14 April charged soldiers with border trespassing and weapons smuggling, 17 April charged one with killing Armenian citizen. Meanwhile, tensions spiked over Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) after Azerbaijan installed checkpoint along Lachin Corridor (see Nagorno-Karabakh).

Foreign actors, notably U.S., worked hard to restart direct peace talks. U.S. officials 17 April travelled to Azerbaijani capital Baku, 18 April met Armenian officials in capital Yerevan as U.S. ramped up efforts to prompt resumption of negotiations; FMs late April arrived in U.S. for talks beginning 1 May. Meanwhile, PM Pashinyan 18 April restated Yerevan’s recognition of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and readiness to sign peace treaty, while emphasizing that both sides need to recognise other’s territorial integrity “without ambiguities” for durable peace; Azerbaijani President Aliyev same day reiterated demand that Armenia recognises that “Karabakh is Azerbaijan”, and said Armenians in NK should accept “Azerbaijani citizenship or find another place to live”.

Tensions with Armenia continued to escalate as fresh fighting along border left seven dead, international efforts to restart stalled peace talks persisted, and relations with Iran remained strained.

Border skirmish killed seven, Azerbaijani soldiers detained after entering Armenia. Baku and Yerevan 11 April reported that renewed fighting on Armenian side of border close to Lachin road killed four Armenian and three Azerbaijani soldiers, with sides exchanging blame for incident; EU 12 April deplored “armed clashes”. Foreign ministry 13 April said Armenia had captured two Azerbaijani soldiers who entered Armenian territory and claimed video circulating on social media showed one soldier (who allegedly praised Azerbaijani troops for beheading Armenians and was later charged with killing Armenian citizen) was subjected to “torture and inhumane treatment” by Armenian civilians. EU 13 April, U.S. and UK embassies 14 April criticised “unacceptable” treatment; Armenian ombudsman 17 April denied mistreatment. Armenian prosecutor’s office 11, 14 April charged soldiers with border trespassing and weapons smuggling, 17 April charged one with killing Armenian citizen. Meanwhile, tensions spiked over Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) after Azerbaijan installed checkpoint along Lachin Corridor (see Nagorno-Karabakh).

Foreign actors, notably U.S., worked hard to restart direct peace talks. U.S. officials 17 April travelled to capital Baku, 18 April met Armenian officials in their capital Yerevan as U.S. ramped up efforts to prompt resumption of negotiations; FMs late April arrived in U.S. for talks beginning 1 May. Meanwhile, Armenian PM Pashinyan 18 April restated Yerevan’s recognition of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and readiness to sign peace treaty, while emphasizing that both sides need to recognise other’s territorial integrity “without ambiguities” for durable peace; President Aliyev same day reiterated demand that Armenia recognises that “Karabakh is Azerbaijan”, and said Armenians in NK should accept “Azerbaijani citizenship or find another place to live”.

Tensions with Iran ran high. After Baku late March opened embassy in Israel’s capital Tel Aviv, Iranian Parliament 5 April issued statement criticising move. Authorities 6 April arrested six individuals suspected of working for “Iran’s secret service” to “overthrow” state, same day expelled four Iranian diplomats. Azerbaijani and Iranian FMs 7-8 April discussed disagreements and need to resolve them through dialogue, though situation remained tense.

Geneva International Discussions (GID) took place after months-long pause with no sign of diplomatic breakthrough; U.S. sanctioned judges for corruption.

“Tough” conversations occurred during 57th round of Geneva Discussions. After several postponements, Geneva 4-5 April hosted 57th round of GIDs – multilateral forum to address security and humanitarian consequences of 2008 Russo-Georgian War. Co-chairs 5 April reported that participants were unable to reach “common understanding” during talks and that Russian, de facto Abkhaz and de facto South Ossetian participants walked out when Tbilisi raised issue of return of internally displaced people and refugees; Tbilisi refused to compromise on proposals from Moscow and breakaways regarding agreement on non-use of force. EU Special Representative for South Caucasus Toivo Klaar 5 April and Georgia’s deputy foreign minister 6 April admitted dialogue was “tough”. Still, participants reiterated commitment to process; next round planned for “mid-July”. Despite troubled Geneva talks, meeting of Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (structure aimed at defusing tensions in South Ossetian conflict zone) 27 April took place; participants notably praised de facto authorities for opening two crossing points along South Ossetian administrative boundary line for Orthodox Easter festivities.

Govt condemned U.S. for sanctioning judges. U.S. 5 April sanctioned four Georgian judges for “significant corruption” that undermined “faith” in judicial system. Chairman of ruling party Georgian Dream Irakli Kobakhidze same day criticised move and accused U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken of seeking to “stigmatise” judiciary; PM Gharibashvili 10 April expressed his “full support” for judiciary. Opposition 6 April called for investigation into “clan rule” within judiciary, ruling coalition 19 April prevented initiative.

Authorities barred Russian delegation from entering Moldova, and EU launched civilian mission to help Chișinău counter foreign interference.

Amid mounting concern about Russian destabilisation efforts in Moldova, Russian delegation led by Tatarstan region’s governor Rustam Minnikhanov 17 April arrived in capital Chișinău to attend forum in autonomous Gagauzia region ahead of local polls on 30 April. Authorities, however, prevented him from disembarking aircraft, accusing delegation of seeking to bolster support for pro-Russian candidate. Minnikhanov same day claimed authorities had designated him persona non grata; border police rejected claim while urging Russian officials to “refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of our country”. Russian foreign ministry that evening condemned move. Two days later, foreign ministry 19 April summoned Russian Ambassador Oleg Vasnetsov, informing him of decision to expel Russian Embassy employee for “inappropriate behaviour” at airport after authorities barred Minnikhanov’s entry; Vasnetsov same day condemned “unfriendly moves against our country”. PM Recean 27 April compiled “blacklist” of Russians banned from entering Moldova, including Russian President Putin. Meanwhile, EU 24 April approved launch of new civilian mission to help Moldova “protect its security, territorial integrity and sovereignty” amid “continued Russian attempts to destabilise” country.

Belgrade and Pristina established Monitoring Committee as normalisation efforts proceeded, local elections in north saw meagre turnout, and trial against former president kicked off in The Hague.

EU-mediated dialogue on normalising relations with Serbia advanced. Kosovo and Serbia 18 April created Joint Monitoring Committee to oversee “implementation” of March agreement on normalising relations and its Implementation Annex. Meanwhile, Council of Europe Ministers’ Committee 24 April forwarded Kosovo’s application for Council membership to Parliamentary Assembly, which Kosovo leaders hailed as “historic step”.

Kosovo Serbs boycotted municipal elections. Largest Kosovo Serb party Serbian List 21 April urged Serb community to boycott “undemocratic” elections, held 23 April in four Serb-dominated northern municipalities. Under 4% of eligible citizens voted, leading to victories for ruling Vetëvendosje party and opposition Democratic Party of Kosovo. VP of Serbian List, Milan Radoičić, same day warned that Serbs “would never allow” officials elected with such low turnout to govern in northern municipalities. EU 24 April said low turnout “shows that this process is not and cannot be considered business as usual”.

Trial against former President Hashim Thaçi and three others began. Kosovo Specialist Court in The Hague, which has jurisdiction over crimes committed in Kosovo 1998-2000, 3 April commenced trial of Thaçi and three other former Kosovo Liberation Army leaders for alleged crimes against humanity and war crimes; all have pleaded “not guilty”. Thousands 2 April protested in capital Pristina in support of Thaçi.

As expectations for long-awaited Ukrainian counteroffensive grew, fresh Russian shelling killed and injured dozens; Moscow may deploy long-range weapons in the coming weeks, causing more civilian suffering.

Russia shelled Ukrainian cities, further high-casuality attacks possible. Russian army and air force ramped up efforts to capture Bakhmut city alongside paramilitary Wagner Group fighters, gaining ground from Ukrainian forces. Wagner’s head Yevgeny Prigozhin 29 April threatened to withdraw his troops from city unless Moscow sends more ammunition. Meanwhile, expectations for Ukrainian counteroffensive grew, though leaked classified U.S. documents revealed scepticism among U.S. officials about offensive’s chances of success. Reports 22 April emerged that Ukraine was establishing forward positions on Russian-held left bank of Dnipro River near Kherson (south).Fresh Russian shelling across Ukrainian cities late April killed and injured dozens. Russia may use more long-range weapons in coming weeks to undermine Ukrainian morale.

President Zelenskyy requested air defence assistance. Ahead of 21 April Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting at Germany’s Ramstein Air Base, President Zelenskyy called for air defence assistance amid fears depleted air defence munitions could facilitate Russian sorties into Ukrainian-held territory and intensified use of bombers over Ukrainian cities; meeting yielded no major announcements. Netherlands and Denmark 20 April announced they would send 14 Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine.

More evidence of Wagner atrocities in Ukraine emerged. Russian human rights group Gulagu 12 April interviewed escaped Wagner mercenary Andrei Medvedev, who attributed brutal video purportedly showing beheading of Ukrainian prisoner of war to Wagner. Two former Russian convicts who fought with Wagner 17 April admitted to killing civilians near Bakhmut; Wagner’s head Evgeniy Prigozhin denied claims.

In other important developments. During China visit, Brazilian President Lula 14 April proposed peace model in which Russia returns all Ukrainian territory aside from Crimea, a non-starter for Kyiv; Lula criticised Russia’s violation of Ukrainian sovereignty, though his remarks suggesting both countries bore responsibility for conflict drew criticism from West. Chinese President Xi 26 April spoke to Zelenskyy for first time since invasion. Meanwhile, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria 15-17 April introduced grain bans from Ukraine, saying cheaper Ukrainian agricultural imports had lowered prices for local farmers.

Azerbaijan installed checkpoint along Lachin corridor, prompting condemnation from Yerevan Moscow and others for breaching 2020 ceasefire deal; tensions could escalate further over uncertainty wrought by checkpoint despite talks in U.S.

Azerbaijan set up checkpoint on Lachin corridor, violating 2020 ceasefire deal. In move fuelling already heightened tensions, Azerbaijan 23 April announced it had installed “border checkpoint” along Lachin corridor connecting Armenian-populated Nagorno-Karabkah (NK) with Armenia. Reiterating past allegations (to which Armenian and de facto authorities have proposed independent monitoring), Baku said checkpoint aims to stop “rotation of personnel of Armenian armed forces that continue to be illegally stationed in the territory of Azerbaijan, the transfer of weapons and ammunition, entrance of terrorists, as well as illicit trafficking of natural resources”. Checkpoint violates 2020 ceasefire agreement, which delegated responsibility for Lachin road to Russian peacekeepers. Azerbaijani-backed protesters, who had blocked road since Dec 2022, 28 April ended rally and Azerbaijani forces reportedly began asserting control over that section of road while allegedly continuing to hamper humanitarian deliveries into NK.

Ceasefire deal signatories and international actors condemned Baku’s actions. Armenia 23 April condemned move and urged Russia – third signatory to 2020 ceasefire deal alongside Armenia and Azerbaijan – to ensure “withdrawal of Azerbaijani forces” from corridor’s “entire security zone”; Azerbaijan same day rejected demand as interference in its “internal affairs”. Russia 24 April condemned move and expressed “extreme concern” about increase in ceasefire violations. Other international actors, including U.S., France and EU, also condemned Baku, saying move could undermine peace efforts.

Armenian and Azerbaijani FMs arrived in U.S. for talks. Armenian and Azerbaijani FM’s late April arrived in U.S. capital Washington for talks beginning 1 May; tensions could escalate should dialogue fail to yield tangible results. Meanwhile, amid disagreement over place and format of direct negotiations between Stepanakert and Baku, de facto authorities 11 April proposed Russian-mediated talks take place at headquarters of Russian peacekeepers in NK; Azerbaijan had not responded by end of April.

Crackdown on opposition continued, and army conducted military exercises.

Exiled opposition leader called for access to political prisoners amid crackdown. Court in capital Minsk 7 April sentenced opposition politician and 2020 presidential candidate Valer Tsapkala to 17 years in prison in absentia. Another presidential candidate, Viktar Babaryka, sentenced to 14 years’ imprisonment in 2021, was reportedly hospitalised late April; EU 27 April expressed concern, pointing to “traces of beatings”, while exiled opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanousvkaya demanded diplomats be given access to political prisoners “to assess the conditions in which they are kept”.

Belarus held military exercises and asked Russia for security guarantees. Defence ministry 5 April announced three-day “tactical exercise” at Polish and Ukrainian borders, 19-22 April conducted further exercises to strengthen air defence, 22 April announced forces had completed training on Russian tactical nuclear missile systems. President Lukashenko 10 April asked Russia for security guarantees amid heightened tensions with West. Meanwhile, Canada 11 April expanded sanctions to include National Bank and eight other banks in Belarus due to its support for “Russia’s illegal invasion” of Ukraine.

Govt sought to clamp down on draft-dodgers with new conscription law, repression of dissent continued, and Ukraine launched more drone strikes in Russian borderlands.

Govt tightened conscription legislation. President Putin 14 April signed new legislation providing for digital register of all Russian citizens eligible for military service, which could help authorities expedite mobilisation activities and prevent conscripts from fleeing abroad. Specifically, law allows authorities, previously required to deliver in-person notices to those eligible for military service, to issue electronic draft orders; it also bans citizens from leaving country when they receive such order. Those who fail to appear at registration office within 20 days without valid reason could face new restrictions related to banking, selling property, driving and registering vehicles. Meanwhile, defence ministry 1 April launched regular spring conscription; 30 April announced it had replaced deputy defence minister Mikhail Mizintsev with Alexei Kuzmenkov.

Crackdown on opposition continued. In harshest judgement for opposition activist since Putin came to power, Moscow court 17 April handed politician Vladimir Kara-Murza 25-year prison sentence for spreading disinformation about army and treason; State Duma next day approved amendments allowing life sentences for treason. Imprisoned opposition leader Alexey Navalny 26 April said military tribunal opened “terrorism” case against him, which could see him imprisoned for up to 30 years. Authorities throughout month declared several foreign NGOs “undesirable organisations” and “foreign agents”.

Pro-war blogger assassinated, Ukraine launched more attacks into Russia. In Saint Petersburg city, explosion in cafe owned by paramilitary Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin 2 April killed war correspondent known as Vladlen Tatarsky; authorities next day arrested Russian citizen and accused Ukrainian special services of planning “terrorist attack”. Meanwhile, Ukrainian drones 4, 18 April hit military offices in Bryansk region; 17 April struck two power stations in Belgorod region. In Moscow region, authorities 24 April found drone containing explosives.

Defence minister announced plans to boost combat readiness of Central Asian bases. Speaking at Shanghai Cooperation Organisation meeting, Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu 28 April announced plans to increase combat readiness of its military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, saying U.S. efforts to strengthen its presence there triggered move.

Supreme Court ruled National Guard’s militarisation unconstitutional, criminal violence persisted, and Lopez Obrador protested U.S. “interference” in efforts to tackle fentanyl trafficking.

Mexico’s top court ruled law shifting National Guard to army unconstitutional. Supreme Court 18 April declared President López Obrador’s 2022 transfer of National Guard to Ministry of Defence unconstitutional, saying 2019 constitutional reform defined National Guard as “civilian police body”; in plenary session two days later, Court gave govt until 1 Jan 2024 to reintegrate National Guard into Ministry of Public Security. López Obrador 19 April said ruling was politically motivated and vowed to present new constitutional reform in Sept 2024 allowing National Guard to operate under Ministry of Defence’s command. Meanwhile, López Obrador 28 April backed proposal introduced day prior by Senate leader Alejandro Armenta to scrap Institute for Access to Information and Data Protection, responsible for processing public information requests.

Criminal violence continued, individuals detained over fire at migration centre. In Zacatecas state, shootout between security forces and alleged members of local criminal group 11 April left eight criminals dead in Pánuco municipality. In central Michoacán state, shootout between army and local criminal group 24 April left one soldier and six civilians dead in Ciudad Hidalgo municipality. In central Jalisco state, authorities 30 April arrested Rodrigo Páex Quintero, nephew of Sinaloa Cartel founder Caro Quintero. Meanwhile, authorities 16 April detained head of National Migratory Institute in Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua state, in connection with fire at detention centre 27 March that killed 40 migrants; authorities 25 April charged head of immigration agency Francisco Garduño over incident.

28 Sinaloa cartel members indicted in U.S. fentanyl investigation. U.S. Justice Department 14 April announced indictments against 28 alleged members of Sinaloa Cartel’s Chapitos faction, which is accused of fentanyl production and trafficking into U.S. U.S. said its Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) had infiltrated group without Mexican authorities’ knowledge, despite 2020 law prohibiting foreign agents from operating on Mexican soil without govt’s approval; López Obrador 17 April condemned DEA’s “abusive and prepotent interference”.

Petro administration’s total peace policy saw progress and setbacks as govt and FARC dissident group geared up for negotiations in May and deadly attack on security forces complicated talks with ELN.

ELN-govt talks faced setbacks, outreach to FARC dissident group progressed. Efforts to advance peace with National Liberation Army (ELN) faced challenges following late March attack that killed nine soldiers. ELN 3 April issued pamphlet justifying attack and promising more strikes until sides agreed to ceasefire, 10 April left explosives and threatening pamphlets in five major cities, including capital Bogotá and Medellín (Antioquia department). New round of talks will begin 2 May in Cuba’s capital Havana. Govt outreach to dissident faction of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) known as FARC-EP saw progress, with ceasefire monitoring mechanism 24 April activating and talks due to start mid-May. Dissidents mid-April released pamphlet alleging govt had violated ceasefire, however, raising doubts about agreement’s durability.

Gulf Clan claimed it held discussions with authorities, criminal groups clashed in Buenaventura. After govt suspended ceasefire with criminal group Gulf Clan in March, group 13 April released communiqué claiming it held discussions with govt in presence of foreign diplomats but that it rejects draft law, presented in Feb, intended to make judicial concessions in return for collective criminal demobilisation. Meanwhile, fragile truce in port city of Buenaventura (Valle de Cauca department) – considered early success of govt’s “total peace” policy – showed signs of strain early April. Two negotiators for Los Shotas criminal group, in talks with rival Los Espartanos, disappeared; clashes resumed early April, triggering displacement. Though peace commissioner’s office 11 April said it was working to calm tensions, incident raised concerns about sustainability of ceasefires between illegal armed groups.

Govt hosted international conference on Venezuela. President Petro 25 April hosted international conference in capital Bogotá on Venezuela, aimed at reigniting talks between Venezuelan govt and opposition (see Venezuela).

Govt declared terrorism a security threat amid surge of gang violence, enabling military deployment to confront these groups without instituting state of exception.

Govt implemented new measures to tackle rising criminal gang violence. Around 30 gunmen 11 April entered port of Esmeraldas city, opening fire and killing nine fishermen; Interior Minister Juan Zapata next day said attack was likely in retaliation for fishermen paying “protection money” to rival gang. In port city of Guayaquil, Ecuador’s murder capital, armed attack 30 April killed ten people; National Police Commander William Villaroel said authorities “believe that this has to do with a struggle between organised criminal groups over the fight for territorial control”. Authorities 28 April declared terrorism a threat to Ecuador’s security, enabling military to launch special operations to confront organised crime groups without declaring state of exception.

Spate of violent incidents occurred in Guayaquil prison. In latest wave of gang violence also plaguing Ecuador’s jails, prison guards 12 April found six inmates hanged in Litoral penitentiary, located in Guayaquil. One day later, four assailants killed three prison guards during hit-and-run operation. Clashes between incarcerated gang members 14 April killed 12 and wounded three. President Lasso 25 April appointed new national security adviser and replaced secretary of public and state security.

Colombia hosted international summit to reactivate talks between govt and opposition, and Maduro floated prospect of early presidential poll without proposals to improve election conditions.

Conference on Venezuela took place in Colombia. Colombian President Petro 25 April hosted international conference on Venezuela in Colombian capital Bogotá, aimed at prompting resumption of talks between Maduro govt and opposition. Representatives from 19 countries and EU attended. Petro did not invite Venezuelan parties, though his govt 17, 22 April held meetings with President Maduro and representatives of opposition alliance Unitary Platform; both endorsed initiative. U.S. President Biden 20 April also expressed cautious support during meeting with Petro in U.S. capital Washington, while insisting that only substantial steps to restore democracy would lead to lifting of sanctions.

Participants urged sides to resume talks and improve electoral conditions. Following conference, Colombian FM 25 April said participants had agreed on need for return to Mexico City negotiating process and steps toward free elections in return for gradual lifting of U.S. sanctions. Maduro same day reiterated his support for dialogue but conditioned on release of some $3bn in Venezuelan state assets held abroad and lifting of sanctions; President of National Assembly Jorge Rodríguez same day also demanded that International Criminal Court suspend its investigation into alleged crimes against humanity in Venezuela and that U.S. release businessman and close govt ally Alex Saab.

Maduro dangled prospect of early polls amid concern about election conditions. At rally to celebrate 21st anniversary of Hugo Chávez’s return to power following coup, Maduro 13 April once again insisted that presidential election slated for 2024 could be brought forward to 2023, but has yet to announce timetable, adding to uncertainty regarding electoral process. Meanwhile, govt-controlled National Electoral Council 18 April announced it would not grant requests from opposition’s primary election Commission regarding conditions for October primary, which commission has been tasked with organising. In particular, council refused to eliminate use of fingerprinting machines, which are likely to reduce voter turnout and exacerbate divisions within opposition over Electoral Council’s involvement.

Mob killed suspected gang members amid spiralling gang violence and concomitant rise of self-defence groups, govt efforts to organise elections continued, and UN ramped up aid.

Local populations mobilised as gang violence soared. Gangs continued to target police and civilians, expanding their territory in capital Port-au-Prince and Artibonite department. Notably, in Port-au-Prince’s Pétionville commune, Kraze Baryè group 5 April set fire to police station, Ti Makak gang 9 April killed three policemen; in Croix-des-Bouquets commune, 400 Mawozo gang 16 April killed one police officer. Two journalists also killed during month. UN 24 April said insecurity had “reached levels comparable to countries in armed conflict” and reiterated calls for multinational security mission. Following UN report late March about worrying emergence of self-defence groups, Canaan gang 5 April attacked Onaville town, allegedly targeting locals who had formed surveillance brigade; residents in Port-au-Prince 24 April burned to death 13 suspected gang members in what police described as “a lynching”; scores of men 25 April reportedly patrolled capital’s Canape Vert neighbourhood, armed with machetes, saying “we are planning to fight and keep our neighbourhoods clean of [gangs]”.

Govt pushed ahead with election planning. Interim govt moved forward with steps toward organising elections, but continued to forgo talks with political parties that refuse to join coalition, as stipulated in 21 December Accord – agreement between acting PM Henry and several opposition forces. Notably, Henry 12 April asked representatives from various sectors to designate potential candidates for Electoral Council, charged with organising vote; National Association of Haitian Media 24 April declined Henry’s invitation to nominate two candidates for Electoral Council, arguing that organising elections amid so much violence is unrealistic.

In other important developments. UN 13 April presented $720mn annual aid plan for Haiti, largest since 2010 earthquake, amid dire humanitarian situation. Dominican Republic President Abidaner 16 April issued decree preventing entry of 39 Haitians linked to gangs. Meanwhile, several media outlets early April reported that leaked classified U.S. documents indicated Russian paramilitary Wagner Group late Feb planned to assess potential contract with govt to fight gangs; Washington Post 10 April reported that officials denied local authorities had met with Wagner representatives.

Repression of Catholic Church intensified around Easter celebrations, and opposition leaders called for unity to challenge regime.

Govt crackdown continued. Authorities continued to persecute Catholic Church and its practitioners. Notably, police 3 April harassed youths trying to conduct religious procession in Nindirí municipality, Masaya department. Govt 11 April confiscated monastery of Trappist nuns in San Pedro de Lóvago municipality, Chontales department. Govt next day ordered expulsion of three nuns belonging to Dominican Congregation of the Annunciation, who ran nursing home and school in Rivas department. Civil society organisation Monitoreo Azul y Blanco 10 April denounced 71 cases of religious persecution during Easter week (1-9 April). Meanwhile, govt 24 April closed three private universities, bringing number closed since Dec 2021 to 24. Human rights group Nunca Más 28 April revealed that since 2018 protests, at least 158 people detained have been subjected to torture, 113 of whom were victims of sexual violence by prison guards and police officers.

Opposition leaders acknowledged need for unity to defeat regime. Exiled opposition politicians Violeta Granera, Felix Maradiaga, Ana Margarita Vijil and Lesther Aleman 16 April participated in televised discussion of much-needed changes to opposition’s strategy. Notably, they acknowledged need for “unity in action,” vowing to set aside differences in order to counter regime more effectively.

Wave of violent incidents prompted govt assessment of prison conditions; NGO said Honduras and its neighbours faced “extreme” levels of violence.

Eruption of prison riots prompted govt to assess prison conditions. Riots 8 April broke out in four prisons, including in capital Tegucigalpa and Tamara National Penitentiary, injuring twelve inmates and killing one. Some reports suggested riots were motivated by poor conditions, including increased prison population, lack of food and limited hygiene supplies. Castro 11 April asked Undersecretary of Security Julissa Villanueva to create intervention plan for prisons, who 18 April set out ten key points intervention will address, including obtaining and digitising number of inmates, vetting prison staff, and separating sentenced inmates from pre-trial detainees. Following day, shooting at prison in Ilama municipality, Santa Barbara department wounded seven prisoners.

NGO decried region’s “war-like” levels of violence. State of exception continued after President Castro late March renewed measure for additional six months, despite uncertainty within govt about its impact. Meanwhile, head of NGO Norwegian Refugee Council 24 April said Honduras and other Central American countries are experiencing “war-like” levels of violence. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 28 April expressed concern about high levels of violence, with criminals notably targeting women and environmentalists.

Authorities renewed state of exception for 13th time as concerns about human rights violations persisted; U.S. arrested key MS-13 leader on terrorism charges.

State of exception extended amid continued concern over human rights violations. Legislative assembly 12 April once again approved state of exception’s extension, while Justice and Public Security Minister Gustavo Villatoro 17 April said authorities had arrested 67,467 people for gang affiliation since introducing measure. Complaints of human rights violations continued. Notably, NGO Amnesty International 3 April published statement accusing authorities of “systematically” committing human rights violations; five local civil society organisations 11 April submitted report to UN regarding extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions in El Salvador’s prisons. Meanwhile, trade union representatives 18 April condemned arrest of at least 16 trade unionists since Jan 2023 under state of exception framework; moves signal measure’s expanding use against political actors, which may increase as elections edge closer.

MS-13 leader arrested on terrorism charges. U.S. 18 April arrested MS-13 gang leader Jose Wilfredo Ayala-Alcantara, also known as “Indio de Hollywood”, upon his arrival in Texas state after Mexico deported him. He and 12 associates already in U.S. custody were detained on terrorism charges and now await trial; President Bukele’s administration had previously released some of these leaders from Salvadoran prisons.

Armed groups and Israel exchanged fire in most significant cross-border escalation since 2006 war; economic hardship continued and parliament postponed May municipal elections.

Cross-border hostilities flared amid Israeli raids in Jerusalem. Amid Israeli police brutality against Palestinian worshippers at Jerusalem’s Al-Aqsa Mosque (see Israel-Palestine), militants in southern Lebanon 6 April fired 34 rockets into northern Israel in largest cross-border barrage since 2006 war, causing minor injuries and property damage; Israel blamed attack on Palestinian militant group Hamas and next day responded with early morning airstrikes in southern Lebanon and Gaza against alleged Hamas infrastructure. While calm subsequently returned, hostilities highlighted that Israeli actions at Muslim holy sites could trigger direct confrontation between Israel and Hizbollah or associated armed groups, echoing earlier warnings by Hizbollah and Hamas representatives in Lebanon.

Economic crisis continued amid worsening living conditions. Following dramatic collapse of Lebanese lira in late March, Central Bank intervention stabilised currency around 100,000 to $1 in April; another sharp devaluation remains likely given low foreign currency reserves. Ministry of Finance 4 April confirmed that govt had spent almost two thirds of $1.13bn worth of Special Drawing Rights from International Monetary Fund – one of its few remaining foreign currency sources. Living conditions continued to erode amid high fuel prices, shortages of essential imported products and public unrest. Notably, state electricity provider 3 April reported collapse of three electricity transmission towers in northern Bekaa due to theft of steel, jeopardising region’s electricity supply.

Presidential vacuum continued as parliament postponed municipal elections. Presidential vacuum entered sixth consecutive month as parliament in April held no election session. Underscoring prevailing deadlock, Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea 1 April reiterated his party would block any candidate from Hizbollah’s axis. Caretaker cabinet 18 April convened to authorise public-sector wage and benefit increases, medication imports, and sanitation contracts. In first parliamentary session not aimed at electing president since vacuum began, MPs 18 April extended mandate of municipalities and local public officials for additional 12 months, in effect postponing municipal elections due by 31 May. Critics see decision as step toward indefinitely delaying long-overdue polls, eroding increasingly important institution.

Damascus intensified normalisation with Arab states, Hei’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) attacked regime in northwest, and Islamic State (ISIS) launched near-daily attacks in centre as Türkiye killed group’s global leader.

Syria and Arab states pursued normalisation. Syrian FM Faisal Mekdad visited several Arab countries for first time since start of war in 2011. Mekdad 1 April met Egyptian counterpart in Egyptian capital Cairo and 12 April met Saudi FM in Saudi Arabian city Jeddah, next day announcing move toward reopening embassies and resuming flights. Syria and Tunisia 12 April re-established diplomatic ties; Mekdad 18 April met Tunisian President Saied in Tunis. Mekdad 15 April met Algerian counterpart in Algeria. Saudi FM Faisal bin Farhan 18 April met President Assad in capital Damascus, amid discussion of Syrian participation in May Arab League meeting. Meanwhile, Syrian, Turkish, Russian and Iranian officials 4 April met in Russian capital Moscow to foster Turkish-Syrian rapprochement (see Türkiye).

HTS targeted regime forces along north-western front. Idlib’s dominant group HTS and allied factions conducted raids on regime positions in north west, while al-Qaeda-leaning Ansar al-Islam for first time in several years conducted two raids 7 and 14 April. Notably, HTS and allies began regularly using anti-tank guided missiles for first time since March 2020.

ISIS continued attacks, Turkish operation killed group’s chief. ISIS cells launched near-daily attacks on civilians in centre, killing dozens during April, and engaged in battles with regime and Russian Wagner Group forces. U.S.-led coalition airstrike 3 April killed senior ISIS leader in Idlib and coalition 8 and 17 April conducted raids to capture two ISIS leaders in north east and Aleppo province. Turkish President Erdogan 30 April announced killing of suspected ISIS global leader in Aleppo.

Israel launched airstrikes and Türkiye struck Kurdish forces. Israel 2, 4, 8, 9, 29 April launched airstrikes amid multi-front escalation (see Israel-Palestine). Turkish defence minister 17 April announced “neutralisation” of ten People’s Defense Units/Kurdish Workers’ Party (YPG/PKK) militants in northern Aleppo after alleged YPG/PKK attack previous day injured four Turkish soldiers. Turkish drone strikes 14 April killed two senior YPG/PKK commanders in Qamishli.

Efforts to revive nuclear accord showed no sign of progress, Tehran and Arab Gulf states continued normalisation, and hostilities in Levant and underscored looming conflict risks.

Holding pattern continued on nuclear talks as Western sanctions increased. Diplomatic track in April showed little sign of progress. U.S., E3 and other G7 members 18 April noted “a diplomatic solution remains our preferred solution” and described 2015 deal as “useful reference”, which underscored that 2015 agreement is in all likelihood not revivable. Meanwhile, West continued issuing Iran-related sanctions. U.S. 19 April blacklisted seven individuals and entities allegedly part of “a sanctions evasion network” supporting Iran’s drone and military programmes. In parallel to EU and UK sanctions, U.S. 24 April designated five Iranian authorities and entities, in addition to imposing visa restrictions on eleven more officials, over human rights violations. Washington 27 April sanctioned five Iranian officials and entity for “wrongful detention of U.S. nationals”.

Momentum continued toward de-escalation in Gulf. Following 10 March Saudi-Iranian normalisation deal, sides continued to improve ties. Tehran 4 April announced appointment of Reza Ameri, foreign ministry veteran, as ambassador to United Arab Emirates – filling position that had been vacant since 2016. FM Hossein Amirabdollahian 6 April met his Saudi counterpart in Chinese capital Beijing for first bilateral meeting in seven years; sides underscored intention to reopen diplomatic facilities by 9 May and subsequently exchanged visits by delegations.

Escalation in Levant and tensions at sea spotlighted risks. Following deadly hostilities in north-eastern Syria between U.S. forces and Iran-aligned groups late March, Tehran 3 April claimed that it had “never been involved, directly or indirectly, in any attacks against the U.S. military forces in Syria and Iraq”. Meanwhile, Israeli military 2 April downed alleged Iranian drone from Syria and early April launched multiple strikes in Syria, amid multi-front escalation (see Israel-Palestine, Lebanon and Syria); hostilities underscore risk that region remains potential theatre for future multi-actor escalation involving Iran-backed forces. In maritime domain, Iran’s navy 27 April seized Marshall Islands-flagged oil tanker in Gulf of Oman; U.S. reportedly had seized China-bound Iranian oil shipment.

Bahrain and United Arab Emirates (UAE) announced plans to restore diplomatic ties with Qatar, concluding process to end almost six-year intra-Gulf rift.

Bahrain and UAE announced plans to re-establish formal relations with Qatar. Bahrain and Qatar 13 April revealed intention to restore diplomatic ties after pair held second round of dialogue at Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Secretariat in Saudi Arabia’s capital Riyadh. Shortly afterward, UAE and Qatari officials 18 April told reporters both countries were working to reopen embassies and restore ties; Bahrain and UAE, along with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, severed ties with Qatar and imposed blockade in June 2017, marking beginning of tense intra-Gulf confrontation lasting until 2021. While announcements mark full resumption of ties between Qatar and all former blockading states, signalling entire GCC’s intent to turn page after 2017-2021 rift, tensions and friction points continue to plague intra-GCC relations, including economic competition between Saudi Arabia and UAE as well as disputes between UAE and Qatar over latter’s alleged ties to Islamists in region.

Türkiye continued strikes in Kurdistan region amid intra-Kurdish tensions, rifts surfaced between armed Shiite factions in capital Baghdad, and deadly tribal clashes flared in south.

Türkiye continued strikes in Kurdistan, highlighting inter-party tensions. After Türkiye 3 April asserted Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) infiltrated Suleimaniya international airport security, Suleimaniya officials 7 April claimed Türkiye carried out drone strike near airport, allegedly targeting Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) commander Mazloum Abdi’s convoy that was accompanied by three U.S. personnel. Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)-led regional govt same day accused Suleimaniya authorities – dominated by rival Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) – of provoking attack, while PUK party leader Bafel Talabani indirectly accused KDP of providing Türkiye with intelligence. Turkish FM Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu 11 April vowed to continue operations in Suleimaniya, alleging PKK controls city. Alleged Turkish drone 15 April killed two near Penjwen town, Suleimaniya governorate.

Friction persisted between Shiite armed groups, intercommunal violence flared in south. Highlighting potential for violent infighting within Shiite paramilitary coalition Popular Mobilisation forces, Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s militia Saraya al-Salam 9 April paraded weapons through Baghdad’s Dora district in response to dispute with Kataib Hizbollah over local property. Meanwhile in Dhi Qar governorate in south, following months of tensions between al-Rumaid and al-Omar clans in al-Islah district, protests over water scarcity and related demand for dismissal of district commissioner (member of al-Rumaid clan) 13 April escalated into armed clashes between groups, killing four and injuring dozen. Security sources 19 April reported clashes between Atab and Hatem tribes in Dhi Qar’s al-Nasr district, following killing of tribal leader.

Low-level Islamic State (ISIS) insurgency continued, Baghdad and Erbil inked oil deal. Security forces 7 April killed five alleged ISIS members in Diyala governorate. Suspected ISIS members 18 April killed two in al-Mudadiya district, Diyala governorate. Following International Chamber of Commerce ruling in March on Kurdistan’s oil exports to Türkiye that marked win for federal govt in years-long dispute, Baghdad and Erbil 4 April signed temporary agreement, likely solidifying Baghdad’s sole control over Türkiye-Iraq pipeline on Iraqi side.

Riyadh continued normalisation process with Iran, intensified engagement with Syria and maintained peace efforts in Yemen.

Saudi-Iranian rapprochement progressed and Riyadh stepped up engagement with Damascus. Following breakthrough deal in March, Saudi and Iranian FMs 6 April met in Chinese capital Beijing for first bilateral meeting in seven years. Saudi Arabia 8 April and Iran 12 April sent delegations to prepare opening of respective embassies by May deadline (see Iran). Meanwhile, Saudi FM Faisal bin Farhan 12 April met Syrian counterpart in Jeddah and next day announced steps toward reopening embassies and resuming flights. Saudi Arabia 15 April hosted Gulf Cooperation Council, Egyptian, Iraqi and Jordanian FMs in Jeddah to discuss potential Syrian attendance at Arab League summit in May, without reaching agreement. In first visit since beginning of Syrian conflict, Saudi FM 18 April met Syrian President Assad in Damascus (see Syria).

Riyadh continued peace efforts in Yemen, U.S.-Saudi ties displayed strains. Riyadh 8 April sent first delegation to Yemen since start of military intervention in 2015 and mid-month participated in prisoner swap, as negotiations appeared to make progress (see Yemen). Saudi Arabia and other OPEC+ members 2 April announced further cuts in oil production, against U.S. wishes; CIA chief William Burns early April travelled to Saudi Arabia to meet Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman and intelligence officials to reportedly express that U.S. was “blindsided” by Saudi decisions to resume ties with Iran and Syria.

First Saudi diplomatic visit to Yemen in eight years and prisoner swap injected momentum into peace talks, raising hope for comprehensive agreement in May to halt hostilities.

Peace process picked up speed amid Saudi-Huthi talks and prisoner swap. Saudi Arabia 3 April invited Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) members to Saudi Arabian capital Riyadh to discuss negotiations with Huthis, where it presented draft agreement that reportedly included six-month nationwide ceasefire, end to transport restrictions, release of detainees and payment of salaries to civil and military employees in both Huthi and govt-controlled areas. Saudi-led coalition 6 April announced lifting of most restrictions on commercial ships docking in southern ports, including Aden, for first time in eight years. Saudi and Omani delegations 8 April met Huthi leaders in Sanaa to discuss renewal of ceasefire that lapsed in Oct 2022, in first official Saudi diplomatic mission to Yemeni capital since kingdom launched military campaign in March 2015; draft agreement was reportedly modified to include declaration of cessation of war instead of truce, roadmap for humanitarian aid and economic arrangements, and steps toward comprehensive political solution; parties also discussed departure of foreign forces. Although stumbling block remained over Saudi Arabia’s status as mediator or conflict party, Huthi chief negotiator 14 April said negotiations were “serious and positive”. In key confidence-building measure, Huthis, govt and Saudi Arabia 14-16 April concluded swap of 887 detainees; Saudi Arabia 17 April unilaterally released 104 detainees. UN Envoy Hans Grundberg 17 April described talks as best opportunity for peace in eight years.

Parties clashed in Marib, Shebwa and Lahij governorates. Huthi forces and Saudi-backed Salafi group, Saba Axis, clashed along front lines in Marib governorate. Huthis, Giants Brigade and Southern Transitional Council (STC)-affiliated Shebwa Defence Forces clashed along border between Shebwa and al-Bayda.

Saudi-led coalition sought to ease tensions in south. Coalition continued meetings with pro-govt and Southern Transitional Council (STC)-affiliated officials to ease tensions, particularly over Wadi Hadramawt area where STC forces seek to replace Islah-affiliated troops. STC President and PLC member Aydrous al-Zubaidi 1 April announced plan for STC to integrate new south-ern components, consolidating STC as chief representative on southern issue.

Israeli brutality at Jerusalem’s Al-Aqsa Mosque triggered multi-front rocket attacks, raising spectre of major escalation, while deadly violence continued across West Bank and Israel.

Israeli raids on Al-Aqsa Mosque triggered rockets from Gaza, Lebanon and Syria. Israeli police raids and brutality against Palestinian worshippers at Al-Aqsa Mosque during Ramadan triggered rocket fire from Gaza, Lebanon and Syria, which may mark beginning of tumultuous period as mutual deterrence between Hizbollah and Israel erodes and shadow war with Iran moves further into light. Israeli police 1 April shot dead Palestinian at entrance of Al-Aqsa. Israeli forces 4-6 April violently raided mosque, injuring at least 18 Palestinians and arresting 450. In response, Palestinian militants in Gaza 5 and 6 April fired rockets into Israel, which responded with airstrikes. In major escalation, militants in Lebanon 6 April fired 34 rockets into Israel in heaviest rocket fire since 2006 war (see Lebanon); Israel blamed Hamas, which denied role, and 7 April struck alleged Hamas targets in southern Lebanon and Gaza. On Syrian front, Israel 2 April shot down alleged Iranian drone that entered Israel and Israeli airstrikes 2, 4, 8, 9, 29 April struck Syria: notably, alleged Palestinian Islamic Jihad rockets fired from Syria 8 April targeted Israeli-occupied Golan Heights and Israel next day struck suspected launch sites (see Syria). Defence Minister Yoav Gallant 16 April accused Iran of waging “multi-front war of attrition”.

Deadly violence and extreme volatility continued in West Bank and Israel. Israel security forces conducted over 421 raids in West Bank and East Jerusalem during month, killing at least 14 Palestinians and arresting 630 amid near-daily gun battles. Israel settler attacks persisted unabated and Palestinians continued attacks: notably, Palestinian gunman 7 April killed three Israeli-British settlers in Jordan Valley; Palestinian minor from Nablus 19 April shot two Israelis in East Jerusalem’s Sheikh Jarrah.

In other important developments. Demonstrations against judicial reform in Israel continued. Govt 2 April authorised controversial “national guard” to deal with Palestinian unrest in Israel. Israeli forces 15 April attacked orthodox Christians attending Holy Fire ceremony in Jerusalem, limiting their access to site. Senior Hamas delegation 18 April travelled to Saudi Arabia.

Amid repression of free speech, three parties set up opposition committee; Algiers stepped up anti-Morocco rhetoric.

Three opposition parties set up joint committee. In unprecedented initiative since end of Hirak protest movement in 2021, three leftist parties (Rally for Culture and Democracy, Workers’ Party, and Union for Change and Progress) 12 April met to discuss country’s political situation, announced setting up joint committee to reflect on way forward, saying Algeria “is going through a pivotal period for its future in a situation of global upheaval”. Workers’ Party and Union for Change and Progress few days earlier had jointly denounced “marginalisation” of political parties and “criminalisation” of trade unions.

Media crackdown continued. Algiers court 2 April sentenced prominent journalist Ihsane El-Kadi to five years in prison – with two years suspended – for “receiving foreign funding” with an aim to harm state security. NGO Amnesty International next day condemned “latest escalation in crackdown on media”. Parliament 13 April approved law further curbing press freedom, notably by tightening media ownership rules and allowing courts to compel journalists to reveal their sources.

Authorities stepped up anti-Morocco rhetoric. In interview with Qatar-based media outlet Al Jazeera published 5 April, President Tebboune for first time accused “neighbouring country” of orchestrating kidnapping and murder in April 2012 of seven Algerian diplomats stationed at consulate in Gao city, northern Mali. Interior Minister Brahim Merad 13 April accused Morocco of political destabilisation, saying “Algeria is being targeted through drugs and is facing a war from its western neighbour”; 15 April urged citizens and members of civil society to take action “in order to defeat these destructive attempts”.

Economic crisis remained major threat to country’s stability; conflict in neighbouring Sudan fuelled fears of regional destabilisation.

Doubts persisted about Cairo’s commitment to reform programme. Ahead of first review of country’s $3bn rescue package, International Monetary Fund in April continued to pressure Cairo to privatise certain state assets and allow flexibility in Egyptian pound to help absorb external shocks and rebuild foreign currency reserves. Authorities in April did not announce any new sales of govt-owned assets to Gulf investors that could ease foreign currency and funding crisis. Amid rampant inflation, foreign investors also complained about central bank’s hesitant monetary policy, calling for steeper interest rate hikes.

Long-awaited national dialogue set to begin in May. Authorities late March-early April said National Dialogue, which was first called by President Sisi in April 2022, will kick off 3 May. Representatives of human rights groups set to participate in dialogue 9 April met with National Dialogue General Coordinator Diaa Rashwan, urged authorities to open civic space; attendees also called for extension of 12 April deadline for NGOs to regularise their status under 2019 NGO law, which govt next day rejected.

Detention of soldiers in Sudan sparked rumours of Cairo’s involvement in conflict. As conflict broke out in neighbouring Sudan (see Sudan), paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) 15 April captured group of Egyptian soldiers in Merowe town, located between capital Khartoum and Egyptian border. Sisi, who has close ties with Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s army, 17 April denied any involvement in Sudanese conflict, saying Egyptian soldiers were on Sudanese soil to carry out military drills with their Sudanese counterparts. The Wall Street Journal 19 April however alleged Cairo had sent warplanes and pilots to back Sudanese military. RSF around 20 April allowed Egyptian soldiers to return home. Govt 27 April said 16,000 people had crossed into Egypt since fighting broke out; thousands more people reportedly stranded late April at Sudan-Egypt border with little humanitarian assistance.

Efforts to unify country’s rival factions behind electoral roadmap remained in stalemate, making presidential and parliamentary elections in 2023 increasingly elusive; concern grew over potential fallout of Sudanese conflict.

Political process remained stalled. East-based House of Representatives (HoR) 2 April published in official gazette series of amendments to 2021 laws on presidential and parliamentary elections. Amendments provide for ineligibility for president of dual nationals, but otherwise do not significantly differ from original laws, suggesting their main purpose may be to show Libyans, UN and international partners that parliament is actively working toward elections as means of fending off a UN-backed alternative mechanism. In briefing to UN Security Council, UN envoy for Libya Abdoulaye Bathily 18 April said he had offered UN technical assistance to HoR-High State Council committee working on electoral laws, made no mention of his previously announced proposal to create High-Level Panel for Elections that would take over drafting of election laws.

UN gathered rival military coalitions’ leaders on Libyan soil for first time in years. Bathily 26 March in capital Tripoli and 8 April in Benghazi city hosted meetings between commanders of rival military coalitions; another meeting between rival chiefs of staff held 14 April in Benghazi without participation of UN envoy. Bathily early April also toured Libya’s neighbouring states of Chad, Niger and Sudan to discuss repatriation from Libya of foreign fighters.

Potential fallout of conflict in neighbouring Sudan sparked concern. After conflict between Sudanese army and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) 15 April broke out in Sudan, credible media reports, including from The Wall Street Journal 19 April, alleged eastern strongman Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s forces delivered weapons to RSF, which Haftar denied; some reports claimed weapons delivered via airlift, but local sources alleged weapons hauled overland. Matter could fuel tensions between Haftar and its Egyptian ally, which supports Sudanese army (see Egypt). Amid growing concern about potential spillover of fighting into southern Libya, where Sudanese militiamen are present, Haftar forces 24 April closed border with Sudan and reportedly sent military reinforcements to southern town of Kufra.

Authorities detained Islamist-inspired An-Nahda party leader Rached Ghannouchi, while President Saïed cast doubt on IMF bailout.

Amid opposition protests, authorities arrested most prominent opposition leader. Hundreds 9 April joined protest led by opposition coalition National Salvation Front in capital Tunis to demand release of over 20 opposition activists detained since Feb. Authorities 17 April arrested Islamist-inspired An-Nahda party leader and former parliament speaker, Rached Ghannouchi, charged him with “conspiracy against the state”; move came few days after Ghannouchi said efforts to “eradicate” Islamist opposition threatened to unleash civil war. Interior ministry 17 April also banned An-Nahda from holding meetings, and police in following days raided and shut down its headquarters in Tunis as well as several regional offices, raising spectre of formal ban on party. After U.S., EU, France, Türkiye and others condemned Ghannouchi’s detention, govt 19 April said “Tunisian justice will not yield to pressure”.

Saïed’s absence from public stage fuelled rumours of power vacuum. Saïed’s 12-day absence reportedly caused by minor heart attack late March-early April sparked concern about succession as 2022 constitution provides that head of constitutional council, which has never been installed, takes over presidency in case of permanent power vacuum.

Saïed cast doubt on International Monetary Fund (IMF) rescue package. In clearest rejection to date of terms of stalled $1.9bn bailout package, Saïed 6 April said he would not accept IMF’s “diktats”. EU Commission 27 April said EU financial assistance would be conditioned to deal with IMF.

For first time in months, ground convoy completed resupply of UN mission in Polisario-controlled territory.

UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) 5-7 April resupplied two sites hosting peacekeepers east of sand berm after Polisario Front independence movement provided safe passage to ground convoy coming from Morocco-controlled Western Sahara. Meanwhile, UN envoy for Western Sahara, Staffan de Mistura, 3-10 April conducted consultations with Algeria, France, Mauritania, Russia, Spain, UK and U.S. ahead of UN Security Council closed-door session on Western Sahara on 19 April; resumption of negotiations between Morocco and Polisario remained elusive.

Bahrain and United Arab Emirates (UAE) announced plans to restore diplomatic ties with Qatar, concluding process to end almost six-year intra-Gulf rift.

Bahrain and UAE announced plans to re-establish formal relations with Qatar. Bahrain and Qatar 13 April revealed intention to restore diplomatic ties after pair held second round of dialogue at Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Secretariat in Saudi Arabia’s capital Riyadh. Shortly after, UAE and Qatari officials 18 April told reporters both countries were working to reopen embassies and restore ties; Bahrain and UAE, along with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, severed ties with Qatar and imposed blockade in June 2017, marking beginning of tense intra-Gulf confrontation lasting until 2021. While announcements mark full resumption of ties between Qatar and all former blockading states, signalling entire GCC’s intent to turn page after 2017-2021 rift, tensions and friction points continue to plague intra-GCC relations, including economic competition between Saudi Arabia and UAE as well as disputes between UAE and Qatar over latter’s alleged ties to Islamists in region.

United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain announced plans to restore diplomatic ties with Qatar, concluding process to end almost six-year intra-Gulf rift.

UAE and Bahrain announced plans to re-establish formal relations with Qatar. Bahrain and Qatar 13 April revealed intention to restore diplomatic ties after pair held second round of dialogue at Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Secretariat in Saudi Arabia’s capital Riyadh. Shortly after, UAE and Qatari officials 18 April told reporters both countries were working to reopen embassies and restore ties; Bahrain and UAE, along with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, severed ties with Qatar and imposed blockade in June 2017, marking beginning of tense intra-Gulf confrontation lasting until 2021. While announcements mark full resumption of ties between Qatar and all former blockading states, signalling entire GCC’s intent to turn page after 2017-2021 rift, tensions and friction points continue to plague intra-GCC relations, including economic competition between Saudi Arabia and UAE as well as disputes between UAE and Qatar over latter’s alleged ties to Islamists in region. Meanwhile, Iran 4 April announced appointment of ambassador to UAE – filling position that had been vacant since 2016.