Failed coup attempt orchestrated by former army chief left Bolivia reeling. 

One day after being stripped of his command, former Army Chief Gen. Zúñiga and allied members of military 26 June took up positions in capital La Paz’s Plaza Murillo, promising to “restore democracy” as armoured vehicle rammed door of govt palace and soldiers stormed building. Footage from within palace showed President Arce ordering Zúñiga and his allies to stand down, as leaders from region and beyond rushed to condemn actions. Within hours, Zúñiga and allied soldiers had withdrawn, presumably because their reinforcements did not arrive, bringing attempted coup to abrupt end. Police forces same day arrested Zúñiga and his alleged co-conspirator, former Navy Vice Adm. Salvador, though not before Zuñiga claimed Arce had ordered him to stage coup in attempt to boost his popularity; Arce 27 June denied allegation. Attorney General 26 June announced formal investigation into Zúñiga and “all the other participants”.

FARC-EMC splinters continued to escalate attacks along Pacific Coast as peace talks with ELN remained in disarray; govt opened negotiations with FARC dissident group Segunda Marquetalia.

Hostilities between military and FARC-EMC splinters intensified. Splinter groups of dissident FARC faction known as EMC stepped up attacks along Pacific Coast, targeting police stations, launching car bombs and improvised explosives, and striking buildings with armed drones. Apparent EMC splinter members 16 June shot at car transporting father and nephew of VP Francia Márquez in Jamundí town, Valle de Cauca department. President Petro 8 June ruled out any peace process with splinters amid violent attacks, saying “the order is to neutralise EMC” in Cauca department. Next round of dialogue with EMC factions still at negotiating table, led by alias Calarcá, is set tentatively for early July; sides 14 June inaugurated commission in Meta, aimed at stimulating rural development in areas of department under Calarcá’s control. 

ELN statement following group’s VI Congress contained few surprises. National Liberation Army (ELN) held its VI Congress in secret, 17 June released statement largely reiterating insurgency’s longstanding talking points. Communiqué said it will continue peace talks, while blaming current crisis in negotiations on alleged govt non-compliance; it also failed to clarify key public concerns, including whether group will continue kidnapping for ransom and if it is contemplating laying down arms. Group voiced support for Constituent Assembly, controversial idea floated by Petro in order to enact constitutional reforms.

Govt opened talks with Segunda Marquetalia. Talks between govt and dissident FARC faction Segunda Marquetalia, which wields significant territorial control along border with Ecuador, 24-29 June took place in Venezuelan capital Caracas. Negotiations focused on conflict de-escalation and improving conditions for civilians; importantly, Segunda Marquetalia agreed to share coordinates of its troops to avoid armed confrontations. Legal uncertainty clouds process, however, as many in leadership are former signatories to 2016 peace accord who subsequently returned to arms. 

In other important developments. U.S. court 10 June ordered Chiquita Brands International to pay $38.3mn in compensation to families of eight victims assassinated by paramilitary groups in Colombia in early 2000s. Congress 14 June passed govt’s pension reform.

Constitutional Court again overturned President Noboa’s state of exception amid ongoing criminal violence; efforts to tackle corruption continued. 

Judiciary overturned state of exception as violence persisted in coastal provinces. Constitutional Court 13 June declared state of exception decreed by President Noboa in late May unconstitutional, second time judiciary has overturned his decree. So-called Security Block, made up of military and police, 15 June criticised decision, arguing states of exception have yielded positive results. Meanwhile, insecurity persisted in strategic drug trafficking enclaves along Pacific Coast. Notably, unknown assailants 2 June killed alternate Congressman Cristhian Nieto and his wife in Manta city (Manabí Province); Noboa 3 June ordered stepped-up security presence in city to contain rising violence. U.S. Treasury Department 6 June announced sanctions against “Los Lobos” gang and its leader alias “Pipo”, saying group had “emerged as Ecuador’s largest drug trafficking organisation” and is responsible for worsening violence.

Efforts to tackle corruption continued. As part of “Metastasis” and “Purge” investigations into high-level corruption across Ecuador, Judicial Council 14 June dismissed seven judges from Guayas Province, prosecutor and secretary for alleged involvement in organised crime. Police 29 June arrested over a dozen individuals, including judges, attorneys and govt officials, in connection with Plaga Case, another high-level probe into ties between organised crime, govt and judiciary. 

Tensions mounted in run-up to July presidential poll as Maduro govt, unwilling to relinquish power, continued to manipulate electoral conditions; outright fraud remains possible.

Opposition candidate’s wide lead in polls raised concerns about govt response. As July presidential poll drew closer, most credible polling organisations gave opposition coalition Unitary Platform’s candidate Edmundo González large lead over President Maduro. Delphos pollster Félix Seijas 4 June cautioned that his surveys show Maduro with “ceiling” of around 30% of vote (20 points behind González), meaning govt’s focus will likely be on discouraging opposition voter participation in order to win. This may require drastic steps, such as ban of Unitary Platform’s ticket and/or González’ candidacy, which would likely throw opposition into disarray. Manipulation of electoral conditions means most likely outcome of poll is victory for Maduro who, along with seven other candidates, 20 June signed agreement to respect results; González refused. In this event, protests are likely following announcement of results, though govt previously vowed to respond harshly, which could shrink their size.

Authorities reduced external election observation. Atop these risks, electoral authorities’ (CNE) late-May cancellation of EU electoral observation mission further indicated govt will prioritise winning poll over recovering international recognition and sanctions relief; opposition-linked CNE member Juan Carlos Delpino 11 June said council president made decision unilaterally, likely on instructions of National Assembly president Jorge Rodríguez; Delpino added that CNE had not met since March. NGO Carter Center and UN 19, 25 June confirmed they will send small observation teams to monitor voting. Deputy FM for Latin America Rander Peña 18 June said govt had invited BRICS+ bloc, including China and Russia, to observe election and confirmed Caracas’ intention to soon join bloc.

Crackdown on opposition figures persisted. Banned opposition candidate María Corina Machado 17 June accused govt of “criminalising the electoral route”, saying 37 opposition activists had been arrested in 2024, four of them in previous week. González same day said govt was creating a “hostile atmosphere” for election, while civil society leaders continued to spotlight security forces’ routine targeting of activists.

Bukele was sworn in for second presidential term, promising economic growth and clampdown on corruption; authorities again renewed state of exception. 

Bukele vowed to improve economy and tackle corruption in inauguration speech. Bukele was sworn in as president 1 June despite ban on consecutive re-election in El Salvador’s constitution. CID Gallup poll 11 June indicated Bukele’s popularity rating stood at 92%, highest of all Latin American leaders. In his inauguration speech, Bukele promised to focus on strengthening economy and fighting corruption. Several international representatives attended ceremony, including Argentina’s President Milei and Donald Trump Jr.; high-level delegation led by U.S. Homeland Security Secretary and other senior U.S. officials also attended, reflecting shift toward more conciliatory approach in U.S. policy, likely due to concerns about immigration ahead of U.S. presidential election. 

Authorities once more renewed state of exception. Legislative Assembly 6 June extended state of exception for 27th time, with 57 out of 60 members voting for renewal despite concerns about human rights. Meanwhile, authorities 11 June transferred 2,000 inmates to El Salvador’s mega-prison, el Centro de Confinamiento para el Terrorismo, now at 40% capacity; total prison population stands at 108,200.

President Castro announced new measures to tackle violent crime. 

Castro sought to crack down on violent crime. Amid mounting public pressure, President Castro 14 June announced series of measures to tackle violent crime, known as “Crime Solution Plan”, which entails: deployment of security forces to municipalities with high crime levels and operations to destroy coca plantations; construction of new “mega-prison”; and reforms to penal code so that gang members who commit specific offences can be classified as terrorists. Castro has sought to emulate “mano dura”, or “iron-fist” approach toward gangs of her El Salvadoran counterpart in hopes of reducing violence, though her efforts have failed to produce similar results. 

In another important development. U.S. court 26 June sentenced former President Hernandez to 45 years in prison for crimes related to drug trafficking, with prosecutors accusing him of running Honduras like a “narco-state”.

Claudia Sheinbaum won presidential election wracked by record levels of violence; President López Obrador set to enact controversial reforms before stepping down.

Claudia Sheinbaum won election amid record levels of violence. Ruling MORENA party candidate Claudia Sheinbaum 2 June won election with about 60% of vote, becoming Mexico’s first woman president. Chief opponent Xóchitl Gálvez 13 June formally contested results, alleging use of state apparatus to support Sheinbaum, unequal competition and organised crime involvement, though allegation unlikely to affect result. According to 4 June report by civil society organisation Causa en Común, these elections were most violent in nation’s modern history: thirty-seven candidates or aspiring candidates were assassinated during campaign period, while two voters were killed at polling stations. 

Criminal violence plagued multiple states. Insecurity remained rampant, partly as criminal groups sought leverage in upcoming negotiations with new govt. Notably, armed assailants 3 June killed mayor of Cotija town, Michoacán state; 17 June killed newly-elected mayor in Copala town, Guerrero state; 22 June killed outgoing mayor of Malinaltepec city, Guerrero state. Violence in Chiapas intensified amid rivalry between Jalisco Cartel – New Generation (CNJG) and Sinaloa Cartel, with clashes 8-9 June forcing over 4,000 people to flee Tila town. Massacre in León city, Guanajuato state, 9 June left six people dead; CNJG denied role in attack as officials 14 June announced arrest of five National Guard agents for potential involvement. 

López Obrador vowed to press ahead with controversial reforms. Outgoing President LópezObrador 7 June announced plans to capitalise on Sept overlap with new MORENA supermajority in Congress to push through constitutional reforms. Among other things, López Obrador plans to introduce elections for judicial figures, dismantle autonomous public bodies and strengthen role of Armed Forces through National Guard; critics argue they could undermine checks and balances. Meanwhile, change to Amnesty Law enacted 14 June gave president authority to grant amnesty for any crime, including human rights violations.

Migration flows persisted at high levels. National Institute of Migration 16 June reported nearly 1.4mn irregular migrants traveling through Mexico Jan-May 2024. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 13 June criticised use of armed forces in migration control. 

Stifling of dissent and poor treatment of political prisoners continued, and regime authorised foreign troop deployment to support humanitarian situation. 

Crackdown on dissent and poor treatment of political prisoners continued. Govt 11 June cancelled legal status of fifteen NGOs, 24 June closed fifteen more. Local media 14 June published report revealing govt had imposed arbitrary fines of up to 20,000 córdobas ($500) on evangelical leaders as suppression of religious institutions continued. Meanwhile, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 11 June condemned “deplorable” prison conditions and urged regime to protect political prisoners’ “lives and integrity”. Organization of American States 27 June adopted resolution urging immediate release of political prisoners in Nicaragua and easing of repression of church members.

Govt approved foreign troop entry and continued to forge new alliances. National Assembly 4 June authorised entry of troops from U.S., Russia, Venezuela and Cuba to provide emergency humanitarian assistance until 31 Dec 2024, specifying that Russian and Venezuelan soldiers will also assist in fight against drug trafficking and organised crime. Meanwhile, regime 7 June reaffirmed its intention to join BRICS and 11 June formalised re-establishment of diplomatic relations with North Korea amid efforts to diversify alliances in face of Western sanctions. President Ortega 22 June appointed ambassador to Afghanistan, formalising establishment of diplomatic relations with Taliban authorities.

Russian vessels docked in capital Havana.

Foreign Ministry 7 June announced four Russian vessels would “pay an official visit” to port in Havana 12-17 June, emphasising that none of them carried nuclear weapons and that “their stop-over in our country does not represent any threat to the region”. U.S. officials played down significance of their arrival, though U.S. submarine 13 June entered Guantanamo Bay in “routine port visit”; Canadian patrol vessel 14-17 June also conducted port visit to Havana. Reasons for visit remained unclear, though some noted actions came weeks after U.S. President Biden authorised limited use of U.S. weapons on Russian soil to defend Ukraine’s Kharkiv region, which prompted Russian President Putin 5 June to threaten “asymmetric response” (see Russia). 

Kenya-led multinational security mission began arriving in Haiti to help quell surging gang violence, while PM Conille assumed office and formed new govt.

First personnel from Kenya-led security mission landed in Haiti. First wave of police officers from much-anticipated foreign security mission 25 June arrived in Haiti. Mission faces enormous task of helping a police force riddled with corruption stem rampant gang violence while ensuring protection of civilians in urban warfare. Earlier, human rights group Amnesty International 4 June expressed concern about lack of transparency on measures taken to ensure respect for human rights during operations and called for all safeguards to be implemented, including transparent complaint mechanisms for timely investigations into allegations of misconduct.

Gang violence continued as police chief stepped down. Gang alliance known as Viv Ansanm launched more attacks, though scaled back violence in days before mission arrived. Notably, gang members 9 June murdered three police officers in Delmas commune of capital Port-au-Prince after their armoured vehicle fell into ditch dug by gangs. Gang violence also affected parts of Artibonite department, Haiti’s breadbasket. Notably, Ti Bwadom gang attacks 14-15 June in Terre-Neuve and Lagon communes killed around twelve people. Viv Ansanm’s self-appointed spokesperson Jimmy ‘Barbecue’ Chérizier 23 June urged PM Conille to refrain from conducting operations against gangs and instead to engage in dialogue; Conille 25 June responded, saying gangs must lay down their arms and recognise state authority. International Organization for Migration 18 June reported 60% increase in displacement since March. Meanwhile, police high command 14 June dismissed its director Frantz Elbé, replacing him 19 June with Normil Rameau, former police director under President Moïse. 

PM Conille assumed office and appointed new govt. Garry Conille was officially installed as prime minister 3 June; one week later, official gazette 11 June published names of fourteen new cabinet members. All members of Transitional Presidential Council reportedly participated in appointment of ministers while Conille selected heads of five most important ministries. Conille 12 June promised govt would prioritise fight against corruption in order to restore Haitians’ confidence in their leaders and institutions.

China continued maritime activity in East China Sea, while U.S. and Japan sought to further bolster defence ties. 

Beijing’s maritime activity around disputed areas persisted. As of 26 June, Japan reported 104 Chinese vessels entering Japan’s contiguous zone during month. Tokyo 7 June identified four Chinese Coast Guard vessels, reportedly armed with cannons, in Japan’s territorial sea near disputed area off Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. In rare occurrence, Chinese coast guard vessels entered into the territorial sea around the disputed islands for five days in a row 20-24 June. Netherlands’ defence ministry 8 June accused Chinese fighter jets of approaching Dutch navy frigate and helicopter in manner that “caused a potentially unsafe situation” in East China Sea; Beijing 11 June rejected accusations.

U.S. and Japan deepened defence ties. U.S. 7-18 June held biennial military exercise near Guam and Palau islands, Philippine Sea, including Japan for first time. Earlier, U.S., South Korean and Japanese coastguards 6 June engaged in first joint drill in Sea of Japan off Tango Peninsula. Japan and U.S. week of 10 June agreed to establish working groups on joint production of air defence missiles, warship and aircraft repairs and supply chain resiliency; 11 June held first such meeting on repair and maintenance of U.S. ships. Japan and U.S. officials 13-14 June discussed extended deterrence at Dialogue in Wyoming, U.S., focusing on threats from China’s and North Korea’s nuclear build-up and military cooperation with Russia. 

In other important developments. Japan 21 June imposed sanctions on companies in India, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan for alleged support of Russia’s war in Ukraine; including Chinese firms for first time for such motive.

Russian President conducted first state visit to North Korea, signalling strengthened security partnership; in response, Seoul issued strong condemnations, including threats to arm Ukraine. 

Russia and North Korea entered new strategic partnership. Russian President Putin 18-19 June paid “friendly state visit” to Pyongyang for first time in 24 years; Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un 19 June signed new bilateral treaty to strengthen “defence capabilities” and promote science and technology cooperation; leaders signed mutual defence article binding both parties to “provide military and other assistance immediately using all available means” should either party be “attacked and finds itself in a state of war”, in accordance with Article 51 of UN Charter and consistent with both countries’ laws; observers raised alarm over possible violations of UN Security Council resolutions by expansion of alleged North Korean weapons transfers to bolster Russian war in Ukraine, and transfers of Russian military technologies to North Korea. 

Seoul responded to Russian-North Korea treaty with threats to arm Ukraine. South Korea 20 June condemned new Russian-North Korea treaty, insisting that it threatens their security and violates UN Security Council resolutions; Seoul warned that it would consider sending arms directly to Ukraine in contravention of its long-standing position of not supplying weapons to countries actively engaged in conflict. South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol 24 June called for “robust security readiness” during meeting of senior secretaries. 

Tensions rose at border as sides used loudspeakers, balloons and other means to show protest. Seoul 9 June resumed broadcasting international news and K-pop via loudspeakers on inter-Korean border; move in retaliation to North Korea floating south 1,000 balloons filled with trash and manure in May. Kim Yo Jong, sister of North Korean leader 10 June warned loudspeakers could spark “very dangerous situation” and risked provoking “crisis of confrontation”. After South Korea detected two separate incursions of North Korean troops crossing Military Demarcation Line, a third saw 20-30 North Korean soldiers 18 June cross Military Demarcation Line, retreating after South Korean military fired warning shots; incidents mark pattern of behaviour that implies potential desire to slowly escalate.

Tensions remained high between Taiwan and China as U.S. approved more military support to Taipei and China maintained intense military activity around island. 

Elevated cross-strait tensions persisted. China Defence Minister Dong Jun 1 June warned at Shangri-la dialogue that any pursuit of Taiwan’s independence would be met with force, leading to “destruction”, and accused external forces of creating dangerous situation for island; 21 June ramped up pressure by issuing new legal guidelines to punish those it says support Taipei’s independence, notably threatening to impose death penalty against “diehard” separatists; Taiwan President Lai Ching-te of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 24 June responded by reiterating that autocracy is the real “evil”. Taiwan Mainland Affairs Council 6 June reported Taiwanese tourist detained for a few days in Fujian province, China, marking first time member of tour group was detained. Meanwhile, opposition party Kuomintang leader Fu Kun-chi 10 June criticised Lai for antagonising China and emphasised importance of maintaining friendly relations with all countries. 

U.S. continued military support to Taiwan. U.S. 18 June approved $360mn arms sale to Taiwan, including hundreds of armed drones and missile equipment. Taiwan-U.S. Defense Industry Forum 6 June held closed-door meeting in Taipei, while U.S. Pentagon 5 June approved $3bn sale of F-16 spare parts to Taiwan. Meanwhile, G7 leaders 14 June issued joint communiqué during two-day summit held in Italy, stressing importance of “peace and stability” across Taiwan Strait, affirming support for Taiwan’s “meaningful participation in international organisations” where statehood is no prerequisite or, if it is, that Taiwan be granted observer or guest status. 

China maintained military activity around Taiwan. As of 26 June, Taiwan detected 579 Chinese military aircrafts around island, of which at least 391 either crossed unofficial “median line”, entered south-western airspace or were detected within Taiwan’s de facto air defence identification zone (ADIZ). Taiwan reported 391 sightings of Chinese navy vessels in surrounding waters. Taiwanese Defence Minister Wellington Koo 18 June confirmed sighting of Chinese nuclear-powered submarine in Taiwan Strait, surfacing near Taiwan’s Kinmen Islands where it was later joined by Chinese military vessel. 

Taliban authorities prepared late-June high-level meeting on Afghanistan, third such international meeting convened under UN auspices; attacks by armed groups persisted.

Taliban authorities engaged in regional and international diplomacy. Taliban spokesperson, Zabihullah Mujahid, 30 June led Afghan delegation to two-day UN-sponsored meeting on Afghanistan held in Doha, Qatar, making it de facto authority’s first participation in third such international meeting which brings envoys from some 22 countries. Exclusion of Afghan women, civil society and non-Taliban stakeholders during this round sparked public criticism with calls by some activists for boycott of the meeting unless representation is widened. UN Special Representative for Afghanistan Roza Otunbayeva, 21 June confirmed Afghan women would not be included but insisted women’s rights would be discussed; also said UN would meet Afghan civil society actors before and after Doha meeting. Mujahid 19 June critiqued UN’s report on women’s rights violations in Afghanistan, calling it biased for “attempting to tarnish perceptions ahead of the upcoming Doha meeting”. Previously, Taliban Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani, 4 June undertook first publicised foreign visit and met UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan. UN Security Council 5 June approved travel ban exemptions for four senior Taliban members, including Haqqani, to perform Hajj pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia. 

Security situation remained volatile. Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP) 3 June claimed responsibility for assassination of Taliban commander in Ghor province (West), signalling expansion into new province. Taliban authorities 1 June claimed arrest of IS-KP members allegedly responsible for attacks against Shia community in Herat. National Resistance Forces (NRF) commander 11 June published video claiming to have returned to Afghanistan to continue struggle against Taliban; NRF 25 June claimed that it killed six Taliban members in two attacks in capital Kabul. UN 21 June reported ongoing anti-Taliban attacks in past three months.

Conflict in Myanmar’s northern Rakhine state continued to drive unrest in Bangladesh’s Rohingya refugee camps as civilians caught in crossfire fled, searching for refuge.

Rohingyas sought to leave Myanmar as fighting in Northern Rakhine intensified. Arakan Army 16 June warned “all residents to evacuate” Maungdaw, predominantly Rohingya town in Rakhine state. With thousands of civilians believed to be caught in violence, Bangladesh’s commissioner for refugees 22 June said “…our stand is that not a single more Rohingya will enter our land”; at UN Human Rights Council Bangladesh 18 June reiterated Rohingya repatriation was “only durable solution” to forced displacement. Despite govt pledges, rising number of Rohingyas continued to find ways across, either by boat or land. Home Minister Asaduzzaman Khan 20 June warned Myanmar and AA against cross-fire, threatening retaliation if cross-border shooting persisted. Myanmar 12 June had moved two military ships into Naf River close to Bangladesh territory; Bangladesh 6-14 June suspended vessel movement between Teknaf and St Martin’s Island due to fighting. 

Situation in Rohingya refugee camps remained tense but armed group recruitment slowed. Three Rohingya refugees 10 June died after clashes between Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO) and Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA); Rapid Action Battalion 10-13 June arrested six ARSA members including two commanders. RSO forced recruitment in the camps declined significantly from late May, likely due to international pressure on govt and pushback from refugees. Bangladesh 9 June repatriated 134 Myanmar security forces as Myanmar repatriated 45 Bangladeshis. 

Opposition announced major reshuffle, final voting of district chairs completed. Opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) 15 June reorganised 39 executive positions and dissolved multiple city committees, widely seen as unilateral move by chairman Tarique Rahman to consolidate power within party. Election Commission 5 June completed final round voting to elect district chairs; low voter turnout of just 34% was attributed to BNP boycott; despite ruling Awami League’s directive, 77% of winning chairs were relatives or associates of sitting AL lawmakers. 

In other important developments. PM Hasina 21-22 June visited India calling it “short but very fruitful”. Police 12 June recovered body of alleged Kuki-Chin National Front (KNF) member killed in combat. 

PM Modi won relative majority in Parliament, ethnic violence spread to Manipur’s Jiribam district, anti-Maoist operations continued in centre.

Modi won elections without outright majority. Modi 9 June sworn in as PM for third term after Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) secured 240 out of 543 parliamentary seats, 63 fewer than in 2019. With results below majority mark of 272, Modi 7 June forced to form coalition with 14 regional allies under National Democratic Alliance umbrella, now in control of 293 seats. Opposition Indian National Democratic Inclusive Alliance won 232 seats, unexpectedly high score given pro-govt political and media landscape during campaign; main opposition party of alliance, Indian National Congress, secured 99 seats, almost doubling previous share.

Violence in Manipur ran high in Jiribam district. After Meitei farmer was found dead on 6 June, under suspicious circumstances, ethnic tensions and violence rose in Jiribam, which had so far been spared by violence. Notably, suspected militants 8 June set fire on police outpost and houses, displacing 2,000 people who sought refuge in Assam state; suspected Kuki militants 10 June ambushed police convoy on way to Jiribam, injuring one security force personnel, reportedly set fire to 30 houses and two police checkposts. In high-level security meeting, Union Home Minister Amit Shah 17 June said govt would talk to both Meiteis and Kuki-zo “to bridge the ethnic divide at the earliest”. Thousands Kuki-Zo 24 June held rallies in hill districts to call for end to ethnic violence and creation of “Union territory”.

Security forces continued anti-Maoist operations in centre. In Chhattisgarh’s Bijapur district, bombs planted by Maoist 2 and 5 June injured two. In Narayanpur district, security forces 7 June shot down seven Maoists during operation; 15 June killed eight Maoists during five-day operation, which also left security personnel dead. In Jharkhand state’s West Singhbhum district, security forces 17 June killed five Maoists. In Chhattisgarh’s Sukma district, IED detonated by Maoists 23 June killed two security forces.

India-China relations remained under stress. Modi 7 June expressed desire to strengthen ties with Taiwan, after Taiwan President congratulated BJP leader on election victory; comments triggered strong diplomatic reaction from Beijing.

Poll results confirmed opposition candidates secured victory in Kashmir valley constituencies, authorities continued to misuse anti-terror laws, militant attacks and counterinsurgency operations persisted.

Muslim-majority Kashmir valley rejected ruling party’s proxy candidates. Official results shared 4 June indicated Ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) won two seats in Hindu-majority constituencies of Udhampur and Jammu. Meanwhile, in Muslim-majority Kashmir valley, opposition party National Conference (NC) secured two seats; all BJP-backed candidates lost, as did Mehbooba Mufti and Omar Abdullah, two former chief ministers from People’s Democratic Party and NC, respectively; in Baramulla constituency, people elected jailed political leader Abdul Rashid Sheikh, previously arrested in 2019 on terror-funding charges; if Sheikh is convicted, he will lose parliamentary seat and new polls will be held.

Authorities used anti-terror laws to stifle dissent. J&K administration 8 June dismissed without formal investigation four govt employees “for their involvement in anti-national activities”. Authorities 14 June charged under anti-terror law novelist Arundhati Roy and former professor from Kashmir Sheikh Shaukat Hussain for public comments made at 2010 event, seen as promoting Kashmiri separatism. Kashmiri political parties 15 June condemned use of anti-terror laws to supress dissent and criminalise free speech; 200 Indian academics, activists and journalists on around 23 June published letter demanding govt to reverse decision.

Militants launched major attack as security operations continued. In Jammu’s Reasi district, suspected militants 9 June attacked bus carrying Hindu pilgrims, killing nine and injuring more than 30 people; police 19 June claimed to arrest man who provided logistical support to militants. In Jammu’s Doda district, militants 11 June attacked security check post, wounding six people, including five security forces personnel and special police officer; during operation, militants 12 June injured another security personnel. In South Kashmir’s Pulwama district, security forces 3 June killed two alleged militants of Pakistani jihadist Lashkar-e-Taiba organisation. In Kathua district, Jammu region, security forces 11-12 June killed two militants, soldier died during operation. In Baramulla district, security forces 19 June killed two militants during operation; 22-23 June shot down suspected militant near Line of Control. Security forces 26 June also killed three militants in Doda district, Jammu region, leaving one policeman injured. 

Authorities unveiled new security plan while insecurity in regions bordering Afghanistan and internal political crisis continued. 

Relations with Afghanistan remained tense. Amid mounting tensions with Kabul, Pakistan 22 June announced new anti-terrorism plan, Operation Azm-i-Istekham (Resolve for Security) to counter extremism and militancy in the country. After backlash from Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and Pashtun nationalist parties, PM Shahbaz Sharif 24 June claimed operation was “erroneously misunderstood” clarifying that it was not all-out operation that would lead to the massive displacement of people in conflict zones. At UN 18 June Pakistan called for “concerted effort” to recover weapons from militant groups like Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Normalcy returned to Chaman district in Balochistan after protests 7 June against mandatory visa regime for cross-border travel to Afghanistan turned violent. Security forces clashed with demonstrators as they attacked govt offices, injuring at least 40 people including 17 security personnel. Chaman border crossing with Afghanistan remained closed for seventh consecutive month, causing economic losses and hardship for traders. 

Militant attacks and faith-based violence continued, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). Officials 9 June confirmed death of seven soldiers who were targeted by roadside bomb in Lakki Marwat district in KP; military 10 June claimed to have killed 11 “terrorists” suspected in attack during overnight operation between 10-11 June in Lakki Marwat District, also in KP militants were suspected of 18 June killing of prominent local journalist. News reports 16 June surfaced about death of Pakistani Taliban commander, Abdul Manan, in Afghanistan amid reports of internal strife within TTP. Faith-based violence continued. Notably, mob 20 June killed Muslim tourist from Punjab for allegedly desecrating Quran in KP’s Swat district. Police 8 June arrested man suspected of killing two men from Ahmadiyya community in Punjab’s Mandi Bahuddin district. 

Internal political deadlock continued. Islamabad High Court 3 June acquitted former PM Imran Khan and FM Shah Mahmood Qureshi in cipher case and overturned 10-year sentence. However, both faced additional charges in other cases, making likelihood of their release slim. Despite first agreeing to negotiate with govt, Khan 14 June told journalists negotiating with “powerless” govt was futile when “higher authorities” predetermined outcomes. 

Additional tranche of four-year IMF loan released amid improved economic climate; President Wickremesinghe’s challenge to Supreme Court provoked criticism.

IMF authorised disbursement of new tranche of $3bn four-year loan. Executive Board of International Monetary Fund (IMF) 12 June approved second review of Extended Funds Facility and authorised disbursement of additional $336mn as part of four-year loan. Colombo 26 June said it had sealed agreements with bilateral creditors committee led by Japan, France and India to restructure debt of $5.9bn. Official statistics released 14 June showed country’s economy grew by 5.3% in first quarter of 2024, considerably faster than 2% growth predicted by IMF for 2024. Govt’s plans to institute IMF-backed rental income tax by April 2025, designed to replace promised property, inheritance and gift taxes, sparked considerable uncertainty and criticism over impracticality and additional burdening of middle class, rather than wealthy groups govt and IMF said they intended to target.

President Wickremesinghe’s criticism of Supreme Court sparks controversy. In parliamentary session Wickremesinghe 18 June attacked Supreme Court’s 17 June determination that key elements of govt’s draft Gender Equality bill were inconsistent with constitution and needed to be removed or amended. President’s statement widely condemned with Bar Association of Sri Lanka 19 June criticising speech as “threat to Supreme Court and entire judicial system” and rejecting president’s proposed parliamentary select committee to review Supreme Court ruling as “dangerous precedent”. Senior Tamil National Alliance member M.A. Sumanthiran 18 June alleged president’s statement was part of larger plan to intimidate Supreme Court into approving constitutional amendment to extend president’s term from five to six years.

Sinhala-dominated parties appealed for support of Tamil voters in north and east. During visit to northern towns, Samagi Jana Balawegaya leader and likely presidential candidate Sajith Premadasa 9 June promised he would implement thirteenth amendment, designed to grant enough powers to provinces to satisfy demands for self-rule by Tamils in north and east. National People’s Power (NPP) and Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) leader Anura Kumara Dissanayake 11 June also visited north, said JVP party also supported “properly implementing” provincial council system, falling short of clear promise to fully implement thirteenth amendment.

Arakan Army (AA) expanded control in west, fuelling displacement, while ethnic armed groups and regime continued hostilities in north and south west. 

In west, AA continued to make battlefield progress. AA rebels 6 June escalated attacks against last regime positions in northern Rakhine state, claiming capture of key military base in Maungdaw township; AA 16 June ordered residents to leave Maungdaw town after it claimed seizure of nearly all military posts in township. Local media 23 June reported that AA had seized key regime base in Ann township vital for defence of its Western Regional Command headquarters. Further south, local sources 24 June reported AA captured Thandwe Airport and Ngapali beach resort along with 132 regime soldiers, 47 policemen and their families. Meanwhile, regime forces 11 June ordered residents to leave as they attempted to secure outskirts of Rakhine capital, Sittwe; UN Human Rights chief 18 June called military response “indiscriminate”, said displaced Rohingya communities had “nowhere to flee”. UN Food Program 25 June denounced burning and looting of its food warehouses in Rakhine.

In north, Kachin Independence Army (KIA) clashed with regime. KIA and regime forces 4 June renewed fighting near Momeik town in northern Shan state forcing 300 people to flee; KIA continued its push through eastern parts of Kachin State, seizing Sadon town on 11 June. While southern Kachin State increasingly comes under KIA control, it is facing more pushback across border in northern Shan State from other ethnic armed groups. 

In south east, Karen forces braced for tough fight. Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) prepared to defend Thingan Nyi Naung village from regime convoy attempting to cross Dawna Mountain range. KNLA has signalled its determination to keep control of strategic village despite its loss of nearby border trade town of Myawaddy. Meanwhile, regime-aligned Kayin National Army (formerly, Kayin State Border Guard Force) is in firm control of Myawaddy.

In other important developments. Regime forces 17 June arrested 13 members of Yangon-based underground group for allegedly planning to attack regime leader, Min Aung Hlaing, during 8 June ceremony for new bridge. Around 1,400 retired personnel under Reserve Forces Law, 1 June began reporting for duty.

Security operations continued in south, as authorities continued to fight communist rebels. 

Insecurity persisted in Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM). Authorities 5 June arrested senior commander of Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) in Datu Piang town for his alleged involvement in burning police car and shooting inside church in Maguindanao del Sur in 2020; suspect is accused of violating Anti-Terrorism Act and faces multiple charges including attempted murder, arson, and frustrated murder. Explosion 18 June occurred at fuel station hours after local govt declared Lamitan in Basilan province free from presence of Abu Sayyaf Group, leaving one person injured; police next day dismissed speculation of group’s involvement citing extortion as motive for attack; Basilan authorities 19 June condemned attack, saying it undermined efforts of provincial and local governments to maintain peace and order in province. Members of 118 Base Command of Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) 19 June clashed with MILF’s 105th base command in Datu Unsay municipality of Maguindanao del Sur, killing one civilian.

Clashes between security forces and communist rebels continued, notably in Mindanao and the Visayas. Amid ongoing counter-insurgency operations, military continued to exert pressure on various New People’s Army (NPA) fronts, targeting leaders of guerrilla units and their legal fronts, as many fighters surrendered over last weeks. Military 10 June announced death of one communist rebel after 9 June clash with New People’s Army (NPA) in Sultan Kudarat province, Mindanao. NPA rebels 23 June briefly clashed with security forces in north Samar, in Eastern Visayas region, killing one rebel. Hostilities, that saw rise in Luzon island, killed total of 17 and injured four during month. 

Violent maritime confrontation strained ties between Manila and Beijing, while Philippines and partners conducted military exercises.

Violent confrontation heightened tensions between China and Philippines. Chinese Coast Guard boats 17 June shoved into Philippine navy vessels attempting to resupply the Philippine ship, BRP Sierra Madre, with food supplies; Chinese coastguards reportedly seized firearms, food airdropped and cell phones, damaged four Philippine navy boats, and forcibly towed one boat during encounter. Philippines foreign ministry 19 June said eight Philippine navy personnel injured during incident including one who lost finger from Chinese boat striking into Philippine boat. Manila 19 June released video of incident showing China Coast Guard sailors brandishing axes and knives while blocking the Philippine vessel attempting to reach Sierra Madre. Incident happened after China 15 June enacted new regulation permitting its coast guards to intercept and detain for up to 60 days foreign boats and crews suspected of “trespassing” in waters it claims. For its part, China’s foreign ministry 19 June said Philippine vessels “deliberately rammed” Chinese vessels, calling incident “professional and restrained”. Philippine executive secretary 21 June said incident on 17 June did not constitute an “armed attack” and therefore does not trigger the mutual defence treaty with U.S.; Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr 27 June reiterated that 17 June incident was not an armed attack. Earlier, Philippines navy 7 June accused China of blocking medical evacuation of marine near Second Thomas Shoal calling it “barbaric and inhumane”. 

U.S. & Philippines conducted military drills with regional partners. U.S. Navy’s Theodore Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Groups 11 June initiated military exercise Valiant Shield 2024, alongside Japanese (see China/Japan), French and Canadian forces. Naval forces from U.S., Canada, Japan, and Philippines 16-17 June conducted “maritime cooperative activity” in Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone. 

Vietnam expanded its features on Spratly islands. Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative 7 June reported Vietnam accelerated land reclamation in Spratly islands, expanding its features in past six months as much as it had in previous two years; Philippine navy official 10 June said navy was monitoring situation, noting “Vietnam does not initiate illegal, coercive, aggressive, and deceptive actions against us unlike China”.

Criminal Court indicated former PM Thaksin on lèse-majesté charges, ethics case against PM Srettha continued, and deadly violence persisted in deep South.

Court indicted former PM Thaksin, Move Forward Party (MFP) continued to face threat of dissolution. Criminal Court 18 June indicted former Thai PM Thaksin Shinawatra for defaming Thai monarchy during 2015 interview with Korean newspaper; Court same day released him on 500,000 baths (or $13,600) bail and ordered him to reappear in court on 19 Aug. Amid court case about potential ban of election-winning MFP on lèse-majesté charges, former MFP leader Pita Limjaroenrat 9 June held press conference outlining party’s legal defence; Constitutional Court 18 June ordered MFP to submit deposition transcripts to court within seven days, set 3 July as date for next hearing.

Proceedings against PM Srettha Thavisin continued, senatorial elections began. Following Constitutional Court’s decision in late May to hear petition filed by 40 senators to remove PM Srettha from office on ethical grounds, court 18 June ordered individuals and agencies involved in case to submit more evidence within 15-day period, set 10 July as next hearing date. Process to select 200 senators from 20 professional and social groups began 9 June, with three rounds of intergroup polling by senate candidates at local, provincial and national levels; national-level poll concluded 26 June amid allegations of fraud, with results due on 2 July.

Violence continued in deep south. Rangers 9 June apprehended two suspected militants and 13 June discovered IED on National Highway roadside in Bannang Sata district, Yala province. In Pattani’s Nong Chik district, unknown attackers 13 June killed employee of Khor Thanyong Subdistrict Administrative Organisation as he rode his motorcycle to work. In Yala’s Bannang Sata district, suspected militants 14 June shot dead two Buddhist villagers. Gunmen 25 June killed human rights activist Roning Dolah in Yarang district, Pattani. An IED attack 27 June wounded ranger non-commissioned officer in Sri Sakhon district, Narathiwat. Militants 30 June detonated car bomb in front of police housing block in Bannang Sata district, Yala, killing one civilian and wounding 21 other people.

In another important international development. Govt 20 June submitted formal request to join BRICS, hoping to become member of group at next summit in Russia in October 2024.

President Macron suspended electoral reform that triggered deadly unrest in May, but tensions remained high as authorities began transferring detained independence leaders to metropolitan France. 

Unrest sparked by France’s proposed voting reforms early June subsided somewhat, although pro-independence militant 7 June died from injuries sustained 3 June during clashes with security forces near capital Nouméa, bringing death toll since riots started in May to nine. Road barricades also persisted in Nouméa with pro-independence militants vowing to remain mobilised until reforms are dropped. President Macron 12 June announced suspension of electoral reform bill in light of snap parliamentary polls in France, also citing need to “give full strength to dialogue on the ground and the return to order”. Authorities reopened international airport 17 June after month-long closure, but extended curfew, bans on carrying weapons, and military support to police. Security forces 19 June took into custody 11 people on allegations of instigating unrest and participating in violence, including pro-independence leader and protest movement coordinator Christian Tein; Nouméa court 22 June announced transfer of Tein and six other pro-independence militants to metropolitan France for pre-trial detention, leading to renewed unrest and violence, including outside Nouméa. Authorities reported unrest 23-24 June throughout New Caledonia’s mainland and on Pines and Mare islands, including “attacks on the police, arson and roadblocks”; security forces arrested at least 38 people. Authorities 28 June extended curfew until 8 July, and prohibited gatherings over 29-30 June election weekend as latest bout of violence fuelled fears of unrest spreading further. 

UN personal envoy continued efforts to resume talks between parties ahead of mandate expiry and Hizbollah threatened to strike Cyprus should it support Israel’s war in Gaza.

Efforts to relaunch formal talks remained stalled. UN Sec Gen’s Personal Envoy Maria Holguin’s efforts to find common ground between Republic of Cyprus and Turkish Cypriot leadership for return to formal talks remained fruitless; during month, Türkiye and Turkish Cypriots appeared opposed to extension of Holguin’s mandate beyond 5 July, while Greece and Greek Cypriots appeared open to idea. Speaking at event marking 50th anniversary of Turkish invasion of Cyprus, Turkish Defence Minister Yaşar Güler 5 June called for two-state solution in Cyprus. Holguin 21 June said “no visit” to Cyprus was planned but that she would meet Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders separately outside Cyprus in coming weeks. Council of Europe’s parliamentary assembly 27 June adopted resolution denouncing Türkiye and Turkish Cypriot leadership’s unilateral reopening of fenced-off area of Varosha city since Oct 2020 and calling for Varosha’s immediate return “to its lawful inhabitants”; Republic of Cyprus next day welcomed resolution.

Hizbollah threatened to strike Cyprus. Hizbollah in Lebanon 19 June threatened to strike Cyprus if it allowed Israel to use airports and ports to strike Gaza; Republic of Cyprus govt next day clarified “Cyprus is not involved, and will not be involved” in any military operations in Middle East. Turkish FM Hakan Fidan 24 June alleged Republic of Cyprus serves as military base for Israel’s operations in Gaza, warned of risk of regional escalation; Republic of Cyprus govt next day denied claims.

Military targeted Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in Iraq, Syria and south-eastern Türkiye, authorities continued to arrest alleged ISIS supporters, and normalisation with Greece remained on track.

Operations against PKK continued. Ahead of expected summer offensive against PKK in northern Iraq, military appeared to fortify supply lines, secure operational support from Baghdad and reinforce existing military outposts. Military also continued strikes on PKK militants. Notably, defence ministry 15-18 June and 26 June said security forces “neutralised” 11 PKK militants in northern Iraq and another 16 in northern Syria; National Intelligence Organization 26 June reportedly “neutralised” PKK leader in Jazira region of Syria, Ali Dinçer, who is wanted by Interpol. Security forces 20-21 June also carried out operations against PKK in south-eastern provinces Şırnak, Batman, and Ağrı. 

Authorities targeted alleged Islamic State (ISIS) members. Detentions during June on ISIS-linked charges continued at lower pace with police arresting at least 62 suspects. Notably, police 10 June detained 11 suspected of financing ISIS; security forces 14 June detained relative of former ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi reportedly attempting to flee Türkiye; police next day detained two ISIS members in Istanbul city allegedly planning attack.

Türkiye floated BRICS membership, looked to mend ties with Greece, Syria. During China visit, FM Fidan 3 June said Türkiye was considering BRICS membership; Russian President Putin 11 June welcomed interest, and Fidan same day attended BRICS summit in Russia. Meanwhile, Defence Minister Güler 1 June hailed “positive period” in Turkish-Greek relations. Media reports 20 June revealed that Türkiye and Greece had made joint nominations for Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) appointments. However Greek Defence Minister Nikos Dendias 24 June said ongoing disagreements, including over eastern Mediterranean/Aegean maritime zones, cast doubts on sustainable normalisation. Syrian President Assad 26 June affirmed Syria’s “openness” to relations with Türkiye conditional upon respect for Syrian sovereignty over its territory; President Erdoğan 28 June told reporters there is “no reason” not to restore diplomatic ties with Syria.

Preparations for September presidential election continued amid unrest over water shortages; national oil and gas company signed new foreign partnerships.

Ahead of upcoming polls, some parties announced candidates. President Tebboune 7 June convened electoral body for 7 Sept presidential vote, but still did not announce whether he would run. Front des Forces Socialistes, historic opposition party that has boycotted elections for 25 years, 7 June nominated national secretary Youcef Aouchiche as party’s candidate for upcoming polls; Saïda Neghza, president of main employers’ union Confédération Générale des Entreprises Algériennes, 10 June announced intention to run.

Protests erupted over water shortages. Residents 1 June rioted in Tiaret town, 300km west of capital Algiers, against weeks-long shortages of drinking water in some districts; protesters took to streets torching tires and blocking roads. Tebboune 2 June convened council of ministers and ordered them to “develop an urgent and exceptional program” to resolve problem; measures, including installing supply system relying on nearby wells, partially solved problem in central Tiaret, but issues persisted in other neighbourhoods.

National energy company sought new partnerships with foreign companies. State-owned oil and gas company Sonatrach 7 June signed agreement with China’s Sinopec and 13 June signed deal with American company Chevron, aiming to expand cooperation and boost output from southern gas fields, increasing exports. Agreements came after Sonatrach late May signed other contracts with international companies and consortiums.

In another important development. European Commission 14 June announced dispute settlement procedure against Algeria, accusing it of restricting European exports and investments in violation of 2005 trade agreement. 

Rafah border point with Gaza remained closed despite attempts to reach compromise between Egypt and Israel, while govt continued spending cuts and economic reforms. 

Rafah border crossing remained closed amid Israeli military presence. After Israel early May launched offensive on southern Gazan city of Rafah and seized control of border point – causing govt to suspend aid collaboration – Egyptian, Israeli and U.S. officials 2 June met in capital Cairo to discuss possible arrangements for reopening Rafah crossing to allow humanitarian aid to enter Gaza; govt continued to demand total Israeli withdrawal and that Palestinians or neutral actor, such as EU, manage crossing on Gazan side. FM Shoukry next day reiterated position during meeting with Spanish counterpart in Spain’s capital Madrid. Despite dialogue, border remained closed. Meanwhile, govt continued to refute suggestion it may join potential post-war multinational Arab-led military force responsible for overseeing security in Gaza.

Price hike in bread did not spark protests, despite serious economic hardship. Govt 1 June quadrupled cost of subsidised bread, marking first official price rise in 30 years; increase aimed to reduce subsidy spending in govt budget as part of plan to decrease long-term debt. Hike not met with protests or riots, despite extremely challenging economic conditions nationwide. Meanwhile, EU and govt 29 June signed agreement for €1bn financial aid to support economic reforms to boost private sector.

President reselected PM and assigned him to establish new govt. President Sisi 3 June re-appointed PM Madbouly and tasked him with forming new govt; cabinet reshuffle – expected since Sisi’s re-election in Dec 2023 – likely to take place early July. New govt expected to continue politically unpopular economic reforms in order to gain confidence of international creditors.

Deadlock between rival govts continued including over economic matters, while Russia stepped up military assistance to eastern authorities. 

UN representative called out ongoing political deadlock between rival govts. Acting head of UN mission Stephanie Koury 19 June gave first briefing to UN Security Council, highlighting need for “inclusive Libyan-led process to overcome political impasse and support Libyan people” and noting “repetitive pattern” of abductions, arbitrary arrests and detentions. Despite broader political deadlock, High National Elections Commission 9 June launched voter registration process for elections in 60 municipalities due to be held sometime this year, later extending deadline to 7 July amid high voter demand to register. 

Financial management challenges persisted despite foreign mediation. U.S. Embassy in Tunis 11-12 June hosted Libya Economic Dialogue with representatives of political and financial bodies aligned with rival east and west govts, as well as World Bank, U.S. Treasury and UN; dialogue intended to facilitate agreement between parallel govts on 2024 budget, but despite participants welcoming opportunity for discussions, forum concluded without final budgetary accord. U.S. 12 June announced sanctions against Russian state currency-printing company Goznak for allegedly printing money for east-based authorities, including $1bn of “counterfeit Libyan currency”; move came amid Tripoli govt’s allegations that counterfeit money is in circulation although east-based officials continued to claim currency is legal, printed in 2020 through agreement with east-based head of Central Bank. 

Moscow’s military footprint grew. Two Russian warships 16 June arrived at eastern Tobruk Naval Base for three-day visit, during which eastern military authorities announced 250 students had been sent to Russia for training and called for closer partnership in training, maintenance, technical and logistical support and maritime security; U.S. 22 June expressed concern over Russia’s increased military activity in country. 

Govt delayed Tunisia border reopening. Libya and Tunisia 12 June signed agreement to reopen Ras al-Jedir border crossing for humanitarian and diplomatic needs, but Tripoli 24 June delayed full reopening amid presence of local militia from nearby Libyan city of Zuwara; crossing closed since March following clashes between Tripoli-based security forces and local armed groups. 

Political tensions and scattered unrest continued ahead of presidential election due by October; govt pursued closer ties with China and Iran as EU support wavered. 

Social unrest continued amid uncertainty over presidential vote. Citizens took to social media to denounce hardline police tactics after football fans clashed with police 2 June at Hammadi Agrebi Olympic Stadium in Radès town outside capital Tunis, with sixty arrested and dozens wounded. Inhabitants of Rouai town in Jendouba governate 11 June demonstrated against lack of drinking water; police same day temporarily detained three members of NGO Tunisian Water Observatory, preventing them from covering protests. Presidential election date still unknown despite President Saïed and electoral authority being required to set electoral calendar by late July, at least three months before end of Saïed’s current mandate.

Tunis moved closer to Beijing and Tehran amid fraying relations with EU. Saïed 28 May-1 June participated in Ministerial Conference of Sino-Arab Cooperation Forum in Beijing, resulting in announcement of bilateral strategic partnership in economic, technical and cultural fields. Govt 15 June abolished entry visa requirements for Iranian and Iraqi tourists following Saïed’s late May visit to Tehran. Tensions with European actors continued to grow; despite strong partnership with Rome, Saïed declined invite to 13-15 June G7 summit in Italy, sending PM Hachani instead. EU High Representative Josep Borrell 24 June said Tunisia “very important and longstanding partner” but expressed concern over govt’s “drive closer to Russia, Iran and China”.

In another important development. With Italian support, UN 19 June officially recognised Tunis’ search and rescue zone in Mediterranean Sea as newest measure for limiting migrant flows to Europe.

Polisario Front suspected of involvement in explosion at Moroccan mining infrastructure.

Videos purportedly showing explosion at conveyor belt transporting phosphate near mine in Boucraa town, 100km east of Laayoune in Morocco-controlled Western Sahara, circulated online 4 June. Moroccan media outlets speculated group may be responsible while pro-Polisario activists spoke of planned attack; some believe Polisario also responsible for similar explosion at same phosphate conveyor belt in May 2023. Neither Polisario nor Morocco supported claim of group’s involvement, however, as former feared accusations of terrorism and latter wanted to reassure investors and international partners that Western Sahara is safe and Polisario does not pose threat. 

Amid continued political tensions, govt clamped down on press while security forces’ abuses remained prevalent.

Political tensions remained high ahead of 2025 legislative elections. As electoral commission continued preparations for polls, opposition Frodebu party – primarily ethnic Hutu party that held power briefly in 1993 – 2 June held meeting in capital Gitega; conference’s combative tone toward govt suggested party may attempt to compete strongly in next year’s polls, despite widespread political repression. Meanwhile, Supreme Court 27 June upheld life sentence of former PM Bunyoni on several charges including attempting to overthrow govt, amid reports authorities may fear his continued influence.

Govt escalated media intimidation and harassment. Political reporter for independent Iwacu outlet 4 June reported he escaped attempted arrest by two policemen in largest city Bujumbura; Iwacu 6 June said it had received warning from press regulator against breaching media guidelines after series of critical articles including on economy. Regulator 11-12 June also prohibited rebroadcast of radio debate featuring opposition leader Agathon Rwasa that focussed on national budget. Human rights group Ligue Iteka 14 June called on govt to stop harassment and intimidation of press and journalists. 

Alleged abuses by security forces remained widespread. Targeting of those linked to opposition figure Rwasa continued to cause concern after series of late May arrests and beatings by police and ruling-party youth wing Imbonerakure of Rwasa supporters in Cankuzo, Rutana and Ruyigi provinces.

In other important developments. Amid economic crisis and worsening fuel and power supply, govt 13 June passed two-year budget that observers saw as overly optimistic; National Assembly president same day threatened to reprimand MPs commenting on current crisis. Leaked UN report early June alleged Rwanda has increased backing to RED-Tabara rebel group, in line with govt’s allegations. SOS Media Burundi 25 June reported military court in Rutana 18-22 June imprisoned or fined hundreds of soldiers for allegedly refusing to fight M23 rebels alongside Congolese army in eastern DRC.

Islamic State-linked group sharply escalated attacks, killing hundreds in east; M23 rebels continued advance, new govt appointed amid political tensions. 

Jihadist violence surged in Beni and Lubero territories in North Kivu province. Islamic State-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) intensified attacks with series of deadly assaults. Group 4-7 June reportedly killed close to 100 civilians in several villages in Baswagha-Madiwe locality, Beni territory; ADF 12-13 June extended attacks to Lubero territory, further south than usual area, killing at least 40 civilians in Maikengo village. Civil society groups 15 June said militants may have killed at least 200 in previous month in Beni and Lubero. Violence also continued in neighbouring Ituri province. In Mambasa territory, ADF 11 June attacked Masongo town, killing six civilians. In Djugu territory, ethnic Lendu militia CODECO 20 June killed 25 civilians in Bianda village and same day killed at least 36 in Lodjo village.

M23 rebels extended offensive northward in North Kivu. Advancing from early June onwards, M23 28 June seized strategic Kanyabayonga town on Route Nationale 2, important gateway to commercial Butembo and Beni towns, and took Kirumba town two days later; expansion opened up access to Lubero territory, north of main hotspots of Masisi and Rutshuru territories where military and allies continued to clash with M23. Fighting displaced tens of thousands including north toward Beni territory, while thousands sought refuge in provincial capital Goma; displacement to neighbouring South Kivu province also contributed to deteriorating security and humanitarian conditions there, including in Minova town which remained in line of rebel mortar fire. Meanwhile, leaked UN report noted heavy Rwandan military presence in North Kivu (see Rwanda).

New govt took office after months of delay. National Assembly 11 June endorsed new 54-member strong govt under PM Suminwa, dominated by President Tshisekedi’s Union for Democracy and Social Progress and close associates. Sidelining or demoting of senior ruling-coalition figures and their parties – including National Assembly head Vital Kamerhe and FM Lutundula – incited discontent over perceived power grab by Tshisekedi. Meanwhile, church observation mission 17 June published final report on Dec 2023 general elections, criticising electoral commission’s handling of vote. 

Govt continued bellicose rhetoric against DR Congo (DRC), as leaked UN report suggested Kigali’s heavy involvement in neighbour’s security crisis; diplomatic initiatives remained moribund.

Kigali maintained criticism of Kinshasa govt. During 20 June press interview, President Kagame accused Congolese President Tshisekedi of reviving “genocidal ideology” targeting Congolese Tutsis and asserted govt “ready” to engage in conflict with DRC, but refused to confirm presence of Rwandan troops in neighbouring country; comments came in response to Tshisekedi’s repeated accusations since Dec 2022 of Rwanda’s support to Congolese M23 rebels and involvement in “genocide” in eastern DRC. UN Panel of Experts report leaked early June reiterated Rwandan military involvement in DRC, reporting Kigali had at least 4,000 troops in North Kivu province; report also highlighted increased Rwandan support for Burundian RED-Tabara rebels following Burundi’s troop deployment in DRC. 

Regional diplomacy continued to stall. Luanda process to bring DRC and Rwanda to negotiating table remained moribund with little sign of improvement; Angolan President João Lourenço 27 June said he was negotiating to organise meeting between Kagame and Tshisekedi “very soon”, but Congolese PM Judith Suminwa same day during visit to displacement camp in eastern DRC said Kinshasa would not negotiate with Kigali.

In another important development. National Electoral Commission 14 June announced Kagame, Frank Habineza of Democratic Green Party and independent Philippe Mpayimana as candidates for 15 July presidential election.

Military denied supporting Congolese rebel group; govt cracked down on alleged internal financial misconduct. 

Allegations of support to Congolese rebels strained ties with DR Congo. Military 13 June reiterated denials that it was clandestinely supporting Congolese rebel group M23 after leaked UN report early June contained such allegations; concerns grew that, amid reports, Congolese govt could look to end military cooperation with Uganda and joint operations against Islamic State-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces rebels in eastern DRC. Meanwhile, govt continued rapprochement with Rwanda after late May meeting of military officials in Rwanda’s Nyagatare town to discuss cross-border security issues.

Authorities launched high-profile arrests on corruption charges. Following UK April and U.S. May sanctions on various politicians over corruption, govt in June launched own anti-corruption campaign. Police 11 June arrested three MPs for allegedly soliciting bribes to manipulate 2024-2025 national budget and 19 June arrested another two over mismanagement of $36mn earmarked for compensating cooperative societies. President Museveni 18 June announced expanded anti-corruption campaign targeting local administration-level theft of public funds. 

Govt temporarily averted potential strike amid persistent fiscal policy discontent. Local traders threatening two-month strike agreed to re-schedule meeting with govt called to resolve grievances on new tax policies and additional taxes from 20 June to 31 July. Meanwhile, govt 13 June presented 2024-2025 budget with security forces bolstered through 25% salary increase – in part to address discontent among lower-ranking military personnel and amid extensive recruitment drive – while oil and gas sector’s budget allocation more than doubled.  

UN expert deplored Eritrea’s human rights record, while relations between Moscow and Asmara continued to strengthen. 

Eritrea’s human rights record came under renewed UN scrutiny. In his fourth report to UN Human Rights Council, UN special rapporteur Mohamed Babiker 20 June said situation in Eritrea remains dire, with authorities showing “little willingness to address ongoing violations”, which include “indefinite and compulsory national service, the repression of freedom of religion or belief, the state of the rule of law and the administration of justice, and violations of civil and political rights”; Babiker also noted Eritrean authorities’ growing efforts to suppress critical voices in the diaspora. Chargé d’Affaires to UN Habtom Zerai same day criticised “annual ritual of demonising Eritrea”.

Eritrea welcomed Russian naval presence in Red Sea. Speaking to Russian news agency Tass, Russian Ambassador to Eritrea Igor Mozgo 11 June said Asmara had welcomed “visits” of Russian navy ships to Red Sea and advocated “permanent presence” in region; Mozgo added that Asmara would like to see more active Russian presence in Africa to serve as “counterweight to Western influence”. Comments come after Russian Pacific fleet late March-early April visited Massawa port, indicating growing defence partnership between the two countries.

Authorities called for dialogue to end insurgency in Amhara, violence in Oromia remained rampant, and Amhara-Tigray tensions persisted despite federal efforts to tackle territorial dispute.

Peace conference took place in Amhara region amid continued hostilities. Violence between federal forces and Amhara nationalist militias known as Fano persisted, with clashes reported in West Gojjam, North Gojjam, East Gojjam, Central Gondar, South Wollo, North Wollo and North Shewa zones. State of emergency declared in Aug 2023 expired 3 June, though military command posts remained operational amid fierce battles and Fano militants’ targeting of local officials and civilians. Security forces throughout month reportedly killed dozens of civilians suspected of Fano ties, including in West Gojjam and North Shewa zones. Regional, federal and military leaders 24-25 June gathered in regional capital Bahir Dar for peace conference, resulting in formation of 15-member Regional Peace Council, comprised of prominent figures from Amhara and backed by federal govt, to facilitate talks with Fano militias.

Oromia region remained wracked by insecurity. Fano militants conducted attacks in Oromia-Amhara borderlands and deeper within Oromia, threatening to heighten inter-ethnic tensions. Notably, alleged Fano militants 15 June fought with Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) in Dera Woreda (North Shewa Zone), marking first direct clash reported between the two groups, and which left four civilians dead; suspected Fano militiamen 15 June killed dozens of civilians in Nono woreda (West Shewa Zone). Meanwhile, federal-OLA fighting continued, with OLA 8 June claiming they had killed “thousands of regime combatants”. Resumption of peace talks appeared increasingly unlikely. 

Tigray-Amhara tensions persisted. Tigray-Amhara tensions simmered amid implementation of Addis Ababa’s plan to tackle their territorial dispute (which entails dismantling Amhara-established administrations in Western and Southern Tigray and resettling displaced Tigrayans). Notably, BBC 15 June spoke with residents in Tselemt woreda (Western Tigray), who claimed that Tigray forces had killed local leaders and attempted to dismantle Amhara administration themselves, before federal forces intervened. Meanwhile, federal parliament 4 June allowed Tigray People’s Liberation Front to re-register as political party.

Relations with Mogadishu remained tense. Somalia's ambassador to UN 24 June accused Ethiopian troops of illegal cross-border incursion that led to confrontations with local security forces (see Somalia). 

Kenya-led peace talks between holdout opposition groups and govt advanced to draft agreement but faced pushback from VP Machar, economy worsened further, and new armed group emerged. 

Kenya-led peace talks yielded draft agreement opposed by VP Machar. Following talks between govt and several opposition groups that did not sign 2018 peace accord, Kenyan mediation team mid-June shared draft peace deal with parties. In addition to security, financial and judicial reforms, agreement includes provisions on unimplemented elements of 2018 peace deal, such as drafting of permanent constitution; parties worked on power-sharing section of draft, which could determine timetable for new transitional period (potentially leading to postponing of elections), as well as on revised structure of executive, legislature and judiciary. VP Machar 19 June said agreement undermined 2018 peace deal; his resistance could encourage others within coalition govt in Juba feeling disadvantaged by power-sharing formula to oppose agreement. 

Economic crisis worsened as govt sought outside financing. Economy remained in dire straits, exacerbated by breakdown of key oil pipeline in Feb due to conflict in Sudan. South Sudan Opposition Alliance MP David De Dau 19 June pressed President Kiir to urgently address crisis, warning that public employees had not been paid for months and that “hunger is looming”. Efforts to secure loans from international partners, including International Monetary Fund and Ethiopia, remained challenging due to stringent conditions attached to loans and Juba’s compromised financial credibility, alongside pipeline rupture.

Holdout opposition group splintered, leading to formation of new armed group. National Salvation Front (NAS) led by Thomas Cirillo (holdout opposition group not party to Kenya talks) splintered as top commander, Maj Gen. Kohn Kenyi Loburon, 20 June criticised Cirillo’s “poor leadership” and announced he had formed new rebel group dubbed National Salvation United Forces; defection of Loburon, who has proven adept at defending NAS territory from govt advances, represents major blow to Cirillo. 

Intercommunal violence persisted in several states. Notably, UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) 24 June announced stepped-up patrols in Unity State and Ruweng Administrative Area (RAA) following deadly cross-border clashes over stolen cattle.

Rapid Support Forces (RSF) overran Sennar’s capital and could capture entire state, expanding conflict to previously peaceful parts of Sudan; fighting in and around North Darfur’s capital El Fasher intensified further. 

RSF overran Sennar’s capital and could capture entire state. RSF rapidly advanced into Sennar state, with paramilitary 29 June storming capital Sinja, seizing military base and forcing thousands to flee; RSF could take over entire state in coming weeks, expanding hostilities to previously peaceful parts of country and bringing conflict closer to Gedaref and Blue Nile states, as well as Ethiopian border. 

Battle for El Fasher raged, increasingly involving ethnic militias. RSF continued to besiege El Fasher, last stronghold of Sudanese army (SAF) in North Darfur, launching offensives from multiple fronts in and around city with growing support from Arab militias. Meanwhile, SAF and allied Darfuri armed groups (which are mobilising mainly from Zaghawa community) intensified airstrikes and offensives in RSF-controlled eastern and south-eastern parts of El Fasher, as well as in RSF strongholds and Arab villages around North Darfur. Battle for city could lead to large-scale massacres along ethnic lines, while prolonged siege threatens to worsen already catastrophic humanitarian crisis. UN Security Council 13 June adopted resolution urging immediate halt to RSF’s siege of El Fasher, cessation of hostilities in area and unrestricted movement of civilians. 

Violent clashes continued elsewhere. In Gezira state, RSF forces 5 June attacked Wad Al-Noura village, resulting in nearly 100 deaths; RSF claimed they engaged civilian-clad militias, while locals alleged indiscriminate killing of civilians. In West Kordofan, RSF 20 June took control of state capital, Al Fula, after intense fighting with SAF. Fighting in June also persisted in Bari city south of capital Khartoum.

AU set up new committee to facilitate talks between warring parties. AU Peace and Security Council 21 June met to discuss Sudan, leading to formation of Presidential Committee led by President Museveni of Uganda and comprising one leader from each African sub-region, whose aim is to facilitate meeting between SAF leader, Gen. Abdel Fatah al-Burhan, and RSF leader, Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo “Hemedti”. 

Instability remained widespread in North West (NW) and South West (SW) regions as Anglophone crisis continued, attracting increasing domestic and international attention. 

Govt and Ambazonia rebels continued to clash. Separatists 5 June ambushed and killed municipal councilor in Zhoa commune, Menchum division (NW). Combined militias under Ambazonia Peoples Liberation Council 8 June ambushed army patrol between Muyuka and Kumba towns, with unspecified casualties. Clashes between govt forces and separatists 14-18 June in Ekondo-Titi, Mundemba and Isangele areas in Ndian division (SW) caused unknown casualties. Gunmen 17 June attacked checkpoint at entrance to Buea city (SW) killing at least one civilian. Conflict took increasing toll on taxi drivers; separatists banned taxis in Bamenda city (NW), burning down at least seven vehicles during standoff partly in response to govt’s 31 May suspension of night-time circulation of motorcycles to limit gunmen’s movements. Some drivers and bike riders in Bamenda 21 June protested against separatist violence. Meanwhile, amid confusion over one separatist faction’s call for all yellow taxis in Anglophone areas to switch to blue and white colours of Ambazonia flag, bitter wrangling erupted, with many faction leaders condemning policy and violence against taxis.

International actors sounded alarm over Cameroon’s conflicts. NGO Norwegian Refugee Council 4 June ranked Cameroon’s displacement crisis second most neglected worldwide, highlighting prolonged Anglophone conflict and jihadist insurgency in Far North (see below). At UN Security Council briefing 10 June, Russia and Japan expressed concern at violence in NW and SW, France called on parties to Anglophone crisis to pursue dialogue while South Korea called for Cameroonian-led conflict resolution initiative in Anglophone regions.  

Jihadist violence persisted in Far North. Multinational Joint Task Force continued Operation Lake Sanity to reclaim territory. In Mayo-Sava division, insurgents 6 June killed one soldier near Mora town, while troops 15 June killed two Boko Haram combatants in Amchide town. In Mayo-Tsanaga division, militants 12 June clashed with national army in Koza town, leaving one dead on each side, and soldiers 13-14 June arrested 12 Boko Haram fighters in Moskota town. Islamic State West Africa Province fighters 17 June abducted local head of fishermen’s association in Chahack area, Logone-et-Chari division. 

Govt continued campaigns against rebels and strengthened its political hand ahead of local elections; foreign nationals faced repression. 

Large-scale offensives against rebels continued. Govt, supported by Russian paramilitary Africa Corps (previously Wagner Group) and ethnic Azandé militia, continued operations that began late May against Fulani-led Unity for Peace in Central African Republic (UPC) in Haut-Mbomou prefecture; army drove UPC from area it had controlled for five years, captured two key leaders and by 8 June seized approximately 100 weapons and disarmed 80 UPC soldiers. Offensive raised concerns over increased insecurity in Haut-Mbomou as UPC fighters crossed into neighbouring DR Congo – potentially reorganising for counterattack – and of possible targeting of Fulani and Muslim civilians accused of backing rebels. Civilians suffered collateral damage from other govt-rebel conflicts. In Haute-Kotto prefecture, Coalition of Patriots for Change rebels 2 June burned houses in three villages in Ouadda sub-prefecture, forcing residents to flee after accusing them of supporting army. Meanwhile, 115 anti-Balaka militia fighters 22 June voluntarily disarmed in Kouango town, Ouaka prefecture, amid army-Russian paramilitary deployment.

Political tensions continued as govt pursued manoeuvres to solidify control. Discontent remained high in some areas like Haut-Ubangi region, where opposition enjoys support, after President Touadéra 30 May bypassed constitutional requirement to hold elections for regional governors, citing electoral commission’s financial difficulties, and appointed them directly. Opposition alliance 13 June reiterated it would boycott municipal elections due in Oct; earlier, French Ambassador to Bangui 6 June urged participation, warning of risk of permanent exclusion from political landscape, causing discontent within opposition. UN electoral adviser 4-14 June led delegation to capital Bangui to assess preparations.

Amid Russian influence, foreign nationals faced repression. Court 21 June charged Belgian-Portuguese national working for American NGO with six crimes, including terrorism, following his May arrest in Zemio town, Haut-Mbomou, reportedly ordered by Russian paramilitaries. Authorities 10 June arrested two French-Algerian nationals in Bangui as prosecutors charged them with mercenary activities; Russian propaganda networks widely broadcasted arrest. Civil society platform led by pro-Russian figure following day organised demonstration attended by around 100 in capital to condemn foreign interference and express solidarity with army.

Ruling party stepped up opposition repression following May presidential election win; govt maintained delicate balancing act with international partners.

Internal party divisions escalated as repression of opposition figures intensified. Despite election win last month, tensions within ruling-Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS) erupted amid strains of competition for govt positions; notably, physical confrontation between MPS Secretary General and party member 7 June resulted in injuries to latter. Meanwhile, concerns over domestic and international repression of opposition continued after France-based activist Charfadine Galmaye Salimi 30 May accused National Security Agency head and deputy of plotting to assassinate him in France. Police 3 June violently repressed student protest in capital N’Djamena’s ninth district, injuring at least 12 students.

Govt directed army to deploy to tackle rising crime. President Déby 18 June ordered exceptional national army deployment to address rising crime in interior following attacks by road-blocking bandits on traders in Salamat province, including 2 June near Am-Timam town that killed one and 8 June in Haraze-Mangueigne division that killed another, prompting local outcry. Meanwhile, assailants 12 June attacked Toumbao village, Logone Oriental province, killing five civilians, injuring seven and stealing 500 cattle. 

Govt deepened relations with Russia, but also defended ties with West. Russian FM Lavrov 5 June visited N’Djamena, marking further step in strengthening bilateral ties following Déby’s Jan visit to Russian capital Moscow; Lavrov praised bilateral cooperation and encouraged Chad’s support for Russia in conflict in Ukraine. Despite growing Russian influence and ongoing anti-Western rhetoric by some regime figures, govt continued to support traditional allies; authorities 7 June banned peaceful march by Revolutionary Movement for Democracy and Peace group against French presence while PM Halina 13 June reaffirmed commitment to historic Western allies but emphasised country’s right to engage with new security partners during presentation of govt program to National Assembly.

In another important development. Govt 20 June announced that fire 18-19 June engulfed military ammunition depot in N’Djamena, resulting in nine deaths and dozens of injuries. 

Political tensions heightened amid implementation of national dialogue’s proposed reforms.

Constitutional revision process received mixed reactions within political class. Recommendations from April national dialogue that political parties be suspended, and that former ruling Democratic Party of Gabon leaders have three-year ineligibility from office imposed, remained contentious; opposition parties argued measures exceeded legal bounds. Meanwhile, revision of electoral roll ahead of upcoming 2025 elections began 24 June, sparking opposition calls for transparency in process. Opposition accused interior ministry – which national dialogue recommended be in charge of running elections – of bias in favour of transitional President Nguema. Amid growing concerns, PM Ndong Sima 18 June affirmed efforts to implement as many dialogue recommendations as possible ahead of pivotal Dec 2024 constitutional referendum, but stated enacting “all” will be impossible, while Institutional Reform Minister 28 June stated govt already implementing some recommendations and would not reverse course.

In another important development. Main opposition figure Albert Ondo Ossa 11 June called for release of “genuine” results of Aug 2023 presidential election, asserting himself as rightful winner and denouncing perceived authoritarian tendencies during transition; coup d’état occurred shortly after announcement that incumbent President Ali Bongo Ondimba had won re-election. 

Kosovar and Serb leaders failed to resume EU-mediated talks on normalisation, and govt sparked criticism over land expropriation in Serb-majority north. 

EU-mediated meeting between Kosovar and Serb leaders fell through. EU High Representative Joseph Borrell 26 June said trilateral meeting between him, PM Kurti and Serb President Vučić on normalising relations, scheduled for that day, had not taken place. According to Borrell, Kurti refused to attend because Vučić had failed to meet Pristina’s conditions on key issues, including handing over Milan Radoičić, prominent figure on Kosovo Serb scene, who admitted role in paramilitary group that clashed with Pristina’s forces in 2023. Speaking after separate meetings with both leaders, Borrell warned that sides “remain far apart” on normalisation. Chief negotiators are set to meet again in Belgian capital, Brussels, in early July. 

International actors criticised Pristina for land expropriation in north. Pristina 6 June drew criticism from Quint states – France, Germany, Italy, UK and U.S., Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and EU for moving ahead with 3o May decision to finalise expropriation of over 100 parcels of land in northern Serb-majority municipalities. Govt same day defended move, saying construction of infrastructure, “including police stations”, will contribute to “ensuring the safety of citizens who have long been subjected to violence and terror by criminal gangs led by the chief terrorist Milan Radoičić”. 

Yerevan and Baku remained at odds on key issues in peace process amid spike in reported incidents along frontline; Armenia pushed to deepen cooperation with West. 

Lack of consensus with Baku on key issues could hinder efforts for peace deal. Armenia and Azerbaijan exchanged draft peace treaty during month amid recent positive momentum in peace process. Yet sides remain far apart on important issues, including withdrawal of Azerbaijani troops from Armenia and opening of road that connects Azerbaijan with its exclave, Nakhchivan. Pointing to another sticking point, Azerbaijani President Aliyev 20 June once again said Yerevan needed to amend its constitution, which includes references to former Nagorno-Karabakh. Day before, local media revealed that PM Pashinyan had instructed Council of Constitutional Reforms to draft new constitution by end of 2026. With these issues entering public domain and parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan approaching (see Azerbaijan), it remains unclear whether sides can sign peace treaty before Nov Cop29, which will be held in Azerbaijan. Meanwhile, small-scale protests against border deal continued in Armenia.

Baku reported multiple incidents along frontline. Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defence mid-June alleged several times that Armenian troops opened fire at military positions, mostly in direction of Nakhchivan. Yerevan denied involvement as PM Pashinyan 15 June suggested new bilateral mechanism to investigate border incidents, 22 June reiterated proposal after Baku reported another incident in its Kelbajar district, key flashpoint along frontline since 2020 war; Baku had not responded to proposition by end of June.

Armenia’s ties with West deepened as relations with Russia and its allies cooled. Yerevan 11 June held strategic dialogue meeting with U.S., 11-12 June hosted Armenia-EU Partnership Committee meeting amid efforts to forge closer ties with West. Meanwhile, Pashinyan 12 June reiterated that Armenia could withdraw completely from Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, next day announced he would not visit Belarus as long as Lukashenko remained president after Politico report revealed Minsk sold weapons to Baku (see Belarus).

In other important developments. Pashinyan and Turkish President Erdoğan 18 June confirmed readiness to continue with normalisation process. Yerevan 21 June announced its recognition of State of Palestine.

Baku and Yerevan remained at odds on key issues in peace process amid spike in reported incidents along frontline; Azerbaijan and Iran conducted military drills. 

Lack of consensus with Yerevan on key issues could hinder efforts for peace deal. Armenia and Azerbaijan exchanged draft peace treaty during month amid recent positive momentum in peace process. Yet sides remain far apart on important issues, including withdrawal of Azerbaijani troops from Armenia and opening of road that connects Azerbaijan with its exclave, Nakhchivan. Pointing to another sticking point, President Aliyev 20 June once again said Yerevan needed to amend its constitution, which includes references to former Nagorno-Karabakh. Day before, local media revealed that Armenian PM Pashinyan had instructed Council of Constitutional Reforms to draft new constitution by end of 2026. With these contentious issues entering public domain and parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan approaching (see below), it remains unclear whether sides can sign peace treaty before Nov Cop29, which will be held in Azerbaijan.

Baku reported multiple incidents along frontline. Ministry of Defence mid-June alleged several times that Armenian troops opened fire at military positions, mostly in direction of Nakhchivan. Yerevan denied involvement as Pashinyan 15 June suggested new bilateral mechanism to investigate border incidents, 22 June reiterated proposal after Baku reported another incident in its Kelbajar district, key flashpoint since 2020 war; Baku had not responded to proposition by end of June.

In other important developments. President Aliyev 28 June signed decree scheduling snap parliamentary elections for 1 Sept. On international front, Azerbaijan and Iran 13 June conducted joint military exercise in latter’s West Azerbaijan province amid thawing relations; Paris 18 June announced deal to sell around 30 CAESAR self-propelled howitzers to Armenia amid deteriorating relations with Baku; top Italian officials 26 June met Aliyev and FM Bayramov in Baku, resulting in agreement to bolster ties; and top U.S. official James O’Brien 28 June met with Aliyev to discuss COP29 and peace deal, indicating possible warming of relations following tensions in recent months.

Parliament enacted contentious ‘foreign agents’ legislation, prompting West to impose punitive measures; South Ossetia held parliamentary elections.

Parliament enacted “Foreign Agents” bill and other controversial legislation. Parliament speaker Shalva Papuashvili 3 June signed into law ‘foreign agents’ bill, which compels NGOs and independent media receiving over 20% of their funding from abroad to register as entities “representing the interests of a foreign power”; law comes into full force in August. Many of Georgia’s most prominent NGOs continued to vow defiance, dubbing measure the “Russian law” for its resemblance to Moscow’s own bill used to stifle dissent. Meanwhile, ruling Georgian Dream party moved ahead with other controversial legislation. Notably, Papuashvili 4 June ratified “offshore law” easing movement of offshore assets to Georgia and raising fears country could become hub for illicit funds benefiting Georgian Dream’s billionaire founder, Bidzina Ivanishvili, and his allies; parliament 27 July adopted bill limiting rights of LGBTQI+ community in first reading.

West imposed punitive measures on ruling party. In response to foreign agents law, U.S. State Department 6 June announced visa restrictions on dozens of ruling party members and their families, hinted that more sanctions would follow unless Georgia’s leaders “reconsider their actions”. EU High Representative Joseph Borrell 24 June announced EU will “downgrade our political contacts” with Georgia and reconsider financial assistance, all while reiterating threat to country’s EU path. 

South Ossetia held legislative elections, among most competitive yet. Thousands of voters in breakaway region South Ossetia 9 June headed to polls to elect legislature. Nykhas party, led by current de facto president Alan Gagloyev, secured majority with 10 out of 34 seats; opposition United Ossetia party, led by Anatoliy Bibilov, came second with seven seats. Polls among most competitive since Russia recognised region’s independence in 2008, with high participation from various political parties, raising hopes for more vibrant political scene going forward. Georgia, U.S., EU and other Western countries dismissed election as illegitimate. 

Dagestan witnessed deadly terrorist attack, while Putin issued maximalist ceasefire demands to Ukraine and threatened reprisals after U.S. allowed Kyiv to use its weapons on Russian soil to defend Kharkiv region. 

Terrorist attack in Dagestan left at least 21 dead. Gunmen 23 June targeted Orthodox churches, synagogue and police post in two cities in impoverished Dagestan region, killing at least 21, including priest and 16 police officers; five gunmen were also killed. No group claimed responsibility for violence, which came three months after ISIS carried out deadly attack on Crocus City Hall in Moscow. UN human rights experts 27 June urged authorities to address issues that help fuel “extremist ideologies”, including “strengthening rule of law, tackling impunity for past and present human rights violations (and) addressing socioeconomic inequalities” in region. 

President Putin issued ceasefire demands to Ukraine. Putin 14 June promised to order “immediate” ceasefire and talks if Kyiv withdrew troops from four regions annexed by Russia in 2022 (comprising fifth of Ukraine’s territory) and abandoned plans to join NATO; other demands included ‘denazification’ and lifting of Western sanctions. Kyiv same day dismissed conditions as “absurd”. Meanwhile, Putin continued campaign to delegitimise Ukrainian President Zelenskyy, 7 June claiming he “usurped” power and that Moscow will only negotiate with Ukraine’s legislature. 

U.S. allowed Kyiv to use its weapons on Russian soil to defend Kharkiv. Drone attacks targeting key infrastructure in Russia occurred almost daily. Meanwhile, Ukraine began using U.S.-supplied weapons to strike Russian borderlands after U.S. President Biden loosened restrictions for defence of Kharkiv region late May (see Ukraine); Washington still prohibits use of U.S.-supplied long-range missiles on Russian territory. Putin 5 June threatened “asymmetric response”.

West imposed more sanctions on Russia as Putin strengthened alliances. U.S. Treasury 12 June announced sweeping secondary sanctions on third parties supporting Russia’s war economy; EU 24 June adopted 14th sanctions package. Meanwhile, Putin 14 June called for creation of ‘Eurasian security architecture’, claiming that “Euro-Atlantic Security system” was collapsing; 19 June signed defence pact with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (see Korean Peninsula); and 19-20 June strengthened ties with Vietnam.

Minsk conducted more nuclear drills with Moscow, UN condemned govt repression, and Western neighbours sought to tighten borders. 

Belarus conducted nuclear drills with Russia. Belarus and Russia 12 June launched second stage of non-strategic nuclear weapons drills, following first exercises in May. Meanwhile, Minsk 29 June accused Ukraine of amassing troops near Belarussian border; Chief of General Staff next day said Belarus could use nuclear weapons if “sovereignty and independence are endangered”. 

UN condemned Belarus’ human rights record. In report produced ahead of UN Human Rights Council session 18 June-12 July, UN special rapporteur warned that human rights situation in Belarus had deteriorated further in past year. Meanwhile, U.S. 24 June designated Belarus a “state sponsor of human trafficking” in its annual human trafficking list.

In important international developments. Armenian PM Pashinyan 13 June announced he would not visit Belarus as long as Lukashenko was president after leaked documents published in Politico revealed Belarus sold weapons to Azerbaijan between 2018 and 2022. Latvian Defence Ministry 18 June announced allocation of €10mn to help fortify border with Belarus and Russia. Polish FM 23 June said Warsaw was considering closing border with Belarus amid fears about illegal migration. EU 29 June adopted new trade restrictions on Belarus to curb Russian sanctions evasion.

U.S. sanctioned pro-Russian governor of Gagauz autonomous region, while EU launched accession talks with Chișinău. 

U.S. 12 June imposed sanctions on pro-Russian governor of Gagauz autonomous region, Evgenia Gutul, accusing her of facilitating “fugitive convicted oligarch Ilan Shor and his Shor Party, and their Kremlin-backed illegal political interference efforts”. Meanwhile, EU 25 June launched accession talks with Moldova after European Commission 7 June announced country met all necessary criteria to begin negotiations.

Ukraine’s forces stemmed Russian assault into Kharkiv region, stabilising northern frontline as fighting in east continued; Zelenskyy stepped up efforts to rally international support.

Ukraine contained Russian offensive in north as fighting in east persisted. Ukraine managed to contain Russia’s ground assault into Kharkiv region, helped by use of U.S.-supplied weapons in Russian borderlands after restrictions on their use on Russian soil loosened late May (see Russia). In east, Russian forces exploited relocation of Ukrainian troops north by stepping up attacks in Donetsk region, notably pursuing efforts to seize strategic town of Chasiv Yar. 

Russian airstrikes persisted as Ukraine targeted Crimea. Russian strikes continued to target Ukrainian cities and energy infrastructure amid lack of air defence, with Kharkiv bearing brunt of attacks; notably, bomb 22 June struck apartment building, killing three and wounding dozens. Meanwhile, Kyiv 23 June targeted Russian-annexed Crimea; Russian Ministry of Defence same day blamed U.S.-supplied ‘ATACMS’ missile, diverted by air defence, for killing at least four and wounding over 150 on busy beach in Crimea’s Sevastopol city near air base.

Peace summit took place in Switzerland. President Zelenskyy 15-16 June held peace summit in Switzerland in hopes of persuading critical mass of non-Western countries to back his ten-point ‘peace formula’. 78 of 92 participants signed joint communiqué on three of ten points, though signatures of key non-Western countries, including China, India, South Africa, Saudi Arabia and Brazil, were missing. Earlier, Putin 14 June laid out Kremlin’s conditions for ceasefire and negotiations, which Kyiv called “absurd” (see Russia).

Foreign partners bolstered support to Kyiv. Notably, Group of Seven (G7) leaders 13 June agreed on $50bn loan for Ukraine, to be repaid using interest from some $300bn in frozen Russian assets. U.S. President Biden and Zelenskyy same day signed ten-year bilateral security agreement, while several countries pledged more air defence. South Korea 20 June said it would consider sending arms to Ukraine after North Korea and Russia day earlier signed treaty containing mutual defence article; move would represent radical departure from Seoul’s long-standing policy of not supplying weapons to countries at war. EU 25, 27 June launched accession talks and signed security agreement with Kyiv.

Court acquitted activists detained for opposition to border deal with Uzbekistan; Bishkek signed transport deal with Beijing and Tashkent, and strengthened ties with EU.

Month saw progress and setbacks for freedom of expression. Court in capital Bishkek 14 June acquitted over 20 activists and politicians detained in Oct 2022 for protesting border deal with Uzbekistan, in which govt handed over Kempir-Abad reservoir in return for land. Meanwhile, court hearings for 11 current and former staff from Temirov Line media outlet, detained in Jan for allegedly calling for “mass riots”, began 7 June; watchdog Committee to Protect Journalists 13 June warned that sentencing the journalists “would mark a terrible watershed in a country historically seen as Central Asia’s ‘island of democracy’”. 

Bishkek signed regional economic deal with Uzbekistan and China. Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and China 6 June signed deal on railway project. All three leaders attended ceremony via video link as Beijing’s Minister of Transport said “project demonstrates the common aspiration for cooperation and development shared by the three countries”; President Japarov said project would enhance regional connectivity and economic ties. 

EU and Kyrgyzstan bolstered ties. EU and Kyrgyzstan 25 June signed Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in Belgian capital Brussels, which EU described as “an important milestone in strengthening bilateral relations”.

U.S. authorities arrested eight Tajik nationals with suspected ties to ISIS, and China’s president prepared for July visit to country.

Media 11 June reported arrest of eight Tajik nationals in U.S. with possible ties to Islamic State (ISIS); according to U.S. media, arrests raised concerns among national security officials about potential terror attacks on U.S. soil. Russian authorities previously arrested number of Tajik nationals for alleged role in deadly attack at Moscow concert hall in March. Meanwhile, China’s Foreign Ministry 30 June announced that, beginning 2 July, Chinese President Xi Jinping would attend Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Kazakh capital, Astana, and visit Tajikistan.

Tashkent signed deal with Beijing and Bishkek on railway project.

Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and China 6 June signed deal on railway project as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. All three leaders attended ceremony via video link as Beijing’s Ministry of Transport said “project demonstrates the common aspiration for cooperation and development shared by the three countries”; President Mirziyoyev said railway would boost regional trade ties and cooperation.

Detention of Nigerien nationals ratcheted up bilateral tensions; threat of jihadist spillover from neighbouring countries remained high.

Diplomatic standoff with Niger continued with arrest of Nigerien oil workers. Bilateral tensions persisted as Niger refused to reopen its land border and oil exports through shared pipeline faced blockages from both govts. Authorities 5 June arrested five Nigeriens working for Chinese-Nigerien operator of pipeline (WAPCo), alleging they fraudulently attempted to access oil terminal and accusing them of spying; in response, Niamey next day blocked oil exports from their side and 8 June denounced “kidnapping” of workers (see Niger). Govt 13 June released two of those detained but 17 June convicted other three, including WAPCo deputy director general, of falsifying data, giving them 18-month suspended sentence; relatively lenient sentence seen by many as attempt at compromise while former presidents Bony Yayi and Soglo 25 June travelled to Niger and met Nigerien President Gen. Tiani and PM Zeine in attempt to ease tensions; oil exports, however, remained on hold. 

Jihadist violence continued in north. Pendjari National Park and others including W Park remained vulnerable to jihadist infiltration from Burkina Faso and Niger despite ongoing deployment of troops in area. Notably, gunmen 4 June killed seven soldiers in ambush near Tanguieta town in Pendjari park in Atacora department near Burkina Faso border.

Jockeying between major political players continued ahead of 2025 presidential election.

Figures from ruling Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace (RHDP) continued to call for President Ouattara to stand as candidate in Oct 2025 presidential election; during speech to Congress, Ouattara 18 June praised his govt’s achievements and country’s economic growth under his rule, but did not clarify whether he intended to run for fourth term. Main opposition party Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) leader Tidjane Thiam 22 June began national tour with rally in Soubré city, Nawa region, criticising govt’s record and calling on PDCI activists to encourage voter registration across country.

Junta kept tight control over political parties and media, while forcing aside former military ally; Russia sought further influence over Conakry.

Junta tightened control over political parties and media. Govt 19 June began evaluation of political parties’ compliance with rules on their activities including financing, only one year after last assessment; in lead up, opposition Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea (UFDG) VP Fodé Oussou Fofana 6 June described process as “way of keeping busy, of distracting, of finding alibis to avoid getting to essential issues” and voiced fears govt might ban main opposition parties, while UFDG leader and former PM Cellou Dalein Diallo same day expressed doubts about junta’s intention to restore constitutional order. Media regulatory body 13 June suspended two of its commissioners after they accused President Col. Doumbouya of giving money to media owners to gain favours; latter same day filed defamation complaint against suspended commissioners. Against backdrop of restrictions on press freedom, Guinean Social Forces Forum, comprising civil society actors, 22 June called for civil disobedience and strike action until restoration of media rights and release of jailed journalists.

Authorities imprisoned former army chief of staff Sadiba Koulibaly, who later died. Military court 14 June sentenced Koulibaly, previously prominent Doumbouya ally, to five years in prison for “desertion and illegal possession of weapons” and removed him from army; junta same day dismissed 40 officers and non-commissioned officers for desertion. Govt 25 June announced Koulibaly had died in prison of cardiac arrest, but lawyers’ union 27 June called for independent investigation as much remained unclear about circumstances surrounding death. Case raised speculation that ruling elite may be concerned about internal discord and threats to Doumbouya’s position.

Govt enhanced ties with Russia. Russian FM Lavrov 3 June began Africa tour with visit to capital Conakry, meeting Doumbouya and FM Kouyaté; both sides expressed commitment to strengthening security, diplomatic and economic cooperation, although Doumbouya also said “Guinea remains an open, sovereign country that cooperates with everyone”.

Insecurity remained widespread as jihadist, bandit and separatist violence persisted despite security forces’ operations against armed groups.

Army reported gains against jihadists in North East, but groups remained threat. Govt’s “clearance campaign” against Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Boko Haram militants around Lake Chad and Sambisa Forest in Borno state made some gains including troops 2-6 June raiding four ISWAP camps in Bama, Marte and Ngala areas, reportedly killing over 100 insurgents; soldiers 15 June destroyed multiple ISWAP camps around southern shore of Lake Chad, rescuing 34 women and children held captive by group. ISWAP, however, continued attacks on civilian population in north east of Borno in attempt to reassert control. Notably, militants 10 June abducted unconfirmed numbers of travellers along Maiduguri-Damaturu highway. Three suspected female suicide bombers 29 June attacked several locations in Gwoza town, near Cameroon border, killing 32 people and wounding 42.

Banditry remained widespread in North West and North Central zones. Security forces continued ground and air campaign against armed groups including Kaduna state govt 13 June saying it had killed notorious bandit leader alias Buharin Yadi and almost 40 others in Giwa and Sabuwa areas, while airstrikes 15 June killed over 80 armed group members in Katsina state’s Faskari area. Despite military operations, armed groups continued attacks and abductions including in Kaduna, Katsina, Niger and Sokoto states. Notably, in Katsina, gunmen 4 June killed at least 30 in several villages in Dutsin-Ma and Safana areas, while in Kankara area bandits 9 June killed 26 people including four police officers and kidnapped dozens in two villages. In Sokoto, armed group 16 June attacked village in Gwadabawa area, killing six and abducting over 100. 

South East recorded uptick in violence between security forces and separatists. In Abia state, troops 8 June raided camp of separatist group Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) armed wing Eastern Security Network (ESN) in Arochukwu area, killing six. Authorities blamed IPOB/ESN for 11 June killing of two police officers and one civilian in Ikeduru area, Imo state. 

Nationwide unrest over finance bill left dozens of protesters dead as demonstrators stormed parliament, with hundreds injured or detained; police mission to Haiti began deployment.

Unrest erupted as thousands demonstrated over proposed tax increases. Spontaneous protests, largely driven by middle-class youths organising themselves on social media, 18 June erupted in capital Nairobi against controversial finance bill containing new taxes that many fear will raise already high cost of living and cause job losses; police arrested dozens and used tear gas and water cannons, wounding several demonstrators. Parliamentary finance committee same day announced it would drop certain clauses, although many controversial levies remained including on cancer treatments and female sanitary products. As protests 20 June resumed and spread to towns and cities nationwide, clashes with security forces reportedly left 200 injured; in Nairobi, police allegedly shot and killed one protester, while another reportedly died when hit by tear gas canister. Demonstrators 25 June stormed parliament after lawmakers passed bill, setting fire to parts of building; medic groups said at least 23 killed as police allegedly shot live-rounds to disperse demonstrators. President Ruto next day said he would not sign bill into law and would engage in dialogue with youth. Protests persisted 27 June, albeit at smaller scale, with some members of defence forces deployed in Nairobi to ensure calm.

Attacks bearing Al-Shabaab hallmark persisted in north east. Gunmen 2 June killed village elder in Malamande village in Lamu county, while police 5 June discovered explosive device at border point with Somalia in Mandera county, and assailants 7 June killed four construction workers near border in Garissa county. 

Nairobi-led multinational police mission to Haiti arrived after delays. Amid domestic opposition challenging legality of deployment of 1,000 Kenyan police to lead UN-backed mission to Haiti, Kenyan police chief 18 June met Haitian counterpart to assure him of support, while U.S. same day authorised over $100mn to support mission; first batch of several hundred Kenyan officers 25 June arrived in Haiti (see Haiti). 

Ruling coalition secured majority in parliament in May legislative elections, but political climate remained tense with reports of widespread fraud.

Political tensions remained high in immediate aftermath of 29 May legislative elections. Notably, demonstrations 30 May broke out in Tsihombe municipality, Androy district, with electoral office set on fire as opposition denounced apparent irregularities in vote such as ballot stuffing; country’s largest electoral observation mission, Safidy Observatory, 1 June denounced “worrying incidents” during polls including distribution of money and food to voters by candidates, and questioned neutrality of National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI); candidates from President Rajoelina’s Irmar political alliance same day accused opposition of paying for votes. After CENI provisional results 11 June showed Irmar had won relative majority, High Constitutional Court 27 June rejected most opposition complaints and gave three additional seats to govt coalition, announcing Irmar had secured 84 out of 163 parliamentary seats, while main opposition alliance of two former presidents won 22. Meanwhile, authorities 17 June released under judicial supervision independent MP who had filed complaint about election-day irregularities and who police had arrested 31 May for allegedly organising protests in Tsihombe.

Islamic State militants remained active in northern Cabo Delgado province; tensions over general elections set for October continued to grow. 

Islamic State Mozambique Province (ISMP) militants remained threat in north. Insurgents continued to move freely around districts of Cabo Delgado including along coast in Macomia, Mocímboa da Praia and Quissanga, with several villages in all three districts left deserted as people feared for safety; reports of presence of group 19 June caused panic in Macomia town, which suffered large-scale assault in May. Violence continued as ISMP 19 June attacked Mbau town, Mocímboa da Praia, where Rwandan and local militia troops are stationed, reportedly killing four civilians; at least one soldier killed same day in Nambala village, Macomia, after triggering explosive device set by insurgents. ISMP also increased activity in Cabo Delgado’s southern districts of Chiúre, Mecufi and Metuge, raising concerns over potential attack near provincial capital Pemba; in Chiúre, residents of Mazeze town 18 June sought refuge in forest amid militant movement nearby. Threat of spillover to neighbouring Nampula province, where militants were spotted 18 June, also remained prevalent. Despite insecurity, govt continued to downplay severity of situation; President Nyusi 16 June said govt and international forces had managed to expel militants from district capitals and destroyed all of group’s permanent bases, although observers questioned assessment. 

Political tensions mounted ahead of Oct votes. Confusion and uncertainty around upcoming general elections remained high with parties and electoral commission differing on electoral calendars, campaigning rules and more. Nyusi’s 30 May veto of revision to electoral law that would have allowed district courts to order recounts fuelled concerns over potential restrictions on free and fair vote; electoral commission 10 June admitted it had inadvertently registered over 800,000 non-existent voters, primarily in ruling FRELIMO party strongholds. Meanwhile, thousands of voters in Cabo Delgado were unable to register or collect voting cards due to insecurity.

Ruling African National Congress (ANC) lost parliamentary majority in landmark election but formed unity govt; largest opposition party challenged results in court. 

President Ramaphosa re-elected to lead broad coalition. Electoral commission 2 June announced results of 29 May general election as incumbent ANC lost parliamentary majority for first time since democratic transition in 1994, securing 40% of vote and 159 out of 400 parliamentary seats, down from 57.5% and 230 in 2019; centrist-right Democratic Alliance came second (22%, 87 seats) followed by new uMkhonto weSizwe party (MKP) led by former President Zuma (14.5%, 58 seats). Electoral authorities declared polls “free and fair”, dismissing allegations of widespread irregularities lodged by MKP. ANC 14 June signed statement of intent with Democratic Alliance and Zulu nationalist Inkatha Freedom Party to form govt of national unity, ensuring that new parliament 15 June re-elected Ramaphosa as president. ANC 17 June invited all parties to participate in coalition and ten (including ANC) agreed to join, giving unity govt 287 seats in parliament. MKP and populist Economic Freedom Fighters declined, choosing to form “progressive” opposition caucus in parliament instead. After fraught negotiations between ANC and Democratic Alliance over number of cabinet posts for each party, Ramaphosa 30 June announced 32-member multi-party cabinet comprising 20 ANC ministers, six from Democratic Alliance and rest from several small parties. 

Opposition party led by former president alleged election rigging. MKP leader Zuma 2 June rejected results and demanded election re-run as he claimed polls suffered from serious irregularities. Party 16 June launched legal challenges seeking to declare election invalid without providing evidence of malfeasance; MPs from MKP stayed away from 14-15 June first sitting of parliament and Ramaphosa’s 19 June inauguration but were sworn in 25 June.  

Police arrested and charged main opposition party interim leader and dozens of supporters; President Mnangagwa’s remarks sparked diplomatic spat with Zambia. 

Police arrested opposition members at gathering. Police 16 June arrested at least 80 youth members of opposition Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC), including interim party leader Jameson Timba, who gathered at Timba’s private residence in capital Harare; authorities next day charged 77 detainees with “gathering with intent to promote public violence and disorderly conduct”; as detainees appeared in court 18 June, Tinashe Chinopfukutwa from Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights reported his clients had been abused upon arrest. Harare court 27 June denied bail to defendants, as police reportedly beat dozens and arrested several CCC supporters protesting outside. Rights group Amnesty International 19 June called for “immediate release” of detainees and investigations into allegations of torture. 

Mnangagwa railed against neighbours in leaked video, causing diplomatic spat. Video emerged of Mnangagwa accusing Zambia and Malawi of colluding with U.S. “both in terms of security and in terms of financial support” to isolate govt, and asking Russian President Vladimir Putin for support including in defence matters; meeting between both leaders took place 13 June on sidelines of St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. Zambian FM Haimbe 20 June rejected suggestions as “unwarranted attacks” and called on AU and Southern African regional body SADC to mediate talks with Mnangagwa’s govt; U.S. 27 June said claims it was militarising Zambia “absolutely false”.

Al-Shabaab conducted large-scale assault on central town while Jubaland forces took back area outside Kismayo city; clan violence persisted while tensions remained high with Ethiopia. 

Militants conducted attack in centre, security forces advanced in south. In most significant attack in Galmudug state (centre) since March, Al-Shabaab 8 June launched assault on govt forces in Ceel Dheere town; militants initially overran army positions and entered town but troops forced them back and regained some territory toward Ali Yabal village; authorities claimed to have killed 47 militants and reported loss of five soldiers. In Jubaland state (south), security forces began clearing road between Kismayo and Kulbiyow towns, 10 June seizing Buulo Xaaji town. As drawdown of AU mission (ATMIS) continued, AU Peace and Security Council 20 June endorsed post-ATMIS mission to focus on securing key urban centres and logistical nodes. Concerns remained high over Islamic State (ISIS)’s growing profile after U.S. in May conducted first anti-ISIS operations in country since Jan 2023 with airstrike in Bari region (Puntland state).

Clan violence erupted, notably in Galmudug. Clashes between Marehaan and Dir sub-clans 8 June erupted in Laandheere village, Abudwaq district, Galgaduud region, killing over 50. Other clashes reported in June between various clans in Galgaduud, Lower Shabelle and Mudug regions as govt’s previous reconciliation efforts appeared to have failed to resolve grievances or stem violence.

Ethiopia-Somaliland port deal continued to aggravate govt. Despite reported Turkish attempts to mediate between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa and Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani 12 June speaking to President Mohamud and Ethiopian PM Abiy in separate calls, little progress made towards rapprochement. Concerns grew over impact of tensions on security as govt officials late May-early June asserted Ethiopian forces would not be part of security picture post-ATMIS unless Addis Ababa retracts deal with Hargeisa; govt’s ambassador to UN 24 June accused Ethiopian troops of cross-border “incursion” into Hiraan region.

In other important developments. Puntland President Said Deni 15 June declared readiness for direct talks with federal govt over issues of contention. UN Security Council 6 June elected Somalia to non-permanent seat for two-year term starting Jan 2025.

Tensions continued to mount ahead of concurrent party and presidential elections scheduled for 13 Nov amid concerns votes may not take place on time. 

As opposition continued to allege partiality of National Election Commission in favour of President Bihi, body’s chairperson 5 June warned ruling Kulmiye party against undermining commission’s autonomy. Disagreements persisted over election technology as some Kulmiye officials continued to push for deployment of eye scanners at polling stations to confirm voter identities, while opposition Waddani party raised doubts about practicality. Adding to tensions, govt 20 June arrested Waddani supporter at Hargeisa airport upon his return to country, sparking protests. Clan-based political tensions could also hinder elections after Bihi 9 June stated members of Gacaan Libaah movement that rebelled against govt in Aug 2023 would face trial, contradicting previous agreement and potentially reigniting dispute. Meanwhile, Horseed political association 2 June reiterated decision not to participate in upcoming party elections, alleging system favoured three officially recognised political parties.

Industrial action compelled authorities to back down over union leader’s arrest; tensions rose among ruling powers.

Union action forced govt to reverse arrest, but civil liberties crackdown continued. Authorities 5 June arrested Hamadoun Bah, head of banking union and deputy leader of country’s largest union, on forgery charges amid union dispute; unions criticised arrest, which some see as likely tied to Bah’s criticism of justice system. Following arrest, bank and gas stations 6-10 June held strikes backed by other unions, demanding unionist’s release. After apparent intervention by President Col. Goïta, authorities 10 June freed Bah. Meanwhile, imprisoned former head of state security Kassoum Goïta and former colonel Alpha Yaya Sangaré remained missing; unidentified individuals 31 May abducted both men from cells. Security forces 8-27 June detained journalist after he covered small anti-govt demonstration in capital Bamako. Authorities 20 June arrested 11 political leaders at private meeting of alliance of political parties and civil society groups, following April suspension of political parties’ activities. 

Rifts between military authorities and civilian PM exposed. PM Maïga 18 June called for continued support to Goïta; in apparent sign of dissatisfaction, however, PM also endorsed M5-RFP political movement’s May statement criticising removal of M5-RFP ministers from office in July 2023 and military’s unilateral decision to prolong transition; move came after late May arrest of chargé de mission at Maïga’s office over his role in statement. Political tensions with opposition continued after govt-in-exile led by former supreme court lawyer Mohamed Chérif Koné formed late May, and Bamako court late May refused to dissolve opposition SADI party led by exiled activist Oumar Mariko; capacity for Koné and Mariko to mobilise major domestic opposition to military authorities remained remote.

Violence persisted across north and centre. Al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims 5 June claimed to have killed Islamic State Sahel Province commander in Fitili area, Gao region (north). Military 13 June reported repelling ambush near Douentza town, Douentza region (centre).

In another important development. Sweden 20 June announced closure of embassies in Bamako and Burkinabé capital Ouagadougou, establishing embassy covering regional activity in Senegalese capital Dakar. 

Tensions with Benin remained high, while armed groups supporting deposed President Bazoum launched attacks; govt continued reorganising foreign alliances.

Diplomatic standoff with Benin continued with arrest of Nigerien oil workers. Authorities during month persisted with refusal to reopen land border with Benin, while oil exports through shared pipeline continued to face blockages from both govts. Amid tensions, Beninese authorities 5 June arrested five Nigerien nationals working for Chinese-Nigerien operator of pipeline (WAPCo), alleging they fraudulently attempted to access oil terminal and accusing them of spying. Niamey next day blocked oil exports in protest and 8 June reiterated allegations French forces in northern Benin were training “terrorists” to destabilise Niger. After Cotonou 17 June gave three of the detainees 18-month suspended sentence, two former Beninese presidents 25 June travelled to Niger in attempt to ease tensions, though oil exports remained on hold (see Benin). 

Supporters of former president Bazoum launched attacks. Patriotic Liberation Front, pro-Bazoum armed group, 12 and 16 June attacked Niger-Benin pipeline in Dosso region, killing six soldiers in first attack and reportedly putting it out of commission in second; another group supporting Bazoum, Patriotic Front for Justice, 21 June kidnapped regional official and four others, reportedly killing another, in Bilma city, Agadez region; both groups called on China to cancel oil exports until Bazoum freed. Meanwhile, supreme court 14 June lifted Bazoum’s immunity in treason case.

Jihadist violence persisted in Diffa and Tillabery regions. In Diffa, military 11 June reportedly clashed with Boko Haram near Bagara village, six militants killed. In Tillabery, Islamic State Sahel Province 9 June killed 24 civilians in two attacks in Tera department, while militants likely affiliated with al-Qaeda 25 June killed at least 20 soldiers and one civilian near Tassia village.

Govt continued military and international realignment. Russian Deputy Defence Minister 3 June met President Gen. Tiani and PM Zeine to discuss defence and energy cooperation. Withdrawal of U.S. troops formally began 7 June, to be completed by 15 Sept. Meanwhile, authorities 2o June revoked French company Orano’s operating permit for uranium mine.

Israel escalated deadly violence in West Bank and approved plans to recognise illegal settlements, while Israeli assault on Gaza Strip continued; Israel and Hizbollah intensified cross-border attacks, threatening expanded conflict.

Israeli security forces and settlers stepped up attacks across West Bank, govt approved plans to “legalise” settlements. Notably, Israeli forces 11 June killed six Palestinians in Kafr Dan village; Israeli airstrike 30 June killed Palestinian and injured five in Nur Shams refugee camp. UN Security Council members, including U.S., 25 June voiced concern about escalating violence in West Bank and expansion of illegal settlements. Israeli govt 27 June approved plan to “legalise” five settlement outposts illegal under Israeli law. 

Israel killed hundreds in operation to free hostages in Gaza. Israel’s June operations in Gaza killed over 1,500, bringing total death toll since Oct to at least 37,765 Palestinians. In central Gaza, Israeli forces 8 June launched operation in Nuseirat refugee camp, rescuing four Israeli hostages while killing 274 Palestinians. In south, Israel continued incursion into Rafah and 17 June claimed control of 70% of city. Israel maintained control of Gaza-Egypt border and Rafah crossing remained closed. Israel Defense Forces 16 June announced “tactical pause” in fighting during daylight along main road in southern Gaza to allow aid in from Kerem Shalom crossing; PM Netanyahu denounced pause. Israeli military 27 June ordered evacuation of residents east of Gaza city, displacing estimated 60,000-80,000 and leaving around 78% of Gaza Strip under evacuation orders. 

Ceasefire proposal made no headway and Israeli war cabinet dissolved. Following U.S. President Biden’s ceasefire proposal outlined late May, negotiations remained stalled, with Hamas demanding Israel’s commitment to permanent ceasefire and withdrawal from Gaza, and Israel refusing to endorse end of war. Meanwhile, centrists Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot 9 June left Israeli war cabinet and coalition govt, citing failure to set out post-war plan for Gaza, and Netanyahu 17 June dissolved war cabinet. Israeli Supreme Court 25 June ruled to end military exemption for ultra-Orthodox men, setting stage for tensions in coalition.

Pressure mounted for all-out war against Hizbollah. Amid domestic pressure notably from displaced Israelis and right-wing ministers for all-out war against Hizbollah, cross-border attacks escalated (see Lebanon).

Spectre of all-out conflict loomed large as Hizbollah and Israel intensified cross-border attacks; crackdown against Syrians continued.

Hizbollah and Israel exchanged threats amid escalation of cross-border attacks. Israel in June targeted southern Lebanon with deadly airstrikes, while Hizbollah launched major rocket and drone attacks on northern Israel, sparking wildfires and injuring several Israelis. Notably, Israeli airstrike 11 June killed Taleb Sami Abdallah, reportedly most senior Hizbollah casualty since Oct 2023, and three others in Jouaiyya town, South governorate. In response, Hizbollah next day launched unprecedented barrage of over 250 rockets into northern Israel, and 13 June targeted nine military sites in what reportedly amounts to group’s largest rocket and drone attack since October. Hizbollah also targeted Israel’s airpower, forcing Israeli warplane to avoid anti-aircraft missile 6 June and shooting down Israeli drone 10 June. Meanwhile, Israeli PM Netanyahu 5 June said Israel is “prepared for a very intense operation”, and Israeli FM Israel Katz 18 June warned of imminent all-out war, saying military’s “operational plans for an offensive in Lebanon were approved and validated”. Hizbollah leader Nasrallah next day threatened war with “no restraint and no rules and no ceilings” in case of Israeli offensive, and vowed to attack Cyprus should island open bases and airports for Israeli use. Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant 26 June said Israel does not want war but warned it could “take Lebanon back to the Stone Age”.

Crackdown against Syrian refugees continued. Nationwide vilification of Syrian refugees continued in June, with politicians calling for immediate deportations and municipalities targeting Syrians with home evictions and document checks. Notably, Christian party Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea 18 June sent letter to UN Sec Gen Guterres complaining that UN refugee agency (UNHCR) was complicit in imposing burden of Syrian refugees on Lebanon. 

Economic crisis and political deadlock persisted. Leaders made no tangible progress to end double executive vacuum or implement reforms required by International Monetary Fund to unlock financial rescue package. 

In another important development. Syrian national 5 June opened fire on U.S. embassy just outside capital Beirut, leading to shootout with army; assailant was arrested after being injured. 

Israeli strikes killed dozens of pro-Iran combatants across country, while latter continued attacks on U.S. bases; Kurdish administration postponed municipal elections in north east.

Israel stepped up deadly strikes on Iran-backed militias, which targeted U.S. base. Alleged Israeli airstrikes 3 June killed Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) adviser Saeed Abyar and 16 Iran-backed fighters north of Aleppo city; 11 June killed six Hizbollah and affiliated fighters near al-Qusayr city, Homs province. Alleged Israeli drones 19 June also struck govt forces in Quneitra and Deraa provinces, killing one officer, while Israeli airstrike targeting pro-Iran centre 26 June killed at least two near capital Damascus. Meanwhile, Iranian-backed groups 10 and 22 June reportedly launched drones at U.S. al-Tanf base, Homs province; U.S. did not acknowledge attacks. Unidentified airstrike 21 June reportedly killed Islamic Resistance in Iraq member near al-Bukamal city, Deir ez-Zor province. 

ISIS attacks continued. Govt forces 7 June launched anti-Islamic State (ISIS) operation with Russian air support amid continued ISIS attacks. Notably in Homs province, ISIS minefield and attack 12 June killed 16 govt forces. U.S. 16 June killed senior ISIS official Usamah Jamal Muhammad Ibrahim al-Janabi in airstrike reportedly in Afrin, Aleppo province.

In north east, Kurdish authorities postponed municipal elections. Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria 6 June postponed municipal elections scheduled for 11 June to August after Turkish President Erdoğan threatened military action should elections proceed and Kurdish National Council (KNC), part of Turkish-backed Syrian National Coalition, questioned elections’ legitimacy, confirming intra-Kurdish tensions. Turkish drone 6 June killed one near Qamishli city, Hasakah province.

In other important developments. In north west, protest movement demanding resignation of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani and prison reform entered fourth month; newly-formed local group Revolutionary Movement Gathering 6 June suspended dialogue with HTS until kidnappings of activists stop. Meanwhile in south, local armed factions continued to demonstrate their standing; notably, Mountain Brigade faction 13 June detained at least three security officers in al-Suwayda city to obtain release of local civil society activist Rita Nawaf al-Aqbani, who was arrested 10 June by security services in Damascus.

Iran held presidential election amid record low turnout; govt responded to censure resolution at UN nuclear agency with plans to expand uranium enrichment capacity as Western sanctions increased. 

Country held presidential election to replace deceased President Raisi. Unelected oversight body, Guardian Council, 9 June approved six candidates for 28 June presidential election triggered by 19 May death of President Raisi; all but one came from conservative end of political spectrum. Voter turnout 28 June hit new historic low of 40 per cent with no candidate securing absolute majority. Runoff between centre-left Masoud Pezeshkian, backed by reformists and moderates, and far-right Saeed Jalili scheduled for 5 July.

Nuclear watchdog censured Iran for failing to cooperate, prompting Tehran’s ire. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director Rafael Grossi 3 June opened Board of Governors meeting by noting ongoing expansion of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpiles, continued limits to IAEA’s access to Iranian facilities and lack of progress in resolving safeguards concerns. Board 5 June voted 20 to two in favour of censure resolution – the first since Nov 2022 – reiterating calls for Iranian cooperation on IAEA access and safeguards concerns, and stressing potential need for comprehensive and updated assessment by IAEA if such cooperation is not forthcoming. Iran’s foreign ministry next day denounced resolution and around 9-10 June informed IAEA of ongoing expansion of uranium enrichment capacity at Natanz and Fordow sites. U.S. 13 June warned it would “respond accordingly” if expansion was implemented and joined IAEA in calling on Tehran to cooperate with agency on safeguards.

U.S. and Canada further sanctioned Iranian individuals and entities. U.S. 10 June blacklisted ten people, entities and ships for financing Houthis; 17 June unveiled another nine Houthi-related designations and designated Iran-backed Islamic Resistance in Iraq member Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya as terrorist organisation; 25 June sanctioned nearly 50 entities and individuals described as Iranian govt’s “shadow banking” network; and 27 June blacklisted three entities and 11 associate vessels for transporting Iranian petroleum and petrochemicals, in response to Iran’s nuclear advancements. Canada 19 June designated Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps as terrorist group.

Iran-backed groups claimed attacks on Israel; Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Federal Supreme Court reached agreement on local elections.

Iran-backed groups continued alleged attacks on Israel. Tehran-aligned Islamic Resistance in Iraq in June claimed dozens of drone attacks against Israeli targets, including in Haifa and Eilat cities, none acknowledged by Israel. Resistance groups 6, 12, 23, 26 June also claimed joint operations against Israel with Yemen’s Houthis (see Yemen). Meanwhile, mobs affiliated with resistance groups early month vandalised and burnt down American restaurants and shops in capital Baghdad on grounds that they finance U.S. support for Israel’s war in Gaza. U.S. 17 June said it targeted Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya (HAAA), part of Islamic Resistance in Iraq, and HAAA leader, Haydar Muzhir Ma’lak al-Sa’idi, with terrorism designation. Islamic Resistance in Iraq 30 June vowed to expand operations, including against U.S. targets, in case of expansion of war in Lebanon.

Kurdish party KDP reached agreement with Supreme Court on Kurdistan parliamentary elections. KDP 9 June announced lifting election boycott after Supreme Court in May reverted February decision to annul minority quota seats in Kurdistan parliament, ordering that five seats be allocated to minorities across Erbil, Sulaymaniyah and Duhok provinces in more even distribution than initial system which put minority seats under de facto control of KDP. Electoral commission 6 June announced reopening window for candidate registration. Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Nechirvan Barzani 26 June set 20 Oct as new date for parliamentary elections, and electoral commission next day further extended deadline for candidate registration until 4 July. With relations between Baghdad and Erbil improving, KRG PM Masrour Barzani 9 June confirmed last remaining federal bank, Trade Bank of Iraq, was added to list of banks at which KRG employees can open salary accounts.

Türkiye continued strikes on PKK, extended flight ban on Sulaymaniyah airport. Türkiye continued airstrikes targeting PKK; notably, Turkish airstrike 19 June caused fires in al-Amadiya district, Duhok governorate. Officials in Sulaymaniyah governorate 8 June said Turkish authorities extended flight ban until Dec due to alleged PKK infiltration on Sulaymaniyah international airport. 

Saudi Arabia continued to push for ceasefire in Gaza, while U.S.-Saudi-led mediation process on Sudan remained stalled.

Riyadh sustained diplomatic efforts on Gaza, Ukraine; Sudan mediation stalled. Saudi-led Arab contact group including Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Jordan, Egypt, and Palestinian Authority 3 June announced support for U.S.-sponsored ceasefire proposal for Gaza. Meanwhile, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman 12 June met Ukrainian President Zelenskyy in Jeddah city, and Saudi officials 15-16 June attended Ukraine peace summit in Swiss city Luzern. Efforts to restart Jeddah talks between Sudan warring parties remained stalled amid tensions with UAE over latter’s alleged support to Sudanese paramilitary Rapid Support Forces. 

In other important developments. Amid liquidity crisis due to spending on Vision 2030 megaprojects, Saudi Arabia 2 June sold $12bn in national oil company Aramco shares. Wall Street Journal 9 June reported that U.S. govt was close to finalising defence treaty with Saudi Arabia as part of wider package aimed at encouraging normalisation of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel.

Houthi attacks on shipping intensified amid continued U.S.-UK airstrikes, while local mediators negotiated reopening of key road in Taiz governorate. 

Houthis sank second ship since start of Red Sea attacks; U.S.-UK airstrikes continued. After hitting two commercial vessels in Gulf of Aden 9 June, Houthi missiles 12 June struck Liberian-flagged, Greek-owned vessel, which sank 19 June, killing one; 13 June struck Palau-flagged ship, injuring one crew member. Houthis 3 June launched new solid-fuel missile at Israeli city Eilat; 6 June claimed first coordinated attacks on Israel with Iran-backed Islamic Resistance in Iraq, with drone strikes on port of Haifa; 12, 23, 26 June claimed more joint operations against Israel. Meanwhile, six U.S. airstrikes 17 June hit Hodeida airport and four targeted Kamran Island near Salif port for first time. Intensification of airstrikes since late May highlight failure of Oman-facilitated talks between Houthis and U.S. and increasing concerns over Houthis’ deployment of unmanned boats. UN Security Council 27 June passed resolution demanding Houthis halt attacks on shipping.

Sanaa-Taiz road reopened after ten-year closure. Local mediators 13 Jun negotiated reopening of crucial Sanaa-Taiz road on frontlines between Houthis and govt forces. Houthis agreed to reopening in likely bid to address local discontent and improve financial situation following govt’s banking sector freeze in Houthi-controlled areas.

Houthis detained scores of aid workers. Houthis 6-7 June detained around 60 employees from UN agencies and various local and international NGOs in Sanaa, Hodeida, Saada and Amran cities, over accusations of spying for U.S. and other Western countries. Crackdown comes amid heightened tensions with U.S. over Red Sea attacks and after some aid organisations, including World Food Programme, suspended aid to Houthi-controlled areas. Detentions could lead to closure of more aid organisations in northern Yemen, further exacerbating humanitarian plight.

Houthis and Southern Transitional Council (STC) clashed in Lahj. Houthis in May-June reinforced military presence in Lahj governorate amid fears that local forces could receive U.S. support to push them back from Red Sea coast, and 5 June launched attack on STC forces on frontline between Lahj and Taiz governorates, triggering clashes that killed 18 on both sides.

Jihadists launched one of deadliest attacks on military to date, amid reports of mutiny attempt within army, raising significant stability concerns.

Major assault shook military as security situation remained perilous. In what could amount to deadliest attack on army since country began anti-jihadist operations in 2015, al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) 11 June raided military base in Mansila town, Sahel region, near Niger border; JNIM claimed to have killed 107 soldiers, while local sources reported over 100 dead and others taken hostage. Attack reportedly fuelled divisions within military, leading to speculation of threats to regime’s grip on power (see below). Security forces and militants conducted other deadly attacks during month, with high toll on civilians. Notably, JNIM 6 June raided Dasse village, Boucle du Mouhoun region, reportedly killing 63; group next day killed around 30 civilians and military auxiliaries (VDPs) in Kossodougou village, East region. In North region, soldiers 11 June allegedly killed around 24 civilians in Ouahigouya area, Yatenga province.

Rumours of mutiny attempt surfaced. Artillery fire 12 June hit state television headquarters near presidential residence in capital Ouagadougou, injuring two; military authorities stated incident was mistaken launch by soldier. Media reports, however, alleged previous day’s Mansila attack had provoked mutiny in army, which President Capt. Traoré 20 June denied on state television. Govt also refuted news outlet Radio France Internationale’s claims that dozens of Malian soldiers and Russian Africa Corps (formerly Wagner Group) paramilitaries 18 June arrived in Ouagadougou. 

Govt continued to limit international press. French network TV5Monde 18 June aired interview with Newton Ahmed Barry, journalist and former electoral commission president, where he openly criticised regime’s inability to combat jihadism since taking power in Sept 2022. Govt same day announced six-month suspension of TV5Monde for “intention to deceive public opinion”.

Diplomatic relations deepened with Russia, Sweden closed embassy. Russian FM Lavrov 4-5 June visited Ouagadougou, emphasised Moscow will continue to supply military equipment and training. Meanwhile, Sweden 20 June announced closure of embassies in both Ouagadougou and Malian capital Bamako and establishment of new embassy covering regional activity in Senegalese capital Dakar.