Army clashed with anti-Kigali rebels near Rwandan border, while main opposition party continued to crumble with disunity.

Army engaged anti-Kigali rebels based in Burundi. Armed forces 3 Aug engaged Kinyarwanda-speaking rebels from Rwanda in Mabayi district, Cibitoke province; clashes reportedly left six rebels and three soldiers dead, and forced residents to flee. Army’s operations commander subsequently vowed to intensify night-time patrols in area, reflecting army’s growing commitment to combat anti-Kigali rebels against backdrop of improving relations between Burundi and Rwanda. Unidentified assailants 9 Aug killed local leader of ruling party youth militia Imbonerakure, Isidore Niyongabo, at his home in Mabayi commune; locals accused FLN rebels of killing Niyongabo for collaborating with security forces during aforementioned operation.

Standoff continued between rival factions of main opposition party. Group of ten dissident executives of National Congress for Freedom (CNL) party 14 Aug proclaimed Marie Immaculée Ntacobakimvuna as interim party president to replace CNL President Agathon Rwasa; CNL wing loyal to Rwasa rejected move. Meanwhile, interior ministry 18 Aug prohibited planned gathering of party’s political bureau loyal to Rwasa.

In other important developments. Ahead of 2025 legislative elections, senate in Aug started consultations on removal of ethnic-based quotas in public sector employment provided in Burundi’s constitution and 2000 Arusha Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation.

Anglophone conflict continued in North West and South West regions, while Far North region faced renewed jihadist attacks and violence over land disputes.

Army reported successful operations against Anglophone separatists. Govt forces 6 Aug ambushed Anglophone rebels in Bafut town (Mezam division, North West), killing two, and raided Anglophone separatist camp in Bopo village, Mbonge town (Meme division, South West), killing five rebels and seizing weapons. Separatists who late July mounted roadblocks across North West and South West regions with stated aim of curtailing govt’s extrajudicial killings, 16 Aug allowed road transport again. Unidentified armed group overnight 11-12 Aug reportedly raided Kekukesi-Akwaya locality in Manyu division (SW), killing four civilians.

Boko Haram stepped up attacks in Far North region after brief lull in July. Boko Haram combatants 2-3 Aug killed 12 civilians and kidnapped another 20 on Darak island of Lake Chad (Logone-et-Chari division); 8 Aug also attacked Bakarisse camp for internally displaced persons in Kerawa locality (Mayo-Sava division), killing three. Jihadist insurgents 15-29 Aug carried out nearly two dozen other attacks, killing at least three civilians in Mayo-Tsanaga and Mayo-Sava divisions. Soldiers 18 Aug killed at least four Islamic State West Africa Province militants near Hile-Alifa town (Logone-et-Chari), and 25 Aug killed another four jihadist militants near Mozogo town (Mayo-Tsanaga).

Land disputes evolved into intercommunal clashes in Far North region. Competition over ownership of rice field located near Kai-Kai town (Mayo-Danay division) 10 Aug led to violent clashes between villagers, leaving three casualties. Two weeks earlier, land dispute had turned into confrontation between Christians and Muslims in Warba village (Mayo-Sava division), with four killed and dozens injured.

Referendum win opened the way for President Touadéra to extend his rule indefinitely, institutionalising authoritarian drift.

Touadéra secured controversial referendum victory. Electoral body 7 Aug announced resounding 95% yes vote for new constitution in referendum held 30 July, and Constitutional Court 20 Aug validated results, saying turnout reached 57%. New constitution, which scraps presidential term limits and bars Central Africans of foreign origin or holding another citizenship from running for president, paves the way for Touadéra to seek third term in 2025. Opposition coalition Republican Bloc for the Defence of the Constitution, which boycotted referendum, claimed results were “fraudulent” and turnout as low as 10%; bloc’s coordinator Crépin Mboli-Goumba 22 Aug vowed to “oppose this desire to liquidate democracy in our country”. Internationally, U.S. 22 Aug expressed “deep reservations” over referendum vote in absence of independent electoral observers and called on CAR authorities to set date for long-overdue local elections.

Violence continued amid growing divisions within rebel coalition. Armed forces 1 Aug killed seven presumed Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC) rebels during operation in gold mine in Abba area of Nana-Mambéré prefecture. Amid growing divisions within CPC, locals in Nana-Gribizi prefecture from 19 Aug onward reported presence of unidentified armed group equipped with robust armaments in several villages including Mbrès, Azène, Linguiri, and Koukourou; armed men in Azène allegedly claimed being part of new rebel movement, portrayed it as last chance for rebellion in CAR. In response, UN mission MINUSCA 22 Aug sent blue helmets to patrol area between Mbrès and Koukourou. Unidentified armed group presence also reported late-Aug in Chari village, Bamingui-Bangoran prefecture, while unidentified armed men 25 Aug attacked army position in Yawa village, Lobaye prefecture, forcing over 2,000 people to flee.

In other important developments. In apparent revenge attack, suspected Fulani herders Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC) militiamen 1 Aug killed 13 civilians in Diki village, Bamingui-Bangoran prefecture.

Amid renewed hostilities in northern Tibesti region, prominent rebel group declared an end to 2021 ceasefire with govt.

Two-year ceasefire between FACT and govt collapsed. Military mid-Aug bombed position of prominent Libya-based rebel group, Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT), in northern Tibesti region, reportedly killing three rebels. FACT 18-19 Aug denounced act of war and called off 2021 unilateral ceasefire, vowing “quick, powerful and uncompromising” reaction. In televised address from frontline, Interim President Déby 20 Aug vowed to personally lead battle against FACT if rebels do not put down arms. Meanwhile, another Libya-based rebel group, Military Command Council for the Salvation of the Republic (CCMSR), 10 Aug conducted offensive on Wour, Kouri and Kouri-Zaou army bases in Tibesti, leaving unknown number of soldiers killed and allegedly capturing 23; CCMSR 28 Aug announced death of two senior leaders in airstrike conducted 17 Aug in northern Chad. Libyan National Army led by Khalifa Haftar late Aug announced offensive against positions of Chadian rebels in southern Libya, said operation conducted in coordination with Chadian authorities.

Jihadist, communal and other violence continued to take toll on civilians. Boko Haram 5 Aug beheaded four captives after their families failed to pay ransom in Lac province (west). Chieftaincy dispute between two sub-clans of Mbaye community next day turned violent in Bekourou locality, Mandoul province (south), leaving four dead and 35 injured. Clashes between pastoral herders and local farmers 18-19 Aug left at least ten people dead in Abkhoura village, Mangalme department, Guera province (south). Meanwhile, Logone Oriental province (also south) saw several attacks by unidentified armed men, with two Arab herders and one farmer killed 13-14 Aug.

Exiled opposition leader announced homecoming. Succès Masra, president of opposition party Les Transformateurs, 10 Aug announced his imminent return from exile — where he has lived since October 2022 crackdown on protesters — and outlined intention to prioritise dialogue and national reconciliation. Minister of Reconciliation and Social Cohesion Abderaman Koulamallah 18 Aug said authorities would guarantee Masra’s security.

In other important developments. Prominent Fulani rebel leader from southern Chad, Baba Laddé, 22 Aug called on all “patriotic forces” to unite for “national uprising” against Déby.

Ahead of elections set for December, crackdown on dissent and civil liberties escalated as security forces killed over 40 anti-UN protesters in eastern province of North Kivu.

Anti-MONUSCO protest turned deadly. Govt forces 30 Aug stopped religious group from holding demonstration against UN mission (MONUSCO) in North Kivu’s provincial capital, Goma; crackdown reportedly left at least 43 people dead and 56 wounded, while over 150 people were arrested. Repression sent chilling message across country over space for free speech and dissent in lead-up to general elections due in late 2023.

Armed group violence continued in eastern provinces, mainly targeting civilians. In Ituri province, Islamist militia Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) 19-21 Aug killed over 50 people in Irumu territory. Also in Ituri, Cooperative for the Development of the Congo (CODECO), which gathers various ethnic Lendu militias, 15 Aug killed 11 civilians in two attacks in Irumu territory, and 27-28 Aug killed 30 people in Djugu and Aru territories. Amid fragile truce with govt, Rwanda-backed M23 rebels continued to fight with local armed groups for territorial control in North Kivu. Notably, clashes between M23 and Democratic Forces for the liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) 6 Aug killed at least two FDLR combatants and ten civilians in Marangara and Ruzanze villages, Rutshuru territory. Meanwhile, participants to President Tshisekedi-sponsored roundtable held 14-16 Aug in capital Kinshasa called for immediate lifting of so-called “state of siege” declared in May 2021 in Ituri and North Kivu provinces, citing lack of conclusive results in fight against armed groups.

In other important developments. In likely bid to strengthen control of security apparatus as elections near, Tshisekedi 1 Aug appointed new heads of National Intelligence Agency and National Security Council. Electoral commission 11 Aug published provisional list of candidates for National Assembly, and 27 Aug completed registration of candidates for provincial and municipal elections; political heavyweights Joseph Kabila and Martin Fayulu boycotted registration process. Electoral commission 22 Aug restricted municipal election on 20 Dec to communes located in provincial capitals, citing customary power conflicts in rural areas; elections projected in 2024 in remaining municipalities.

Washington sanctioned Rwandan and Congolese individuals for alleged role in eastern DR Congo (DRC) conflict; President Kagame reshuffled military positions.

U.S. sanctioned individuals for contributing to eastern DRC conflict. U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken 15 Aug held phone call with Kagame to discuss security crisis involving Rwanda-backed M23 rebels in eastern DRC; Blinken reportedly renewed call for “diplomatic solution to the tensions” between Kinshasa and Kigali and “for each side to take measures to de-escalate the situation”. Meanwhile, U.S. treasury 24 Aug placed sanctions on six individuals for their alleged role in eastern DRC conflict, including one Rwandan and one Congolese senior army officers, one M23 deputy commander, and three Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda militia leaders.

Kagame announced major changes in security forces. Hours after coup in Gabon, Kagame 30 Aug retired 12 army generals, including old guard members, and dozens of other senior military officers; also promoted several young officers to rank of colonel and designated new generals to lead military divisions.

Asmara rejected fresh accusations of troop presence in Ethiopia’s Tigray region while fears simmered that Ethiopia’s Amhara rebellion could draw Eritrea in; army accused of human rights abuses.

Asmara dismissed allegations of troop presence in Tigray. Ministry of Foreign Affairs 10 Aug summoned British Chargé d’Affaires after British Ambassador to Ethiopia Darren Welch 9 Aug called for complete withdrawal of Eritrean troops from Ethiopia’s Tigray region; govt accused Welch of “endorsing the TPLF’s [Tigray People’s Liberation Front] irredentist claims”.

Amhara rebellion heightened risks of Eritrean involvement on insurgent side. Ethiopia’s Defence Minister Abraham Belay 22 Aug announced plans to return hundreds of thousands of people displaced from Western and parts of Southern Tigray (under Amhara’s administration since Nov 2020) to their homes; Abraham added that govt will dissolve Amhara’s “illegal administration” in these areas in accordance with Nov 2022 peace deal with TPLF (see Ethiopia). Remarks came amid escalating rebellion in Amhara region, led by nationalist militia known as Fano, and increased likelihood of Asmara supporting Fano rebellion in order to prevent Tigray from recovering control of disputed territory and gaining access to an external border.

UN spotlighted human rights abuses in army. UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Eritrea Mohamed Babiker 7 Aug said Eritrean conscripts are subjected to torture, inhumane or degrading treatment, sexual and gender-based violence, forced labour and abusive conditions during military service.

Govt and opposition returned to negotiating table, but mutual distrust persisted; Al-Shabaab continued to step up attacks near Somalia border.

Govt and opposition resumed talks to bridge differences. Ruling Kenya Kwanza alliance led by President Ruto and Raila Odinga’s opposition Azimio la Umoja coalition 9 Aug agreed to resume bipartisan talks to tackle disagreements on raft of issues, including high cost of living and results of 2022 elections. Bipartisan dialogue committee 21 Aug met and 30 Aug signed framework agreement for dialogue, agreeing to report to respective leaders on five major issues within 60 days. Hard-line politicians from both sides and sour personal relations however risk derailing talks; notably, Deputy President of Kenya Rigathi Gachagua 22 Aug dismissed bipartisan talks as “waste of time”. Meanwhile, energy regulator 14 Aug said govt reinstated limited subsidy to stabilise fuel price for 30 days; along with tax hikes, govt’s removal of fuel and maize subsidies has sparked public anger and protests in recent months.

Al-Shabaab staged multiple attacks in Lamu county near Somalia. Al-Shabaab 1 Aug ambushed and killed two people in Mwembeni area on Lamu-Witu-Garsen road near Lamu-Tana River county border; security forces next day reported killing 60 Al-Shabaab militants in response to series of ambushes in area. Al-Shabaab 10 Aug killed three soldiers near Kiunga town, 15 Aug launched two separate attacks on civilian vehicles near Koreni and Bargoni localities, leaving at least two dead, and 22 Aug killed two civilians in ambush near Lango La Simba area on Lamu-Witu-Garsen road.

Cattle-related violence erupted along Kisumu-Kericho border. Tensions over suspected cattle rustling 19 Aug turned into clashes in Nyakach sub-county along border between Kisumu and Kericho counties; at least two killed and eight injured.

Govt’s attempt to revitalise offensive against Al-Shabaab in central regions backfired, with military retreating after making initial gains in Galgaduud region.

Military offensive against Al-Shabaab suffered setback as troops retreated. President Mohamud 5 Aug travelled to Galmudug state capital, Dhusamareb, to reinvigorate stalled offensive against Al-Shabaab in central regions. Army and allied clan militias 14 Aug launched operations in Galgaduud and Mudug regions (both Galmudug state) and in following days made initial progress. Notably, army 16 Aug successfully cleared mines in several villages on border between Galgaduud and Hiraan regions, 21 Aug regained key Wabho town, next day captured Cowsweyne village and 24-25 Aug took over strategic Elbur town (all Galgaduud). Troops however lost ground after Al-Shabaab militants 26 Aug launched major attack involving suicide bombs in Cowsweyne, inflicting heavy losses on govt force. Govt forces in following days reportedly pulled back from villages and towns recently captured, including Budbud, Wabho, Galcad, El Dhere and Masagaway, and 29 Aug also left Elbur.

Al-Shabaab militants continued to pose major threat in several regions. In Lower Shabelle region (south), bomb aboard passenger bus 9 Aug killed six and wounded 12 on road between Marka to Qoriyoley districts. In Hiraan region (centre), Al-Shabaab suicide bomber 10 Aug targeted Jalalaqsi district governor, killing five including district officials but leaving governor unharmed. Militants 23 Aug launched suicide attack on security forces in Kadha area on Mogadishu’s outskirts, killing two soldiers. Meanwhile, authorities 4 Aug announced arrest of ten govt staff from various departments including intelligence agency for allegedly collaborating with Al-Shabaab, serving as reminder that group has infiltrated govt security structures.

Security situation remained tense but stable in Puntland state. After Puntland parliament in July passed constitutional amendments allowing for direct election of state president, Puntland President Said Deni 1 Aug pledged to hold presidential and parliamentary polls by 8 Jan 2024; opponents however continued to accuse him of seeking to use transition to direct universal suffrage to extend term or set rules of the game in his favour.

President Kiir appointed ally as finance minister amid deteriorating relations with U.S. over Juba’s economic management; concerns about country’s preparedness for elections persisted.

U.S. issued business advisory over govt’s economic mismanagement. Minister of Petroleum, Puat Kang Chol, and Minister of Roads and Bridges, Simon Mijok Mijak, 3 Aug appeared in front of Public Financial Management (PFM) Oversight Committee, reportedly painting grim picture of govt’s economic mismanagement. Chol presented numbers that revealed misappropriation of oil income while Mijok reportedly described non-transparent procurement process for road building project and vastly inflated prices for its development. Days after presentation and amid years of mounting frustration, U.S. Department of State, Labor and Commerce 14 Aug issued advisory warning U.S. companies that conducting business with enterprises linked to South Sudanese govt officials or their families comes with “reputational, financial and legal risks”. Move marked significant escalation from previous warnings of business dealings with sanctioned individuals and companies. Meanwhile, President Kiir 3 Aug sacked Finance Minister Dier Tong Ngor and replaced him with Bak Barnaba Chol, who hails from Kiir’s home state Warrap; appointment set to tighten Kiir’s grip on public resources.

Stalled election preparations raised concerns. Head of UN mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) Nicholas Haysom 2 Aug said country “is not yet ready for elections”; UNMISS Deputy Head Guang Cong 10 Aug reiterated warning, while interim chairperson of peace monitoring mechanism Charles Tai Gituai same day said authorities had made no progress on implementing key sections of peace deal. Despite concerns, govt 15 Aug said South Sudan would hold elections in 2024 according to schedule without implementing key provisions like census, border demarcation and provisions for displaced populations. VP Machar 29 Aug met with South Africa’s Deputy President Paul Mashatile in capital Juba, with latter offering to help resolve “challenges that may hinder free and fair elections”.

In other important developments. UNMISS 28 Aug reported thousands of South Sudanese refugees had returned to Akobo town from Ethiopia, owing to “ethnically fuelled violence within refugee camps in the Ethiopian Gambella region” and food shortages. Juba 3 Aug acceded to international Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Army chief fled Khartoum as fighting in capital raged on, inter-ethnic clashes flared in Darfur, and tribal mobilisation threatened stability in east.

Army leader fled Khartoum amid heavy fighting. Hostilities between Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) continued in Khartoum, with RSF attacking SAF military bases and SAF conducting airstrikes and firing artillery. Notably, SAF early Aug targeted Shambat bridge, key RSF supply line to sister cities Omdurman and Bahri; SAF and RSF 20-23 Aug battled over Armoured Corps base in Al-Shajara neighbourhood, SAF’s only remaining stronghold in capital besides headquarters. Meanwhile, army chief Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan 24 Aug escaped headquarters after months-long RSF siege, subsequently visiting regional bases and Port Sudan before 29 Aug travelling to Egypt for talks.

RSF-SAF clashes in Darfur enflamed intercommunal conflicts. RSF 4 Aug claimed it had defeated SAF in Central Darfur, which SAF denied; in South Darfur, fighting between SAF and RSF throughout month killed scores and displaced 50,000 from state capital Nyala; and in North Darfur, fighting 17 Aug resumed in state capital El-Fasher. SAF-RSF fighting exacerbated intercommunal conflicts, particularly in South Darfur; notably, Salamat and Beni Halba tribes throughout month clashed in Kubum locality; rival Reizigat clans fought in and around Nyala. Meanwhile, media outlet The New Humanitarian 15 Aug reported testimonies of Darfuri refugees in Chad alleging RSF attacks on non-Arab civilians, especially Masalit, fleeing region.

Tribal mobilisation in east threatened stability, fighting continued in Kordofan. In eastern Sudan, RSF late July accused former President Bashir’s National Congress Party and Islamists in military of arming tribal militias, prompting number of Arab tribes to join RSF in Aug. In North Kordofan state, SAF 1 Aug clashed with RSF near Umm Ruwaba city. In South Kordofan state, rebel group Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North continued targeting SAF positions, notably in state capital Kadugli and Dalami town.

Burhan rejected RSF call for negotiations. Amid stalled external mediation efforts, RSF 27 Aug expressed willingness for talks and presented ten-point plan for “lasting peace”; Burhan next day rejected initiative.

World Bank suspended new lending to Uganda in response to anti-homosexuality law, while opposition party encountered internal divisions.

World Bank halted funding to Uganda. World Bank 8 Aug announced freezing fresh loans to Uganda over recently passed anti-homosexuality law, setting aside funding worth nearly $2bn. In almost instantaneous reaction, Uganda’s currency went downward to its lowest level against U.S. dollar in nearly eight years. President Museveni in following days released two defiant statements chastising institution for its “insufferable” decision, while finance ministry 10 Aug told parliament that World Bank move would likely affect payment of some public servants’ salaries.

Prominent opposition party faced internal rift. Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) Sec Gen Nathan Nandala Mafabi 7 Aug petitioned parliament to replace Ibrahim Ssemujju Nganda as FDC Chief Whip in parliament after latter alleged Mafabi and other FDC leaders received “dirty money” from state agents ahead of 2021 general elections. Speaker of Parliament Anita Among 16 Aug declined to dismiss Ssemujju, citing opposition party members themselves sharing dissatisfaction with Mafabi, prompting latter to accuse Among of taking sides in internal party matter to drive wedge between FDC factions.

Violence involving Kenyan Pokot herdsmen persisted in Karamoja sub-region. Armed individuals from West Pokot county of Kenya 21 Aug launched cattle raid and later ambushed Ugandan soldiers in Nakapiripirit district (Karamoja sub-region), killing two.

In other important developments. Authorities looked to domestically promote military successes against Islamist militia Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in DR Congo following militia’s deadly attack on Ugandan school in June. Notably, armed forces 6-21 Aug reported capturing two ADF operatives, seizing 150 firearms and rescuing 26 hostages, and 23 Aug claimed killing several ADF elements including one commander.

Multiple observation missions reported widespread irregularities in general elections, casting doubt on legitimacy of vote which saw President Mnangagwa declared winner of second term.

Election authorities Mnangagwa re-elected in elections marred by irregularities. Electoral commission 26 Aug declared President Mnangagwa winner of presidential election held 23 Aug with 52.6% of vote against opposition leader Nelson Chamisa’s 44%; ruling party ZANU-PF also won 136 of 210 parliamentary seats against 73 for main opposition party Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC). Chamisa 27 Aug alleged “gigantic fraud” and 29 Aug called for elections rerun. Conduct of elections could also hamper Zimbabwe’s re-engagement drive with international partners, as most international election observers said vote was marred by irregularities and poor organisation, while pre-election environment was largely favourable to ZANU-PF. Notably, in departure from past statements on elections in Zimbabwe, Southern African Development Community (SADC) 25 Aug said elections “fell short of the requirements of the Constitution of Zimbabwe”, citing curbs on freedom of assembly and judicial capture. In response, Mnangagwa 27 Aug criticised outside observers for “interrogat[ing] institutions of a sovereign government”.

Lead-up to vote and election day marred by violence and repression. NGO Zimbabwe Peace Project recorded 84 human rights violations related to elections in first half of Aug, including arson, assaults, kidnapping threats and intimidation. Notably, suspected ZANU-PF activists 3 Aug ambushed and killed CCC supporter near campaign rally in capital Harare; police arrested 10 people in connection with case. Police 15 Aug also arrested 40 CCC members including MP candidate for allegedly blocking traffic and disrupting order during campaign event in Harare suburb. On voting day, journalist and opposition figure Hopewell Chin’ono 23 Aug accused ZANU-PF supporters and officials of intimidating voters outside polling stations, also criticised electoral commission’s lack of preparedness as authorities extended voting to 24 Aug in some wards amid delayed distribution of ballot papers. Police 24 Aug arrested 41 election monitors from civil society groups, accusing them of trying to disrupt voting process by releasing unofficial vote results from independent count.

Amid countrywide insecurity, military authorities engaged in diplomatic spat with Paris over stance on Niger coup, and intensified crackdown on dissent.

Insecurity remained elevated, with heavy toll on civilians. Military operations against jihadist groups continued. Notably, airstrike 2 Aug allegedly killed around ten al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) militants in Bourou village, Soum province, Sahel region. Meanwhile in Hauts-Bassins region, presumed JNIM combatants 1 Aug killed around seven army auxiliaries (VDPs) and lost ten of their own militants in attack on Niamana village, Kenedougou province. Civilians remained caught between jihadists on one hand and govt forces and their civilian auxiliaries on the other. Notably, presumed JNIM fighters 6 Aug killed around 22 civilians and wounded another ten near Nohao village, Boulgou province, Centre-East region.

Ouagadougou continued to draw further away from erstwhile allies. French govt 6 Aug announced suspending French development and budgetary aid to Burkina Faso after country expressed support for coup leaders in Niger (see Niger). In response, Ouagadougou next day denounced double taxation treaty with France. After Niger 6 Aug closed its airspace, French flag carrier Air France next day suspended all flights to and from Ouagadougou (and Bamako) citing “geopolitical situation in the Sahel”. Meanwhile, interim President Capt. Traoré 31 Aug reportedly discussed possible military cooperation with Russian delegation in capital Ouagadougou.

Clampdown on dissent intensified. Coalition of around 50 political parties and civil society groups, Patriotic Front, 4 Aug denounced “abuses” and non-inclusive governance by military authorities; statement came days after alleged state agents briefly kidnapped former MP Issouf Nikièma and court sentenced civil society activist Mohamed Sinon to prison for criticising gendarmerie. Authorities 10 Aug suspended prominent media outlet Radio Omega over accusations of promoting “strategy of chaos” in Niger after station broadcast interview with civil society activist opposing coup.

In other important developments. Videos purporting to show gunshots near air base in Ouagadougou 1 Aug circulated on social media, prompting Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Col.-Maj. Célestin Simporé to denounce presence of “suspicious” individuals around base; days earlier, latter had denied rumours circulating on social media of mutinous feelings in certain military barracks.

Death of former President Bédié created power vacuum in main opposition party, and Niger’s junta recalled ambassador to Côte d’Ivoire to protest President Ouattara’s firm stance against coup.

Veteran politician Bédié died, leaving massive void in his party. Veteran politician and leader of Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI), former President Henri Konan Bédié, 1 Aug died aged 89. President Ouattara next day declared ten days of national mourning, cancelling 7 Aug Independence Day celebrations. PDCI set to embark on fierce succession struggle one month before local elections set for 2 Sept, and two years before 2025 presidential contest, as Bédié kept strong control over party apparatus during his decades in charge, resisted generational change, and did not designate successor.

Tensions rose between Abidjan and Niamey after coup in Niger. Following extraordinary summit of West African regional bloc ECOWAS, Ouattara 10 Aug affirmed commitment to using all necessary means, including military force, to reinstate constitutional order in Niger; also said Côte d’Ivoire would send battalion of up to 1,100 troops as well as financial resources in case of ECOWAS Standby Force deployment. In response, junta in Niamey 14 Aug recalled Nigerien ambassador to Côte d’Ivoire (see Niger).

Tensions continued to run high between transitional authorities and political parties.

Opposition expressed concern over transition timeline. Transitional President Col. Doumbouya early Aug amended electoral code by decree, enabling military governors to appoint local state representatives. Opposition immediately denounced attempt by junta to consolidate power. Notably, Edouard Zoutomou Kpoghomou, leader of Union for Progress and Renewal political party, 7 Aug accused Col. Doumbouya’s military govt of attempting to extend transition period beyond 24-month timeline agreed upon with West African regional bloc ECOWAS. Main opposition party Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea (UFDG) 17 Aug also reiterated opposition to future electoral processes being led by military govt.

Political landscape reshaped itself in anticipation of future elections. After 19 opposition parties late July announced creation of National Alliance for Change to serve as common front ahead of next elections, nine political parties in Upper Guinea region 13 Aug announced joining force. Former UN Special Representative for Central Africa, Guinean diplomat François Louncény Fall, 11 Aug announced his candidacy for president. UFDG 15 Aug said preparations for leader Cellou Dalein Diallo’s highly anticipated return from exile still ongoing, with no fixed date in sight.

In other important developments. Delegation from Niger's junta 12 Aug visited Guinea and met with Col. Doumbouya to ask for “stronger support to face the challenges ahead”, in view of ECOWAS threat of military intervention.

Amid UN mission’s withdrawal, significant clashes erupted in north between govt forces and former rebels for first time since 2015 peace agreement; coming weeks could see more violence and collapse of peace process.

MINUSMA withdrawal put 2015 peace deal under threat. Permanent Strategic Framework, which gathers northern armed groups signatory to 2015 Algiers peace agreement with Bamako, 1 Aug warned about “serious imminent risks” associated with handover to Malian army of UN mission (MINUSMA) camps in areas controlled by signatory armed groups. In following days, major clashes erupted between alliance of former rebel groups Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) and military for first time since peace deal implementation. CMA alleged army and Russian paramilitary Wagner Group 4 Aug attacked CMA-controlled border post in Foyta locality (Timbuktu region) near Mauritania, killing two CMA elements; govt forces and CMA 11-12 Aug also clashed near MINUSMA camp in Ber (also Timbuktu region), leaving unclear number dead. MINUSMA 13 Aug accelerated withdrawal from Ber camp in light of security situation, completing it same day, and 16 Aug also left Goundam camp (Timbuktu). CMA 28-29 Aug accused army of launching airstrikes on CMA positions near Anefis town in Kidal region.

Jihadist violence continued in centre and north. Islamic State Sahel Province 3 Aug attacked army-escorted convoy in Essailal locality, Menaka region (north), killing at least six soldiers. Al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) 8 Aug imposed blockade on Timbuktu city, creating food and aid shortages, to oppose Malian army’s deployment in context of MINUSMA’s withdrawal. In Bandiagara region (centre), suspected JNIM elements 18 Aug raided Yarou village, killing 23 people.

In other important developments. Bamako and Ouagadougou 1 Aug warned West African regional bloc (ECOWAS) against any military intervention in Niger, saying it would amount to declaration of war against Mali and Burkina Faso. After Niger 6 Aug closed its airspace, French flag carrier Air France next day suspended all flights to and from Bamako (and Ouagadougou) citing “geopolitical situation in the Sahel”. In escalating row, France and Mali 7-9 Aug stopped issuing visas to each other’s nationals.

West African regional bloc continued to threaten use of force to restore constitutional order; move could trigger major pushback and put Niger and wider region at risk of war.

ECOWAS maintained threat of force to restore constitutional order. Military junta 6 Aug closed Niger’s airspace as West African regional bloc (ECOWAS) seven-day ultimatum to hand power back to elected President Bazoum expired. ECOWAS 10 Aug activated standby force for possible action against junta and 18 Aug reportedly set “D-Day” for military intervention. Regional bloc, which appears divided over course of action, 19 Aug sent delegation to Niger to press coup leader Gen. Tchiani and other junta figures for peaceful return to constitutional order.

Coup leaders found common ground with counterparts in Sahel. Military authorities in Bamako and Ouagadougou 1 Aug jointly said any ECOWAS military intervention in Niger would amount to declaration of war against Mali and Burkina Faso. Senior junta leader, Gen. Salifou Mody, next day met with Malian and Burkinabe transitional presidents in their respective capitals. Coup leaders continued to capitalise on ill feelings toward former colonial power. Junta 25 Aug ordered French ambassador in Niamey, Sylvain Itte, to leave country within 48 hours; French President Macron 28 Aug said Itte would stay at his post, reportedly prompting junta in following days to order police to expel him.

Junta proposed three-year transition to civilian rule. Junta 7 Aug appointed former Finance Minister Ali Mahaman Lamine Zeine as interim PM, and 10 Aug announced 21-member interim govt with military officers in charge of six ministries, including defence and interior, and Bazoum’s party holding no ministries. Gen. Tchiani 19 Aug said transition to civilian rule would “not go beyond three years”; also warned ECOWAS that security forces would “not shirk” from defending country. ECOWAS 21 Aug rejected three-year transition plan as “unacceptable”.

Jihadists launched deadliest attacks on military in months. Possibly emboldened by political upheaval in Niamey, suspected jihadists 15 Aug ambushed military detachment near Koutougou town, Tillabery region (south west), killing 17 soldiers and wounding another 24. Another ambush 20 Aug killed 12 soldiers in Anzourou commune, also Tillabery, with military reporting “heavy losses” among assailants.  

Turmoil increased among rival jihadists in North East Zone, while military suffered deadly armed group attack in North Central Zone.

Jihadist violence continued to wreak havoc in Borno state, North East Zone. Boko Haram fighters 12 Aug attacked military base near Konduga town, killing three soldiers, and later same day shot ten farmers dead in Maiwa village, 5km outside Borno state capital Maiduguri. Group 22 Aug also kidnapped over 40 women on their farms near Maiduguri-Mafa road in Jere area, released them three days later after state official reportedly paid ransom. Turmoil continued to increase between – and within – rival jihadist groups. Inter-ethnic clash among Boko Haram fighters 15 Aug reportedly left 82 dead in Kukawa area; crisis allegedly sparked by execution of seven fighters from Buduma tribe after they tried to surrender to govt troops. In what could amount to deadliest confrontation to date, Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province 18-19 Aug clashed near Marte town, allegedly resulting in death of over 100 combatants on both sides.

Army suffered deadly armed group attack in North Central Zone. Armed group 14 Aug ambushed soldiers near Kundu village in Zungeru area of Niger state (North Central); at least 36 soldiers killed in attack and subsequent crash of military medical evacuation helicopter. Domestic intelligence agency 16 Aug warned of imminent kidnapping-for-ransom attack on Abuja-Kaduna railway line. Military operations against criminal groups continued. Notably, security forces 10 Aug rescued ten people held hostage at Birnin Yero village, Igabi area of Kaduna state (North West).

President Tinubu’s economic policies faced opposition amid aggravated hardship. Labour unions 2 Aug led marches across country to protest soaring cost of living notably since Tinubu removed fuel subsidy; labour union representatives later same day met with Tinubu and agreed to return to talks. Meanwhile, nearly three months after taking office, Tinubu 21 Aug swore in 45 ministers; bloated cabinet widely seen as contradictory to Tinubu’s campaign promise of reducing governance costs.

In other important developments. Niger coup leaders 3 Aug announced withdrawing ambassador to Nigeria as West African regional bloc ECOWAS, presided over by Tinubu, threatened to use force to restore constitutional order (see Niger).

Amhara region witnessed worsening violence as nationalist militia clashed with security forces, prompting Addis Ababa to declare state of emergency; federal minister vowed to end Amhara’s “illegal administration” in Western and Southern Tigray.

Violence in Amhara region reached new heights. Fighting between Amhara nationalist militia known as Fano and federal and regional forces dramatically escalated, with Fano early Aug seizing control of several towns and cities. Addis Ababa 3 Aug blocked internet access to region, next day declared six-month state of emergency. In following weeks, authorities arrested hundreds of people allegedly linked to militants, including politician and outspoken govt critic Christian Tadelle. By 9 Aug, federal forces had recaptured major towns, pushing Fano militants to rural areas where fighting continued. Clashes late Aug flared in large towns, such as Debre Tabor and Debre Markos. UN 29 Aug said at least 183 killed in clashes since July.

Minister vowed to return IDPs to Western and Southern Tigray. Defence Minister Abraham Belay 22 Aug announced on Facebook govt plans to return people displaced during Tigray conflict from Western and parts of Southern Tigray (under Amhara’s administration since Nov 2020) to their homes; Abraham added that govt will dissolve Amhara’s “illegal administration” in these areas as per Nov 2022 peace deal with Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Remarks risk enflaming perceptions among Amhara that federal govt betrayed them when it struck deal with TPLF, and could empower Fano rebellion and draw Eritrea into conflict (see Eritrea).

Govt-insurgent fighting persisted in Oromia region. Heavy clashes between govt and Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) continued in Oromia, with civilians again targeted. Notably, residents in West Shewa Zone’s Chobi district 16 Aug accused govt troops of killing at least 12 civilians during anti-insurgent operations; OLA fighters 17 Aug attacked police station in West Guji, killing local official. Fano continued to mount attacks and abduct residents.

In other important developments. World Food Programme 8 Aug resumed food aid deliveries, suspended in June. BRICS bloc of emerging economies 24 Aug invited Ethiopia to join from Jan 2024. Talks with Egypt and Sudan over Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam 28 Aug concluded without breakthrough (see Nile Waters). 

In most significant advance since conflict began, Dhulbahante militias captured several army positions on outskirts of Las Anod town, driving Somaliland forces out of Dhulbahante territory.

Clan militias forced govt troops out of Dhulbahante territory. In major victory, Dhulbahante militiamen 25 Aug captured Goojacade army base from Somaliland forces, as well as several smaller outposts on outskirts of Sool region’s capital Las Anod, meaning Somaliland forces no longer retain significant presence in Dhulbahante territory. Abdulkadir Ahmed ‘Firdhiye’, who was elected 5 Aug as chair of self-declared SSC-Khatumo state’s executive council (new 45-member body tasked with running area), same day gave triumphalist speech vowing to “immediately commence efforts to secure our region and establish our own administration”. Somaliland President Bihi and opposition party leaders next day jointly pledged to defend Somaliland’s territory. In joint statement, UN, African Union mission in Somalia, Intergovernmental Authority on Development, European Union and others 27 Aug condemned “escalation of conflict” and urged all sides to agree to “immediate and unconditional ceasefire”.

Clan militia protesting election delays mounted new attack in Togdheer region. Newly-formed militia composed of members of Haber Yonis clan protesting against delays in Somaliland’s electoral cycle 11 Aug ambushed Somaliland security forces in Godayar district in Togdheer region, killing nine and injuring 17. Abdirahman Irro, founder of main opposition party Waddani (which is dominated by Haber Yonis clan), 12 Aug called on both sides to refrain from violence.

In other important developments. Ruling Kulmiye party 21 Aug elected Bihi as candidate for presidential election set for late 2024, and Interior Minister Mohamed Kahin as new party chair. Elders from Haber Jeclo clan 27 Aug proposed combining political party and presidential elections in Nov 2024 as means to bridge gap between govt and opposition over electoral dispute.

Insurgent activity against govt forces remained high in Macomia district in northern Cabo Delgado province; authorities postponed district elections.

Macomia district continued to be hotspot of Cabo Delgado conflict. Suspected Islamic State Mozambique Province (ISMP) fighters 1 Aug killed nine soldiers near Ilala village; Southern African Development Community Mission to Mozambique (SAMIM) patrol hours later engaged insurgent cell, causing unknown number of casualties. ISMP militants 5-8 Aug killed at least seven soldiers in clashes near Catupa forest, and 22 Aug ambushed govt and SAMIM forces convoy travelling to Quiterajo village, killing nine. Army 23-25 Aug announced killing three senior ISMP executives, including commander of operations in Cabo Delgado, in Macomia forests; report is yet to be confirmed by Rwanda and SAMIM. Meanwhile, ISMP cells pursued hearts and minds strategy in some coastal areas, with militants 3 Aug buying goods and food from residents in Pangane (Macomia) and Marere (Mocímboa da Praia district) villages.

Reports of indiscipline within security forces in Cabo Delgado continued to emerge. Rwandan soldiers 1 Aug reportedly intervened after police beat local in Mocímboa da Praia town. Meanwhile, significant number of police officers and soldiers in Aug reportedly had salaries delayed for second month; delays in salary payments could add to indiscipline within security forces, creating additional hurdle in counter-insurgency efforts.

President Nyusi visit to Cabo Delgado overshadowed by postponed elections. As Nyusi visited Palma town and his home district Mueda, National Assembly 3 Aug approved indefinite postponement of district elections initially scheduled for 2024, due to financial and security constraints. Main opposition party RENAMO said decision threatens democracy and will allow ruling party to entrench hold on power. Meanwhile, mayor of Nampula city and RENAMO party member Paulo Vahanle alleged police officer 22 Aug attempted to kill him; RENAMO 26 Aug threatened to “bring country to a halt” in case of attacks on party members.

Military seized power from President Ali Bongo moments after authorities announced his re-election for third term.

As general elections 26 Aug drew to a close, authorities cut internet access and announced nightly curfew. Main opposition candidate in presidential contest, Albert Ondo Ossa, same day denounced “fraud” and 28 Aug claimed to have won, urging incumbent President Ali Bongo to concede defeat and organise handover. Election body 30 Aug however said Bongo had won third term with 64.27% of vote. Moments later, gunfire was reported in capital Libreville, and dozen military officers appeared on state TV to announce “putting an end to the current regime”; officers said they had detained Ali Bongo, election results were cancelled, all borders closed and state institutions dissolved. Hundreds of people immediately filled streets in multiple cities to celebrate change of leadership. Military junta, calling itself Committee for the Transition and Restoration of Institutions, later same day named head of Republican Guard, General Brice Oligui Nguema, as country’s transitional president. Coup drew international condemnation. Notably, African Union 31 Aug suspended Gabon’s membership and “strongly condemn[ed] the military takeover of power” as did, among others, Nigerian President Bola Tinubu, and French and U.S. govts.

Govt faced criticism over detention of critics.

NGO Human Rights Watch 7 Aug alleged authorities have detained or threatened 22 people since June for criticising govt decision to let foreign logistics company manage Tanzania’s ports, and urged govt to “respect freedom of expression, right to protest”. Police 12 Aug arrested lawyer Boniface Anyasile Mwabukusi and opposition politician Mpaluka Nyagali on accusations of inciting and planning nationwide anti-govt protests.

Opposition leader Ousmane Sonko continued hunger strike to protest detention, and electoral reform allowed previously sidelined political heavyweights to stand for election.

On hunger strike since late July to protest his detention and dissolution of his PASTEF party, opposition leader Ousmane Sonko was admitted to hospital 6 Aug and to intensive care 16 Aug. PASTEF next day condemned “inhuman persecution” of Sonko. Almost 150 prominent figures, including former minister Serigne Diop, and President of Senegalese League for Human Rights, Alassane Seck, signed petition demanding Sonko’s release and reinstatement of PASTEF. Meanwhile, parliament 5 Aug passed electoral law revision effectively clearing two key opposition figures to run for president in Feb 2024: Khalifa Sall, former mayor of Dakar, and Karim Wade, son of former President Abdoulaye Wade.

Talks between Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan over Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) concluded without breakthrough.

Ethiopian, Egyptian and Sudanese officials 27 Aug met in Egyptian capital Cairo to restart negotiations over Ethiopia’s controversial GERD project, though talks 28 Aug concluded without any indication of progress. Resumption of discussions followed mid-July agreement between Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El Sisi and Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed to finalise deal on dam’s filling and operation within four months. Next round of talks scheduled for Sept in Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa.

North Korea’s second attempt at satellite launch failed as U.S. and South Korea began summer military drills, which raised tensions and could provoke further missile tests by Pyongyang.

North Korea attempted second satellite launch. After first try to launch military reconnaissance satellite into orbit failed on 31 May, North Korea 24 Aug made second attempt but rocket booster faced issues during third phase, according to state media, and disintegrated before falling into sea. U.S. and South Korea condemned launch as violating UN Security Council resolutions, as Pyongyang vowed to try again in Oct.

U.S. and South Korea began summer military exercises. U.S. and South Korea 21 Aug commenced annual summer drills called Ulchi Freedom Shield. Although arguably essential for military readiness, drills risk fuelling instability on peninsula and triggering North Korea response; South Korean National Intelligence Agency 17 Aug warned that Pyongyang had “provocations” in works to respond to combined drills, which may come in form of missile tests. North Korean military 18 Aug said it dispatched warplanes after U.S. reconnaissance aircraft previous day entered North Korea’s economic zone off eastern coast, denouncing “dangerous military provocation”. Leader Kim Jong-un 29 Aug warned of “danger of a nuclear war” in waters off peninsula. Pyongyang 30 Aug fired two short-range ballistic missiles as part of “tactical nuclear strike drill simulating scorched-earth strikes”.

With North Korea in mind, U.S., South Korea and Japan deepened ties. At historic Camp David summit, leaders of U.S., South Korea and Japan 18 Aug signalled enhanced trilateral relations and coordination against North Korea; three pledged to “share information, align our messaging and coordinate response actions” and embark on joint military exercises as well as “annual Trilateral Indo-Pacific Dialogue”; statement also reaffirmed “commitment to the complete denuclearisation of [North Korea]” and urged north to “abandon its nuclear and ballistic missile programs”.

Pyongyang began repatriating citizens. North Korea 22 Aug began repatriating its citizens from abroad more than three years after country closed its borders amid COVID-19 pandemic; China and Russia play host to significant cohorts of North Korean workers as well as hundreds of govt personnel.

China maintained aerial and maritime military activity as Taiwan’s VP transited U.S., while Washington, Seoul and Tokyo pledged commitment to strait’s stability.

China held military exercises as Taiwan’s VP transited U.S. As of 28 Aug, Taiwan had detected 351 Chinese military aircraft around Taiwan, of which at least 115 crossed unofficial “median line” or were detected in south-western ADIZ; at sea, Taiwan spotted 183 Chinese navy vessels in surrounding waters. Taiwan’s VP and presidential candidate Lai Ching Te 12 Aug transited New York en route to Paraguay and 15 Aug went through San Francisco during return trip, meeting Taiwanese Americans and representatives of American Institute of Taiwan; upon his return, Lai said Taiwan’s election in 2024 is choice between democracy and autocracy, declaring that China cannot decide outcome. In response, Beijing 18 Aug launched low-key joint air and sea exercise around island. Taiwan’s military 15-17 Aug carried out “precision missile drill” during which air-to-air and anti-ship missiles were fired at decommissioned vessels. China 21 Aug banned import of Taiwan mangoes, citing concern with pests in likely attempt to create political pressures for Taiwan’s ruling party. U.S. 23 Aug approved $500mn sale to Taiwan of F-16 infrared search-and-track systems. Tsai administration 24 Aug proposed 7.7% increase in next year’s defence budget.

U.S., South Korea and Japan voiced support for stability. In historic trilateral meeting between leaders of U.S., Japan and South Korea, trio 18 Aug reaffirmed commitment to peace and stability across Taiwan Strait and called for peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues. President Tsai 11 Aug expressed Taiwan’s interest in participating in NATO’s Center of Excellences in Baltic countries, as she urged parliamentary delegations from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to help deepen defence cooperation.

High-profile Japanese figures visited Taiwan. Former Japanese PM Taro Aso 7 Aug visited Taiwan and delivered keynote address at regional forum in which he urged international community to “wake up” to worsening situation in Taiwan Strait. Nobuyuki Baba, leader of Japanese parliament’s second-largest opposition party, 2 Aug visited capital Taipei, asserting “Taiwan’s peace is Japan’s peace" and calling for more cooperation on deterrence.

On second anniversary of Taliban’s return to power, countrywide violence remained at historic low but worsening humanitarian crisis loomed large and tensions persisted with Pakistan.

Violence remained at low ebb despite sporadic attacks and Taliban raids. Afghanistan Freedom Front launched attacks on airport in Badakhshan province (north) 9 Aug and in Baghlan province (north) 11 Aug. Reports 19 Aug emerged that Taliban had besieged and dismantled last remnants of rebels in Badakhshan’s Shuhada district, likely referring to renegade Taliban commander who rebelled in Oct 2022; although surrender removes major threat of armed challenge to Taliban’s rule in Badakhshan, insecurity in province – which borders China, Tajikistan, and Pakistan – remains major concern. Meanwhile, Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) did not claim major attack in Aug. Taliban-affiliated media 15 Aug claimed security forces’ raid killed two important ISKP members. Fanning fears of transnational jihadist threats, gunman who 13 Aug conducted attack in Iran was Tajik national allegedly trained by ISKP in Afghanistan.

Threat of worsening humanitarian crisis persisted. Humanitarian appeal remained drastically underfunded by 75%, making it most underfunded UN humanitarian program. UN humanitarian coordinator 17 Aug warned that “massive funding cuts are forcing life-saving programs to close at an alarming rate”, with 29.2mn Afghans in need of assistance. U.S. diplomats and Taliban officials late July met for first time since Taliban retook power; despite meeting, impasse over Central Bank’s frozen assets remained unresolved.

Taliban and Pakistan traded barbs over militant threat. Pakistan’s foreign ministry 1 Aug and army chief 7 Aug alleged that Afghan nationals had been involved in July attack in Pakistan’s Baluchistan province; Taliban called allegations baseless, countering that dozens of Pakistani nationals had joined ISKP and Pakistan failed to act on intelligence shared by Kabul. Taliban 11 Aug confirmed that preeminent body for religious edicts had issued fatwa prohibiting Afghans from fighting Pakistan. Reports 14 Aug emerged of blast near hotel in Khost city (south east) that housed refugees from Pakistan’s Waziristan district; reports suggested Pakistani drones targeted site. Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani 20, 23 Aug stated attacks inside Pakistan were country’s own internal problem.

Opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) continued campaign to force govt’s resignation ahead of polls, while police abuses against Rohingyas came to light.

Opposition rallied countrywide, leading to clashes with police. BNP held near-daily rallies, sit-ins and protests in capital Dhaka and elsewhere to force PM Sheikh Hasina’s resignation in order to hold elections – set for late Dec or Jan 2024 – under non-partisan caretaker govt. Ruling Awami League, however, rejected demand and ruled out dialogue, continuing its crackdown on opposition. Notably, BNP protested in capital after court 2 Aug sentenced exiled BNP acting leader Tarique Rahman to nine years in prison for corruption, and his wife to three years, making it impossible for her to contest next election. BNP and allies 17 Aug commenced three-day countrywide activities including mass processions; though mostly peaceful, police 19 Aug opened fire with rubber bullets in Habiganj in north east, injuring up to 300 people. Amid police attempts to disrupt Jamaat-e-Islami organisation, senior party officials 4 Aug held rally in Dhaka and 6 Aug organised processions countrywide, telling govt to “dissolve the parliament, resign immediately.” Member of Awami League’s Youth Wing 15 Aug shot dead Jamaat member in Cox’s Bazar. Police and Jamaat members same day clashed in Dhaka. Thousands of opposition supporters 30 Aug protested in Dhaka to demand information about hundreds of people allegedly disappeared under govt’s rule.

Plight of Rohingya continued amid reports of abuse by security forces. NGO Fortify Rights 10 Aug published report alleging Armed Police Battalion “arbitrarily detained and tortured Rohingya refugees while systematically demanding corrupt payments”. Bipartisan U.S. delegation 14 Aug visited Rohingya camps, urging international community to step up aid amid funding shortfall. Thousands of Rohingya 25 Aug rallied in camps demanding safe return to Myanmar to mark sixth anniversary of Myanmar military campaign against them. Insecurity concerns remained acute: according to local police, 85 of 186 murders in camps since 2017 have occurred in past 12 months.

Authorities arrested suspected militants. Police 12 Aug raided “militant hideout” in north-eastern region Moulvibazar, arresting 10 suspects whom authorities claimed were members of new jihadist group, and recovering explosives and jihadist books.

Supreme Court began hearing case on Jammu & Kashmir’s (J&K) autonomy revocation, govt signalled intent to hold grassroots poll, and security forces targeted militants.

Supreme Court heard oral petitions challenging abrogation of J&K’s status. After 2 Aug beginning hearings, Supreme Court 10 Aug said J&K’s surrender of sovereignty to India in Oct 1947 was “absolutely complete”, and it was “really difficult” to say Article 370 (which offered J&K semi-autonomous status) was permanent in nature. Due to surveillance and retaliation fears, media coverage of proceedings in Kashmir remained scant but local politicians expressed satisfaction with hearings taking place; former chief minister Omar Abdullah 17 Aug said, “We are fighting and we are there with a hope for justice.”

Authorities signalled support for elections at grassroots level. After J&K in July marked five years without elected regional govt due to ruling Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) reluctance to hold assembly elections, J&K Lieutenant Governor Manoj Sinha 3 Aug asserted “time has come when we should have Panchayat polls so that people can once again reap the benefits of governance at their doorsteps”, referring to grassroots administrative bodies; govt hopes such local elections will project normalcy in region but significant risk exists that militants could target participants in polls, which could take place in coming months.

Security forces continued operations against militants in J&K. Militants 4 Aug killed three soldiers in Kulgam district during security operation. Security forces 4 Aug killed four militants in Srinagar city; 5 Aug killed Pakistani militant during two-day operation in Rajouri district; 6 Aug killed militant near Line of Control in Kupwara district in north; 7 Aug killed two Hizbul Mujahideen militants, including senior commander, near Line of Contact in Poonch district. Resistance Front Militants 10 Aug threw grenade at security forces during search operation, injuring one soldier and two civilians in Anantnag district. Meanwhile, govt and Pakistan traded blame for violating Line of Control ceasefire, as India 21 Aug claimed to foil infiltration bid by shooting two militants in Poonch district; Pakistan accused India of killing civilian in “unprovoked firing”.

Court handed former PM Imran Khan prison sentence as govt signalled potential delay to elections, while deadly militant attacks roiled provinces bordering Afghanistan.

Authorities imprisoned Imran Khan and banned him from politics. Police 5 Aug arrested Imran Khan following court order which sentenced him to three years imprisonment for allegedly selling state gifts received in official capacity; Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party called for peaceful protests but response was limited amid heavy police deployment. Citing conviction, election commission 8 Aug declared Khan banned from contesting elections for five years. Federal Investigation Authority 19 Aug registered case against Khan and former FM Shah Mahmood Qureshi under Official Secrets Act 1923, and same day arrested Qureshi, over alleged misuse of diplomatic cable at public rally. Appeals court 29 Aug suspended Khan’s three-year sentence; court next day ordered Khan to remain in judicial custody until mid-Sept pending investigation into diplomatic cable case.

Uncertainty pervaded timing of upcoming elections. Govt 5 Aug claimed upcoming general election – set to be held by Nov – must be based on new census, which implies polls could be delayed by several months; PTI 17 Aug vowed to challenge decision at Supreme Court. President 9 Aug ordered parliament’s dissolution and govt 12 Aug appointed Senator Anwaar-ul-haq Kakar as caretaker PM.

Militants continued deadly attacks in provinces bordering Afghanistan. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province’s North Waziristan district, suicide bomber 7 Aug killed two; IED 20 Aug killed 11 labourers en route to construction project; Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants 22 Aug ambushed two military vehicles, killing six soldiers and four militants. In Balochistan province, roadside bomb 7 Aug killed seven, including Balochistan Awami Party member, in Kech town. Balochistan Liberation Army 13 Aug attacked vehicles carrying Chinese engineers in Gwadar port city. Amid tensions with Afghan Taliban, FM Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari 1 Aug said Pakistan could act in “self-defence” in Afghanistan (see Afghanistan).

Blasphemy allegations triggered rampage in Punjab. Mob of several hundred Muslims 16 Aug attacked Christian settlement in Faisalabad district, Punjab province, after two locals were accused of “blasphemy”; mob desecrated churches and ransacked properties.

Economic hardship continued amid severe drought and looming debt restructuring, while inter-ethnic tensions spilled over from north east as govt unveiled new measures aimed at reconciliation.

Inflation diminished but concerns grew over drought’s impact. Reports in Aug showed inflation in July fell to under 7%, but relief for average citizens remained limited given high prices of many essentials. Drought conditions during month affected large parts of island, threatening drinking water supplies and farming and possibly reducing hydroelectric power. Meanwhile, govt’s flagship anti-poverty program continued to face serious administrative delays.

Domestic debt restructuring took centre stage. Govt attempted to fend off legal and political criticism of its decision – endorsed in motion by parliament on 1 July – to impose losses on contributory govt and private sector pension schemes while sparing banks. Supreme Court 4 and 11 Aug dismissed lawsuits that sought to block restructuring of debt held by pensions. After parliament speaker argued courts do not have power to rule on parliamentary resolution, opposition leaders 11 Aug criticised alleged blow to separation of powers, arguing parliamentary approval had taken form of non-binding motion.

Inter-ethnic relations faced pressure. Significant tensions surfaced at contested site known in Tamil as Kurunthurmalai, and in Sinhalese as Kurundi in Mullaitivu district (Northern Province), where newly built Buddhist temple sits in close proximity to Hindu Athi Aiyanar temple. Eyewitnesses said Sinhala Buddhist monk and followers 18 Aug attempted to disrupt Tamil Pongal celebration at Hindu temple, despite permission from local magistrate. Sinhala nationalist legislator 22 Aug denounced magistrate in parliament, while second Sinhala nationalist MP 26 Aug led protest outside residence of Tamil MP for his role in supporting Hindu worship at Kurunthurmalai. In separate dispute, Buddhist monks 28 Aug disrupted govt meeting and threatened Eastern Province governor for his decision to halt construction of new temple in traditionally Tamil village in Trincomalee district.

Govt unveiled new policies aimed at inter-ethnic reconciliation. President Wickremesinghe 9 Aug announced series of moves to strengthen provincial devolution of power within terms of existing constitution. Wickremesinghe rejected opposition demands to hold provincial elections, now years overdue, proposing instead to first amend Provincial Council Elections Act.

Regime battled resistance forces, notably in Shan State in north, while regime expelled Timor-Leste’s top diplomat to protest engagement with parallel National Unity Government (NUG).

Clashes continued between military and ethnic armed groups and resistance forces. Fighting escalated in northern and central Shan State (north) between regime forces and ethnic armed groups after military and Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) clashed in late July for first time since Dec 2022. Notably, hostilities 29 July-3 Aug continued in pocket of territory in Muse Township; TNLA claimed up to 25 regime soldiers and militia members were killed and released photos of large amount of seized weaponry. Fighting was also reported between two sides further south in Lashio Township. Meanwhile, clashes continued between military and Kachin Independence Army (KIA). Military 2 Aug drove KIA and aligned People’s Defence Forces out of strategic Nabar junction in northern Sagaing Region (north) and 4 Aug carried out airstrikes at Mali Yang village in Waingmaw, damaging transmission lines that carry electricity from Kachin Independence Organisation-run hydropower station to state capital Myitkyina. Clashes 7 Aug erupted in jade mining township of Hpakant. Karen National Union 10 Aug declared Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement had been rendered null and void because regime had “destroyed” principles of deal; seven of ten initial groups continue to engage regime in process.

Regime expelled Timor-Leste’s top diplomat. Regime 27 Aug announced that it had ordered charge d’affaires of Timor-Leste’s embassy in Yangon to leave country by 1 Sept following series of engagements between Timor-Leste and rival NUG, including between Timor-Leste’s president and NUG earlier in Aug.

UN’s top humanitarian official visited capital as security council condemned violence. UN Under-Secretary General and Emergency Relief Coordinator Martin Griffiths 15-17 Aug visited Naypyitaw, meeting with regime leader Min Aung Hlaing to push for greater humanitarian access; Griffiths called on donors to increase their funding. UN Security Council, except China and Russia, 23 Aug backed statement condemning “unrelenting violence” and lack of progress on Council resolution passed in Dec calling for end to violence and release of all political prisoners.

Militant attacks and surrenders continued in south, while deadly hostilities between military and Communists persisted.

Insecurity persisted in Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Around 10 militants 12 Aug killed soldier and wounded eight others in ambush on convoy in Ungkaya Pukan, Basilan province; two Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) members 15 Aug surrendered to authorities in Isabela city and claimed responsibility for attack. Explosion 16 Aug killed village official and wounded another local official in Shariff Saidona Mustapha, Maguindanao del Sur province. Thirteen members of Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) 12 Aug surrendered in Maguindanao del Sur and North Cotabato provinces, turning over heavy weaponry. Three BIFF members 18 Aug surrendered in Isulan town, Sultan Kudarat. Military 17 Aug declared that 14 towns in Sulu province are free from Abu Sayyaf Group. Armed factions of MILF’s 106 and 108 Base Command 22 Aug clashed in village of Sapakan in Mamasapano, Maguindanao del Sur, displacing at least 40 families. Assailants 28-29 Aug killed several village officials across country as they filed their candidacies for village chief and council positions. Bangsamoro parliament 17 Aug approved creation of eight new towns, emerging from pool of over 60 villages in region’s Special Geographic Area in Cotabato province.

Clashes continued between military and Communist militants. Hostilities between security forces and Communist rebels occurred in Mindanao Island (Misamis Orental) in south and Visayas Islands in centre, resulting in at least 12 fatalities (combatants and civilians alike) and two injuries.

Parliament appointed PM from opposition Pheu Thai after forging coalition with pro-military parties, raising prospect of protests and unstable coalition; insecurity persisted in deep south.

Pheu Thai joined forces with establishment parties to form next govt. Pheu Thai, which came second in May elections, 2 Aug abandoned eight-party coalition led by election winners Move Forward Party, citing latter’s promise to amend lèse-majesté law; Pheu Thai nominated real estate tycoon Srettha Thavisin as its candidate for PM. Pheu Thai 21 Aug announced it had formed 11-party coalition comprising pro-military parties, which essentially pairs party with same pro-military coalition that was rejected in May polls, breaking Pheu Thai’s election promise not to join forces with 2014 coup plotters. Joint sitting of parliament 22 Aug appointed Srettha as PM, ending months of jockeying; all signs, however, point toward unstable coalition hobbled by mutual mistrust, as well as possible street protests by disaffected voters.

Authorities arrested self-exiled former PM upon his return. Pheu Thai de facto leader Thaksin Shinawatra 22 Aug returned to Thailand after 15 years in self-imposed exile to escape abuse of power trials following 2006 coup that deposed his govt. Arrested upon arrival, Thaksin appeared at Supreme Court before being taken to Bangkok Remand Prison to begin eight-year sentence for three convictions; local media late Aug reported Thaksin applied for royal pardon.

Southernmost provinces witnessed slight uptick in attacks. In Narathiwat province, motorcycle-borne gunmen 3 Aug killed Muslim man in Cho Ai Rong district. Motorcycle-borne assailants 7 Aug attacked eight-strong army patrol in Tak Bai district with pipe bombs and small arms, killing soldier. IED attack 17 Aug killed ranger in Si Sakhon district. Gunmen 19 Aug killed off-duty paramilitary ranger in Chanae district. Militants strung banners in Bacho, Cho Ai Rong, Rangae, and Yi Ngo districts with message, “Is there lasting peace?”. In Pattani province, IED attack on military truck 3 Aug killed soldier and wounded five others in Yaring district; gunmen next day killed retired army colonel in Yaring. Combined army, police and defence volunteer force 16 Aug surrounded suspected insurgents in Nongchik district, ensuing gunfight killed two suspects. Gunmen 27 Aug killed former village headman in Saiburi district.

In East China Sea, China continued its maritime presence and conducted operations with Russia.

As of 25 Aug, Japan had spotted 95 Chinese vessels in its contiguous zone during month. It detected 16 such ships in its territorial sea over three days in Aug. Notably, China’s Maritime Security Administration 9 and 12-14 Aug held military exercises in waters adjacent to Chinese city Ningbo. Joint China-Russia flotilla consisting of around 10 ships 17 Aug operated in East China Sea, after it had sailed near Alaska earlier in Aug; China’s foreign ministry said passage was consistent with international law. Japan next day spotted two Russian IL-38 information-gathering aircraft flying between Sea of Japan and East China Sea, prompting Japan to scramble its fighter jets. Japan 25 Aug sent fighter jets to monitor two Chinese air force bombers flying between Okinawa and Miyako islands.

Manipur in north east remained volatile, authorities responded to communal clashes in Haryana state in north with home demolitions, and govt continued talks with China on disputed border.

Ethnic violence in Manipur showed little sign of abating. In Bishnupur district, gunfight between Kuki and Meitei communities 5 Aug killed two Kuki village guards, while assailants same day killed three Meitei men in their sleep; Manipur police, dominated by Meitei, 5 Aug registered case against federal security force Assam Rifles for allegedly helping Kuki militants escape from village where three dead individuals were found. In Ukhrul district, Meitei militants 18 Aug allegedly shot dead three Kuki men guarding village. Border security forces 18 Aug lodged protest with Manipur governor over “blockade on movement of troops” by locals, “mostly women”; amid state-wide insecurity, rule of law has broken down and state machinery seemed to have vanished. Gunmen 29 Aug fired at farmers on Bishnupur-Churachandpur border, killing two. The Wire 11 Aug reported violence erupted in May just as central govt was finalising agreement with Kuki militant groups to create autonomous territorial council within state. United Naga Council 21 August accused Kukis of “distortion of Naga history” and objected to separatist memorandum recently authored by 10 Kuki members of Manipur's legislative assembly sent to PM Modi that included reference to Naga-dominated districts.

Authorities demolished scores of homes following deadly clashes in Haryana. Clashes between Hindus and Muslims 31 July erupted in Nuh town, Haryana state (north), after local Muslims opposed procession by right-wing Hindu groups, killing six and resulting in large-scale property destruction; state authorities in subsequent days demolished more than 300 Muslim homes/businesses and arrested 150 Muslims. In rare criticism of demolition, Punjab and Haryana High Court questioned if “an exercise of ethnic cleansing is being conducted by the state”.

Talks with China on disputed border made little progress. Indian and Chinese commanders 13-14 Aug met in eastern Ladakh for 19th round of talks; joint statement described “positive, constructive and in-depth discussion”, although situation remained unchanged. On BRICS summit sidelines, PM Modi 24 Aug raised concerns with China’s President Xi about border.

Maritime incident between China and Philippines near disputed shoal in Spratly Islands elevated tensions.

China blocked Philippine resupply mission to disputed shoal. Chinese Coast Guard 5 Aug fired water cannon to drive away Philippine vessels seeking to resupply BRP Sierre Madre, World War II vessel grounded at Second Thomas Shoal in north-eastern Spratly Islands, causing one of supply boats to turn away; Philippine coast guard condemned China’s “dangerous manoeuvres”, while U.S. same day reaffirmed that attacks on Philippine coast guard ships will trigger commitments under 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty. Manila 19 Aug vowed to resume supply missions to BRP Sierre Madre, raising prospect of further interceptions by China; Philippine vessels 22 Aug reached Second Thomas Shoal. Amid spat, Philippines 9 Aug announced it will conduct joint patrol with the U.S. this year in SCS and next day revealed plans to deploy maritime militia and establish reserves unit in SCS; Philippines 20 Aug announced U.S., Japan and Australia will organise joint navy drill off its waters. After China’s annual summer fishing moratorium ended 16 Aug, Philippines said it was ready to “take law enforcement measures” as Chinese fishing activities are expected to increase in SCS.

China and U.S. traded criticism as Manila mulled maritime deal with Vietnam. Chinese FM Wang Yi 11 Aug blasted U.S. for being “the biggest source of instability” in world and for “fanning flames” at Second Thomas Shoal. At historic Camp David summit, U.S., Japan and South Korea 18 Aug criticised China’s “dangerous and aggressive behaviour supporting unlawful maritime claims” in SCS. Philippine President Marcos Jr. 10 Aug revealed govt is considering maritime agreement with Vietnam to “bring stability” to SCS. Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia late Aug protested new Chinese govt map laying claim to vast areas of SCS.

Covert construction continued on disputed islands. Planet Labs satellite imagery 17 Aug revealed China appears to be building airstrip on Triton, an island in Paracel group also claimed by Vietnam and Taiwan. Philippine media 19 Aug reported that Vietnam is planning to fortify its presence on Spratlys.

Activists detained for protesting border delimitation agreement with Uzbekistan went on hunger strike; U.S. and EU raised concerns with govt about circumvention of sanctions on Russia.

Jailed activists launched hunger strike. Six activists detained late Oct for protesting border demarcation agreement that handed Kempir-Abad water reservoir to Uzbekistan 22 Aug launched hunger strike amid ongoing court hearings.

Western powers urged govt to tackle efforts to circumvent sanctions. U.S. Senator and Chairman of Senate Foreign Relations Committee Bob Menendez 8 Aug sent letter to President Japarov condemning govt’s “complicit facilitation of trade with Russia in products that implicate sanctions” and urging it to “establish more reliable processes to prevent the illicit flow of goods” to Russia. Delegation from EU’s Foreign Affairs Committee 21-25 Aug visited Kyrgyzstan as well as Kazakhstan, where “issues of the circumvention of sanctions featured prominently” during exchanges with politicians and other stakeholders. Following visit, EU Foreign Affairs Committee Chair David McAllister said “allowing sanction circumvention feeds the Russian war machine” and praised govt’s “readiness… to work with the EU on this issue”.

President Rahmon visited Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region in first trip since May 2022 violence; repression of civil society and curtailment of media freedom continued. 

President Rahmon 15-18 Aug visited Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO) for first time since anti-govt protests in May 2022 and subsequent crackdown but reportedly made no mention of violence during trip. Meanwhile, Deputy Justice Minister Asadullo Hakimzoda 8 Aug announced that five NGOs in GBAO had been shuttered in past six months owing to their alleged links with local criminal groups; announcement came amid ongoing crackdown on civil society representatives from region. Committee to Protect Journalists 15 Aug called for “immediate release” of journalist Khurshed Fozilov, sentenced in May to seven years in prison, and condemned “criminalisation of the press” in Tajikistan.

Court sentenced police officers for abuses during Karakalpakstan unrest, and U.S. sought to strengthen development cooperation.

Court handed prison sentences to police officers over Karakalpakstan unrest. Supreme Court 5 Aug announced that court in Kogon city had sentenced two police officers to seven years in prison for torture during crackdown on July 2022 protests in autonomous Karakalpakstan region; third officer handed three-year prison sentence for failing to prevent crime.

In another important development. U.S. development agency officials 26-30 Aug visited country “to advance the U.S.-Uzbekistan development partnership”.

Violent skirmishes erupted in buffer zone between Turkish Cypriots and UN personnel, injuring multiple peacekeepers and Turkish Cypriot police officers and sparking diplomatic furore.

Turkish Cypriots and UN peacekeepers clashed, triggering diplomatic spat. Turkish Cypriots 17 Aug began constructing road to connect village of Pile/Pyla, located within UN controlled demilitarised zone known as Green Line, to “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”), citing humanitarian reasons. “TRNC” police and construction crews next day approached Green Line where UN peacekeepers bolstered presence with civilian vehicles to prevent construction; construction workers used excavators and physical force to disperse UN troops, leading to skirmishes that harmed at least three peacekeepers and eight Turkish Cypriot police officers. Incident sparked stern diplomatic responses. Notably, Greek PM Kyriákos Mitsotákis 18 Aug denounced Turkish Cypriot actions as “unacceptable”, while “TRNC” and Türkiye same day condemned UN personnel, claiming peacekeepers wrongfully intervened in humanitarian project. Although Russia next day vetoed UN Security Council resolution introduced by UK against actions of Turkish Cypriots, UN Sec Gen along with several embassies, including UK, U.S., EU and China, condemned “TRNC’s” actions. U.S. senator Robert Menendez 24 Aug visited Republic of Cyprus where he described Turkish Cypriot actions as unacceptable violation of international law.

Prospects for relaunching formal talks remained dim. Before buffer zone incident, Republic of Cyprus defence minister 6 Aug repeated that President Christodoulides is focussed on lifting deadlock and welcomes negotiations under UN auspices with active EU engagement. “TRNC” leader Ersin Tatar 11 Aug rejected Christodoulides’ proposal for joint meeting with UN Assistant Sec Gen Miroslav Jenča, who visited island 27-29 Aug, preferring to hold separate meeting on 28 Aug. Meanwhile, after U.S. 18 Aug announced it would continue to lift for another year arms embargo on Republic of Cyprus – imposed in 1987 and first lifted in 2021 – “TRNC” same day expressed concern over “upsetting the delicate balance on the island”; “TRNC” also described docking of U.S. destroyer USS Ramage at Limassol port on 17 Aug as “worrying”.

Military targeted Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and affiliates – principally in Iraq and Syria – while govt sought improved ties with Greece and EU, and tensions surfaced with Russia in Black Sea.

Military intensified strikes in Iraq and Syria. In northern Iraq, military stepped up strikes (see Iraq): notably, clashes between military and PKK in Zap region 9-10 Aug killed at least six Turkish soldiers; retaliatory Turkish air strikes 10 Aug killed at least four PKK operatives. Turkish FM Hakan Fidan 21-24 August visited Iraqi capital Baghdad and Erbil, met with local and national authorities. In northern Syria, military predominantly struck Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and PKK-linked militants, “neutralising” dozens: notably, drone 4 Aug struck Syrian regime position in northern Aleppo and SDF vehicle near Qamishli, killing four. In Türkiye, security forces 3 Aug captured two alleged PKK members in Istanbul and 22 Aug captured seven in Edirne city.

Ties with Greece and EU showed signs of improvement. Greek FM Giorgos Gerapetritis 3 Aug said Athens was “relatively eager” to enhance relations and political dialogue. After years of strained relations, govt 7 Aug announced plan to improve bilateral trade and economic relations with EU; FM Hakan Fidan same day defined obstruction of Türkiye’s EU membership as “strategic blindness” and asserted “without Türkiye, the EU would never be a truly global actor”. Skirmishes erupted between Turkish Cypriots and UN peacekeepers (see Cyprus).

Tensions with Russia surfaced in Black Sea. Amid intense diplomacy to revive Black Sea grain deal, President Erdoğan and Russian President Putin 2 Aug held phone call to discuss possible avenues for cooperation. Russian navy 15 Aug fired warning shots and raided Palau-flagged Turkish ship near Romanian waters. Ankara 17 Aug announced it had warned Russia against moves “which could escalate tensions in the Black Sea”; Moscow claimed ship had failed to respond to demands to halt.

Anti-Islamic State (ISIS) operations continued. Security forces during Aug detained at least 45 individuals with alleged links to ISIS; notably, security units 10 Aug arrested three ISIS members allegedly readying attack in northern Syria.

UN Security Council (UNSC) held emergency session on humanitarian crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh (NK); violence flared along Armenia-Azerbaijan border.

UNSC failed to pass resolution on NK during emergency session. Deteriorating humanitarian situation in NK due to Lachin blockade (see Nagorno-Karabakh) sharpened tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia, with latter 11 Aug formally requesting emergency UNSC session to address situation. During 16 Aug session, UNSC members highlighted worsening humanitarian situation and called for resumption of aid deliveries – halted in July – but did not pass resolution on matter. PM Pashinyan 17 Aug said UNSC “reaffirmed the existence of a humanitarian crisis”, which therefore contradicted Azerbaijan’s denial of blockade; Azerbaijan same day dismissed Armenia’s failed “attempt to instrumentalise” UNSC.

Violence flared at Armenia-Azerbaijan border. Azerbaijan early Aug claimed its forces had intercepted two Armenian reconnaissance drones heading toward Lachin region. Sides throughout month traded blame for shootings along border between Azerbaijan’s Kelbajar district and Armenia’s Gegharkunik region. Notably, Armenia 15 Aug claimed Azerbaijan fired at individuals from EU civilian observation mission, which EU same day confirmed. Armenia 14 Aug reported one soldier injured, 21 Aug reported one serviceman “fatally wounded”; Azerbaijan 16 Aug said it injured and detained Armenian soldier and 22 Aug reported one of its soldiers injured.

UN Security Council (UNSC) held emergency session on humanitarian crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh (NK); violence flared along Azerbaijan-Armenia border.

UNSC failed to pass resolution on NK during emergency session. Deteriorating humanitarian situation in NK due to Lachin blockade (see Nagorno-Karabakh) sharpened tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia, with latter 11 Aug formally requesting emergency UNSC session to address situation. During 16 Aug session, UNSC members 16 Aug highlighted worsening humanitarian situation and called for resumption of aid deliveries – halted in July – but did not pass resolution on matter. Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan 17 Aug said UNSC “reaffirmed the existence of a humanitarian crisis”, which therefore contradicted Azerbaijan’s denial of blockade; Azerbaijan same day dismissed Armenia’s failed “attempt to instrumentalise” UNSC.

Violence flared at Azerbaijan-Armenia border. Azerbaijan early Aug claimed its forces had intercepted two Armenian reconnaissance drones heading toward Lachin region. Sides throughout month traded blame for shootings along border between Azerbaijan’s Kelbajar district and Armenia’s Gegharkunik region. Notably, Armenia 15 Aug claimed Azerbaijan fired at individuals from EU civilian observation mission, which EU same day c0nfirmed. Armenia 14 Aug reported one soldier injured, 21 Aug reported one serviceman “fatally wounded”; Azerbaijan 16 Aug said it detained Armenian soldier and 22 Aug reported one of its soldiers injured.

Authorities brought fresh charges against detained opposition politician. News agency Turan 25 Aug reported that authorities had brought new charge – religious extremism – against prominent opposition politician Qubad İbadoğlu, arrested late July for alleged involvement in “preparation, acquisition or sale of counterfeit money or securities by an organised group”.

Tense political atmosphere prevailed as Georgia marked 15th anniversary of 2008 war with Russia; former Russian president warned Moscow could annex breakaway regions.

15th anniversary of Russia-Georgia 2008 war provoked fierce debate. Foreign Ministry 7 Aug called on Russia to withdraw its troops from Georgian territory on occasion of 15th anniversary of Russian-Georgian war. Opposing narratives of conflict, meanwhile, dominated anniversary. Notably, PM Garibashvili 8 Aug blamed former govt of jailed ex-President Mikheil Saakashvili for war that “could have been avoided”; move followed chairman of main opposition party United National Movement day before criticising ruling Georgian Dream for allowing Russia to pursue its goals even after war ended. EU and U.S. 7 Aug condemned Moscow’s invasion, while Russian officials sought to shift blame onto NATO; notably, deputy Head of Russian Security Council and former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev 8 Aug claimed “the U.S. and its vassals” had waged proxy war in Georgia. Breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia 7 Aug praised Russian “aid” in 2008.

Former Russian president threatened to annex breakaways. Ahead of 15th anniversary of Russia recognising South Ossetia and Abkhazia’s independence on 25 Aug, Medvedev 23 Aug published article in Argumenty i Fakty newspaper blaming NATO for escalating tensions over Georgia by discussing country’s potential membership to alliance. He concluded by threatening to annex breakaways “if there are good reasons”; Tbilisi same day condemned comments.

Pristina took further de-escalatory steps in Serb-majority northern municipalities, though tensions remained high; EU stepped up pressure on Pristina and Belgrade to resume normalisation efforts.

Kosovo police further reduced presence at municipal buildings in north. Authorities 3 Aug announced 25% reduction of police presence around municipal buildings in north, second such reduction in two months, while PM Kurti next day described security situation as “calm”. NATO-led force KFOR 4 Aug and EU 10 Aug welcomed move. Tensions simmered, however, after authorities in North Mitrovica town 22 Aug ordered Serbia’s parallel govt institutions to “vacate” their premises within three days; EU 24 Aug condemned move and town’s mayor 25 Aug postponed deadline by two weeks.

EU maintained pressure on Pristina and Belgrade to de-escalate. Following reduced police presence in north, Pristina called for removal of EU’s punitive measures, imposed in June. EU 10 Aug demanded additional de-escalatory steps, however, while stating readiness to impose “punitive measures” against Serbia unless it too works to de-escalate. French President Emmanuel Macron 28 Aug threatened Pristina and Belgrade with “review” of EU visa liberalisation and economic cooperation amid growing EU pressure on sides to resume efforts on normalising relations. EU Special Representative Miroslav Lajčák same day met with PM Kurti, 30 Aug met with Serb President Aleksandar Vučić ahead of possible trilateral meeting in Sept.

South remained epicentre of fighting as Russia intensified attacks on Odesa region and Ukraine’s counteroffensive continued at slow pace; Kyiv sought to drum up support for peace plan during well-attended summit in Saudi Arabia.

Russian withdrawal from grain deal brought more fighting to Odesa region. After scuppering Black Sea grain deal, Moscow intensified air raids on port infrastructure and grain facilities along Black Sea coast and Danube River in Odesa region. Notably, Russian drone 2 Aug destroyed port administration building in Izmail city; military 23 Aug said drones targeted “grain storage facilities and production complex in Danube region”. Russia continued to strike cities elsewhere; notably, missile hit theatre in Chernihiv city 19 Aug, killing at least seven. Kyiv, meanwhile, stepped up drone attacks on Russia (see Russia) and Russian-controlled territory, including massive attack 25 Aug on Russian-annexed Crimea.

Ukrainian counteroffensive ground on slowly. Ukraine’s counteroffensive along southern front, which stretches across Kherson, Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk regions, continued to make incremental progress at high cost. Forces 16 Aug liberated Urozhaine village (Donetsk) and 28 Aug freed Robotyne village (Zaporizhzhia), pushing frontline closer toward road and rail hub of Tokmak city; neither advance broke through Russia’s main defensive lines. Senior NATO commanders mid-Aug reportedly urged Ukrainian Commander in Chief Gen. Zaluzhniy to concentrate forces on southern front rather than Donetsk, request which Ukrainians appeared to heed. Ukrainian forces 24 Aug raided Russian-annexed Crimea, briefly clashing with Russian forces and planting Ukrainian flag to mark country’s Independence Day. Meanwhile, Russian forces conducted operations near Kupiansk town (Kharkiv region), forcing authorities 10 Aug to issue evacuation order.

Saudi Arabia hosted dozens of nations for Ukraine talks. Kyiv gathered delegations from around 40 countries, including China and India but not Russia, in Saudi city of Jeddah 5-6 Aug to drum up support for peace plan; 7 Aug announced more extensive talks would follow in Autumn 2023.

In important domestic developments. President Zelenskyy 10 Aug announced govt is working on comprehensive framework document, which would lay foundation for “transformation of our state” in order to “win the war [without] losing the country”. Govt 18 Aug prolonged martial law and mobilisation for another 90 days.

Escalating humanitarian crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh triggered emergency session at UN Security Council (UNSC); de facto authorities and Baku remained at loggerheads.

Humanitarian crisis deteriorated further. Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) continued to experience acute shortages of food, fuel and medical supplies due to Baku’s blockade of Lachin road, which connects NK to Armenia, fuelling humanitarian crisis. International Committee of Red Cross, unable to deliver aid since late July, 18 Aug reiterated appeal to resume assistance. Baku 30 Aug blocked French humanitarian convoy from entering NK via Lachin. Azerbaijani Red Crescent society 29 Aug sent food trucks via Agdam road, which connects NK to Azerbaijan-controlled Agdam region; de facto authorities 30 Aug declared it would not accept aid (many in Armenia and NK view Baku’s preference for Agdam route as tactic to integrate enclave into Azerbaijan and entrench Lachin blockade). Meanwhile, Azerbaijani border guards 28 Aug detained three ethnic Armenians from NK as they attempted to cross Lachin checkpoint; detainees allegedly members of football team filmed stepping on Azerbaijani flag in 2021.

UNSC failed to pass NK resolution during emergency session. UNSC 16 Aug held emergency session on crisis at Yerevan’s request, highlighting worsening humanitarian situation and urging resumption of aid deliveries but failing to pass resolution. Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan 17 Aug said UNSC “reaffirmed the existence of a humanitarian crisis”, which therefore contradicted Azerbaijan’s denial of blockade; Azerbaijan same day dismissed Armenia’s failed “attempt to instrumentalise” UNSC.

Baku and Stepanakert disagreed on proposal to resolve crisis. Azerbaijani foreign ministry 11 Aug announced that international “shuttle diplomacy” had produced deal to resolve crisis; agreement (based on Russian proposal put forward in July) envisioned opening Agdam road and in reciprocation, 24 hours later, traffic through Lachin road would be allowed to increase. Despite reportedly considering proposal, de facto authorities 17 Aug rejected it on grounds it gave Baku full control over deliveries via both roads; Baku consequently accused Stepanakert of sabotaging efforts to resolve crisis. De facto leader of NK Arayik Harutyunyan 31 Aug announced intention to resign, marking further blow to work on resolving crisis. Meanwhile, de facto forces and Azerbaijan throughout month traded blame for near daily “ceasefire violations”.

Tensions with western neighbours rose, while govt continued to stifle dissent.

Tensions with neighbouring NATO member states intensified. Following July arrival of mercenaries from Russia paramilitary Wagner Group, tensions between Minsk and its western neighbours escalated further. Notably, Poland 1 Aug accused Belarus of airspace incursion, which latter 3 Aug denied. Belarus 7 Aug began military drills in Grodno region near Polish and Lithuanian borders. Poland 9 Aug deployed 2,000 soldiers to border, citing mercenaries’ presence and rise in illegal border crossings, Latvia 15 Aug announced deployment of “additional forces” to its border and Lithuania 18 Aug closed two border crossings to Belarus. Polish Interior Minister Mariusz Kaminski 28 Aug said Poland, Latvia and Lithuania would close their borders with Belarus if “critical incident” involving Wagner mercenaries took place; Kaminski added that this would include border with Russian exclave Kaliningrad, which lies between Poland and Lithuania. Meanwhile, Polish President Andrzej Duda 22 Aug confirmed Russia had begun transferring short-range nuclear weapons to Belarus, which he said would change regional security architecture.

Western countries imposed more punitive measures on Belarus. EU 3 Aug and U.S. 9 Aug sanctioned dozens of Belarusian individuals and entities for human rights abuses and “involvement” in Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Lithuania 4 Aug declared 910 Belarusian citizens living in country were “threat” to national security, revoking residence permits and rejecting residency requests.

Authorities continued to suppress opposition. Supreme Court mid-Aug ordered dissolution of two opposition parties, Belarusian Popular Front Party and United Civil Party. Authorities 23 Aug reportedly declared Vyasna Human Rights Centre “extremist”. Homel regional court 31 Aug sentenced journalist Larysa Shchyrakova to three years and six months in prison for “discrediting” country and facilitating extremism.

Authorities confirmed Wagner chief’s death in plane crash amid speculation about Putin’s role; Ukraine intensified drone strikes on Russian territory.

Wagner boss killed in plane crash. Authorities 27 Aug confirmed that head of paramilitary Wagner Group Yevgeny Prigozhin, who staged failed mutiny in June, was killed 23 Aug in plane crash outside capital Moscow alongside nine others. U.S. 24 Aug said explosion on board likely brought down plane as number of Western intelligence assessments suggested President Putin may have ordered his death, which Kremlin 25 Aug denied. Meanwhile, Putin 23 Aug sacked Gen. Surovikin, ally of Prigozhin who many believe knew about plans for June insurrection and possibly aided him.

Ukraine conducted near-daily drone attacks on Russia. Ukraine intensified strikes on Russian territory, with largest drone attack since Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine 29-30 Aug targeting seven regions. Among other notable incidents, aquatic drones 4 Aug struck Navy base in Black Sea port city of Novorossiysk; drones 19 Aug struck Soltsy airfield in northwestern Novgorod region; shelling in Belgorod region 23 Aug killed three; and shelling in Bryansk region left several people dead. Moscow targeted throughout month.

Rumours of possible mobilisation swirled. Bloomberg report 20 Aug revealed hardline members within Russia’s security apparatus are pushing for changes to army leadership (including dismissal of Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of General Staff Valerii Gerasimov), declaration of martial law and introduction of full-scale mobilisation. Though Putin gave no indication he plans to take such steps, rumours of new mobilisation wave due to shortage of volunteers spread on social networks. Meanwhile, Putin 4 Aug signed into law measures to increase number of potential conscripts.

Crackdown on dissent continued, value of Russian ruble tumbled. Court 4 Aug sentenced imprisoned opposition leader Alexei Navalny to 19 years in prison on extremism charges; authorities 17 Aug searched offices and homes of members of Golos movement, which monitors elections; and Moscow court 29 Aug sentenced in absentia investigator Ruslan Leviev and journalist Michael Naki to 11 years in prison for spreading disinformation or “fakes” about army. Meanwhile, Russian ruble 14 Aug hit 17-month low against dollar.

Criminal violence continued at high levels amid rising discontent over govt handling of disappearances; tensions with U.S. simmered over fentanyl crisis.

Growing number of disappearances raised concerns. Though National Institute of Statistics and Geography report late July said 2022 marked lowest homicide rate in Mexico since 2017, rising number of disappearances underscored persistently high levels of insecurity. Notably, five youths 11 Aug disappeared from Lagos de Moreno city in Jalisco state (centre). Four days later, video surfaced in media allegedly showing victims being forced to kill one another; video reportedly attributed to MZ faction of Sinaloa Cartel, which is in competition with Jalisco Cartel New Generation for control of drug trafficking and fuel theft in area. Case triggered alarm, with opposition presidential candidate Xochitl Galvez 16 Aug announcing suspension of campaign activities for 24 hours. Head of National Search Commission 23 Aug resigned amid growing frustration with govt’s handling of disappearances, further underscored by late July decision of independent investigators to end probe into 2014 disappearance of students from Ayotzinapa college due to lack of collaboration from authorities. Some 200 protesters 30 Aug took to streets in Mexico City to mark International Day of the Disappeared, chanting “Where are our children” and calling for more concerted govt efforts to locate missing persons.

Attacks on state forces and civilians continued. Coahuila’s Prosecutor’s Office 1 Aug announced detention of “criminal leader” who could be responsible for series of late July attacks on police checkpoints in Coahuila state (north). Army 22 Aug said cartels are increasingly deploying roadside bombs and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), with 42 soldiers, police and suspects wounded by IEDs in 2023, up from 16 in 2022. Cartels in Michoacán state (centre) late Aug burnt trucks and shops and blocked roads, prompting govt 28 Aug to send 1,200 troops to quell uptick in violence.

Frictions with U.S. over fentanyl crisis simmered. Tensions between Mexico and U.S. over responsibility for fentanyl drug crisis continued to rise; U.S. officials blame Jalisco Cartel New Generation and Sinaloa Cartel for production and trafficking of fentanyl, while Mexican govt claim country is only transit route.

Govt’s landmark ceasefire with National Liberation Army (ELN) took effect, marking important step forward in President Petro’s “total peace” efforts; govt announced negotiations with FARC dissidents will begin in Sept.

Bilateral ceasefire with ELN commenced. 180-day ceasefire between ELN and state security forces — longest bilateral ceasefire ever concluded with guerrilla group – 3 Aug got under way, marked by ceremony in capital Bogotá. Parties same day inaugurated public participation mechanism with 81 national delegates who are meant to organise several dozen regional consultations; purpose of consultations unclear. Govt and ELN negotiators 14 Aug began fourth round of talks in Venezuelan capital Caracas. Despite progress, Attorney General Francisco Barbosa 8 Aug alleged guerrillas planned to assassinate him, which ELN next day denied. UN Security Council 2 Aug expanded UN mission mandate to include monitoring of ELN ceasefire and expressed willingness to consider covering potential future agreement with Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) dissidents.

String of attacks by FARC dissident faction threatened progress toward talks. Petro administration 12 Aug announced it would begin formal peace negotiations with dissident FARC faction known as FARC-EP Estado Mayor Central (FARC-EMC) on 17 Sept, likely in Caquetá department (south). Group launched series of attacks in Cauca department (west). Notably, FARC-EMC 12 Aug killed three police officers in Morales town; several car bombs 13 Aug killed police officer in Buenos Aires town; local Indigenous communities reported at least five assassinations 12-13 Aug; and attack 24 Aug on police station in Santander de Quilichao town wounded four. Attacks follow 1 Aug video circulated by group naming ceasefire with military as first priority in talks and saying it would not consider wider cessation of hostilities; Petro 14 Aug stated that govt would seek cessation of hostilities against civilian population before agreeing to ceasefire.

In other important developments. Official campaigning for Oct local elections began amid concerns poll may escalate political tensions in conflict-affected regions as armed and criminal groups seek to assert influence. Petro’s son, charged with money laundering, 3 Aug reportedly said some of these dubious funds financed president’s 2022 election campaign.

Spate of political assassinations in lead-up to elections prompted President Lasso to declare nationwide state of emergency; first-round voting in poll failed to produce clear winner.

Gunmen shot dead prominent electoral candidate. Ahead of presidential poll on 20 Aug, gunmen 9 Aug killed Construye party candidate Fernando Villavicencio and injured nine others at campaign rally in capital Quito. Security forces shot dead one suspect and arrested six others – all Colombian nationals. Villavicencio had advocated for tough approaches to drug trafficking, corruption and other illicit activity, as well as alleged links between politicians and organised crime. President Lasso same day declared 60-day national emergency. Govt 12 Aug deployed 4,000 armed guards to Prison 8 in Guayaquil city and transferred Jose Adolfo Macias, head of Los Choneros gang, to maximum security prison; Villavicencio had previously mentioned receiving threats from Macias. Just five days after Villavicencio’s murder, gunmen 14 Aug shot dead local leader of left-wing Citizen Revolution Movement Pedro Briones near his home in Esmeraldas province.

Election produced no clear winner, leading to runoff in Oct. Ecuadoreans 20 Aug cast their ballots in poll overshadowed by Villavicencio’s assassination. Voters chose among eight presidential candidates, all of whom named security as their top priority. With no candidate able to secure absolute majority, Citizen Revolution Movement candidate Luisa González will face businessman Daniel Noboa in Oct runoff.

Inmates took dozens of law enforcement officers hostage. Authorities 31 Aug announced over 50 law enforcement officers had been taken captive by inmates from six prisons; hostage-taking followed explosion of two car bombs in capital Quito 30-31 Aug reportedly targeting country’s prisons authority; authorities said actions may be in response to recent security measures inside penitentiaries.

Opposition candidates competing in Oct primary kicked off their campaigns as authorities announced new National Electoral Council; govt saw progress and setbacks in court rulings on foreign assets.

Campaigning for opposition primary kicked off. Candidates 22 Aug began campaigning for opposition primary on 22 Oct to select single nominee for 2024 presidential election. Primary process continued to encounter obstacles, however, with no clarity from govt about location of voting centres opposition will be able to use, raising concerns about voters’ ability to cast ballots. Opposition candidates also faced threats. Notably, Attorney General Tarek Saab 13 Aug launched investigation into death threats against primary candidate Delsa Solórzano, including one that referenced murdered Ecuadorean presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio (see Ecuador); and reported govt supporters 15 Aug violently dispersed campaign event of Henrique Capriles in Apure state (west), injuring ten. Meanwhile, National Assembly 24 Aug appointed new National Electoral Council headed by govt loyalist Elvis Amoroso, which signalled govt’s unwillingness to allow competitive presidential race.

Govt won lawsuit to recover frozen assets from Portuguese bank. Govt 9 Aug announced it had won legal battle to release $1.5bn in state assets from Portuguese bank, which were frozen in 2019 following imposition by U.S. and other countries of sanctions on govt; Venezuela 16 Aug petitioned U.S. Supreme Court to overturn U.S. judge’s late July ruling, criticised by govt and opposition, which set Oct start date for auction of shares of Venezuela-owned refiner Citgo Petroleum’s parent company to pay off creditors.

Dismissal of Red Cross chief in Venezuela sparked condemnation. Supreme Court 4 Aug dismissed President of Venezuelan Red Cross Mario Enrique Villarroel and ordered organisational restructuring after VP of ruling United Socialist Party accused Villarroel of “mafia activity” and conspiring against govt; international and domestic NGOs criticised move while Red Cross 9 Aug said “any state intervention in our National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies raises serious concerns regarding their independence”. Meanwhile, rights group Amnesty International 29 Aug published report accusing govt of using arbitrary detentions as tool of repression.

Despite judicial and other interference, presidential election went ahead, resulting in landslide victory for centre-left candidate Bernardo Arévalo; President Giammattei endorsed result.

Surprise candidate won presidential election. Bernardo Arévalo of centre-left Movimiento Semilla won landslide victory in presidential runoff on 20 Aug, securing 60.9% of vote compared with 37.2% for Sandra Torres of right-wing Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza; Arévalo, who takes office on 14 Jan, promised to fight corruption after victory. President Giammattei 21 Aug congratulated Arévalo, inviting him to launch transition. Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) 28 Aug confirmed result.

Attempts to undermine Arévalo and his party persisted. Torres, who had not conceded by end of month, repeatedly claimed election may be stolen and 18 Aug alleged fraud in first round; hours later, director of Special Prosecutor’s Office Against Impunity (accused of corruption) echoed Torres’ accusations, implying possible international interference and claiming advances in investigations into Semilla party. TSE 18 Aug criticised comments so close to second-round vote, but 28 Aug provisionally suspended Semilla after Judge Orellana, at request of Special Prosecutor’s Office Against Impunity, issued order. Organization of American States (OAS) 28 Aug called decision an “abusive interpretation of the law”. Ruling unlikely to affect Arévalo but for now leaves him without party.

International community kept close eye on proceedings. Amid concern about efforts to alter electoral process, external actors including U.S., OAS and Inter-American Commission on Human Rights called for transparent elections with no interference. OAS 10 Aug extended observation mission until Jan transition upon request from outgoing president and others. OAS 24 Aug asked govt to provide Arévalo and running mate Karin Herrera with protection amid death threats.

Gangs sought to capture new territory in capital Port-au-Prince as discussions on deployment of multinational police force moved forward amid calls for broad political consensus.

Gangs mounted assaults aimed at expanding presence in capital. Gangs stepped up operations in various parts of Port-au-Prince in attempt to expand foothold toward centre of capital. Notably, alleged members of Kraze Baryè gang 8 Aug carried out attacks in Tabarre district in push toward main airport where large companies are located. Alleged members of Grand Ravine gang 5 Aug attempted to invade Carrefour-Feuilles district from their Martissant stronghold and several days later took control of local power plant, leaving several districts without electricity and killing police officer in clash; alleged Grand Ravine gang 25 Aug resumed assaults on Carrefour-Feuilles, forcing around 9,000 people to flee. Alleged members of Canaan gang 26 Aug opened fire on hundreds of parishioners armed with machetes and sticks attempting to confront gang leader in Canaan suburbs, which left at least seven dead. Meanwhile, UN humanitarian office 14 Aug reported number of internally displaced persons had reached nearly 195,000.

Discussions on multinational force moved forward. U.S. 1 Aug praised Kenya’s late July offer to consider leading multinational force and urged Haitian stakeholders to “urgently broaden the political consensus”. CARICOM (body of Caribbean nations) 4 Aug welcomed announcements by the Bahamas and Jamaica to commit troops to mission. Following 20-23 Aug security assessment mission to Haiti, Kenya 25 Aug agreed to lead force. Given history of misconduct by external missions in Haiti, NGO Human Rights Watch 14 Aug called for safeguards to prevent abuses. Leader of G9 gang coalition, Jimmy Chérizier aka Barbecue, 16 Aug threatened violence if multinational force commits abuses in poor neighbourhoods.

Dialogue to resolve political crisis made tentative progress. Media outlets reported series of meetings from late July continuing into Aug between main Haitian political groups involved in negotiations to resolve political crisis; CARICOM 14 Aug said its facilitation team had made progress with various stakeholders during virtual meetings.

Govt crackdown on Catholic Church, political opposition and media persisted.

Authorities targeted Jesuit order amid crackdown on Catholic Church. Govt 9 Aug froze bank accounts and 16 Aug seized assets of Jesuit-run Central American University in capital Managua, accusing institution of being “centre of terrorism”; UN rights office and Jesuit movement same day criticised move. Govt 23 Aug declared Jesuit order illegal and ordered confiscation of all its property over alleged tax reporting issues. U.S. 19 Aug announced sanctions on 100 municipal officials for role in suppression of Catholic Church.

Repression of opposition and independent media continued. Police 2 Aug arrested opposition leader Juan Carlos Baquedano Castro upon his return from exile in Mexico, next day apprehended opposition activist Lester Macolla Solís when he returned from U.S. Court 8 Aug found political prisoner and VP of April 19 University Movement Jasson Salazar Rugama guilty of “undermining national integrity and spreading false news”. Meanwhile, govt 4 Aug expelled Honduran journalist Kenya Volkanoe from country for publishing pro-Christian posts. Collective of media outlets known as Digital Mercenaries 6 Aug said regime used 1,400 social media accounts to serve as disinformation network.

Govt renewed state of emergency for sixth time, while Congress continued work toward establishment of anti-corruption body.

Stringent anti-gang measures remained in place. After enforcing night-time curfew in San Pedro Sula city (Cortés department) early July, authorities 10 Aug implemented further security measures, deploying 500 police officers throughout city as well as plainclothes unit and unmarked cars. Authorities took similar measures in other areas, including Olancho department (centre). Military police, meanwhile, 4 Aug announced its mano dura approach in penitentiary system would continue despite concerns about rights violations. Authorities 7 Aug claimed national homicide rate had decreased by 44% since state of exception came into effect Dec 2022 and 20 Aug extended measure for sixth time.

Efforts to enable creation of anti-corruption commission continued. Congress 2 Aug repealed further decrees that protected its members from prosecution for corruption; Secretary of Parliament Carlos Zelaya 6 Aug said Congress had completed all necessary steps for establishment of International Commission Against Corruption and Impunity.

Constitutional crisis loomed over blocked vote for new Attorney General. National Party, main opposition group in Congress, 22 Aug prevented vote to replace incumbent Attorney General Oscar Chinchilla, whose mandate ended 31 Aug; move was in response to passing of controversial amnesty law that National Party claim benefits members of ruling party while persecuting the opposition; President Castro 11 Aug and 29 Aug organised national protest to demand Congress proceed with vote.

Govt’s hardline security policies continued to fuel concern among rights groups.

Authorities carried out massive security operation amid anti-gang efforts. In one of biggest military operations since President Bukele first declared state of exception in March 2022, govt 1 Aug deployed 7,000 soldiers and 1,000 police officers to Cabañas department (north) to tackle “terrorist cells”. While previous raids had focused on particular communities, Cabañas became first full department to be placed under siege as authorities arrested scores and seized dozens of weapons. Meanwhile, Legislative Assembly 9 Aug approved state of exception’s 17th extension until 13 Sept. Authorities 22 Aug announced 7,000 of 72,000 people detained under measure had been released.

Rights groups kept condemning security measures. Civil society organisations, including Movimiento de Víctimas del Regimen and Institute of Human Rights of the University of Central America, continued to denounce persecution, harassment and abuses under state of exception. Former Supreme Court of Justice magistrate Sidney Blando 1 Aug said no judicial independence existed in El Salvador. Andrés Guzman, appointed to Commission for Human Rights and Freedom of Expression by Bukele, 7 Aug defended administration.

Palestinian factions battled in southern refugee camp and Christian and Shiite groups clashed near capital Beirut; Hizbollah-Israel tensions remained high and presidential vacuum continued.

Intra-Palestinian fighting continued, Shiite-Christian hostilities erupted. After 30 July assassination of Fatah general, violent clashes early Aug continued inside Ein el-Helweh Palestinian refugee camp in south, resulting in at least 13 deaths, destruction of 400 houses and displacement of several hundred families. Separately, vehicle allegedly carrying Hizbollah ammunition 9 Aug crashed in Kahaleh, Maronite Christian-majority village outside capital Beirut, triggering gunfight that killed resident and Hizbollah member; various Christian parties denounced incident as consequence of Hizbollah maintaining its independent weapons arsenal. Hizbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah 14 Aug called for calm but warned that party’s rivals were seeking to push country into civil war. Leader of Lebanese Forces (LF) party Samir Geagea 14 Aug suggested that Hizbollah may be behind death of former LF coordinator in southern town of Ain Ibl.

Hostile rhetoric continued between Hizbollah and Israel. Following tensions in July over Hizbollah’s alleged build-up of military infrastructure along border, Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant 8 Aug threatened to “return Lebanon to the Stone Age”; Nasrallah 14 Aug returned threat. Israel’s UN ambassador 30 Aug said Israel is closer to launching military action in Lebanon than at any time since 2006 war. Bellicose statements come after series of altercations at border, which have increased in regularity since mid-2022. U.S. Treasury 16 Aug designated Hizbollah-linked Lebanese NGO Green Without Borders as terrorist group.

Presidential vacuum entered its tenth consecutive month. Parliament speaker and Hizbollah ally Nabih Berri 8 Aug said Sept dialogue proposed by French envoy Jean-Yves Le Drian is opportunity that “should not be missed”. Lack of president kept parliament at standstill, as body 17 Aug failed to secure necessary quorum to hold proposed legislative session.

Economic hardship persisted. Interim Central Bank governor, who succeeded Riad Salameh on 31 July, 17 Aug announced that total liquid foreign exchange reserves are down to around $7bn. Army 9 and 13 Aug announced that it had arrested dozens of people accused of involvement with irregular migration to Europe.

Major battle erupted between Hei’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and regime in northwest as Russia renewed airstrikes and Islamic State (ISIS) killed dozens in centre; collapsing currency triggered protests.

Hostilities escalated between HTS and regime, leading to fierce battle. In Idlib province, HTS 7 Aug launched raid 10km behind regime lines to destroy Russian-Syrian base, 11 Aug conducted raid on Latakia front, and 26 Aug detonated tunnel bomb beneath regime base in southern Idlib. As of 28 Aug, HTS continued to heavily shell regime forces around southern Idlib amid one of most intense battles in northwest since 2020 ceasefire, although fighting remained contained to artillery and sniper fire. Amid hostilities, Russian resumed airstrikes in Idlib: 21-22 Aug killed 15 HTS members and late Aug intensified deadly strikes across region.

ISIS attacks surged in centre. ISIS 7 Aug temporarily captured largest regime position near village of Shoula, Deir Ez Zor and two checkpoints along Raqqa-Deir Ez Zor highway. ISIS 8 Aug killed eight regime troops and pro-govt fighters in Raqqa province and 10 Aug killed at least 25 soldiers outside Mayadeen town. Upsurge in attacks may indicate group’s shift away from areas dominated by international coalition. Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) 18 Aug killed group’s eastern region emir in Raqqa city.

Currency crisis sparked rare anti-govt rallies. Syrian pound 16 Aug fell to 15,500 to $1 USD, sparking general strike next day in Suwayda province, protests 18 Aug in Daraa city and rare protest in capital Damascus amid reports of increased social media criticism of govt among Alawites; protestors in Suwayda city 24 Aug raided ruling party’s office. Anti-regime protests persisted late month among Druze population of Suwayda and across opposition-held northern Syria.

Hostilities erupted in northeast, regime allowed aid in northwest. In eastern Deir Ez Zor in northeast, clashes beginning 28 Aug between SDF and Arab groups reportedly killed dozens after SDF 27 Aug arrested commander. After month-long pause, Damascus 8 Aug acquiesced to UN efforts to reopen Bab al-Hawa border crossing for humanitarian aid for six months; HTS-aligned authorities in Idlib, however, rejected aid sanctioned by Damascus.

De-escalatory understandings between U.S. and Iran began to take shape, underscoring potential for sustained mutual restraint on nuclear and regional fronts, but maritime tensions remained elevated.

First evidence emerged of U.S.-Iran de-escalation. U.S. 10 Aug confirmed Iran’s release of five U.S. nationals from prison to house arrest. Iran’s deputy FM same day indicated that frozen Iranian assets in South Korea were in process of being released, along with “several Iranians who were illegally detained in America”; assets, estimated at around $6bn, will be held in Qatar, where they be available for non-sanctionable humanitarian trade. Additionally, U.S. media reports mid-Aug indicated Tehran had tapered growth of its enriched uranium stockpiling at highest end, while major attacks on U.S. and allied forces by Iranian/Iran-backed groups in Iraq and Syria appeared to be in lull.

Tensions in maritime domain persisted. After U.S. throughout July announced series of military deployments to Gulf region, various media outlets 3 Aug reported Washington was in advanced deliberations about possibility of dispatching U.S. forces aboard commercial vessels that request it. U.S. 6 Aug announced arrival of 3,000 forces in region facilitating “greater flexibility and maritime capability”; next day Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps warned Iran would “respond in kind to any U.S. action and mischief, including the seizure of ships”. U.S., EU and UK naval authorities 12 Aug alerted commercial vessels of unspecified threat and advised distance from Iranian waters.

Normalisation with Saudi Arabia continued. After Iranian officials 13 Aug reported reopening of Saudi consulate in Mashhad, FM Hossein Amir-Abdollahian 17-18 Aug travelled to Saudi Arabia for meetings with his Saudi counterpart and Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman; Amir-Abdollahian described meetings as “frank, beneficial and productive” (see Saudi Arabia).

Western sanctions mounted. Canada 8 Aug sanctioned seven Iranian individuals, including secretary of Supreme National Security Council, citing their involvement “in activities that gravely threaten international peace and security or that constitute gross and systemic violations of human rights”. UK same day blacklisted nearly dozen Iranian persons and organisations as part of set of 25 designations of foreign entities giving military support to Russia.

Hundreds of prisoners began mass hunger strike in protest of detention conditions.

Prisoners in Jau prison in south – which incarcerates majority of Bahrain’s 1,200 political prisoners – 7 Aug began hunger strike to demand better conditions, including increased time outside cells and better health and education facilities; by late month, reports suggested more than 800 prisoners had joined action, making it largest prisoner hunger strike in country’s history. In rare demonstrations, villagers 7 Aug in Sanabis, on outskirts of capital Manama, held protest in solidarity with prisoners; protesters also took to streets in downtown Manama.

Hostilities intensified between Türkiye and Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in north, parties formed lists ahead of provincial elections in Dec, and Islamic State (ISIS) continued low-scale insurgency.

Türkiye escalated drone strikes on PKK. Turkish drone 6 Aug killed two PKK militants in separate strikes in Sulaymaniyah and Dohuk governorates; 9 Aug killed two PKK members in separate strikes in Sulaymaniyah. Clashes between Turkish forces and PKK 9-10 Aug killed at least six Turkish soldiers in Zap region, Dohuk governorate; Türkiye 10 Aug responded with airstrikes, killing four PKK members. Türkiye 24 Aug launched drone strikes in Erbil governorate, killing seven PKK members. IED 25 Aug killed Turkish soldier in north. Turkish FM Hakan Fidan 22 Aug visited capital Baghdad and Erbil, declaring “we will clear this virus [PKK] from Iraq together”.

Shiite parties formed separate lists for forthcoming provincial elections. Ahead of provincial polls set for 18 Dec, party registration 14 Aug closed with 303 registered parties and 37 coalitions. Shiite Coordination Framework parties decided to compete separately through multiple lists, including former PM Nuri al-Maliki’s State of Law coalition and Hadi al-Ameri’s Fateh alliance comprising many Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF)-affiliated groups; scattered coalition reflects parties’ competing local interests, particularly in south. While Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s movement continued boycott of formal politics, it could back independents.

ISIS continued attacks as govt discussed role of U.S. forces. ISIS 7 Aug attacked PMF position in Salah al-Din governorate, killing one. Clashes between French/Iraqi forces and ISIS cell 28 Aug killed French soldier in Salah al-Din. UN experts 14 Aug warned that ISIS still commands 5,000-7,000 members in Iraq and Syria. Defence Minister Thabit Muhammad al-Abbasi 7 Aug met U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin in U.S. capital Washington to discuss defence partnership beyond defeat of ISIS; continued presence of around 2,500 U.S. troops is recurring issue of contention, particularly for pro-Iran parties that constitute governing coalition and in wake of reports that U.S. forces recently bolstered presence at Ain-al-Asad airbase.

In another important development. Iran 28 Aug said it agreed with Iraq that “armed separatists and terrorist groups” in Kurdistan would be disarmed before 19 Sept.

Govt pursued normalisation process with Iran and cracked down on freedom of expression at home.

Iranian-Saudi rapprochement made progress as normalisation with Syria stalled. Iranian FM Hossein Amir-Abdollahian 17 Aug met Saudi counterpart in capital Riyadh, describing relations “on the right track”; Amir-Abdollahian next day met Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) in highest-level talks since March reconciliation. Reports during month indicated Saudi Arabia delayed opening of embassy in Syria, which was reportedly planned for June. Amid talk of U.S. efforts to secure normalisation deal with Israel, Saudi Arabia 12 Aug named its ambassador to Jordan, Nayef al-Sudairi, non-resident envoy to Palestine. Riyadh 5-6 Aug hosted Ukraine “peace summit”. BRICS 24 Aug invited Saudi Arabia alongside other nations, including Iran, United Arab Emirates and Egypt, to join bloc.

Govt continued domestic crackdown. Amid series of arrests of social media personalities, authorities early Aug arrested public health expert and social media influencer, Mohammed Al Hajji, before releasing him on 15 Aug; arrests point to authorities’ attempt to stifle perceived criticism of govt policies. Human Rights Watch 21 Aug alleged Saudi border guards conducted “widespread and systematic” killings of hundreds of Ethiopian migrants between March 2022 and June 2023.

Oman sought to advance peace talks as Huthis threatened escalation and clashed heavily with separatists in south, while armed raid on Aden’s presidential palace revealed deep govt divisions.

Omani delegation visited capital Sanaa in hope of fostering talks. Amid growing resentment among civil servants over stalled salary payments, Huthi leader Abdul Malek al-Huthi 11 Aug threatened escalation against Saudi-led coalition if talks do not make progress. After last visit in April, Omani delegation 17 Aug arrived in Sanaa to meet Huthi leadership and discuss latest developments in talks; while Huthis want humanitarian file and salaries addressed first, Omanis suggested addressing salary payments and concurrently establishing principles. Meanwhile, UN special envoy Hans Grundberg 8-9 Aug met Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) members and Saudi officials and 15 Aug met Omani and Huthi officials. In briefing to UN Security Council, Grundberg 16 Aug highlighted dire economic situation and intermittent fighting on Taiz, Marib, Dhale, Hodeida, Shebwa and Saada front lines.

In south, Huthis and Southern Transitional Council (STC) clashed amid spate of militant attacks. Huthis attempted to seize control of strategic military sites in Al Hadd Yafea, northeast of Lahj governorate, triggering clashes with STC on 26 Aug that killed eight STC fighters with unknown Huthi causalities. Meanwhile in Abyan governorate, suspected al-Qaeda attack 1 Aug killed at least five STC-affiliated troops in Wadi Omran; similar assault 10 Aug killed six fighters, including senior STC commander, in Mudiyah district. Unknown gunmen 15 Aug assassinated govt officer in Taiz city investigating last month’s killing of UN official.

Southern militia raided presidential palace. Giants Brigades, southern salafi group aligned with United Arab Emirates (UAE), 13 Aug stormed presidential palace in Aden, besieging PM Maeen Abdulmalik Saeed’s residence for several hours following his return from Riyadh in attempt to pressure Saeed to agree to financial benefits for associates of salafi commander Abu Zara’ah al-Mahrami; raid underscored divisions within PLC, likely stemming from tensions between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.

In other important developments. Saudi Arabia 1 Aug announced $1.2bn economic aid for PLC. UN 11 Aug removed over 1m barrels of oil from decaying FSO Safer to avert ecological disaster.

Israeli forces and settler attacks killed over a dozen Palestinians, as settler violence reached highest levels ever recorded and govt expanded settlement funding.

Israeli raids, settler violence and Palestinian gunmen roiled West Bank and Israel. Israeli military forces and settlers killed at least 18 Palestinians in Aug, while Palestinian attacks killed five Israelis. UN 4 Aug recorded 39% annual increase in settler attacks in first six months of 2023, highest since it began gathering data in 2006, while UN envoy 21 Aug said Palestinian casualties in 2023 have already surpassed 2022 figures, marking highest toll since 2005. Notably, Palestinian 1 Aug shot and injured six Israelis before being killed in Maale Adumim settlement. Israeli settlers 4 Aug killed Palestinian in Burqa village and 6 Aug killed Palestinian near Ramallah; Palestinian hours later killed Israeli security guard before being shot dead in Tel Aviv. Israeli forces 6 Aug killed three Palestinians near Jenin. Suspected Palestinian gunmen 19 Aug killed two Israelis in Huwara village. In rare clash, Palestinian security forces 30 Aug killed Palestinian in Tulkarem refugee camp.

Israel accelerated settlement building, Palestinian prisoners began hunger strike. Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich 15 Aug announced plans to allocate $180mn to West Bank settlements after freezing funds to Palestinian communities in Israel and East Jerusalem; Arab local councils 21 Aug held strike in protest and Smotrich 28 Aug said he would unblock funds. Meanwhile, Palestinian administrative detainees in Israeli prisons early Aug began open-ended hunger strike in protest of detention without charge or trial; issue could provoke retaliation if any prisoner dies. Hundreds of Arab citizens of Israel 23 Aug voiced anger at govt’s failure to curb wave of criminal violence.

In other important developments. Amid legitimacy crisis facing Palestinian Authority (PA), PA President Abbas 10 Aug fired 12 governors in West Bank and Gaza in apparent attempt to reclaim public confidence. Tens of thousands of Israelis 17-19 Aug continued protesting govt’s judicial overhaul in Tel Aviv. Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant 8 Aug threatened to “return Lebanon to the Stone Age (see Lebanon). Suspected Israeli airstrikes struck Syrian capital Damascus.

Algiers posed as mediator in Niger crisis amid fears of greater instability along shared border; BRICS bloc of emerging economies dealt a blow to Algeria’s membership bid.

Algiers offered to mediate Niger crisis. Tebboune 5 Aug said Algeria was “ready to help” resolve crisis in Niger following late-July coup against elected President Bazoum; Algiers, which favours diplomatic path to ensure return to constitutional order, has intermediate position between West African regional bloc ECOWAS’ threat of military intervention, and Burkina Faso and Mali’s support for military coup leaders. FM Ahmed Attaf 23 Aug started tour of three ECOWAS member states – Nigeria, Benin and Ghana – to hold consultations on Niger crisis, and 29 Aug proposed six-month transitional plan to restore “constitutional and democratic order”; Niger coup leader Gen. Abderrahmane Tchiani 19 Aug had called for three-year transition.

Repression of dissent continued. Constantine court 29 Aug sentenced Algerian-Canadian researcher for NGO Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, Raouf Farrah, and Algerian journalist Mustapha Bendjama, to two years in prison for allegedly publishing classified information; their lawyers same day filed appeal.

In other important developments. BRICS bloc of emerging economies 24 Aug invited six countries to join alliance, not including Algeria; move deals a blow to President Tebboune who in recent months had engaged in advocacy drive to advance Algiers’ candidacy. Meanwhile, Ahmed Attaf 9 Aug met with U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken in U.S. capital, Washington DC, to discuss situations in Niger, Ukraine and Western Sahara; visit also focused on reinforcing bilateral ties.

Govt continued to shy away from fulfilling International Monetary Fund loan conditions, and President Sisi received timid recommendations from national dialogue.

Implementation of IMF reform program remained suspended. Govt continued to prioritise boosting country’s foreign currency liquidity over implementing politically-sensitive structural reforms negotiated with International Monetary Fund. Notably, in effort to boost foreign currency inflow, govt 14 Aug announced measures targeted at Egyptians abroad, including U.S. dollar pension plan and $5,000 fee to avoid military draft. Authorities 18 Aug extended acting Central Bank governor Hassan Abdalla’s term by another year, providing further sign of continuity in current approach.

National dialogue submitted conclusions. National Dialogue Board of Trustees mid-Aug submitted recommendations on number of topics to President Sisi; proposals however fall short of addressing pressing issues including plight of political detainees and exercise of political rights.

Tensions persisted with U.S. over human rights record, stance on Ukraine war. In joint letter, group of U.S. lawmakers 10 Aug urged President Biden’s administration to withhold $300mn conditional to human rights record out of annual $1.3bn in military assistance to Egypt, citing continuous repression of journalists, opposition officials and civil society activists; U.S. administration expected to release decision before 30 Sept. Meanwhile, U.S.-based daily newspaper The Wall Street Journal 11 Aug published article detailing Egypt’s reluctance to meet U.S. request to provide weapons to Ukraine, highlighting Cairo’s still warm relations with Moscow.

In other important developments. BRICS bloc of emerging economies 24 Aug invited Egypt and five other countries to join alliance. Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan 27-28 Aug held direct talks on Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) for first time in two years; talks ended without breakthrough (see Nile Waters).

In apparent policy shift, UN envoy for Libya called for unified govt before elections take place; rival militias engaged in deadly clashes in Tripoli, revealing precarious security outlook in capital.

Amid political gridlock, UN urged unified govt for elections. Tripoli-based consultative body, High State Council (HSC), 6 Aug elected Mohamed Takala as new leader, unseating incumbent Khaled Mishri, with unclear consequences on HSC’s support for eastern-based House of Representatives (HoR)’s plan to appoint interim govt as part of roadmap to general elections. HoR 8 Aug discussed draft election laws agreed upon in June by UN-backed “6+6” joint committee (composed of HoR and HSC representatives) and referred comments back to committee. Meanwhile, UN envoy for Libya Abdoulaye Bathily 22 Aug told UN Security Council agreement on unified govt is “imperative” to lead country to elections; statement appears as reversal of UN longstanding position that elections should be held ahead of govt unification.

Central Bank announced reunification after decade-long division. Central Bank Governor Sadiq al-Kabir 20 Aug said Central Bank of Libya reinstated as unified institution almost ten years after splitting into two rival branches; it is still unclear, however, whether procedures required to make unification operational have been activated.

Fighting between rival Tripoli militias left dozens dead. Members of Special Deterrence Force (alias Rada militia) 14 Aug detained commander of 444 Brigade, Mahmud Hamza, at Mitiga airport in capital Tripoli. In response, members of 444 Brigade opened fire at Rada militiamen, leading to intense fighting with heavy artillery around Mitiga airport and elsewhere in Tripoli that continued into 15 Aug; UN reported at least 55 people killed and over 100 injured. Fighting, which in following days subsided as Hamza was released, took place amid turf war between Rada militia and 444 Brigade commanders (both allied to Tripoli-based PM Dabaiba) for control of Tripoli International Airport upon its reopening.

In other important developments. Eastern strongman Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army 25 Aug launched airstrikes against Chadian rebel positions on Libyan side of border with Chad (see Chad). Dabaiba 28 Aug suspended FM Najla Mangoush after protests previous day erupted in several cities over Mangoush’s meeting with Israeli counterpart.

Grain and bread shortages turned into crisis, and govt reached agreement with Libya to share responsibility for rescuing migrants expelled by Tunis to border zones.

Bread shortages turned into crisis. Govt 1 Aug issued decree banning privately-owned bakeries – employing around 20,000 people across country – from purchasing subsidised flour, blaming country’s grain and bread shortages on their selling of bread at higher price than govt-subsidised baguette. Move prompted most privately-owned bakeries to close doors, while around 200 bakery owners 7 Aug protested in front of trade ministry in Tunis. Trade ministry 19 Aug cancelled decree and agreed to restore subsidised flour supply to private bakeries.

President Saïed dismissed PM, showing continued rejection of IMF program. Saïed 1 Aug sacked PM Najla Bouden and appointed little-known former central bank executive Ahmed Hachani as replacement; move indicates Saïed’s continuous rejection of International Monetary Fund loan terms, including economic reform program that Bouden had tried to advance.

Tunisia and Libya agreed to rescue migrants stranded along border. UN Sec Gen António Guterres 1 Aug called on Tunis to stop expelling migrants into desert border areas and demanded “urgent relocation of those stranded along the border to safe locations”. Interior Minister Kamel Fekih 2 Aug conceded authorities have pushed back “small groups” of sub-Saharan migrants trying to enter Tunisia into desert no man’s land, but labelled claims of collective deportations and mistreatment of migrants as “false allegations”. Libyan authorities 8 Aug reported death of at least 27 sub-Saharan migrants in Tunisia-Libya border zone. Tunis and Tripoli next day reached agreement to share responsibility for providing shelter to at least 300 migrants stranded in shared border zone. Meanwhile, EU-Tunisia migration control deal faced pushback. In confidential note leaked early Aug, German Federal Foreign Office argued Germany and other EU member states were not properly consulted before EU Commission and Tunisia mid-July signed migration deal.

Polisario Front independence movement leader attended summit of BRICS bloc of emerging economies in South Africa.

Amid tense relations between South Africa and Morocco, president of self-proclaimed Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic and Polisario Front independence movement leader, Brahim Ghali, 22-24 Aug attended summit of BRICS bloc of emerging economies in South African city of Johannesburg. Earlier in month, Morocco’s state news agency MAP 19 Aug denied South Africa’s FM Anil Sooklal’s claim that Morocco was among countries seeking to join BRICS, said Morocco would not send delegation to BRICS summit in South Africa.