Venezuela is in the midst of a tense political standoff and socio-economic meltdown, with hyperinflation, violent crime, political repression and food shortages pushing nearly six million citizens to flee the country. Incumbent President Nicolás Maduro has grabbed power for the executive and dismantled democratic checks and balances, triggering moves backed by the U.S. and allies to unseat him and install an interim president. A negotiated restoration of legitimate and representative state institutions as well as urgent economic reform are vital if the country is to resolve the political crisis peacefully and reduce mass emigration. Crisis Group aims to engage national, Latin American and international players to build momentum for talks, strengthen human rights protections and help restore the rule of law.
Venezuelans will cast ballots on 28 July. Polls indicate that a credible election would see the opposition prevail in the economically stricken South American country. Crisis Group spoke with chavistas to gauge how they respond to the possibility of losing power.
Tensions mounted in run-up to July presidential poll as Maduro govt, unwilling to relinquish power, continued to manipulate electoral conditions; outright fraud remains possible.
Opposition candidate’s wide lead in polls raised concerns about govt response. As July presidential poll drew closer, most credible polling organisations gave opposition coalition Unitary Platform’s candidate Edmundo González large lead over President Maduro. Delphos pollster Félix Seijas 4 June cautioned that his surveys show Maduro with “ceiling” of around 30% of vote (20 points behind González), meaning govt’s focus will likely be on discouraging opposition voter participation in order to win. This may require drastic steps, such as ban of Unitary Platform’s ticket and/or González’ candidacy, which would likely throw opposition into disarray. Manipulation of electoral conditions means most likely outcome of poll is victory for Maduro who, along with seven other candidates, 20 June signed agreement to respect results; González refused. In this event, protests are likely following announcement of results, though govt previously vowed to respond harshly, which could shrink their size.
Authorities reduced external election observation. Atop these risks, electoral authorities’ (CNE) late-May cancellation of EU electoral observation mission further indicated govt will prioritise winning poll over recovering international recognition and sanctions relief; opposition-linked CNE member Juan Carlos Delpino 11 June said council president made decision unilaterally, likely on instructions of National Assembly president Jorge Rodríguez; Delpino added that CNE had not met since March. NGO Carter Center and UN 19, 25 June confirmed they will send small observation teams to monitor voting. Deputy FM for Latin America Rander Peña 18 June said govt had invited BRICS+ bloc, including China and Russia, to observe election and confirmed Caracas’ intention to soon join bloc.
Crackdown on opposition figures persisted. Banned opposition candidate María Corina Machado 17 June accused govt of “criminalising the electoral route”, saying 37 opposition activists had been arrested in 2024, four of them in previous week. González same day said govt was creating a “hostile atmosphere” for election, while civil society leaders continued to spotlight security forces’ routine targeting of activists.
The [Venezuelan] opposition has a massive opportunity [in the upcoming elections] to make it clear Maduro isn’t wanted.
El Gobierno de Maduro [en Venezuela] tiene un interés en dar algunas concesiones desde el punto de vista político y electoral.
[Venezuelan President Maduro] can use repression and fraud to stay in power. But I think he would far rather win a relatively clean election.
This week on Hold Your Fire! Richard is joined by Crisis Group’s Venezuela expert Phil Gunson to discuss Venezuela’s presidential elections and its government’s claim to an oil rich region in neighbouring Guyana.
Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro is tilting the July presidential election in his favour, in violation of the 2023 Barbados accord. While Maduro should face consequences, the U.S. should take a calibrated approach to the reimposition of sanctions.
This edition includes entries on Cameroon, South Sudan, Venezuela and Western Sahara, offering a snapshot into emergent conflicts and crises in the next three to six months in a clear, accessible format, identifying triggers, key dates to watch and potential behaviour of conflict actors, to support global conflict prevention efforts.
Venezuela’s government and opposition have reached an agreement laying the groundwork for a competitive presidential election in 2024. It could be a breakthrough in efforts to resolve the country’s political and socio-economic crisis. The accord is untested, however, and obstacles may lie ahead.
With key polls approaching, negotiations to resolve Venezuela’s political crisis are stuck. To avoid prolonging the country’s malaise, the government, the opposition and foreign powers should converge behind a plan involving sanctions relief and matching steps by Caracas toward fairer votes and better-functioning state institutions.
Venezuela’s international isolation is easing, though its political crisis remains unresolved. In this excerpt from the Watch List 2022 – Autumn Update, Crisis Group explains what the EU and its member states can do to pave the way for progress in negotiations between government and opposition.
Crisis Group experts talk in this Twitter Space about what can be done to better protect Venezuelan migrants fleeing to Colombia from exploitation by criminal armed groups. The discussion was hosted by Bram Ebus, consultant for Latin America, Mariano de Alba, our senior advocacy advisor for Latin America and Glaeldys González, Giustra fellow for Latin America.
In recent years, Venezuelans have streamed into Colombia looking for work and respite from their country’s socio-economic meltdown. But dangers also await them, including the clutches of organised crime. Bogotá’s change of government is a chance to reset policy to keep the migrants safer.
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